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. 'i^lJ^i:^^^ 



THE 



ARMY AND NAVY 



MAGAZINE. 



VOLUME VI. 



(May to October 1883.) 



. . \^N I. 



[ iTTJOVr.d 




'• . •••O'.'i^^ 



LONDON : 

W. H. ALLEN & CO., 13, WATERLOO PLACE, S.W. 

1888. 



LOKPOX : 
PUINTKD BY W. H. ALLKN AND CO., l.'i WAT£ULo(> I'l.Af K. 



INDEX TO VOL. VI. 



AroHAK Gamp»igQ, The, of 187S~80. By Major M. J. Ku)([-Hi>riDaD, 
B.S.C 66, ua 

BiiTUi-nEiiDS ol GermMiy. B; Colonel G. B. JUuUesoii, C.S.I. :— 

L — ^Breitenfeld 2H3 

U. — The Lech and Nuremberg S81I 

ni.— LBtwn JUii 

Obdu, tba Nwkl Strength ot By Lieutenant Hon. Henry H. Shore, R.N. 21li 

DBBomnxB Spirit, A 6H 

PmwI C*aipi A Few Pacts [rom the. By Henry Haymau, D.D. . . 307 

Fuxca Colouial Afiiireasiou. By George C. V. Holmes . . . 3-2.J, i'll 



r tu 



HiiTKE, Lord, the Father of the British Ttavy. By George C. Y. Holmes . IIH 
Health to Old Eniiland.— A Kew National Song. By Captain Clurke- 
Keimedy, F.B.G.S., *e. 5311 

icta durins the Bevolt. liy H. G. Kiinic, CMO, . . 34, 97, 
1P3, a37, JSl, 5lM 
India under King Baboo. By Major-Generol H. W. H. Coie . .261 
iDddentE in Soutliem Indiu during the Mutiny Years 19o7->*5B. By 
Captain Ralph N. Taylor, late Madraa Staff Corps 5511 

LiBCTEKjkKTH ot the Navy, FoKition of, HtatistiuoUy treated. By Lieutenant 

C- Bleeman, R.N. I 

'tdeutoiiaota of thu Navy, Ktnpbyment of, as Pikymn»ter>t> By Retired 

[ X'leatctuuit 0. Sleeman, B.N 4 IM 

»• Eyes. By H. E. K (i;i 

■tti BiflcB. By Lieiitemuit- Colonel Charlan Ford .41 
u Eclogue, A. ByH.G. K ■•«; 

ftrx Ealimates, Tile, (or 1883-1884. By Mark Fytton .... 2Tli 

■ Own Notth-WeM, By C. F. Gordon Gumming 2311 

IT Oia and Xew Bystema. Bjr C. J. Btoue, late Both Bepmenl . . S5) 



IV INDEX. 



Pre-eminknce ill War. By Major F. W. Graham 171, r)()7 

Ranjit Singh's Death and itH Consequences. By General Court . (>4 

Roy, Major-General William, F.R.S. By H. M. C 1(50 

Recruiting Question, The Moral of the. By J. H. Lawrence- Archer . 357 

Red Men and White. By Miss C. F. Gordon-Gumming . . . 4')H 
Royal Marines and our Coast Fortresses. By Lieutenant-Colonel A. 

Pariiell, late R.E .501 

Royal Naval College, The, considered in Relation to the Higher Educa- 
tion of Naval Officers. By a Volunteer Student 538 

Reviews and Notes 94, 1(K), 2M(), 4H3 

Shoht Remarks on Short Service. By a General Officer .74 

Sweden, The National Defences of. By Carl Siewers . .110 

Seaforth Highlanders, The. By W. E. Milliken 207 

Song of the Rifle Brigade. By Captain Clark Kennedy, F.R.G.S., &q. 45('» 

Two Loves. By H. E. K 170 

War Premiums on Life Policies. By Spencer C. Thomson . 152 



THE ARMY AND NAVY 
MAGAZINE. 



C^e ^(jsitiait of t\t ItEuteti^tiits of tliE llaiiii 
statisticallji trcaffb. 

By LmuTEKANT G. Sleeiun, B.N. 



The present seems an exceedingly fit and proper time for dis- 
eoBsing the case of lieutenants of the navy, as the question of 

the improvement of the position of naval eseeutive officers, more 
especially in regard to their pay, has lately been publicly 
brought forward by Lord Belmore in the Upper House, and 
has, besides, been the constant theme of the Semce papers for 
some time past. 

Id the following pages, I propose to treat this important 
subject more comprehensively and in greater detail than has 
hitherto been attempted, by calling in the aid of statiatica, and 
further, by so doing, avoid falhng into the far too common 
error of generaUsing on such matters, and thereby I look forward 
to securing a fair and impartial hearing. 

Then I shall also strive to steer clear of being charged with a 
tiegire to revolutionise the existing state of things— a charge 
which may so frequently and justly be laid against the majority 
of writers and speakers when dealing with reform, whatsoever 
be its nature. 

It was stated only a short time since that " if the whole of 
the officers now on the lieutenant's hst were by some cause 
to be suddenly swept away, their places would be filled with the 
greatest ease in some thirty years of peace, if no war inter- 
vened, by men willing to serve under the same conditions as 
Uist in the present age." 

ibly this may be, in the main, a correct assertion, though 
Iteke leave to doubt it: but this question, in my opinion. 



2 The Position of the Lieutenants of the Navy. 

demands to be carefully and honestly considered from a far 
loftier standpoint. 

Are our naval lieutenants remunerated and treated in accord- 
ance with the grave responsibilities of their position, and as 
becomes the ** back-bone " of a navy which we claim to rank as 
the most efficient and most powerful of all the navies of the 
world ? 

In considering only the wants of the lieutenants, I do not for 
one moment intend to claim that this particular branch of 
naval officers alone needs improving ; and no doubt one of the 
principal causes which have deterred successive Boards of the 
Admiralty from advocating their special claims, may have been 
the supi)Osition that by so doing they would have been sprmging 
the mine of a general cry for reform throughout the Service. 

At the same time, there would seem to be no single one of 
the other executive branches in which any agitation for reform 
has been evinced, or in which any need for such is readily 
apparent ; and, further, the lieutenants far exceed in number 
those comprised in either of the remaining executive branches, 
which is made very apparent from the following table ; — 

Number of Admirals on the list . . 06 

„ Captains ,, . . 178 

„ Commanders ,, . . 223 

Sub-Lieutenants on the list . 190 



9> 



Midshi2)men «, . 823 



Total ... 980 
Number of Lieutenants on the list . . 884 



Diflference. . . 146 



That is to say, the lieutenants alone afford 45*9 per cent, of 
the aggregate total (1,814) of executive officers of our navy. 

In the following pages I shall endeavour to show that the 
particular branch of naval executive officers under discussion 
have certain solid and reasonable grievances which it is needful 
and proper, for the honour of the country and benefit of the 
naval service generally, as well as for the individual good of 
those officers, should be rectified at the earliest opportunity. 

I prefer to deal with this question entirely on its own merits^ 
without in any way seeking to deduce from the past argumente 
in support of the cause — ^the whole conditions of service in the 
navy having so materially changed during the last thirty years ; 
and, fortheri I do not believe tibat systems which may seem fit 



Tlie Position of the Lieutenants of the Navy. 8 

and proper in foreign navies can be applied in ours, where the 
<^aract^ of the men is so materially different. 

Before proceeding further, let us see what is the precise 
position of the lieutenants' list, according to the official Navy List 
for January of this year. This is shown in the following table : — 

Number of Lieutenants employed . . . 697 

unemployed 
Gunnery Lieutenants employed 

unemployed 
Torpedo „ employed 



99 >> 

99 

>» >> >> 

>> _ 

„ „ „ unemployed 

„ Navigating „ employed 

99 9» 99 



137 
64 
7 
15 

95 
25 
28 
48 

105 
12 



unemployed 
Lieutenants on surveying duties 
„ „ Commanding 

„ First Lieutenants . 
„ Flag „ ... 

Thus it is seen that the per-centage of the unemployed 
lieutenants to the total number (834) on the Ust, is only 16*4. 
Bearing this fact in mind, and glancing over the foregoing 
statement, it may not appear to the casual reader that a very 
lamentable picture of neglect is presented; but I would ask 
him to suspend his verdict until he has analysed the statistical 
diagnosis of the case of lieutenants which is offered him in 
these pages. 

For the purpose of comprehensively treating my subject in 
detail, I have divided the different functions, the sum total of 
which constitutes the actual position of a lieutenant, into six 
sections, as follows : — 

Section I. — Employment. 
„ IL — Promotion. 
„ III. — ^Education. 
„ • rV. — ^Bank. 
„ v.— Pay. 
„ VI. — ^Eetirement. 

In this category the various functions are not placed in regard 
to any order of merit, but merely arranged in the manner most 
smtable to my purpose. 

Section I. — ^Employment. 

The numerical strength of the lieutenants must be such 
that the requisite number of officers of that rank are at all times 

1 ♦ 



4 The PosHion of the Lieutenants of the Navy, 

forthcoming for service during peace time, and also tbtit it 
permits of a certain small proportion being from time to time 
unemployed, either by reason of their being on leave, or placed 
on half-pay due to ill-heath, or other causes. At the same time 
the percentage of unemployed lieutenants compared with those 
on active service, must be kept as low as is consistent with the 
requirements of the service, and with the power of enabling the 
Admiralty to meet a sudden extra demand for such officers as 
would occur on the outbreak of a war. 

Of course, in the event of a naval war, all the executive 
branches, from the captains downwards, would have to he con- 
siderably strengthened numerically, by the ro-appoiutment ot 
retired oificera, the unemployed lieutenants on the Active List 
only aETording an immediate and partial supply. 

The determination as to the number and composition of the 
lieutenants required for each class of ship in commission, that 
is to say, the seniority of the lieutenant-commanders of the 
" firsts," and various other matters, is a most important and 
an exceedingly delicate task if strict justice is to be dealt out to 
all alike. At present the system adopted by the Admiralty, if 
system there be, certainly appears somewhat defective, as is 
evidenced by the statistics adduced in support of this plea. 
The figures brought forward iu this paper are obtained, where 
not otherwise spccitied, from the January Navy List of this year 
(1883). 

The total number of oflicers on the Lieutenants* List is eight 
hundred and thirly-foitr, of which 835 per cent., or nix hundred 
and ninety-seven, are actively employed, includinfi the tliirti/- 
eiyht lieutenants perfonning coastguard duties; that is to say, 
there is one lieutenant on the list for every fifty-three seamen, 
and one lieutenant actwaUy employed for each sixty-three seamen 
voted. 

The following tabular statement affords a comparison of this 
nature to be drawn for ebch fifth year during the last tweoty 
years : — 

IBGS. 1B68. ISTS. 187a. 1B8B. 

Number of Li«uteiiMiti on tha liit (1) . 807 778 6S1 SOS BU 

„ «nplo]r«d(:^ . 6DT 670 468 645 697 

SeunMiTOted . 19,007 46,189 41,77S 41,262 48,890 

, for SMh Uantsunt (1) COT U-4 60-4 68-8 BS4 

.. „ „ „ (S) 89- 79-1 91-3 efi-S 6M 

From the above table it is seen that the Dumber of lientenuitB 
have floctoated considerably, there being a difterence of owe 



The Position of the Lieutenants of the Navy. 5 

hundred and forty-three between the highest number for this 
year (1833) and the lowest number in the year 1873. It will be 
further observed that there is an excess as well for this year in 
the number of lieutenants on active service over the corresponding 
numbers for the other years. 

Taking the years 1863, 1878, and 1883, the per-centages of 
the lieutenants employed as compared with those on the list, 
are respectively 73*9 per cent., 83*2 per cent., and 83*6 per 
cent., while for these same times the per-centages of ** unem- 
ployed *' to " employed " are 36*1 per cent., 24.5 per cent., and 
19*6 per cent, respectively. 

The foregoing comparisons may be taken as exceedingly 
favourable for the lieutenants of 1883, as they convincingly 
prove that, though the actual niunber of those officers on the 
Active List is greater than has been the case in each fifth 
year for the last twenty years, yet the chances of active 
service have considerably increased, and therefore a hitherto 
common source of grievance of this branch of the executive 
line, namely, the enforced length of time on half-pay, can no 
longer be urged. 

When we consider the lieutenants who are on full-pay 
leave, and those obliged to remain on half-pay owing to ill- 
health, both of whom go to swell the total of the unemployed, it 
must be conceded that the number of these (unemployed) 
officers, only 16*4 per cent, of the lieutenants on the list, is as 
small as can reasonably be expected. 

The first point to be dealt with is the consideration of the 
numbers of lieutenants appointed to the different classes of 
ships in our navy, which niunbers will be foimd to vary 
considerably in the vessels comprised in each class. 

Of course, some of the larger ships are enabled to accom- 
modate a greater proportion of lieutenants than others of the 
same class, due to the difference in their size and interior con- 
struction, which may possibly account for the diversity which 
exists in this respect in vessels of the same class, though I am 
inclined to believe that this variety is due to the absence of any 
fixed system of appointments at the Admiralty. 

From the Navy List for January 1883 I gather that there are 
nineteen first-class ships in commission, which carry five 
lieutenants and over ; of these two (flag ships) have each nine, 
two of them eight each, five ships carry seven, eight of them carry 
six, and two of these vessels have^re lieutenants. 

The following statement affords a comparison between the 



The Position of the Lieutenants of the Navy. 



number of lieutenants and the tonnage of the ships, the flag- 
lieutenants in this case not being counted : — 

Tonnage per each Lioatenant. 

I486- 



Ships with eight lieutenants 



Ships with seven lieutenants 



Ships with six lieutenants 






Ships with Jive lieutenants 



1336-2 
1227-5 
1186-2 

1540- 
1327-1 
1310- 
1151-6 

1781-6 
1386-6 
1271-6 
10016 
1001-6 

621-6 

1708- 

1526- 

1202- 

974- 

828- 



Thus it is noticed that the number of the lieutenants of a ship 
does not accord with the tonnage of the vessel, that is to say, is 
not in proportion to her size. 

I would suggest that to each of the first-class ships, by which 
is meant the ''battle-ships" and flag-ships on foreign stations* 
there should be appointed, as part complement, seven lieutenants, 
including a " first," a gunnery, and a torpedo oflicer, thus 
leaving four lieutenants for performing the ordinary duties of 
the ship, such as watch-keeping at sea, and as officers of the 
day in harbour, &c. 

As nearly every one of our battle-ships is armed with the 
Whitehead, Spar, and other torpedoes, and as they all carry 
one or two second-class torpedo-boats, a torpedo lieutenant is 
indispensable ; the gunnery officer has as much work as he can 
carry out in a manner satisfactory to himself and to the service, 
in attending to his training and other gunnery duties, without 
increasing his burden by adding to them the work of a torpedo 
officer as well. 

Flag officers are not included in the seven lieutenants I 
oonsider should form part complement of all the larger vessela. 

The actual number of lieutenants now serving in these nineteen 
first-claBS ships, including flag and Bupemnmeraiy lieutenantB, 



The Position of the Lieutenants of the Navy. 7 

is one hundred and twenty-seven. The supernumeraries include 
those officers who are serving their year at sea, which is necessary 
before they are eligible for gunnery or torpedo officers. In this 
scheme the number of lieutenants, including ** flags," but not 
supernumeraries, would amount to one hundred and thirty-nine 
for these nineteen ships. The lieutenants serving their one year 
at sea, for gunnery and torpedo officers, would have to be 
appointed to those vessels which can afford accommodation for 
more than the seven regular lieutenants, a matter which could 
be easily arranged. 

Besides these large vessels, there are two other ships, both on 
special surveying service, which carry six lieutenants, and one of 
these is commanded by a lieutenant. 

Next comes the corvette class, which carry from Jive to three 
lieutenants as part complement. 

There are fifteen such vessels, comprising nine with 14 guns, 
four with 12 guns, one with 6, and one with 4 guns, each of them 
being commanded by a post captain. I notice that of these ships 
three of them — of 14, 12, and 8 guns respectively — are unprovided 
with a gunnery officer, and that three of the larger corvettes have 
their ** firsts " and gunnery lieutenants combined ; both of these 
facts are, in my opinion, grave errors. 

As these ships carry no commanders, it seems inconceivable 
that the multifarious duties which must necessarily devolve on 
the commanding officers of even corvettes, can be efficiently per- 
formed by officers who also have in addition to carry out the 
onerous and responsible duties of gunnery officers ; one or other, 
it would seem, must be to some extent sacrificed. In stating 
this, I do not for one moment wish to reflect on the capabilities 
of those officers who are at present employed in this difficult 
position. 

Then, again, in the event of the small-arm men being landed 
for actual service, either the proper officer (gunnery lieutenant) to 
be landed with this body of men cannot be employed, or else the 
ship is denuded at one and the same time of her commanding 
and gunnery officer. Therefore, it would be more advisable that 
the larger corvettes of 14 and 12 guns be provided with a first, 
gunnery, and at least three other lieutenants, making in all a 
total of five officers of that rank ; and the smaller vessels of 
that class, with 8 and 6 guns, should have four lieutenants 
appointed to them, including a first and a gunnery officer. 

Except under special circumstances, I hold that neither first, 
gunnery, or torpedo lieutenant should bo called upon to keep 



8 The Position of the Lieutenants of the Navy. 

watch at sea (in harbour never), but in common with the other 
lieutenants they should attend from time to time when fleet 
evolutions are being performed. 

I now propose to deal with the question of the seniority of 
the lieutenant-commanders and first lieutenants. The seniori- 
ties refer in each case to the date of appointment. 

I find that there are forty-eight lieutenants commanding 
different classes of small craft; this number comprises those 
in conunand of 10 special vessels, 25 gunboats, 6 brigs, and 
7 schooners. 

In the special class I note that the seniority of the lieutenants 
commanding ranges from fourteen years to seven years, the 
former being the seniority of the lieutenant in charge of a 
drill ship for the Koyal Naval Reserve, and the latter of the 
officer (lieutenant) commanding the VesuiiuSf torpedo vessel. 
Two of this special class are ships carrying out surveying work, 
the seniority of their lieutenants in command being respectively 
12f years and 12^^^ years. 

It seems rather an anomaly that of three similar despatch 
vessels, the Lively, Helicon, and Vigilant, the former should be 
commanded by a commander of over 9 years' seniority, and the 
latter two by lieutenants of 11^ years and 8i years respectively. 
As the work these vessels have to perform is very similar, 
then the reason why so great a difference should exist in the 
rank and seniority of their respective commanders demands 
some explanation; for either the Helicon's lieutenant-commander 
is too junior, or the Lively s commander far too senior for such 
an appointment. 

Proceeding with the consideration of the seniority of the 
lieutenants commanding gunboats, I find that the senior one 
has 15 years', and the junior one 4 years' seniority, of whom the 
former is in command of a gunboat in the Mediterranean, 
and the latter of a tender; at the same time I notice that 
the junior of these two officers is stated in the Navy List as 
being only in temporary charge. Treating that as a special 
case, the next junior in seniority is the lieutenant-commander 
of the VemivivM^ of 7 years standing. 

This vessel being also a tender, I pass on at once to the 
Cygnet, which has as her captain a lieutenant of only nine years' 
standing; whilst in two other gunboats, also in the Mediter- 
ranean, the lieutenants in command have each a Beniority of 
fifteen years, which is another ouriouB anomaly. 

On the China station there are at present foor gonbofttB 



Tlie Position of the Lieutenants of the Navy, 9 

ftmimanded b; lientenanta whose average seniority is 9ff jeare 
—the maximum being i2j*s years, and minimum &f^ years. 

In the Mediterranean there are also four gunboats so com- 
Buuded, the average seniority of the lieutenants being 12,V 
j^ears — maiimam 15 years, minimum 9 years. 

On the North American station there are three gunboats, 
trerage seniority of the lieutenants in command being 11^ 
je&ra — ^maximum 11-^j years, minimum 9i years. 

On the Cape of Good Hope station there are also fonnd 
Uiree gnnboats, the average seniority of the lieutenants in 
eommand being 10| years — maximum 11} years, minimum 
9{ years. 

Thus, it is evident that there exists a great lack of uniformity 
u regards the seniority of lieutenants appointed to the command 
of gnnboats, &c. The following table enables this statement to 
be more easily verified. 

Seniority ot Usot. Commanden. 





Yr.. 


Mo. 


Mai. MiD. 
Yra. Mo.Yrs.Mo. 


flpauA] cUsfi of vessels 


. 11 


7 


13 11 7 


hnden to harbour ships . 


. 9 


4 


14 3 4 


QuboKto on the Cbuia station . 


. 9 


11 


12 5 8 10 


„ „ Mediterranean station 


. 12 


7 


15 9 


„ „ North American station 


. 11 


3 


12 5 9 6 



M It Cape of Good Hope station 10 8 11 9 9 9 

Nest, I will consider the seniority of the lieutenants in command 
of schooners. Seven of these vessels are now in commission, 
the seniority of whose lieutenant-commanders averages Sy'j 
years — the maximum being 10^^ years, the minimum being 5| 
years. Here, again, I notice as an anomaly, that five years' 
difference exists between the seniority of two officers of similar 
mnk in command of vessels of the same class and employed on 
the same work. 

Of the six brigs in commission for trainin^j the boys of the 

navy, the average seniority of their lieutenant-commanders is 

ft^ years — the maximum being 12 years, whilst the minimum is 

7t years ; showing too great a difference in the standing as 

limtcnants of the senior and junior officers in command, 

This closes the case of lieutenant-commanders ; and the 

I lesson afforded by a careful review of the foregoing facts ia, that 

f ia many instances too wide a latitude has been allowed in their 

k tppointmvnt, as regards their seniority. I would suggest that 

^^a^.aFJjiautft»aul to be aligible for the command of any of the 



J 






10 The Position of the Lieutenants of the Nai-y. 

gunboats and despatch vessels employed on foreipjn stations, 
or for particular service on the home station, he should have ten 
years' seniority in that rank, of which six should be sea time, 
and should also be carefully selected. It must be remembered 
that such officers may have to act in positions where a consider- 
able amount of diplomacy and tact on their part may be needed 
to prevent serious consequences occurring. And, besides, they 
may often be forced to act on their own responsibility, in 
asserting the authority and dignity of Great Britain ; this 
especially refers to the gunboats employed in China, as for the 
greater part of their time they represent, in isolated ports, the 
military power of England. The lieutenants appointed to the 
command of the schooners and brigs should have seirn and ci^ht 
years' seniority respectively in that rank, of which four and a 
half and five years respectively should be sea time. 

I will now proceed to discuss the appointment of the first 
lieutenants of different classes of ships in regard to their 
seniority. 

There are twenty large ships in commission on the different 
stations, and the average seniority of their "firsts" is 10-,\- 
years — the maximum being 13^, and the minimum 7^ years. 

The junior is the ** first "of the Boadicea, flag-ship on the 
Cape of Good Hope station ; whilst the senior is the " first " of 
the Audacious, fiag-shi}! on the China station. 

I notice, further, that the seniority of the ** first " of the 
Alexandra and Minotaur flag- ships respectively of the Mediter- 
ranean and Channel fleet is lOJ years for the former, and but 
9-j^ for the latter ; and in each of these cases there are eight 
lieutenants other than the ** firsts." 

Then, the ** firsts " of the Irin and Iron Duke are each senior, 
by over one year, to the " first " of the Inflexible, who counts 
only 8^ years time in that rank. It is hardly necessary to point 
out the difference which exists in regard to the comparative 
importance of these two appointments. 

It is curious to compare the seniority of the " firsts " of the 
four most important ironclads now in commission, as will be 
seen from the following table : — 





Seniority on appointment 




as first lieutenant. 




Yrs. Mo. 


H.M.S. Temeraire • 


. 13 2 


„ Sultan 


. 12 11 


ff Alexandra . 


. 10 9 


„ Inflexible 


8 10 



The Position of the Litutenants of the Navy. 1 1 

Proceeding with my diagnosis, I find that the two gunnery 
depot ships — Cambridge &ni Excellent — have " firsts " (gunnery 
lieutenants) with a seniority respectively of only 7^^ years and 
8^ years ; and in the fiagships at Fortstnouth, Plymouth, and 
Sbeemess, their "firsts" have a seniority of 7f, S^, and llf 
years respectively; and, besides that, the "first" of the 
EntyeUut flagship of the East Indian squadron has only 7 years 
standing in that rank. 

The following table gives the seniority of the " firsts " of the 
different sea-going flagships : — 

Teara. 

Flagship on the China station . . 13f 

North American station 12^ 

Mediterranean . „ ISf 

Channel Squadron „ 9-^ 

Pacific „ 9tV 

Australian ., 9^ 

Cape of Good Hope „ 7§ 

East Indian „ 7 

A ^anoe at the foregoing data affords another proof of the 
want of uniformity in the syatem adopted at the Admiralty for 
the appointment of firat-lieutenanta. The seniority of the 
" firsts " of all the first-claaa sea-going ships, including the 
flagships on foreign stations, I would suggest should be fixed at 
Iwtlve years, of which seven and a half years should be sea 
time. It must be borne in mind that, according to the atanding 
of the senior-lieutenant, ko is arranged the seniority of the 
other officers of that rank in each ship. 

Dealing next with the seniority of the "firsts" of the six 
luge troopships in commission, which include four of the 
Indian troopers, I note that their average seniority is \0\ years — 
the maximum being 16i, and the minimum 7^ years. 

Neither of these vessels carries a commander ; and, looking to 
tho peculiar work on which they are employed, it can hardly be 
iJlowed that great discretion is shown by the Admiralty n» 
ttjardt tkf. se-itiority oi the "firsts" appointed to these vessels, 

E would have the solo command — ui the event of anything 
>enuig to the captain— of a vessel carrying possibly over 
tho}ijia)id Bools. 
would fix the seniority of the first-lieutenants of these 
da at tweU-e years, of which they should be obliged to count 
fLjfiiajii aft sM time. 



>i5!i.i?W*<^ 



12 Th^ Position of the Lieutenants of the Navy. 

The following table sets forth the seniority of the ** Firsts " of 
the larger troop-ships : — 

Indian troop-ship . 



99 



>» 



>> 



99 



16J 


years. 


12i 




H 




H 




H 




n 





H.M.S. Himalaya . 
Indian troop-ship . 
H.M.S. Tamar 

Next to be considered is the state of the seniority of the first 
lieutenants of the different corvettes, of which fifteen vessels 
of that class are now in commission. All of them are com- 
manded by post-captains, but carry no commander. 

The seniority of the "firsts" of the nine larger corvettc^s 
(14 guns) averages 8 years, the maximum being 9^ years, the 
minimum 6f years ; while for four 12-gim corvettes the 
average seniority of their ** firsts" is 8^^ years — maximum 
lOi^ years, minimum 7 years; and for the remaining two 
corvettes of 8 and 6 guns each, their ** firsts " count respectively 
12 J years and 6 years' seniority. 

Here I observe that the seniority of the ** firsts " appointed 
to the smaller corvette of 8 guns exceeds by more than three 
yeB,T& the standing in that rank of the senior ** first " of the 
larger corvettes, and by nearly seven years that of the junior 
** first," which, as these latter vessels are far more important 
commands, ought not to be the case. 

The following table sets forth the comparison of the seniority 
of the ** firsts " of the corvettes : — 



Qans. 

14 
14 
14 
12 
12 
8 
6 



Tons. 

2,380 
1,970 
1,860 
2,120 
1,760 
1,420 
1,180 



9* 
12J 



9A 



Years. 

Si ^ 
-^ Z 

8| - 



8 
8 



7* 



6§ 
5| 



7 
6 



A glance at the above data snffices to make clear the absence 
of anything approaching a method in determining the seniority 
of the " firsts " of corvettes. I consider that the " firsts " <tf 
the corvettes of 14 and 12 guns, should have ten yean' 
seniority, of which they should be able to count tix years as 
sea time ; and for the smaller corvettes, nine years should be 



The Position of &e Lieutenants of the Navy. 18 

. the limit of standing in that rank of lieutenants appointed as 
(heir " firsts," of which Jive and a half years shonld be sea 
time. It must be remembered that, as these ships carry no 
commander, the " first " ma; at any moment be called on to 
take entire command, under circumstances requiring great 
experience and judgment. 

Lastly, there are twenty-seven sloops and gun-vessels, com- 
manded by commanders, where the " firsts " average in 
seniority 5f yeara, the senior being 8} years and the junior 1^ 
years. Of these officers, eleven are under six years' seniority 
(two of whom are under three years), ten of them between six 
vaA tuven years, and six officers are over seven years' standing 
S8 lieutenant. The minimum seniority of the "firsts " of this 
class of ships should be six years, of which three and a half 
years must be counted as sea time. 

Then summing up on what has been said in reference to the 
seniority of lieutenants appointed in command, and as " firsts" 
of different ships, and also in regard to the number of officers 
gf Qui rank appointed to each ship, I come to the following 



1. That lieatenant-commanders should have the following 
IMOtint of Beniority, according to the nature of the vessel 
Mdv tiieir command : — 

Ateruge Senioritj u Sm 



Age. 1 

^Hblboata and despatch vessels on foreign 
^^etationa, and particular service vessels SS 


Yoarn, 


. time. 

Tew*. 


10 


G 


Tenders to harbour ships , , .29 


6 


H 


Australian Bchooners . . . .30 


7 


4J 


Iraining brigs 31 


8 


5 


^KJi. That lieutenants appointed as "firsts " should be able to 


^nnt seniority according to the following scale, 


in order to be 


Hnible for such position : — 






Hl 


.« .Sob 


Aicragi, 


^^^^ 




Age. 


^H 


YOBM. 




^Birrt Ueotenants of first-class ships . 12 


7i 


85 


^^L troopships 12 


8 


35 


^^^^H^ „ large corvettes 10 


6 


33 


^^^^^K „ small 


44 


31 1 


^^^^K^^^ sloops. 


3* 


29 ; 



*-HiSi''?**^ 



14 Tlie Position of the Lientetiantu of the Navn. 

The composition of the Lieutenants' List for certain specified 
periods x)f seniority is shown in the following table : — 

10 ycnrB' 8 to 11 7 to 10 (J to 9 
seniority years years years 

and over, inclusive, inclusive, inclusive. 

Gunnery-lieutenants employed 32 36 10 42 

,, ,, unemployed 4 3 4 2 

Torpedo „ employed 4 5 9 9 

•Coastguard „ ... 38 6 2 — 

Lieutenants for navigating duties 4 6 8 12 

Ditto unemployed ... — — 1 4 

Ordinary Heutenants employed 130 143 230 238 

„ unemployed 39 30 28 21 
Total number of lieutenants 

employed . . . .204 195 289 301 
Total number of lieutenants 

unemployed. ... 43 33 33 27 

According to the seniority of the ** first " of a ship, so will 
the corresponding seniority of the other lieutenants be governed ; 
for example, take the case of the Alexandra, flag-ship of the 
Mediterranean fleet, in which five lieutenants, exclusive of the 
"flag," are borne as part complement. These five average in 
seniority only (i^\ years, the senior being 10 J J years, and junior 
only } I year : then adding the three supernumerary lieutenants, 
the average is reduced to 4i'2 years, and it can hardly be denied 
that both of these averages for a ship like the Alexandra is far 
too small. 

By adopting the plan of only appointing ** firsts " to this 
•class of ship of twelve years' seniority, and allowing a descending 
scale of seniority for each of the other six lieutenants of 1^ 
years, the average then would be 7i years, with a maximum of 
12 years, and a minimum of 3 years. 

3. That the different classes of ships should carry a number 
of lieutenants according to the following scale : — 

** Firsts" Gunnery. Torpedo. Ordinmry. ToUL 

Eirst-class ships (sea-going) 1114 7 

Troop- ships ... 1 - - 4 5 

Corvettes .... 1 1 - 8 6 

Sloops .... 1 - - 2 8 

Where the accommodation of a ship does not afford cabins 
for her proper complement of lientenanta. then the number of 
her ordinary lieutenants must be reduced, and their work 
performed by the sub-lieutenants. 



The Position of the Lieutenants of the Navy. 15 

Only in the larger class of vessels where a commander is 
carried should the first lieutenant be also a gunnery ofiicer, in 
which case the second lieutenant would have to perform the 
ship work of the " first," leaving that officer to carry out his 
special gunnery duties. At the same time, it seems a mistake 
to make such an appointment as " first "aud "gunnery," as 
the duties of the two positions must clash ; and, besides, I con- 
tend that the special officers, such as the gunnery and torpedo 
lieutenants, should be considered as apedal officers, and not as 
ordinary lieutenants with special duties. As before stated, on 
QO account should the " first," where he is also commanding 
offic^'r, be appointed for gunnery and torpedo duties. 

The following tables show the comparative state of the 
Lieutenants' List for January 1882 and 1883 : — 

Tan joars' senioritj 

1882. less. 

Lieutenants on Coastguard duty . . 27 84 

„ „ (gunnery) 5 4 

^B There are no lieuteoants employed on coastguard duties of 

^^iftder ten years' seniority. It appears to be rather a waste of 

*■ good material to employ officera who Imve undergone the special 

gunnery examinations for coastguard work, except under 

exceptional circumstances. 

I A. B. 

1882, t8H3. iaS3. 1883. 

Gunnery lieutenants employed . 28 22 50 46 

„ unemployed .33 14 

A. Ten yean' sonioritj and ovor. 

B. DndeT ton yearn' seniority. 
ises. 1883. 

' Lieotenante qualifying for gunnery (lutaea . 11 18 

[ From the above it is seen that the number of gunnery lieu- 

jits for January 1882 exceede<I those for January 1883 by 

at the same time the number qualifying for gunnery 

I for the latter year exceeds those of the former year by 

I same number. 

t The small per-centage {8"9 per ctrnt.) of gunnery officers 

(Spared with the total number of Ueutenants, does not afford 

i sufficient number of specially qualified officers for gunnery 

tliitjea, when the increasing importance of naval gunnery is 



16 The Position of the Lieutenants of the Navy. 

ships of war, which exists at the present time, and also of the 
component parts of those armaments. 





A. 


B. 




1882. 1883. 


1882. 1883. 


Torpedo lieutenants employed 


. 3 1 


10 14 


„ „ unemployed 


. 


2 

1882. 1883. 


Lieutenants qualifying for torpedo 


duties . 


13 13 



Here, again, is to be noticed a paucity of lieutenants specially 
trained in the manipulation of torpedoes, and also that the 
number of such officers is not increased for this year. 

The smalhiess of the per-centage (1*7 per cent.) of the torpedo 
lieutenants, as compared with the total number of officers of 
that rank, calls for the same remarks afore-mentioned in con- 
sidering the case of the gunnery lieutenants. I would suggest 
that each of these special classes of lieutenants be increased 
respectively 1*6 per cent, and 1*3 per cent., which would give a 
total of 87 gunnery and 26 torpedo officers, in the place of 71 
and 15 officers now on the list especially qualified for those 
duties. These numbers will necessarily have to be still further 
augmented as the strength of our navy in "battle-ships" is 

increased. 

A. B. 

1882. 1883. 1882. 1888. 

Lieutenants qualified for navigating duties 

employed 4 4 83 91 

Lieutenants qualified for navigating duties 

unemployed 26 2& 

The number of lieutenants qualified for navigating duties will 
be gradually increased as the navigating-lieutcnants proper 
become absorbed ; and for this purpose the Admiralty are 
authorised to raise the number of lieutenants on the list to a 
total of 1,000. 

The officers of the rank of lieutenant, qualified as naval 
surveyors of different classes, number respectively 26 and 28 for 
the years 1882 and 1883. 

This branch of a naval officer's work is a most important and 
a never-ceasing one ; and, therefore, looking to the special natnre 
of the duties to be performed by lieutenant-surveyors, differing 
so entirely from the ordinary duties of officers of that rank, it 
would seem advisable to keep their numbers at the lowest limit 
consistent with the sufficient and regular supply of such specially 
qualified officers, as they would probably have to be retained in 
the Burveying-line throoghout the remainder of their career. 



The Position of the Lieutenants of the Navtj. 17 



Section II. — Promotion. 

Ill this section the question of the promotion of lieutenants 
will be dealt with. 
The latest Admiralty circular on this subject states : — 

Tiifit tn'^nfy-ftre Hciitonants iiiiiy J»o |»riiini)te(l to tho rank of commaiuler carb 
\«':ir. without ii'LTunl lo the iiuiiihor «if vacaii'-ioH. ju*i>vi<UMl that tho iiuiiiluT on tho 
f iiimanrlcrs' list iluos not oxi't-oil twn hundivd and Iwonty-tlvo; furthrr if hujIi 
• n-anoios cxi'immI twenty- Jivo. thon. jn-ovidod the odniniantlors' list is koj)t uj) at two 
'.U'ulroJ, th«7 excess to he carried over in the folio win;jf year. 

Fur tho vear 1882, I find that fortv-two names have heen 
ivmoved from the list of lieutenants, due to a variety of causes 
•)ther than pronn>ti()n, tluii addinj:: to this number the annual 
twenty-live jiromotions, there is obtained as an average a fraction 
under twelvi' and a half vt.'ars' service for each lieutenant before 
In-in^T promoted, provided the foregoing iigiu'es are maintained ; 
und also only a number of suh-lieutenants are promoti'd, e([\ii- 
valent to tlie deduction made on the lieutenants' list. Of course 
the aforesaid avrrage would only be correct if the reduction of 
the list by in-omotion and other causes be effected from the 
head. 

The number of lieutenants i)romoted to the rank of commander 
for 1882 was forty; tlu» excess of Jifteni over the orthodox 
nnmber being due to tlie late Egyi^tian campaign, in wliich the 
Navy played so important a part. 

The following table sets forth certain data in reference to these 
forty promotions : — 

Average seniority of the total (40) promotions 

Maximiim ,, ^ 

Minimnm „ „ 

Average senioritv of the onliniirv ('21) promotions . 

&Iaximam \. ' ,. 

Average Beniority of the special war promotions (19) 
yaTinmin „ n 



II II 

Afn5^g ihe^itj^ promotions are included : — 

9 lieutenant-commanders. 
14 first lieutenants. 
6 " firsts " and " gunnery." 
. ' 1 gunnery-lieutenant. 

Wr-'^ 1 " torpedo " and " first." 



12.', 


years. 


i<;,' 




8/., 




Vl-'., 




IGJ 




n 




IH 




15i 




8 A 





2 



18 Tlie Position of the Lieutenants of the Navy. 

1 torpedo-lieutenant. 
1 lieutenant-surveyor. 
1 yacht promotion. 
1 flag-lieutenant. 

The following is a general statement of the services as 
lieutenant of five of the commanders made in 1882 : — 



yy 



99 



99 



1G| years. 
1 year. 
12 years. 

o 
1 2 >» 

9 ^' 



2 



>> 



99 



99 



99 



(1) Seniority on promotion . 

Qualifying for gunnery-officer 

In first-class ship as gunnery-officer 

Eequalifying as 

In corvette as 

In first-class ship as " first " and " gunnery 

As lieutenant-commander 

Koyal Naval College 

As ** first " in troop-ship 

Sea-time as lieutenant about 

(2) Seniority on promotion . 
As ordinary lieutenant . 
As surveyor 

,, and lieutenant-commander 

In Hydrographic Department 
Indian Marine Survey . 
Sea-time as lieutenant . 

(3) Seniority on promotion . 
As ordinary lieutenant . 
Qualifying for gunnery officer 
On the gunnery staff of the Excellent 
As gunnery-officer of first-class ship 
On the gunnery sta£F of the Cambridge 
As ** first " and ** gunnery " of 
Sea-time as lieutenant, about 

(4) Seniority on promotion 

As ordinary lieutenant 
As "first" 

In Her Majesty's yacht 
Sea time about 
Time as sub-lieutenant 
Promoted to lieutenant for obtaining three first-class eec- 
tificates. Served in the Arctic Expedition 1876-6. 

(6) Seniority on promotion • • • . S^^yeaflk 

B.N. CoUege f 

As ordinary lieutenant • • • • 1^ 



1 ^ 

m 99 

12J years, 
I'a year. 
If years. 
1 year. 
4{J years. 
{^ year. 

10 years. 

U 
1 - 

1 year. 
21^2 years. 
1 7 

■•■l 2 99 

8iJ 

7i 

1 year. 
8f^ years. 
I year. 



99 



99 



99 



9> 



99 



99 



99 



ft 



Ths Position of the LietUenants of the Navy. 19 

Qualifying for gunnery officer . . . Ij years. 

Junior BtafF in C'ambrid0e . , . . 1 year. 

As gunnery lieutenant IJ years. 

Sea time about 6^ ,, 

Time as sub-lientenant .... 4 „ 

Specially promoted to lieutenant for gallant conduct, and to 
commander for services during the Egyptian campaign. 

With the exception of four cases which occurred amongst the 
promotions for service before the enem}', it is noticeable that 
there is only one instance of the seniority of the lieutenant 
promoted being under 10 years, and this was 9i years, for the 
Epecial promotion accorded to the " first " of the Excellent, 

I would offer the following suggestions in reference to the 
promotion of lieutenants : — 

1. That for a lieutenant to be eligible for promotion to com- 
mander, he should possess ten years' seniority, of which seven 
years slumkl In.' m-.l tiiin.', iiichnling lirtj years iis a watch- 
keeper ; for distinguished ser^'ifc before the enemy, eight years' 
eeoiority should be required, including two years as a watch- 
keeper. 

2. That all vacancies on the commanders' list should be filled 
np as soon as possible after they have been created, instead 
of the present system of waiting luitil several such vacancies 
oecnr, and then making a batch of promotions. 

3. That a special annual gunnery promotion be allowed, but 
Dot necessarDy confined to the "first" of Excellent or Cmn- 
hridge, provided that the officer selected has shown special 
gunnery qualifications and fulfils the conditions included in the 
fiist saggestion. 

4. That a special bi-annual torpedo promotion be allowed, 
under the same conditions as the special gunnery promotion. 

5. That the special promotions, which include the gunnery, 
torpedo, survejing, and yacht promotions, he not considered as 
a portion of the twenty-five ordinary anuual promotions, if the 
nnmber of commanders on the list does not, by these additions, 
exceed 225. 

I woald also suggest that a maximum limit of seniority be 
fixed, which should preclude the promotion of lieutenants escept j 
(or tiotno specially meritorious conduct. For instance, taking j 
sxtocu years as this limit, then I think that if during that period \ 
of HOfvice as lieutenant an officer has failetl for some cause or | 
Jbebuia for promotion, it ia better tb»t ha ^ot 



20 The Position of the Lieutenants of tJte Navy. 

not be allowed to suffer any longer from that most unpleasant 
malady of "hope deferred," but know, that except for some 
very special conduct he muet become resigned at once to the 
inevitable. 

There were tireiit!/-KJj- lieutenants on tlie list, in tho January 
Navy List of this year, of sixteen years' seniority and over, of 
whom twenty were employed, inchidiug eighteen of the total 
number of tliirty-eight on coastguard duty. 

For the position of " firsts" in the larger troopships, there 
would seem to be no reason why these senior, not to be pro- 
moted, lieutpnants should not be employed. This question is 
further dealt with in the section treating of the retirement of 
lieutenants. 

Broadly speaking, there seems to be no great cause for 
grumbling in regard to the promotion of lieutenants*, exei-pting 
that which we believe to be a mistaken notion, nnmely, the 
Admiralty system of halrh instead of imDieiUutr iiuliriiltinl pro- 
motion. Patronage to some extent must and will always exist, 
and rightly so, wluTever advancement by selection is the system 
adopted, but the Admiralty cannot be charged witli the umhe 
use of patronage in regard to the promotion of the forty 
lieutenants during 1882, 

Section III, — Education. 

Tlic present system of requiring tho lieutenants, other than 
the special classes studying at the College at Greenwich, to 
devote a ctmniilrrablf jKirtion of tlieir time to chasing the wily a-, 
as the study of mathematics is playfully termed, does not seem 
to be a good one, or at all necessary ; neither is it successful in 
attracting as many of the unemployed lieutenants to study 

* Since writing tbix. Ilii' pronioliaD of a rortnin lisutcDimt to tho rank of 
CDmniBndPr lins Imcn mnde, ivhicli decidedly doss nppeur most injudicioiu, and doM 
o(F(>r a RaoHi' for ftrnmbling on tiio part of hin brother officers. 
Tlio lerriccN of tbix ofGucr uro as fellows :— 

Seniority as Uentenont on promotion ... 4 yaan. 

An ordinary lieutenant in a flrat-clnnii roaeiTe ahip . J year. 

A* flaK-lientensnt .... . . 8| jean. 

Sea timn aboot 8f^ „ 

A* lulj-lientsnant 1^ <• 

Tbe whole of hin Rsrrice M sab-Iieatenant and flag lientsnant has bean pntonwl 
in tlio Sag-kbip of tbe Mediterrnnoui sqwulron, and It ii extrenxely donbtfnl U be 
has erar kept witch ■■ a Uontemuit at aea, or daring aqnadron aralntian*. Booh • 
pramotiou ai this ia nothing leai than a uindal. If the offioer li doieiTuig of iptatol 
pTonntloii, thro vnder the eirenautuioei of hU oaner ha ihonld hmve tots <nt 
Mnt to lea lor at leait two jean at ■ irateli-ktaper. 



The Position of tite Lieutenants of the Nanj. 21 

there as on<{lit to be the case, and wliich is one of the principal 
objects of tlie college. For instance, in January 18HS, tliere 
were only cujht lieutenants other than those qiiiJifying for 
gunnery or torpedo duties, studying at the college, 

Tlit're are majiy subjects, to a study of which a lieutenant 
might, with henefit to the service and to himself, dc\oto the full 
term of nine months. 

For instance, naval tactics, foreign languages, the practice of 
courts-martial, naval history, international law, chemistry, 
naval architecture, physics, navigation, steam, &c. &c. 

It is surely better, in the interests of the service, that a lieu- 
tenant, during liis college course, should become a fair linguist, 
or well informed on the subject of international law ; or, liy 
devoting the chief portion of his time to the study of naval 
architwturf, gain some real practical knowledge of the construc- 
tion of men-of-war ; or. further, should become a fair naval 
engineer : than that be should have been forced to give the 
greater portion of his time there to the study of mutiiematics, 
which, I venture to think, seven-tenths of the heutenauts thus 
nowilliiigly kept to the mathematical grinding-stone never lind 
of the loast possible value to them in the i«-rformance of their 
Aities, and the study of which it is almost impossible to kc-ep up 
on board ship, and which is, besides, very easily forgotten ; whilst 
a subject which a lieutenant has voluntarily taken up at college, 
and for which he will probably develop a taste, if it requires 
only careful reading, can and will be continued throughout his 
areer. 

Farther, looking to the average age and the position of the 
flfficers studying at the college, the system in vogue at the 
Oxford and Cambridge Universities would seem more suitable 
ind correct flian the school system of fixed and regidar study 
hoars, prevalent at our Naval College ; and it is difticult to 
conceive what are the objections against this plan, entertained 
liy the Admiralty. 

Then, in the case of lieutenants quaUfying as gunnery and 
toipedo officers, my opinion is strongly in favour of mora 
praetiee and leas theory. 
L By tl'ifi is meant, that, in the interests of tlie service in every 
r Tay, it would he far more sensible to entirely abolish the college 
I. theoretical course for the majority of the gunnery lieutenants, 
■excepting a special few, who, starting with a good knowledge of 
■luathematics, which must be proved at an entrance examination, 
EMj^reDaj^ to devote t^eir time to the soieutific study of nanJ 



•22 The J'osition of the Lieuteiiants of the Xary. 

gunnery, with a view of becoming attached to and forming tlie 
()nliiauc« Department of tlio Admii-alty, that on an extended 
ficalc must be sooner or later formed for tlie piiqjoae of eon- - 
trolling tlic eonstruction of tbe naval ordnance, and also for 
determiiiiiig tbe aimaiuent of oui- Hliips. 

ThuH, tbe nine uiontltR spent at tbe college by theso upeiial 
gunnery ollieers would not be txiieuded in being i-niiinnal witb a 
kjiowledgc of bigber mathematics while yet ignorant of the 
rudiments of tbe same. 

In evidence of thin charge of "tramming." I will mention 
the fiict that when qualifying for gunnery lieutenant (in 1875-C) 
at the lioyal Naval College at Greenwich, a ratbei' stiff paix;r was 
set in the linal examination, on the Differential and tbe Integi-iil 
Calculus, the former of which had only Ix'en studied by us three 
or fom- months, and the latter only a few weeks before the 
examination. 

It is needless to comment on the farce of such a proceeding. 

I dare to say that ninety per cent, of the ofl'icers who have 
qnalificd for gminerj- lieutenants Tiavo never found tbe least use 
for the mathematics pumped into them during their niiif months 
at the Boyal Naval College, 

What I vvoidd propose is this : that lieutenants desiring to 
become ordinary gunnery officers — that is, not caring to go in 
for the special class — should devote the nine months now wasted 
at college to a more extended iiracticul study of gunnery, 
including a course of field fortification and of torpedoes, and 
also be thoroughly initiated in the manipulation of all and 
every portion of war material which they are likely to be at 
any time called on to use. 

Furthi r, as it should be considered part of a gmmeiy lieu- 
tenant's duty to forward re[x>rts on all foreign war material that 
he may be afforded an opportunity of examining, he should be 
initiated into the mysteries of weapons of wai- used by other 
nations, and be taught to evince some interest in gimnery and 
torpedo matters outside the Service. 

Examining into the nature of a gunnery lieutenant's work, it 
will be found that it is entirely and essentially of a practieal 
nature, and of a kind in which tbe wily x does not in any fonn 
intrude its ugly head : the armament of a ship is decided on, 
and is mounted in her before the gunnery or any other lieatenant 
is appointed ; and thus the actual vork falling on the gnnneiy 
officer is tbe drawing of gunnery stores, tbe detailing of the 
gune' crewB, Eimall-arm men, Ac. ice., and the training of thfl 



Tlie Position of the Lieutenants of the Navy. "23 

officers auil ui(;n in all iDaUcirt appiTttiiiiiiig to the use of 
tilt yuns, rifles, &e. unually fiupi)lie(l to a man-ot'-war, and 
■ fiirtliiT filling up the various returns, and oucasionally the 
forwarding of a report which lias been called for on the working 
of !k)nie new arm, i-c, Jn vessclH fitted with torjieiloes, where 
uo torjHdi) officer is carried, the gminery lieutenant has also to 
proi'ieed ill a similar manner with the torpedo deiiartinent. 

It is hardly necessary to pouit out that the work fulling on 
the s-houliliTs of a gunnery licntiiiiant of any sliii), ospeeially the 
lately- cm struct I'd ones, is of uo mean ainonnt, and of great 
resi)on^ii)iIity, and that he is well worth sonie extra con- 
t^tderation. 

The special class of gininery Heuteiiaiits — for whieli there 
should be, siiy.yin: ^-acanciea every year to he competed for — 
should, in addition to their theoretical college coiuse, be attached 
to the Woolwich Arsenal for a period of at least xix mouths, for 
tbe purjiose of obtaining some practical knowledge of the 
eonstruction of guns, and all material appertaining thereto, 
and further have, of course, to pass a practical course in the 
ExcrUent ; but this latter part would not be so important to these 
tpteial officers as for the jmicdVif/ or ordmary gunnery lieu- 
tenants. These gunnery specialists should, also, not be required 
to pass any torpedo course. 

What is hoped to be achieved by the foi-mation of a special 
elfiGS of gunnery lieutenants, is the gradual control of naval 
trmaments by naval officers, who, by a tboroug)) seieutiiio nnd 
practical training, arc rendered capable of undertaking such 
an important matter. 

These apecial gunnery officers should continue to he employed, 
after promotion, by the Ordnance Department, and on ordnance 
oommitieea, &c. It is an unfortunate fact that when serving on 
a mixed committee, naval officers usually allow their ox)inions 
and decisionB to he overruled by the supposed more scientiiic 
membera of the sister Service. 

This special class of gunnery lieutenants should be obliged to 
bftTe one year's sea time before being eligible to compete, and 
ihonld, after their course, be obliged to put in two years' sea 
tipiiBfa eaeh^ e years of seniority in that rank. 

|to say that such a scheme as hero proposed must 
ifit of the Benice in the long run, aud, further, 
s to be more carefully worked out in detail than 
itiuu beCQ possible to attempt in the scope of this paper. 

The lieutenants irho have obtained a first class in the short 



24 The Position of the Lieutenants of the Xavy. 

torpedo and gunnery eoiu'fie in the Vernon and Excellent^ an- 
now to be appointed to ships not carrying a gunnery or torpedo 
Heutenant for the performance of those duties, and will be granted 
one shilling per diem extra pay when so employed ; but it 
seems that the scheme I propose of making the lieutenants 
qualifying as gunnery officers, other than the five special ones, 
pass through a severe and complete practical course, and bo 
increased in their number, is infinitely more suitable, for the 
short gunnery course does not seem sufficient training to make 
an efficient gunnery lieutenant. 

What has l)een said in regard to gimnery lieutenants applies 
in a great measure to the lieutenants qualifying as torpedo 
officers. Here I would have two lieutenants ajmiaUji trained in 
the theoretical as well as the i)raetical part of torpedo warfare, 
while the other toq^edo officers are to devote the whole of their 
time under training to the practice of toq^edo warfare. More 
practice and less theory is also here nee<le<l for the majority of 
torpedo lieutenants, as the manipulation of toii)edoes is entirely 
and essentially a matter of continued i)ractice, whicli results in 
begetting the necessaiy familiarity needed for manipulating this 
modern branch of naval warfare with perfect safety and 
certainty. 

I trust, some — not far distant — day, to see the whole of the 
submarine defence of our coasts in the hands of naval officers, 
as it most cerfahily ought to be. 

Special instruction should be given to all officers, who may be 
called ui>on to take charge of torpedo boats, in the management 
of their engines, so that in the event of the single engineer 
officer being killed or wounded, the officer in command should 
be capable of taking his place. 

In my opinion it is a mistake, and is quite unnecessary, to 
include in the torpedo department engineer officers ; for torpedo 
lieutenants should sm'ely be able to take charge of the toipedo 
mechanism they have to manipulate, witli the assistance of 
practical mechanics, and the old saying that " too many cooks 
spoil the broth " is exceedingly applicable here. 

I would further venture to suggest that there should be a 
Professorship of Naval Tactics at the College, held by an officer 
of the Executive line ; and that also the education of gunnery 
and other lieutenants at the College in the art of field fortifi* 
cation, and in the management of naval brigadesi should bfr 
entrusted to a qualified commander or lieutenant. 

Of the twenty-six lieutenants who have passed as mterprat0n» 



The Posilion of the JAeutenants of the Nacij. 25 

it is noticeable that only fiee of them have qualified in French, 
stud '>/(> each in Gt-nuan and Spanish, the remainder being 
qualified to act as intei-preterji of Hindustani, Swabili, and 
Fijian. This is linrdly as it should be; for Burely French, 
(ifiinan, and Italian are the lingiiiKtic attainments the 
Admu-alty sluiuld ondeavom- more particularly to promote. 
There are professora for teaching French and (ieriuan at the 
lioynl Naval College, but none for impai"ting a knowledge of 
Hindustani, Swahali, &c., and yet, of the total- nunilier of 
lieutenant-interpreters, only tirmtii-thrtr pvr cent. ha\e passed 
in French and Gei-uian. 

Suction IV. — Rank. 

The time would seem to have arrived when some alteration 
most be inadt^ in the mnk of lieutenants, tenih'ng to benefit the 
service generally, and that class of executive othcers iu 
jiarticnlar. 

I would suggest that eveiy lientenant should, after serving 
tor twehe j-ears in that position, be raised to the rank of 
" lientenant-eommander," provided he shall bir able to count 
tight years sea time, and that he shall be then called, by 
conrteHy, " commander." in the same manner as a commander 
a now, by coui-tesy, called " captain." 

The preaent regulations entitle a lieutenant of eight years' 
Htanding to rank with a major in the army, Imt this does not 
Mem to he sufficient seniority for advancement to the new rank. 

Then this new rank would also be availaWe, as an inter- 
mediary step, for the advancement of junior-lieutenantB for 
meritorious conduct, provided they have /our yeai^s* seniority in 
that rank, of which two atul a half yeara should be sea time, and 
one year and a half as a watch-keeper. 

The object I have in view in proposing this, is to decrease the 
stagnation attached at iiresent to a lieutenant's career, which is 
10 detrimental to the Bervice in general, in promoting discontent 
aaumgst a body of executive officera nearly equalling, in point 
of nombers, the whole of the officers in the remaining executive 
huushes. 

The prefix (G. or T.) before a gunnery or torpedo lieutenant's 
•-, iu the Navy List, should be so aii'anged aa to show his 
olias — Gret and second, or special and ordinary. For instance : 
G*. might represent the special, or first-class, gunnery officers, 
and Uie plain G. thos<i of the ordinary, or second-class ; also 
"" ' T^ ^ ntefiJUig against the names of torpedo officers. 



26 llie Position of the Lieutenants of the Xavy. 

Further, such a prefix should be contmued before an officer's 
name in all his successive ranks. 

At in-esent, it is imi^ossible to discover in the Navy List 
whether a gunnery or torpedo lieutenant be a first or second- 
class man, or whether a captain or commander has held either 
of those positions, without exi^ending a deal of trouble in 
himting through back Navy Lists, &c. 

Section V. — Pay. 

Li attempting to solve this prol)lem, I feel that I am treading 
on dangerous ground, after tlw^. rather strong adverse opinion 
expressed by Lord Northbrook in tlie Ui^per House, a few weeks 
ago, in his position as Civil First Lord of the Admiralty, against 
an increase being made in the pay of lieutenants, or any other 
of the executive branches. 

But, tliough Lord Belmore's question failed to secure the 
approval of the Fii'st Lord of the Admiralty, probably because 
of its covia-ing rather too much ground, and thereby naturally 
alarming the Admiralty and Treasury, I am still of opinioii that 
the pay of lieutenants is not altogether adequate. 

I do not wish it for one moment to be unilerstood that the 
pay of lieutenants is such as to doom them, in the words of one 
of the leading Service papers, ** to a life of incredible privation, 
misery, and destitution," for such is a highly-exaggerated view 
of the case, and one not calculated to bring about any just 
consideration of their position. 

Without doubt a lieutenant, who has not taken upon himself 
the expenses and responsibilities of maiTied life, can live, by the 
exercise of ordinary self-denial, on his i)ay of ten shillings per 
diem ; but, to do so without incurring debts for his uniform, &c., 
is a more diificult matter ; but what I do say is, that a lieutenant 
of over ten and lifteen years' standing in that rank — that is, 
probably over thirty-three and thirtif-eii/ht yeai*8 of age rospec- 
tiveiy — should be paid at a higher rate than those just promoted^ 
of, on an average, tweutj'-three yeai*s of age. 

It must be remembered that numbers of the senior lieutenants 
are placed in positions of as great responsibility as aro com- 
manders, who are in receipt of nearly double their pay ; and 
the amount of the pay of any officer should in a great meaBure 
be dependent on the degree of responsibility of the position he 
may at any time be called on to occupy, an argument ^hich can 
hardly be gainsaid. 



The Position of the Lieutenants of the Kavij. 27 

The following table seta forth the present rate of payment for 
lieutenants : — 

Par Yoar. Por Day. 

£ «. d. B. d. 

The ordinary pay of a lieutenant . . 182 10 . 10 
Lieatenants in command of any sea- 
going vessel 2G9 3 9 . 14 9 

Lieutenants in command of any tender 

to a harbour-ship . . . . 240 7 6 . 13 6 
First Ueutenants of ships commanded 

by a captain, but without a commander 228 2 6 . 12 6 
First lieutenants of other vessels , . 209 7 (J . 11 6 
First-class gunnery lieutenants 24li 7 . 13 6 

Second „ „ „ . . 228 2 . 12 6- 

Third „ „ „ . . 209 7 G . 11 6 

Fu^t „ torpedo „ . . 24(3 7 (» . 18 6 

Second „ ,. „ . . 228 2 6 . 12 (i 

Lieatenants appointed for navigating 

duties 228 7 G . 12 6 

loeidenantB appointed for navigating 
^|dati6S, if over gvt.' yeai-s' seniority . 287 f> t*> > 13 & 
JHenteiiants appointed for navigating 

Eaotiea who passed for first-class shipH 255 . 14 
Lieutenants employed as transport 
agents, including allowance (or servant 285 18 4 . IS 8 
It must be noted here that the extra guuneiy, toi-pedo, and 
uarigating pay only commences on the day of an officer joining 
his ahip for the purpose of performing those duties, and ceases 
on the day he leaves his ship. 

From the above data it is seen that the greatest aggregate 
pay of any lieutenant that can be obtained is that of a tii'st- 
claflB gonuory or torpedo officer, who is also the senior 
lienteiiant of a captain's siiip, without commander, and 
alao performing either gunnery or torpedo duties, which 
omoonts to the respectable sum of 1:292 per aimum. There is 
iOfitAnce, at present, of any lieutenant holding this combined 

I would propose that the scale of lieutenant's pay should be 
Hiding one, as follows: — 

p.'!- IJiL-m. InyroBBo. 

Pivfl yc«r»' seniority and under . . lU . 

r fito years and under ten years . . 12 . 2 

r tell years and luider fifteen years . . 13 (i . 1 (i 

r fiftwa years 15 . I li 



28 The Position of the Lieutenants of the Xavy. 

The amount of seniority to entitle an officer to claim the 
increased rate of pay to include three years' sea-time for every 
five yc^ars of seniority. Thus, to entitle a lieutenant to receive 
the extra 2s., 3s. 6d., and 5s. per diem, he must have respec- 
tively three, six, and nine years' sea-time. 

Tlien, as it is part of my scheme that no lieutenant of less 
tlian ten years' seniority should be appointed as "first," it 
would aholish the 2s. (kl. and Is. Od. extra daily pay now granted 
to olHcers holding such a position, and also would do away with 
thr Is. p(.'r day at present allowed to lieutenants appointed m 
command of any vessel, as it is projiosed that officers holding 
tliat i)()sition should he of not less than six, eight, and ten years' 
seniority according to the importance of their command. 
Thus tli(j first lieutenant of a ship commanded by a captain, 
but not allowe<l a commander, would at present be entitled to 
t22H 2s. <»d., no matter what his seniority, whilst, according to 
my scale of i)ay, he would be receiving either £240 7s. 6d. or 
l*27li 1 5s. according to his seniority. 

The amount thus obtained by doing away with the extra pay 
of lieutenants, commanders, and ** firsts," would be an 
appre<riabl(? set off against the sum that would have to be added 
to the Naval Estimates for the i^roi)osed increase to lieutenants' 
pay. 

1 Ihid, according to the January Navy List of this year, the 
followhig data : — 

Employed. Unemployed. 

Lieut(niants of live years' seniority and under 246 . 53 
13. Lieutenants between five years and ten 

years 301 . 41 

C. Lic^utenants between ten years and fifteen 

years 120 . 32 

D. Lieutenants over fifteen years . . . 30 . 11 

Therefore, by the proposed new scale of pay, the aggregate 
amount of increase would be as follows : — 

£ B. d. 

Class B 10,986 10 

Class C 7,846 

Class D 2,737 



Total . . . £21,568 10 



The Position of the Lieutenants of the Navy. 29 

Then the pay of gunnery and torpedo lieutenants should be 
as follows : — 

Per Diem. 
8. d. 

The special class of gunnery and torpedo Ueutenants . 4 
The ordinary „ „ ,,.20 

The amount that would be obtained by doing away with the 
present extra pay of " firsts " and lieutenant-commanders 
(but not the command money), and by adopting the above 
proportionate payment of gunnery and torpedo oflScers, is 
upwards of i£4,635, so that the actual increase of the Estimates 
would be as follows : — 

£ 8. d. 

For increase of lieutenants' pay . 21,568 10 
Less 4,635 



Actual increase of Estimates . ^£16,983 10 

Which would mean only an increase of 0*15 per cent, of the 
actual cost of the Navy for 1883-4, and would only be 2*5 per 
cent, of the value of the old store-moneys and extra receipts 
for this year, which are now allowed to be appropriated in aid of 
the Votes. 

I come next to the question of the half-pay of lieutenants, 
which at present is arranged as follows : — 

A. Lieutenants under three years' service 

D, ,, ,, SIX ,, ,, 

C ,, ,y nme ,, ,, 

D. „ i> twelve „ „ 

E. „ above twelve „ „ 

The (A) class are allowed to coimt one year's service as sub- 
lieutenant ; the (B) class two years, and the other classes all 
their service as sub-Ueutenant. 

I propose to increase the scale of the lieutenant's half-pay as. 
follows : — 

8. 8. d. 

A class from 4 to 5 per day. 

B „ „ 5 to 6 

C „ „ 6 to 7 6 

•D „ „ 7 to 9 6 

E „ „ 8 to 11 6 



Per Diem. 


8. 


d. 


. 4 





. 5 





. 6 





. 7 





. 8 


6 



99 
99 



30 The Position oftlie Lieutemiiits of the Navy, 

Then, rowglily calculating, there arc : — 

In the A Class ... '24 lieutenants. 
„ 13 „ ... 19 
,, C „ . . . -24 

„ I> „ . . . ly 

„ E „ . . . 51 

This would give a total augmentation of the half-pay of lieu- 
tenants, aci-ordinj!! to the proposed scale, of £5,100 ITs. (id,, 
which, together with the amount retjuired for the increase of 
lieutenants' full-pay, would be t22,0S4 7s. f>d., which means a 
reduction of the extra sum of £825.758, now allowed to be 
appropriated for the Naval Estimates, of '2'ti per cent., or an 
increase of the estimates of 0'2 per et-nt., which certainly 
cannot he considered a serious increase when is remembered the 
benetit accruing to the service, by the imi)rovement of the 
position of a most deserving and most important body of naval 
executive ollicers. 

Though I advocate an increase of the half-pay of lieutenants, 
yet I entirely concur with Captain Hridges in his statement that 
the worst possible use you can put a naval ollicer to is to X'hice 
him on half-pay, but it is yuite impossible to expect that the 
whole of the lieutenants can he emiiloyed on active service : and 
therefore it must fall to some to bu placed on what is teimcd 
"half-pay," and their lot. I would suggest, ought to be made 
an easier one than it has liitherto been. 

There is jtt another point which calls for some notice, namely, 
the fact that oHiecrs appointed to ships for gunnery and torpedo 
duties are not allowed to receive the extra pay accorded them 
for siieh duties until the actual day on which they join the ship 
they have been appointed to, which may mean a delay of several 
weeks if that ship he on a foreign station. In the place of 
this, it would seem only right and proper that an officer who 
has elected to go through the hard vork of qualifying himself 
for either of those imsitions, should be aJlowed to count his extra 
pay from the date of his apxiointinent. 

The expenses of a lieutenant, in travelling from his place d 
residence to the port at which the vessel may he to which he ii 
appointed, should also be allowed him. It ia these small 
economies practised by the Admiralty which tend to diBcontent 
the lieutenEintB, and other naval officers bh well. 

It would also seem only jost and right that the half-pij df 
gojmery and torpedo lieTttenanta should be slightly im 



The Position of the Lieutenant n of the Navy. 31 

ne to recompense thorn to some extent for the liard work they 
hiive chosen to go through in qualifying themselvea for such 
{xt^ittons for the heiietit of the service. 

IScforc conchuliiig this section, I uiiist point out, even at the 
ri*k of repetition, the fact which seems to he eutircly ignored by 
thi- majority of writei-s and speakers on this part of my paper, 
ami this is that the cxccutivo line, from the- midshipman up- 
wardft. are linhle at all times to be placed in positions of sreat 
tniht and responsibiUty, not in the same degree shai-ed by 
any othir branch of naval offieers ; and this 1h the main argu- 
ment on which I b%se, and which shoiihl alwayti be the basis of, 
a I'laim for increasing the pay and improving the position of 
eSi^'utive officers. 

Oenernily «poaking, in the niercuntile world tlie remunera- 
tion of employes dejjenda, in a great measm-c, on the degree 
of responsihihty of the position ; hut the extent of this rc- 
epousiitility can never compare with that wliich may at any 
toie be thrust on the shoulders of officers of the executive 
line. 

Lord Northhrook, in his answer t^ Lord lielmorc, stated, as a 
eoneltisire reason for not advancing the pay of lieutenants, 
that since his connexion with the Admiralty in 1833, several 
privileges, in the shape of extra pay, haie bf^en granted to 
{hose officers, but it must be r<auembered that sueli have 
been only accorded for some «piriiil and i:rtrtt work which 
the Admiralty have called upon the Heutenants to perform, 
necessitating a eonaiderable amount of extra hard work on their 
put. 

We note that, though no increase in the pay of lieutenants 
■nn be considered for one moment, yet the pay of the Permanent 
Secretary to the Admiralty h^ been augmented this year, and 
thai the higher ranks of the Admiralty clerical staJT have also 
raeefred an access of pay. I do not mention this in a 
i spirit, for no doubt such increases are absolutely 
_ , but merely as a proof that the raising of pay in 
bis not objected to by the Admiralty, but only that 

i in partioalar. 

I it is considered how entirely dependent on her navy 

1 is for her safety, and for the high position she holds 

: the powers of the world, it seems scandalous that only 

leral strike oa the part of the fathers, against sending 

I into the navy, can lieatenants hope to gain what is 




32 T/« Positiojt of the Lkutenanis of the Xavij. 

Section VI. — Hetiiiejiekt. 

I do not propose to advocate iiiiy chaiipos in tlie present 
syattini of n^tirenient of lieiitciiaiitH, as there appears that sutli- 
fient, or rather, too much, iiuhicemcnt is held out to otiicers to 
retire- 
It Befins to be the object at the Admiralty to induce lieu- 
tenants to leave the serviee, rather than to serve afloat, whicli 
latter, I shoitld imagine, was the legitimate- purjNJSe, and also 
the ambition, of every olKeer of the executive branches. 

It might i)ossibly he better to secure the services of the senitir 
executive officers who now are forced to retire, by eiuptoying 
them in the place of paymastei's, and gradually abolishing that 
litie. 

This plan acts very well in the army, and there seems nty 
reason to doubt but that it would act na well in the na^y, and 
it would undoubtedly he the means of effecting a conniderablo 
saving to the estimates. One of the givat evils attendant on the 
naval sei-vice is the uiriety of the classes serving therein, and I 
See no absolute ntred for aught hut the executi^■e line, if the 
medical and marine branches a.r(^ excepted. IJut in stating tins, 
I fear I shall be accused of attempting to revolutioniM; the 
senice, and effect sweeping reforms, which, in the pivamble, I 
stated it would ho my endeaiour to steer clear of; therefore, 
it is not intended to do more than allude to these points, the 
details of which I may possibly work up at some other time. 

In Bumniiiig up, I claim that the appointment of lieutenants 
requires to be systematised and treated with some degi-ee of 
fairness and uniformity. 

Secondly, that the education of the ginmery anti torpedo 
lieutenants necessitates some changes ; aud tliat the system of 
stndy at the Eoyal Naval College might, with advantage, be 
made more alluring and suitable to officers of the rank and age 
of lieutenants. 

Thirdly, that an intermediary rank between lieutenants and 
commajiders might be granted. 

Fourtlily, that the full and half-pay of lieutenants might be . 
raised without any considerable or serious increase to the 



I also, further, foreshadow a scheme for expunging the enfiKoel 
retirement of lieutenants. 

In conolosiott, I shall constder that all the trouble thai haa 
been oecasicmed in pr^nring this paper, vill be mon than iwom- 



The Positioa of the Lieutenants of the Nav^. 33 

pensed, if only one single particle of the different proposals of 
improving the position of lieutenants of the navy, duly set forth 
in these pages, be accepted and carried out by those who it is 
understood, by their position, can have but one aim and object, 
whioh is the welfare of all classes of naval officers. 

The variety of the functions of a lieutenant's position which I 
have attempted to pourtray in the foregoing pages, and which, I 
have endeavoured to show, needs some adjustment and improve- 
ment, has prevented a very elaborate examination, the space at 
my disposal being limited ; bat I tmst some more able pen than 
mine may follow ap this subject more closely. 



|ii'tii;in JJisfritts banng tbc ^cbolt. 

By H. G. Kkkne, CLE. 



V. 
TiiK next (liBtrict. n(rc'or<ling to the map, is that of jVligarli, but 
the events there were not sufficiently grave to furnish mueh 
matter for a Bpecial narrative. The same may be said of the 
adjoining disti-ict of Muttra — or, Mathura, as now wTltten — ami 
tho magistrates of those two districts, Messrs. Bramiy and 
Thornliill, Iiave deseriLed their mutiny administration with such 
brevity and tack of litorarj' skill, as to render tlie events there 
less interesting, (;ven, than might otherwise be the case. Good 
men were there who did good deeds ; but tliey are in the same 
condition as the brave who lived their lives before Agamemnon. 
It will therefore be enough if we briefly consider Aligarb and 
Muttra in connection with Agra, to which they served as 
satellites. 

The district of Aligarh is named after an old fort about two 
miles north of the city of Koil. Originally built under the 
Mughal Government, this fort had been strengthened by the 
Mahrattas and their French officers ; but it was taken by Lake 
in 1803 by a brilliant coup-de-main, as described, under the 
chapter of Laswaii, in Colonel Malleson's Decisive Battlet of 
India, It was not occupied during the early part of the 
IVsbolIion, and need not further detain us here. About half- 
way between the town and the fort stands the " Station," a 
small collection of bungalows grouped about the public offices. 

At the time of the outbreak, several neighbouring estatSB 
were in the hands of British planters, amongst whom the 
most noticeable were Messrs. Paterson Saondere and Jobn 
O'Brien Tandy,* conains, and men of great spirit and influence. 

The force present in May coDsisted of 300 men of the 9th 
Native Infantry, commanded by Mqor Eld ; reinforoed (m tha 
neint of the Meerut outbreak by the right wing of the 1st Bagi- 



Iitdiaii Dixliidii during the Revolt. 35 

ment of Cavalry of tbe Gwalior Coutiiigeiit, under Captain 
Ali'saiuler, On tbt; u^oniiig of the 20tli the Infantry broke into 
mutiny, buriiwl the ofticoB, and carried off about thirty thousand 
pounds in specie, with whii:h they marched off to the insurgent 
iicad-(j[Uarters in Uelili, Tlic officers, civil and military-, wi-rt' 
allowed to depart to Jliithras, a town soutli of Ali^arli, on the road 
toA;;r;i. which tlieyreachwl in safety. Here they were joined by 
a pliinttr nameil Nichturleiii, and other refuReea, Mr. Nicliter- 
leius son haWng been killed on the way. On the 2Gth they 
were reinforced by a body of mounted Volunteers raised by Mr. 
Situnders, and commaiuleil by Mr. Wilherforeu Greathed, * of tlie 
Ben;^al Engineers, one of three brothers who took very distin- 
guished parts in the events that were i^oiuH on in the noigli- 
bourhooil. Other members of this little force were Messrs. 
Arthur Coeks,t C.S., J. O'B. Tandy, Harington, and Castle ; 
Eurtign OUivant (sinuo a promuient officer of the Pronucial 
Policej, and Ensign Mtu'sh. These gallant fellows, having 
performed the main object of their expedition — which was the 
relief of a factory — protieedcl to Abigaih, where they rcinstatc^d 
Mr. William Watson, the then magistrate (who afterwards died 
of cholera iu Agra Fort), aud remained there till the 2nd of July, 
when they were driven out by overwhelming invasions, and 
retired to Agra. 

Meanwhile, Mr. Mark Bcnsley Thornhill, of Aluttra, who had 
taken the field with a body of Bhurtiwre troops under Captain 
Nixon, was recalled to his chief station by news that the detach- 
ment of the 44th Native Infantry had mutinied, murdered 
Lieateilftnt Burl ton, their commandant, and plundered th<- 
TresBury. This occurred on the 26th. On the morning of the 
30th Mr. Thornhill returned ; but finding the Station ruined 
and deserted, proceeded to Agra to seek assistance. Not suc- 
eeeding, he returned next day — having been repeatedly shot at 
on the rood — buried Burlton's body (which he found naked in a 
ditch near tbe rains of the Treasury;, and endeavoured, with 
tha aid of some wealthy native bankera, to restore order, in 
flui lu waa only moderately BucceHsful. Fifty thousand pounds 

BtMcn carried off; the jail-birds had broken loose ; the police 
UOtuiied, and spread abroad with arms in their bands ; 
Bit the zemindars refosed to pay revenue, and set them- 
W^ u) 1^ directtons as B&jas. Thranbill seems to have 

' * Aft>rvant!i Colonel Qwrtlwa, OB., BaentH? ^to Gbmnmnrt, Narth-Waat 



36 Indian Districts during tlie Revolt. 

done what he could in these trymg circumstances. He took up 
his quarters in the city, which he protected by barricades ; he 
raised fresh police, and, on being joined by some of the Contin- 
gent of the Kota State under Captain Dennys, proceeded into the 
district, and seized one of the ringleaders of the rural revolt, who 
was immediately hanged for the discoui-agenient of the others. 
Seven more were executed soon after, and a number of minor 
offenders severely flogged. The magistrate further evinced his 
resources by submitting to the Lieutenant-Governor at Agra 
a plan for utilising the loyal landowners, by giving them spe- 
cial powers to enforce authority, which was sanctioned and 
carried out. These measures, working surely, if slowly, gradually 
brought about some semblance of tranquillity. 

To return to Aligarh. It has been said that the Volunteers 
remained there till the 2nd of July. That is, however, not 
strictly true, though so stated by Mr. Bramly. The fact is, 
that only eleven so remained, the majority having been recalled 
to Agra on the 21st of June. On the 30th of that month, these 
eleven gentlemen performed a notable exploit. Eeceiving inti- 
mation that the rabble of Eo'il were on the way to attack them 
in a factory where they were temporarily quartered, flying the 
green flag of Islam, and sworn to have their heads posted over 
the city-gates by nightfall, they mounted their horses to receive 
the visit. Presently the advanced guard, a body of more than 
500 men, were perceived marching up the road. Watson's party 
immediately charged. Fourteen of the assailants were slain ; the 
rest fled in every direction, and their stragglers fell into the hands 
of the villagers by the wayside, who stripped them to the skin. 
The names of Watson's intrepid comrades are given in the note,* 
for such a deed ought to be fully recorded. Outram was son of 
the famous Sir James, whom he succeeded in the baronetcy. 

Marsh and Tandy were doomed men. The former, a meet 
promising young officer, was shot in a subsequent skirmiah. 
On the same occasion, Tandy, reckless, as Irishmen of good 
birth are apt to be at the sight of combat, jumped his horse 
over the wall of an orchard crowded with fanatics, by whom 
he was immediately cat to pieces. Saunders — an equally fear* 
less man — ^lived for many years after ; and most, if not all* 
of the others still (1888) sarvive to look back, as oi^ a dxetm, 
to those stirring times. 

• A. Goeks, G.S., Ontnun, O.8., Ensign OUiTuit, Buign Uanhf Mman. P. 
Sannden, J. 0*& Tandy, H. B. Harington, Hind, Oaatle, and BwUqjavv^ 
Stewart Olark, H.D. 



Indian Dlstricls during the Revolt. 37 

It is iinnccpfisarj' to dwell for tbo present on events in thcBe 

ontlyiii" districts. Early in July Watson and Tliornliill were 

both driven from their ilistrictH and forced to take refuge in 

till! fort of Apra, to which place our scene now changes, 

VI. 

.^gi'H, at the time of the outbreak, was the ofiieial capital 
of the province of Hindustan proper, or " North-West Pro- 
Tinces,'" to use the technical term. Hero were stationed the 
Lieiitfuant-Governor, at that time the Hon. John Riisst'U 
Colvin, a man of signal ability; the Chief, or "Sudder," Court 
of Judicature ; the lioai'd of Revenue ; and the bead-quarters 
of the several departments of the public service. The garrison 
comprised a battery of Horse Artillery, a newly- raised l)attalion 
(if Foot — the Comjiany's 3rd European Kegiment — ^and the 
44th and (iith Native Infantry. This force was commanded 
liy Urif^adier Polwhele, and the thief civil officer of the district 
was the Hon. Robert Drummond (brother of Viscount Strath- 
ollan). The population consisted of about 160,000 souls, of 
which over 2,000 were Christians. 

On learning the news of the mutiny at Muttra, Mr. Dnim- 
mond, a man of strong character, at once promised the sanction 
of the Government to the disarming of the sepoy regiments. 
This was effected on the morning of the Hist May without 
bloodehed, and the men di»i)ei-8ed "on leave of absence." Thi^ 
itep was followed by the enrolment of the Christians capable 
of bearing arms ; expeditions were sent in the dhection of tho 
Bhortpore frontier, and order was maintained, taut bifn que 
mat, for about a fortnight. On the 15th June the force stationed 
at Sindhia's capital, tmder the designation of "the Gwalior 
Contingent," mutinied, and the example was followed by tbc 
detachment of that force which haA been hitherto servmg ui 
ttie Agra district. Soon after came news of the mutinies at 
Naorabad and Nimoch, and of the approach of a strong body 
of the mutineers from those places. According to the invaria- 
ble practice, these men were to join the great gathering at 
Da hli ; but, encouraged by sympathiserB at Agi'a, they had 
iolved to make a slight deviation in order to captuiw and 
e English at Agra on their way. This would be a good 
r l« wear in their caps as they presented themselves 
! the King, besides gratifying the instincts for slaughter 
which were just then very active in sepoy bosoms. 
, however, were destined to be disappointed. 

r between the mutineers and tiie defenders of 




38 Indian Districts during the Tterolt. 

Agra has been described in the histories of the period (notably 
in Malleson's Indian Mutiny), and has no special claim to be 
noticed here, but for two reasons. One is that, thoup;h success- 
ful in so far that the mutineers were repulsed from Apjra, it 
was attended by disasters; the other that, while not remark- 
able as a specimen of military skill, it was signalised by much 
dash and heroism on the part of men usually falling under the 
tite of " non-combatants." 

The enemy were met at Sucheta, bemg comi)uted at 2,000 
foot, 600 horse, and ten tield-pieces. To these the Agra garri- 
son could only oppose 600 bayonets, thirty-three mounted 
volunteers, and six Horse Artillery guns. Still, Englishmen ui 
India had often been victorious over far greater odds than that; 
and the Brigadier was quite justified in assummg the otfensive. 
Of the action that ensued it nec^d only be here observed that 
every conceivable advantage was thrown away. With the 
exception of a charge by Major Prendergast, who lost twelve out 
of his eighteen civilian troopers, the British were demoralised 
by being kept back till their guns became useless by the 
explosion of their tumbrils and the death of theii* officer, the 
gallant Captain D'Oyley ; and the troops had to be eventually 
retired from the field, and escorted into their quarters in the 
fort by the volunteer infantry left behind as a reserve. Two 
officers and thirty-nine men were killed, and ninety-nine of all 
ranks wounded. But the enemy had also suflered, and thej' 
turned from their vainglorious pur|)08e and went their way to 
Dehli, re infecta. 

It is no doubt to be regretted that a bolder front was not at 
once assumed. But the Council was distracted. Over 5,000 
persons were now crowded into the narrow limits of the fort^ 
which became a scene of the utmost confusion. '* Loose horses 
were fighting and galloping about; artillery-cattle lying woimded 
and dying with thirst; drunken soldiers bivouacking in the 
rain." From the ramparts a circle of fire was seen, denoting 
the destruction of the European habitations. It was not till 
the third day that, on urgent invibition from well-wishers in the 
city, U^e local authorities were permitted to emerge from thia 
dismal shelter. An armed demonstration was carried through 
the city on the 8th July, and " from this moment," says the 
author of the District Narrative. " rapine, murder, and outrage 
ceased." It was not too soon. During the three days and 
nights of inactivity no less than seventeen men, women, and 
children of European blood had been gratuitously and farutaBly 



* 



Indian Districts during the Reroll. 39 

inordered by the police and other rascaldom of the native 
qoarters. 

The writer hopes that he will not be ehai-ged with esprit de 
rnrpx of an imjast sort if he in\-ites the observation that these 
calamities were in no degree due to the ciril officers. Drum- 
niond, though his pohcy in some respects iiiciirred grave diis- 
lipproval, had energy enough and to spare. Mareh-Phillipps 
and Oldfield* charged hke Paladins with Prendergast — the 
niUy thing bold that was done in the battle of Sucheta. Mr. 
R. A. Reade, senior member of the Revenue Board, was con- 
Hpicnoas wherever calm courage and sagacity could be of use. 

On the 10th July Mr. Drummond was removed with pro- 
motion (at that time nominal) to the post of Civil and Sessions 
Jndge at Banda, s district then in full revolt. Mr, March- 
PhiUipps succeeded him in charge of the Agra district. A 
cooncil of the leading native citizens was convened by Mr. 
Beade, and the place of the regular police — who had utterly 
betrayed their trust—was taken by the heads of the various 
Uteheiat, or wards, of the city, under the control of a trust- 
vortfaj Kotmdl named R&ja Bfim. It is verj' noteworthy that 
thil offieer, who was appointed on the recommendation of the 
*»f|j*"»*" of the native community, proved in every way faithful 
ind efficient : for we have here a specimen of the elective system 
triad probably for the first time in India, and certainly under 
Am most searching conditions. 

Butt if the state of Agra itself had become reassuring, far 
ottus^ise were the feelings caused by a survey of the district at 
large. The inaction that foiloweil immediatfly on the battle of 
Kucheta had given the signal for univprsal anarchy, of which 
the first RjToptom was an almost simultaneoua attack upon all 
the outposts where authority wa.s represented in the district, 
Some of the native officials joined the niutinears, others retired 
to their homes in distant places : those who remained and tried 
to do their dnty were hard pressed and, generally speaking, driven 
away. In one case — the eub-collcctor having fled — the very land- 
liolder whom he professed to fear took charge of the office, and 
|>rotected the records, and the town itself, until the troubles came 
to an end. So various are the workings of human nature! 

Tho first efforts of the British authorities were directed to 

I'atihpur-Sikri, the old country palace of the Mughal emperors, 

abont twenty miles west of Agra, where a strong party of lebab 

Shol ihrvDicfa Ihe lung*, llua ofBcor rccoTorod, wid ts now (IBP^ thi Eg*. 

MJttdittef UmHl«liO0Bn.M.WJ>. 



40 Indian Districts during the llevolt. 

had eHtablishod themselves. The old town is steep and narrow, 
while the palace l)uilding8 are massively built of stone, on the 
top of a rock a mile and a half long, standing in a walled park. 
Decently defended, they might have afforded a stubborn resist- 
ance ; and it was Imt a slender column that Agra could spare 
for their reduction. A body of fifty British bayonets and thirty 
mounted volunteers, under the command of Captain Pattou, 
accompanied Mr. Phillipps to Fatihpur on the 29th of July. 
They were attacked in the naiTOW streets of the town by a 
strong force of ifewatis, a tribe of i)redatory Muslims, who at 
first drove them out. Being reinforced in the open, the magis- 
trate and his men charged, killing fourteen of the enemy, and 
rapturing two prisoners, who were afterwards tried and 
executed. The Mewatis evacuated the palace, in which 
Government offices were at once established. On the lOlh 
August, a similar expedition was sent to Itmadpur, under the 
joint magistrate, Mr. W. II. Lowe, and order was restored 
there. Shortly after, the eastern border towards Mainpm'i— a 
revolted district — was settled ; and here, also, the offices were 
re-opened ; while, on the north, matters were restored about 
the same time by the influence of a loyal native nobleman^ 
the Eaja of Awa-Misa. Greater difficulty was experienced 
in the parts to the south-east, which were too remote to be 
dealt with by the dwindling garrison of Agra Fort ; but here 
again aid was obtained from a powerful clan of Bajputs, whose 
chief, though not himself a man of much force of character, 
was kept straight by a well-disposed councillor. So wore on 
the month of August, during which the Christian inhabitants 
of Agra, many of them women and children, accustomed to 
every comfort when they were not sent to the hills for the 
summer, were exposed to the ills of climate in the most extreme 
form. In close rooms, or in tents under broiling heat and 
pelting rain, the ladies bravely bore their parts, tending the sick 
and wounded, and winning the respect of all. 

After the middle of September, disturbances were resumed by 
fugitives from Dehli. Some made their way across the Jumna 
to Bohilkand; others, under Prince Firoz,* assembled at 
Dhaulpur, about half-way between Gwalior and Agra; and 
finally, about the beginning of October, advanced to attack 
the fort. Before they could carry out their purpose, however. 
Colonel E. Greathed, of the 8th Foot, had arrived at Hithxaa 

*Aft«rwftrdB traiuiently troublesome in £t4wa mud sImwIimw; vUbuIs^ 
believed to bave retired to Meece. 



Indian l>istiicts during Oie lievolt. 41 

with a DritiRh column of all arms. Towards this officer the 
eyes of tht Briti»h at Agra were now anxiously turiied ; and on 
the 9th Octobtr the best information available was sent to 
him, in pursuance of wliich he hastened on. He arrived in 
the nick of time. On the morning of the 10th, Greathed crossed 
the hridfic of boats, and proceeded with his column to the 
briyade parade-^p-ound, south of the fort, at the very instast 
that the Prince's columns, in entire ignorance of hia arrival, 
were approachinir from Dhaulpur. The eolhaion was short, 
sharp, and decisive. " Such was the pi-omptitude with which 
the different arniH formed into position, that the artillery of 
the rij;ht flank replied to the fourth gun of the enemy." The 
battery was charged, and taken, by twenty-five of the 9th 
Lancers, under Captain Green, who unhappily was killed in 
the mfUi' : the rcWIs soon took to (light, and were pursued for 
tight mileH. They lost 1,000 men, iti killed alone; tlie British 
loiiB amounting to eleven killed and fifty-four wounded, four of 
■ whom were officers. This is a military incident which will be 
found fully described in the standard histories; it has bceu 
only referred to here because a certain amount of blame han 
been sometimes thrown upon the civil olhcers, on account of 
their not famishing Greathed with closer details of the enemy's 
movements. The evidence recorded in Mr. I'liillipps' narrative 
■bows that they gave all information that it was in their power 
to obtain, and that the surprise was perfectly unavoidable. 

It remains to add that Itilja BAm, the new Kotwal, kept the 
city quiet during these events, and made public proclamation of 
the reanlt of the battle as soon as he beennie aware of it. From 
that moment no further disturbance took place in the city, and 
the reorgoniaation of the district began to assume the character 
of " a question of time." 

vn. 

The remaining events in Agra, and the adjacent districts of 
Aligarh and Mattra, may be briefly disposed of. Mention hau 
' I of the defensible position of the old palace of 
", so familiar to sight-seers. A body of mutineers 
ft harboured there by the Mew&tis, already men- 
*' tloiKd as ^ving tronble in the some locality ; and on expedition 
Went to dislodge them towards the end of October. Colonel 
Cotton commanded, and carried the place by stoim, after a 
MToru rL-iiiatance in vhich the defenders lost eighty of their 
immber. The column then moved on in the direction of 
riMBBmd^BBg dcnm reoolcitrant landholders, and restoring 



42 Indian Districts during the lievolt. 

the local officers and establishments. On the 27th of Novem- 
ber, Mr. Phillipps took out a small force into the ravines of the 
Jumna on the opposite (eastern) direction, where forty-five 
policemen had been massacred in one night while engaged iu 
an inquiry. Mr. Phillipps was only partially successful in this 
demonstration, as his force was recalled to the city before its 
full purpose had been attained. The city had been, by this 
time, surrounded by a wall ; but no precautions appear to have 
given complete satisfaction. The ultimate result of the revolt, 
for Agra, was that the seat of government was removed to the 
less central, but more strategic, region of Allahabad, where it 
has continued ever since. 

In the meanwhile, the districts of Aligarh and Muttra were 
gradually cooling down. After the battle of Sucheta had 
somewhat ceased to depress the military spii-it at Agra, a small 
force under Major Montgomery was sent out, to which Mr. 
Cocks, C.S., was attached as Special Commissioner. The very 
presence of this little force produced a healthy effect on public 
opinion, " showing them," as Mr. Bramly naively puts it, 
** how vastly inferior they were to the men they were 
attempting to crush." On the 10th August, Montgomery 
inarched towards Hathras, which was threatened by Ghaus 
Mohamad, a deputy of Walidad the "Subah" of Malagarh. 
The traders of Hathras, inspired by the example of a blind 
pensioner, named Chaube Oansiaiu Das (who was afterwards 
killed), exhibited a bold front; and Mr. Cocks, having occu- 
pied the place, assumed tlu; offensive, and marched out to 
attack the enemy, assembled near the town of Koil. A 
fight ensued, in which the enemy were defeated and put to 
flight, with the loss of their ** Maulvi," or spiritual guide. But 
the fall of Dehli in September brought back the elements of 
disorder, for a time at least ; and Major Montgomery had to 
fall back on Agra before tlie tide of maddened mutineera pouring 
out from the rebel stronghold. After the defeat of Prince Firoz 
by Greathed, on the 10th October, Mr. Cocks returned to 
Aligarh, bringing with him Mr. Bramly, who had Emcceeded 
the gallant Watson in the office of district magistrate.* These 
officers were accompanied by a force of 150 British bayonets 
and 100 stout Sikhs. The old fort of Aligarh was cleaned out, 
and utilised as a barrack ; the city was held by a Jat chief, viih 

* It is curious that Watson, Saunders, and Tandy had all rohel blood in thair 
own TOina : the first from Colclough of Wexford, the second and third from Na|i|Mr 
Tandy. 



Indian Duitrietx duniifi the I'eroll. 43 

a strong force of constables ; and tbo collection of tlic revenue 
bes;an to proceed in the usual course. 

The condition of the Miittra district ivns for awhile less satiH- 
factorj'. Tlie countrj'-side was overi'im by iniitiiioers ; and 
ulthou(:;b Mr. Tliornhill's plan of adininisterlni:: through the 
locfti chiefs was partially successful, there were mauy parts 
which continued more or less lawless throughout the entire 
|)eriocl of his absence at Afira. On the 5th October, however, 
lie returned to the district, making his temporary head-quarters 
ut Saidabi'ul, and there taking prisoner a ringleader, who was 
promptly hanged. On the Ist November he got back to Kluttra, 
under convoy of Colonel Cotton'K column above mentioned, and 
availed himself of its aid to piniish some refraettiry villages. 
The restoration of order speedily ensued. 

.\t the same time, Mr. I'hillipps wsh doing what he could in 
tlie Agra district, while Mr. iJrauily was siniilai'ly employed 
in that of Aligarh. Laj:gc bodies of mutinous troops contiinied 
tn cross into Hohilkand, or march distractedly V)ack. These 
were occasionally caught and chastised by flying columns — a 
Btate of things which was somewhat exciting, ftn<l delayed the 
oalming of the public mind necessary for the complete resump- 
tion of peaceful life. At length, in Alarch 1858, a strong 
colnnin inarched down under Major-General Penny, commanding 
the division * ; and no further incidents are recorded in regard 
to this portion of the DiiAb. 

Of the behaviour of the native population dunng this period, 

Mr. Bramly observes that it was generally " apathetic," A 

nomber of ex-landholders resumed estates from which thor had 

been dispossessed in course of law ; " tliat the people plundered 

vfa«n they suddenly found authority overthrown by the 

mntinonB troops, and anarchy ready-mado, was natnral." But 

on the wbol'', here, as in most other places, tlio attitude was that 

of expectation, and order was restored as soon as the elements 

of disorder disappeared. Ncvei'thetess, it is easy to see that 

the dviiiana in all three districts had arduous ta^ks set before 

tbem. It is bard to say which were the most tined : the ofHccrs 

[ uf Muttra and Ali!;arh, left to their own resoiu-ces among hordes 

[ of serai-harbarianB tempted in exery evil way; or those of Agra, 

[ controlled by superior authority, and hamperad, to a considerable 

I extent, by military inefficiency. 

I * Tbii otBoer wa* buou aftar UUmI by «n amliuHood* in tho AligBrh diatrict, hii. 
I dfiUi lali^ ioMflntly rovfagad. 



44 



Poantttt Pes. 

By LmoTENANT-CoLONEL Chables Ford. 



Hatihq, in a previons paper, stated some of the reasons which 
appear to me to render a^Tisable the conetitutioQ of a perma- 
nent force of mounted riflemen, I will now proceed to consider 
as briefly as possible the organisation, equipment, drill, &c., 
which would eeem beet adapted to such a corps. It is scarcely 
necessary for me to disclaim any pretensions to finality in this 
scheme ; it simply suggests the lines on which, I believe, the 
organisation of a corps of mounted rifles should be proceede*! 
with. 

I propose to divide the subject into various heads, and to 
consider each in detail. 

These heads are as follows : — 

a. Strength and organisation of the regiment. 

h. Officers, warrant officers, uon-commiBsioned officers, and 
men. 

c. Horses. 

(I. Dress. 

e. Saddlery, and kit to be carried in marching order. 

/. Arms. 

g. Drill (1. Mounted. 2. Dismounted). 

h. Musketry instruction. 

i. General remarks. 

n, — Stkenoth and Oboanisation. 
Havino in view the fact that wheu the rtngiment is dismounteil 
for action a conBidt^rablo deductiou from itn fighting strength 
muat onaToidably be made, not only for borse-holdiTS, but also 
fbr a auffioient guard to protect tliem and the led horses, it 
mmld appear desirable to lis the strength at a considerably 
higher figure than that of an ordinary cavalry regiment, in order 
that, when acting on foot, it might present proportions aoDroaeh- a 



Mounted Bifies. 45 

ing those of an average battalion of infantry. I would, therefore, 
in the first place, fix the number of troop-horses at 800 ; in 
which case, keeping the es'tablishment of staff and employed 
aon- commissioned officers and men (i.e. such as would be un- 
available for duty in the ranks of the sqaadrous), as low as 
possible consistent with efScieney, I would suggest 969 as the 
eetablishment of all ranks. 

Of this number 25 should be officers, viz. 2 lieutenant- 
colonels, 4 majors, 4 captains, 12 lieutenants, 1 adjutant (a 
lieutenant or captain), 1 quarter-master, and 1 riding-master. 

Of these, the majors, captains, and lieutenants would be 
squadron officers, the rest regimental staff. 

One warrant officer, and 31 non-commissioned officers and 
men, would complete the number of regimental staff aa 
folloire : — 

One sergeant-m^or (warrant officer),! quartermaster-sergeant, 
1 fivrier-major, 1 trumpet-major, 1 sergeant rough rider, 
1 saddler - sergeant, 1 paymaster - sergeant, 1 orderly-room 
■^[WDt, 2 orderly-room clerks, 1 master tailor, and 21 privatea 
as servants and batmen (viz. 3 for each lieutenant-colonel, 2 for 
each of the other staff-officers, and 1 for each warrant and uon- 
commissionod officer, with the exception of the two orderly-room 
clerks who would be below the rank of sergeant). Six of the 
above {i.e. from the sergeant-major to tlie saddler-sergeant 
inclusive) would be mounted men. Consequently, 6 horses for 
them most be deducted ftona the effective of the squadrons. 

We thus have 912 non-eommiHsioued ofBcers and men and 794 
horses left to form the squadrons. 

The regiment to be divided into four squadrons ; each squadron 
to be commanded by a major, assisted by a captain, and to 
consist of three divisions, each commanded by a lieutenant. 

We have, therefore, a uniform strength of 228 non-commia- 
aioned officers and men to euch squadrou, whilst two of them 
would have 198 horses each, and the other two 199 each. 

The squadron staff (exclusive of officers) would consist of 
I squadrou sergeant-major, 1 squadron quartermaster- sergeant, 
I farrier- sergeant, 2 trumpeters, and 8 privates as batmen 
to Don - commissioned officers-^-in all 8 non - commissiooed 
officers and mc>n, and 5 horses, as the sergeant-major, quarter- 
master-SL'rgeant, farrier, and trumpeters are mounted men. 

Ve muHt also allow 10 privates as servants to the 5 squadron 
, making a total of 18 non-commissioned officers and men* 
B to be deducted from the ranks of the three divisions. 



I 

i 



46 Mounted Llifl4is. 

(N.B. Of course, every officer, non-commissioned officer, man, 
4ind horse in a squadron would be shown on the strength of 
one or other of the divisions, and even on one or other of 
the sub-divisions of that division, for pay, rations, &c.; but 
this analysis is intended ^to show in detail the unavoidable 
deductions which render a large excess in the number of men 
over that of horses absolutely necessary, this being a point on 
which, I believe, not only civilians but many officers of the dis- 
mounted services, to be profoundly ignorant). This gives us 210 
non-commissioned officers and men, and from 193 to 194 horses 
availa])le to form three divisions of the squadron. Each division, 
therefore, would contain 70 non-commissioned officers and men, 
and either 04 or 05 horses. 

In two of the squadrons, therefore, two divisions would have 
05 horses each, and one division 04 horses ; whilst in the other 
two the proportions would be reversed, two divisions having 64 
each, and one 05. 

Each division to consist of two subdivisions, each under a 
sergeant, and to be composed as follows. 

In a division numbering 05 horses : — 

Ut Suh'dicmon. — 1 sergeant, 1 corporal, 1 lance-corporal, 
One shoeing smith, 1 private as batman to sergeant, 81 
I)rivates, and 33 horses, leaving 2 spare men. i.e. privates 
not told off to any particular horse, but available to take 
the place of men in hospital, on guard, &c, 

2nd Snh-divisi<m. — 1 sergeant, 1 corj)oraI, 1 lance-corporal, 
1 saddler, 1 batman to sergeant, 29 privates, and 82 
horses ; leaving 1 spare man. 

4 

In a division numbering 04 horses : — 
Ist Suh-divmon. — 1 sergeant, 1 coii^oral, 1 lance-corporal, 

1 shoeing smith, 1 batman, 30 privates, and 82 horses; 

leaving 2 spare men. 
8nd Sub-diviHion. — 1 sergeant, 1 corporal, 1 lance-corporali 

1 saddler, 1 batman, 30 privates, and 82 horses ; leaving 

2 spare men. 

It will be seen from the foregoing that there would be 3 spaze 
men in each of the 65 horse divisions, and 4 in each of the 64 
horse ones, so that two of the squadrons would have 10, and the 
others 11, spare men each. (N.B. Sergeants, or non-commia- 
eioned officers actually in charge of sub-diTisions, would not 
groom their own horses, the private detailed as b&tman pezfarm- 
ing that duty; all others groom their own horses when not 



Mounted Llijks. 47 

lotailcd for other duties.) I think no officer who has served in 
1 mounted cor])s will consider the above too liberal an allowance 
>l mt-n, in proportion to horses ; at the same time, jndRing by 
ny own ex[>erience, I beUuvo it to be sufficient if a good sycitem 
Ite properly worked. 

To rtummiirise the foregoing — We have a regiment, numbering 
!Mi;) of nil raiikK, with 800 troop-horsca ; organised in four 
^'lu^lron.-!, each consisting of three divisions, and each division 
•ii two sub-divisions. The sub-division is commanded by a ser- 
SL-Eint : the division by a lieutenant ; the si[uadron by a major, 
iishihti.'d by R ctiptiiin ; the regiment by a lieutenant -colonel 
{-i>]inuiuidhi<:!, assistt^d by a "^nd licntenant-eolonel, who would 
ulvavK he availahli.! to command a wing, cither on detachment or 
ill the tield, and whose functions would, in fact, be the same as 
tlmse of the one miijor formerly allotted to cavalry regiments 
(111 iiome service. 

Each Kquiulron would be a complete unit, not only tactically, 
but also as regards udniinistration and interior economy, the 
fiqnadi'on qnartermastir-sergeant being also pay-sergeant ; thus, 
moreover, avoiding the great dieadvantages conseijuent on 
making pay-sergeunts of troop sergeant-majors and colour- 
Hergeants, which prevents tlieir bestowing their whole energies 
on their disciplinary duties. 

It will also be seen that tlie total mounted strength of 
squadrons, not including officers, staff-sergeants, farriers, or 
tnimpeters, would be eitiier 1!)3 or lU-1, so that, putting S 
wi^eantB per squadron (1 per division) into the serrctile rank, 
we may say broadly that the/u/i strength of rank and Jile would 
lie 190 per squadron, or 760 for the entire regiment ; and, 
making deductions for casualties, we may put the squadrons on 
parade at an average strength of 180 rank and lile, or a total 
at 730 for the regiment. 

It iriU DO doubt be observed that, amongst the regimental 
staff, I bare made no mention of musketry instructors. I have 
pvpoaely omitted them, as I should propose that the whole of 
the musketry instruction be carried out by and under the 
■foadroD officers and non-commissioned officers. 

1 have also, whilst placing a farrier-sergeant among the 
;tqua<lroD staff, included the saddlers in the rank and file of the 
^visioDD. My reason for this is, that not only la the farrier's 
naily routine work more constant and important than the 
Bkldler'ft, but that there is far more need for the supervision of 
m leli&ble aon-commissioned officer in the matter of a 



48 Mounted Rifles. 

horses than in that of repau's and alterations of saddlery, Sec. 
The farrier's duties also include a considerable proportion of 
veterinary surgery, and involve the immediate custody of and 
responsibility for a considerable stock of valuable drugs. 

I have taken no account of either medical or veterinary 
oJBBcers, as, in the present day, it appears quite impossible to 
foresee what may be the ultimate arrangement as to the con- 
nection of officers of these departments with regiments. 

I have purposely made no mention of lance-sergeants, as, 
since recent provisions have rendered lance and acting rank 
permanent, it has always struck me that a most unnecessar}* 
and midesirable complication of ranks has been caused thereby; 
and the formation of a new corps appears a favourable oppor- 
tunity for a new departure in the classification of the non-com- 
missioned ranks. 

Of course, there should be such a proportion of provisional, 
or acting, lance-corporals as to ensure the presence of a sufficient 
number of non-commissioned officers to carry out effectively all 
their many and important duties. 

h. — Officers, Warrant Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers 

AND Men. 

Of all points connected with raising the regiment, none would 
be of such vital importance as the selection of officers, and none 
would be attended with equal difficulties. As regards the junior 
ranks, comparatively little trouble need arise, as there are un- 
doubtedly many of the younger officers, in the various arms of 
the service, admirably fitted in almost all respects to serve with 
such a corps ; but, when we come to the higher ranks, we are 
confronted with the difficulty arising from the fact that, in the 
vast majority of cases, a considerable number of years passed in 
any one branch of the service tends to engender prejudices, and 
habits, both of mind and body, which are hard to overcome ; 
while each succeeding year increases this difficulty. In other 
words, though there is no great obstacle to a lieutenant or 
young captain of infantry becoming a thoroughly efficient 
cavalry officer, or vice versdy but few majors, and fewer lien- 
tenant-colonels of cavalry, could be expected to fill with sncoess 
the corresponding ranks in an infantry regiment; whilst the 
number of infantry officers of those grades capable of aoqniring^ 
in any reasonable time, real fitness for the equivalent positioQB 
in a cavalry regiment, might probably be counted on the fingm 
of one hand. 



Mounted llifies. 49 

Whilst, then, tho captains and Etubnltcrnti for the new corps 
iniRht be roadily obtninctl hy careful selection from the numerous 
list of ToIiintf(-rs. which would tindoubtcdly fill from all arms 
of the Bervice, the RfU-ction of the lieutenant-colonelw and rnajorx 
would ntfd tlu' utinoHt care. I am far, howcvir, from suggesting 
that it need prove insuperable. 

As. by the adoption of tlm squadron system in its entirety, 
iDuch of the detail of interior economy, which in cavalry regi- 
ini;nts is now administered by the lieutona.nt- colonel commanding, 
would be transferred to the majors commnnding squadrons, 
peculiar care in their selection would be needed. 

My Buggestion is as follows : — Call for volunteers from among 
tlie majors of cavalry and of horse and field artillery. Make 
the selection, from tlie list thus obtained, with scrupulous 
attention to the fitness, l)oth mental and physical, of the 
applicants. I'ut those Bekctcd through a course of drill nith 
an infantry regiment specially chosen lor its Minartness in the 
field; and, fiu-tlur, send any who may have come from the 
artillery through a course of musketry instruction. 

Surely four officers, from amongst the many of the required 
gnde in the mounted branches of Her Majesty's service, could 
be fonnd who would fultil all requirements. 

As concerns the two lieuteu ant-colonels, it would almost seem 
that there is at present a list from which to select. Several 
officers whose army rank quite entitles them to be considered 
eligible, have recently served with this very arm in Africa ; and 
ODfl, at least, of them, having served some years in the infantry, 
ia now and has long been in a distinguished cavalry regiment ; 
whilst another raised and commanded on active service the 
most considerable body of mounted infantry which, I believe, 
we have as yet pat into the field. 

Btirely, from among these officers, besides the long list of 
lieatmant-colonelB and senior minors of cavalry, it would not 
be impoBsible to find two fitted in all respects for the posts of 
flnt ud HeoDd in command of the new regiment. 

Linleotillg non-commissioned officers, I should he disposed 
f on the cavalry, as non-commissioned officers of 
, however zealoas and efficient, could not possess that 
r knowledge of details in the core and management of horses, 
rtiDder all conditions, which is one of the most important 
I reqaisiteti for a non-commissioned officer in any mounted corps, 
I tiDt which most of those who have written on this salgect 
k» i^Dote, bioug apparently disposed to adopt. 



60 Mounted Bifles. 

with that noble animal the horse, the well-known principle 
attributed by Punch' a "hofltler" to the fair sex: "Dam'me! Vs 
a 'orse and 'e must go ! '* 1 would, at the same time, suggest 
the advisability of selecting some, at least, of those non-com- 
missioned officers who have recently served with mounted 
infantry, as their long and intimate acquaintance with the 
minutiae of infantry drill would doubtless prove most valuable 
in the early days of the regiment. 

The non-commissioned officers coming from cavalry should 
be put through a careful course of instruction with the infantry 
rifle, and should also be attached to infantry for a course of 
drill, as suggested for. the majors. 

The selection of the regimental sergeant-major might well be 
left to the lieutenant-colonel commanding ; and, indeed, many 
of the officers would doubtless be able to render valuable aid in 
the selection of non-commissioned officers. 

The men, saving only such as might volunteer from amongst 
those who have recently served in mounted infantry, should be 
selected entirely from volunteers from the cavalry. As Lieu- 
tenant Hamilton, 14th Hussars, in his able paper entitled 
" Mounted Marksmen," points out, but little extra instruction is 
needed to make a cavalry soldier an efficient infantryman, 
whereas months of constant and severe work would be needed 
to make an average foot-soldier a really efficient horseman. 

Volunteering for the regiment should be confined to men of 
good character, of not less than three years' service, and it 
would be well if it were specially arranged that they should 
complete the whole of their first period of service with the 
regiment instead of passing into the reserve ; being, moreover, 
given the right to re-engage to complete twenty-one years' 
service, at the termination of their first period, or after serving 
two years in the mounted rifles ; provided always that they etill 
bore a good character. 

They should be from 5 ft. 6 in. to 5 ft. 9 in. in height, and 
not over 11 st. 7 lbs. in weight when in ordinary fatigue dress. 
There is no doubt that a man from 5 ft. 7 in. to 5 ft. 8 in. in 
height, with a good chest measurement, and rather long-limbed 
in proportion to his size, is about the best average for fJl round 
work both in and out of the saddle. 

The corps once raised, it should be kept up by recmitingy not 
by volunteering from other regiments. 

To revert once more to the oflScers. The adjutant and ihe 
quartermaster should certainly come from the oavalryv aa nvioiiU^ 



Mounted Rips. 61 

of coarse, the riding-maBter ; but it cannot be too stronglj 
emphasised tbat, under the squadron system, the first of these 
must be simply a staff-officer to the lieutenant-colonel com- 
mandiiig, and not have power to interfere between squadron 
commanding officers and their men. The same principle applies 
in a modified degree to the riding-master. 

No doubt objections will be urged against the above develop- 
meot of the squadron system ; but I can only point to the fact 
that its counterpart has existed for about a century in the 
Royal Horse ArtUlery, and for many years in the field batteries, 
and, whatever may be the past or present faults in the organisa- 
tioo of the Boyal Regiment of Artillery as a whole, I may be 
pardoned for saying that but little has ever been alleged against 
the battery system or its results. 

c. — Horses. 
In first forming the regiment, it would be advisable to obtain 
a ooDBiderable number of the horses, say one half, by drafts 
from the cavalry, in order that there might be from the very 
fint a sufficient number of trained horses to enable the requisite 
ioBt to be carried on ; but I should be in favour, even at the 
aMBmmeemeDt, of purchasing the remainder specially for the 

Afl the dead weight carried would, as will presently appear, 
be much less than at present borne by cavalry troop- horses, 
and in consideration also of certain differences in the style of 
work to be demanded of the animal, I would lower the standard 
of height, making it not leas than 15 hands or more than 15 
handa 2 in,, instead of from 15 hands 2 in. upwards, as is the 
present rule for cavalry. 

At first sight this may seem likely to result in undermouuting 
the men ; hut there is a class of horse by no means uncommon, 
especially in Ireland, compact, active, and, above all, well bred, 
running commonly from 15 hands to about 15 bands 1 in., and 
which u.tnally commands a considerably lower price in the 
tnaritct than many a really less serviceable animal standing a 
nouple of inches higher. 

Now, as long as j'ou have great lumbering Iti-hand animals 
in th« ranks, it would be impossible to mix with them these 
RDUlU compact horses ; the sizing would be almost an impossi- 
bility; but if your tallest horse is not over 15 hands 2 iu., this 
^fficulty disapiKariK. I must here remark that sizing horses 
BfejKSSlfB^ ^ *^*> "'"^'^ matter of appeatunoe which tfae^ 



J 



62 Mounted Tlifles. 

uninitiated might suppose, a small horse being more liable to 
be lifted off his legs by the pressure from cither side which will 
sometimes occur in executing movements at a rapid pace. As 
to the mere ability of horses of this stamp to carry their riders' 
weight, let me quote the words of the late Whyte Melville : — 
** Ask any celebrated * welter ' to name the best horse he ever 
had, he is sure to answer * Oh ! liitlc So-and-so ; he wasn't up 
to my weight, but he carried me better than anything else in 
the stable.' " There is no doubt that we are apt to confound 
mere height with weight-carrying power, and, moreover, wi- 
should lay to heart the old maxim that though ** a good big *uii 
is better than a good little 'un," there are many more of the 
latter class than of the former. 

While on the subject of horses, I would suggest that less of 
the manrrje, and more instruction in negotiating natural fences, 
would seem advantageous. I am far from undervaluing school 
breaking as a means of bandying horses; indeed, the best 
hunter 1 ever crossed was a perfectly broken charger ; but I am 
sure that with the average troop-horse we rather over-do the 
inaitrge, and dexidedly under-do instruction in fencing and in 
working alone. How many troop-horses are there which 
are pleasant or handy mounts if taken away from the ranks '? 

d. — Dress. 

Before entering into details on this head, I must crave the 
indulgence of the reader for a few generalities. 

There is a school of military reformers whose disciples express 
utter and unbounded contempt for appearance in military 
costume. Now, whilst warmly admiring the mental altitude 
attained by these gentlemen, I fear that their ideas on this 
point would, if carried out, produce a most unfortunate effect on 
the morale of the British soldier, and would, moreover, render 
still more difficult the already somewhat trying task allotted to 
the Inspector-General of Becruiting, of proving in his annual 
report that a deficiency of recruits tends, rather than otherwifle, 
to demonstrate the extreme popularity of the profession of arms 
amongst the working classes. 

The simple fact is that we have for many years been striving 
after the unattainable, in that we have been ever attempting to 
devise a dress for our army equally adapted to the frigid, the 
temperate, or the torrid zone, and equally appropriate for a 
royal levee or the vicissitudes of a campaign. The perhaps not 
unnatural result has been that it is, as a role, ju$t abotU equally 



Mounted Hifies. 68 

lit for onfit) for all these varit'd circunistaiifOK. Now, do wo 
:itteiiipt nn ytbinp of thin sort in privnU- life ? English gontlc- 
iiien arc generally allowed tn be. all round, about the best 
lireRsed men of the agf: does any one of them, in his most 
I'tupian dreams, contemplate the poHKiliility of a (.-OHtunie wliich 
lift wonld don with equal conlidenie were lie about to start for u, 
diiy'fi snipe -shooting over an Irish bo;;, or an afternoon stroll in 
llie Park, for a day with the Quorn, or a ball at the Hnirhess of 
Stilton's? To go to a lower fjrade in soeiety, tlmt from which 
• ■URht to come some of our best reeruits — does not the respect- 
able working-man, who throuj^h the we(!k wears fustian, 
lorduroy, or moleskin trowsers, a rough, serviceable coat (when 
lie sports one at all), a cap. and hobnailed highlows — does 
not he, on Sundays, don broadcloth, elastic-sidi^d hoots, and a 
■ himney-pot ? I do not assert that the noble Ihitish workman 
idwnys looks better in his Sunday kit than in his working 
habiliment« ; but it is an outward aud visible sign of respect- 
ubilJty, be values it as sueii, and should ho see the soldier 
takiDg his walks abroad in n dress obviously intended for work, 
not show, he would at onee form a very mean opinion of th<t 
trade. 

I faamhly snggest. then, that the army may. without shame, 
foUovtfae DBoal custom of other branches of society, and have a 
vorJh'nfj dreat and a swagijcr iJrcKx. 

And now, to return to our mounted ritiemon. 

As a working dress, I should propose the following : — 

Bifle-green, single-bieasted patrol jacket, with five brass ball 
bnttons, stand and fall collar similar to that of an artillery olHcer's 
piifarol jacket, cloth shoulder-straps, with badge of the regiment in 
laau, and four pockets (two breast and two side). For warm 
weather, a false collar of the regimental facings (white) to button 
on inaide collar of jacket (as in artillery pattern); nnd for cold 
weather, a sleeved cloth waistcoat, with standing white collar, 
ts be worn nnder the jacket. 

^ Pantaloons of same colour as jacket, and without any stri])e, 
button np to knee like hunting-breeches. * 

Field boots and jack spnrs of the universal pattern. 
Ht'hnet, universal pattern, green cloth, with plain bronae 
plate showing regimental badge, button on top, and plain black 
leather chin-strap. 

kAs fall dre«8. to be worn in review order, dec : — 
Ibe same holmet, but with yellow metal badge-plate, yellow 
MtM^Bb and white bdrMhau plume, and brass chin scale. 



54 Mounted Rifles. 

Jacket, of same cut as undress, but embroidered in yellow 
braid in same pattern as an infantry officer's patrol jacket. 

Pantaloons, same pattern as undress, but with double white 
stripe similar to light cavalry. 

Boots and spurs, same as undress. 

There should also be a forage cap, of the pattern recently 
sanctioned for officers on service, which should be worn only 
when walking out, on fatigues, or night-guard. 

Each man to have also a pair of trousers, with double-whiti' 
stripe, to be worn only when walking out, or in full dress dis- 
mounted, with half Wellingtons and heel spurs. 

Gloves should be worn only in review order, and walking out. 

The various dresses, and the occasions when worn, would then 
bo as follows : — 

Full dress. — On birthday of the Sovereign, and other Static 
occasions. 

Full dress, dismounted (i.e. with trousers instead of panta- 
loons and boots). — On church parades, officers' funerals, &c. 

Undress. — In marching and drill order, and for all guards, 
unless mounted over royalty and vice-royalty. 

Walking-out dress. — Consisting of forage cap, undress jacket, 
and trousers. 

The men should also have a pair of ankle-boots for stables 
and fatigue duties, and a double-breasted, split-tailed great 
coat, and a long waterproof cape similar to officer's regulation 
pattern. 

The undress of officers should, except in quality of material, 
exactly resemble the men's, and their full dress be also of the 
same cut and pattern, but embroidered in gold chain lace. 

€. — Saddlery, Kit to be Carried, &c. 

As the reduction of the dead weight to be carrit^d by the 
troop-horse is of vital importance, I would suggest the 
following : — 

Saddle. — A wooden tree-saddle, but with iron arches, with 
small small fans in rear, pommel and cantle as low as con- 
sistent with safety to horse's back, general shape somewhat 
similar to the recently-sanctioned regulation staff saddle. 
No pannels, but to be worn with two thick felt nnmiialis 
(These would be alternately worn next the horse's baokt 
thus decreasing the well-known difficulty of having a dxj 
surface next the back on first saddling). 

Wallets attached to front of saddle. 



Mounted Rifles. 55 

Namaqoa gtm-bncket attached in usoal manner, in front on 
off Bide. 

One shoe-pocket (to contain one pair fore shoee), on near ring 
of eaddle. 

Girths. — Open raw-hide. 

Horcingle. — Usual pattern. 

Breastplate. — Adapted to Namaqna f{tm-backet. 

No crupper. 

BhdJe and head-collar. — Universal pattern, but with bit 
considerably lighter than the universal pattern ; the bridoon 
rein should have a simple arrangement of buckles at 
the middle, so that, if the order be given to link horses, 
the bridoon reins could be unbuckled and attached to the 
squares of the head collars of the horses on either side. 

Marching order. — In cold weather the great coat to be carried 
rolled in rear of saddle, waterprooof cape in front. In 
warm weather, no great coat, and waterproof cape carried 
in rear. 

Kmit wallet. — 1 woollen jersey, 1 pair of drawers, 1 pair of 
aoeks, hair brush and comb, 1 towel. 

Offvftllet. — Oil tin and rag, blacking tin, shoe-brushes, cloth- 
bnah, onrry-comb and brush, hard soap in tin case, small 
sponge, horse-rubber. 

Havrettack (rifle pattern). — Worn over right shoulder, hold all 
(with knife, fork, Kpoon, and scissors) carried in it. 

Water-bottle- — Worn on right side, strap passing over left 
sbonlder underneath ammunition belt. 

Heel rope. — Rolled round picketing pegs, carried on near ring 
' of saddle, over shoe-pocket. 

' MeSB tin. — On top of great coat (or cape), in rear of saddle. 

Head rope. — Attached to ring of hea<l collar, and passed round 
honte's neck, as at present. 

/. — Abhb. 

Uartini-Heury rifle. — Cai-ried in Namuqua gun-bucket, nosling 
and swivels removed. 

Sword-bayonet (rifle pattern). — Worn in " Sam Browne " belt, 
belt to be worn under jacket, and to be all web except the 
frog ; frog to be of black leather, and of such length that 
the guard of the aword-bayouet just clears lower edge of 
jacket, leaving grip standing up outside. 

Sword. — Ordinary cavalry pattern, but with modifled guard, 
like that of sword-bayonet euppUed with artillery pattern 



66 Mounted Jiijles, 

Martini-Henry carbine ; to be carried edge to rear, on off 
ring of saddle. Scabbard, wooden, covered with black 
leather and with steel mounts. 
Ammunition. — Carried in Transvaal belt, (worn over left 
shoulder) of black leather. All four pockets of undress 
jacket to be fitted with pipes to can-y extra ammunition if 
required, and to have waterproof flaps to button over in wt^t 
weather. 

//. — Drill. 

1. Mounted Drill. — The svstem of mounted drill must be framed 
with the double object of permitting a sufficient proportion of 
the men to be dismounted for action, without too completely 
destroying the mobility of that portion remaining mounted in 
charge of the led horses, and of enabUng the whole, or any 
portion of the regiment, to act effectively as cavalry. 

To this end I propos(^ the adoption of rank entire, and a return 
to the old drill by threes. 

As to the first of these two points, its desiral)ility has long 
been maintained by many of our best cavalry officers. It 
offers, amongst others, these great advantages : greater elas- 
ticity and facility in passing over rough ground, the absence 
of the danger of a rear-rank man and horse being put hor^ 
de combat by falling over their prostrate front rank, and the 
doubling of the front shown by any given number of men. 
On the other hand, no real increase of weight, and consequent 
momentum, is gained by cavalry in attacking in double rank, 
the conditions being quite different from those of infantrr 
charging in line. 

As concerns the question of threes versus fours, while far from 
denying the advantages of the latter system when drilling in 
double rank (such as the increased variations of front which it 
offers, in fours, sections, and half-sections, as against tlirees and 
sections only), I fail to see that, in rank entire, these advan- 
tages counterbalance its obvious disadvantages. 

I would simply have the wheel, or wheel-about, of threes 
made on the flank, instead of on the centre, unless specially 
ordered, thereby doing away with the necessity of reining badu 

Considering the system with reference to dismounting men fi»r 
infantry work, the advantages of threes are obvioos. I shoold 
assume that the normal system would be to dismount two-thirds 
of your men. In that case the centres of threes wonld be the 
horse-holders, and, as one man can easUy manage two kd 
horses, the usual mounted formation would not be interferad 



Mounted Rifiea. 67 

with, and the regiment, or squadron, left nearly ii>* mobile as if 
fvery man were in the saddle. 

Thus, with a properly-proportioned escort, i\n- horses would 
not be liable to be at any moment seized fay n small body of the 
i^nemy's cavalry, and the commanding officer mi<fht dcvoto his 
■■ntire attention to bis infantry attack, in the full coniidence 
that his horses and horse-holders were safe. 

To take an extreme case, when it was necessary to exercise the 
utmost care to prevent the iMssibility of hucIi a mishap aw that 
above alluded to. We may suppose that throe Hquadrons would 
lie ordered to dismount, leaving the 4th as guitrd. The order 
would be : " lat, 2nd, and 3rd squadrons — dismount for action." 
The commanders of the named aquadrono would kivc the word 
■ — squadron for action, preimre to dismoimt — dismount." The 
i-eiitres of threes would advance two horses' lengths, Ifft of threes 
pass off to the right, sufficiently to get room to dismount, flanks 
i>f threes draw rifles and prepare to dismount. 

At the word " Dismount," flanks of threes dismount, unbuckle 
ther spurs, and place them in the near wallet, lead their horses 
np into their places, hand them over to centres of threes, and 
ia3\ in either in front, or on a Hank of the squadron, as may Iks 
ordered ; right of threes forming the front rank, loft of threes the 
rear rank. Mtgors, let and 2iid lieutenants join the dismounted 
party, captains and Srd lieutenants remain in charge of horses ; 
awgeant-majors, and the three sergeants in the serrelile rank 
(Usmomit, their horses being held by the other non-connnissioned 
ofl&OBrH in the eerrefile rank, and squadi-on quartermaster- 
aergeants remain mounted to assist the eaptiiiiis and lieutenants 
in charge of horses. 

The dismonnted men of each squadixjn would then be told off 
u an infantry company, ofBcers and non-commissioned officers 
tiking their proper places — the majors as commanders, tlie two 
lientenanis as right and left guides, in:. 
The battalion would then he formed in whatever manner 
r advisable, the 2nd lieutenant-colouel being either 
B of the horses, or told off to command any portion 
~~ ' \ force. la the latter case the senior captain 
Ef command of the horses. 
Meanwhile the 4th sijimdron complete (i.t. about 160 rank and 
lile) would operate in whutt^er manner might seem best for the 
Mwority of the led horses and horBB-holders, and, if necosaary, to- 
1 th« conunonication between them and the dismonnted 



58 Mounted Rifles. 

The above example is, of course, one in which the disposable 
dismounted force is put at its lowest, and it gives a strength of 
860 rank and file, in three strong companies, amply provided 
with officers and non-commissioned officers. 

It seems hardly necessary to point out that in many (we may 
almost say most) cases a much smaller mounted guard would 
suffice — say, a division, or about 60 rank and file ; whilst not 
unfrequently, by linking horses and leaving one man in charge 
of 6 horses, 150 or more rank and file might well be drawn 
from each of the first three squadrons, and 100 from the 
fourth. 

In this case we should get three companies of 150 each, and 
one of 100, or a total strength of 550 men for our infantry 
battalion ; the led horses being still by no means immobile, and 
being guarded by 60 rank and file, or nearly the equivalent of 
an average squadron of cavalry. 

8o much for the adaptation of the system of mounted drill to 
the object of furnishing an effective dismounted force without 
entirely crippling that portion remaining mounted. 

As to the formation and system of drill best suited to enable 
the regiment to act as cavalry, I should suggest that, seeing the 
large front covered by 180 horses in rank entire, each squadron 
should be formed with intervals between the divisions equal to 
the present squadron intervals. The accompanying rough 
sketch shows the proposed formation of a single squadron in line. 

Pio. 1. 

6 (i 6 



6 ■ ■ (^ ■ o 

•Omveniional Sigfu showing various ranks of Officers and Non-comaussumtd Q/btn, 



s 


Major. 


Farrier. 


s 


Gaptain. 


■ Seiseant 


6 


lieatmant 


S CorpormL 


6 






6 


Bqnaditm Qrtnaatr.-Bt^gttaiiL 


O Tmmpetar. 



Mounted liijies. 59 

The usual formation of the regiment for iuajjectioa, &c-, might 
be in two lines, thus occupyiufi only the aarno front as if it were 
formo<1 in two ranks ; auil this formation would seem all the 
more reasonable inasmuch as the whole regiment would seldom, 
if ever, attack in lim^, hut cither in two lines or uome sort of 
echelon. 

A convenient and handy formation for manceuvre wonld be in 
double eoluuiu of diviHiouB from the centre (as shown in the 
accompanying sketch) ; a formation readily aissuined, very 
i-lastie, as it admits of a rapid foi-mation of either single or 
■iouhlc line to the front or to either Hank, and having, moreover, 
the merit of not occupying too largo a space for commands being 
readily transmitted to squadron leaders. 

In changes of iwsition, or wliile halted, the quarter column 
would be, of course, employed as a rule ; column (i.e. wheeling 
distance) being only uxed when an immediate wheel into line 
>eemed likely to be required. 

Fm. 2. 

Regittient jurniid in dotibln quarter-cobiimi of diriaiont 

J'ruia the centre. 



*d Squadron 2nd Squadron 



1 



■*0i Bqaadron • Ist Squadron 



In the above aketch, the formation is shown as made from 

BD^ line, but it would make no difference were it made from 

flu doable line, except that the 1st and 2nd squadrons would be 

IB front and the 3rd and 4th in rear. 

FormaitionB to the front or either flank would be made with 

* equal readiui^ss, for I need hardly point out that, in thia ayetem 

. of drill, not only nu^ the position of Hquadroos be inverted or 

I allered to any extent, but the divisions of each squadron mi^ 

[ also bo inverted without causing any confusion. 

I To enter further into the detaoJa of this subject is impossible 



60 Mounted Rifles. 

within the limits of this article ; but I hope I have said enough 
to indicate generally the system of drill I propose, and to 
show that it need be neither complicated, cumbersome, or in- 
sufficient. 

2. DismcHtnted Drill. — On this head I would only observe 
that, whilst adhering to the infantry drill book, attention should 
be devoted mainly to essentials, such as the attack formation 
and simple line and column formations and movements, com- 
plicated manoeuvres being both unnecessary and unadvisable for 
troops of this description. 

//. — MusKKTRY Instruction. 

I have already remarked that T propose that the musketry 
course be carried on entirel}' by and imder squadron officers. 
When I add that an increased annual allowance of ammuuitiou, 
and frequent practice in field iiring, are eminently desirable, I 
have said as much as this space will permit. 

i. — (1ENER.U. Remarks. 

As expense is an element entering largely into the considera- 
tion of any scheme of military reform or reorganisation, I wish 
to point out that even if mounted rifles received, as I should 
suggest, a slightly higher rate of pay (say 2d. per diem) than 
cavalry of the line, the proposed regiment would not appear an 
expensive one if fairly contrasted with either a regiment of 
cavalry or a battalion of infantry. Its staff of officers and non- 
commissioned officers differs but slightly from that of either. 

As compared with a cavalry regiment, it would present, 
roughly speaking, double its mounted strength, and a power and 
efficiency for dismounted work quite beyond an3rthing attainable 
by cavalry as at present organised. 

Compared with an infantry battalion, it shows a compact and 
effective battalion of, at least, respectable strength, possessing 
a mobility totally unattainable by ordinary foot-soldiers, and 
capable, in consequence, of performing outpost and scoating 
duties of a far more daring and extended nature, of snrprisiiig 
detached posts of the enemy, or of rapidly reinforcing threatened 
points held by its friends. 

With reference to certain points of detail in the varionB 
sections of this article, I will make a few explanatory observft* * 
tions. I have made no mention of a band in section (^) as ito 
constitution appears to me a question for after considemiiQtti. 






Mounted llijies. 61 

\x to mt.-hi(]iii<r majoi-s of liorec and field ai-tillery in the; lint from 
ulik-li st;loctions for Uk' same rank might be madG, I may 
nmark that otlicors who havt: nerved loii<; in the mounted 
lirunth of the Royiil Artillery have perhaps had greater oppor- 
tunities of studying the aetion, both independent and combined, 
of all the three arms than UKUally falls to tlic lot of either 
cavah-j- or infantry ofSceru. They have, as a rule, acquired a 
HiMjd eye for ground from tlio coUKtant necessity of Hclccting 
]M)sition3 for their hatterieH, and of reaching them by tlic safest 
and most expeditious route ; and, fi-om the very nature of the 
duties of artillery in the lield, they are, perhaps, lees prone than 
many officers of the other arms to that vice {a tendency to 
iiiaimuvre on too cramiied a scale) alluded to in Lieutenant 
Jliimiltou's article. Wlien one adds that they are already versed 
in the system of cavalry drill, and thoroughly at home in atahle 
economy, I think enough has been said to show that no great 
incongruity would be involved in the possible scleetioii of 
perhaps one of the four majors from the Uoyal Artillery. 

I have mentioned a pair oifore shoes only amongst the articles 
carried in marching order, not only beeausc they aiv much more 
liable to be wrenched off than hind ones, but also it is much 
mora important that they ulionld be promptly replaced. Spare 
hind shoes would be carried in the waggons (of which each 
squadron should have at least two), in which also additional 
articles of kit, camp equipage, &c. would be packed. If thought 
necessary, the farriers might carry a small number of hind shoes 
(say two or four pairs), either in churns, or in special pattern 
Bhoe-pocketB. 

Beferring to those articles which I have detailed to be carried 
ia the wallets, I would observe that, though it is absurd to 
encTunber the soldier, or rather his horse, with a wardrobe 
almost eoEtensive enough to meet the requirements of a gtaitle- 
man Btajnng for a week in a country house ; it is, ou the other 
hand, desirable that a man should have a change of mider- 
dothing alw^B readily available, even if he is separated from 
the bKBBme-waM ons- Jackets and pantaloons can often be 
I^^^^^^^HKble ease ; but it is different with the guernsey, 
4?au^0?anwera. The man simply does not take them off 
(even if he has the chance) and sit in his pelt while they dry, 
bat goes on getting them wet and letting them dry (more or less) 

p his body, and rheumatism and fevers are the results. 

~I have often been atmok by the fact that nearly eveiyone who 
S^tild-kit of the soldier gives him a comb, but no hair- 



62 Mounted Hips, 

brush. Now, I confess that my owni experience of roughing it 
leads me to the conchision that a man with his hair close clipped 
scarcely needs the comb, however thick his thatch, but stands 
decidedly in need of the brush. I have therefore included the 
hair-brush, and, as the comb neither weighs heavy, or takes up 
much room, I have thrown it in also. 

Concerning those articles detailed for the off- wallet, I consider 
them all so necessary for the care and preservation of the horse 
and his appointments, and the man's arms and accoutrements, 
that 1 should be most unwilHng to relegate any of them to the 
baggage-waggons. 

I recommend a modified guard for the sword, as, when slung 
to the saddle, the present pattern would be dangerous to the 
liorse in case of a fall to the otf-side ; and might, even under 
ordinary circumstances, be liable to establish a gall. 

OflScers who have served with mounted infantry seem 
generally to advocate the Namaqua gun-bucket in preference 
to any system of slinging at the back, and it would certainly 
seem unlikely that a man dismounting for action would forget 
his rifle, unless he happened to be in the condition of the well- 
known volunteer bandsman who had ** lost the big drum." 

Recent experience seems also to point decidedly to telling oflF 
by threes for dismounting, as, though the number of horses 
one man can manage varies with their freshness and many other 
causes, three appears to be generally regarded as the normal 
number advisable if the horses are to be called on to move whilst 
the dismounted men are in action. 

In conclusion I will only say that one, and that perhaps not 
the least, of the advantages of the mounted drill being by tlurees, 
lies in the absence of any chance of confusion arising in the 
men's minds between two systems of drill by fours, differing so 
utterly as those in use by cavalry and infantry respectively. 



Tbosb living jewels have a charm and worth 
Far above diamonds, if their magic light 
Springs from the bouI, and flashes flawless might. 

More than cold crystal : let it have its birth 

In righteons anger or in childlike mirth ; 
Or melt in tenderness, nntil the sight 
Swoons into shadow like a summer night 

Vailing to moonset. 

There is not ou earth 
A traer antidote for aching care 

Than love that answers love in woman's gaze, 
When faithful eyes return a faithful emile 
To him alone for whom she 'd fain be fair ; 

Nor — in the brightness of our brightest days-* 
A coi'se like woman's eyes that harbour guile. 






^aitjit ^itig^'s §tat| wxa its (iLoiTstqujnas. 



A MONOGRAPH. 
By General Court. 



[General Clourt was a French oflicer who had " made hU proofs* 
in tho Artillury under Napoleon. He had nerved throughout the 
Russian eainpaign, and had diHtinguiahed himself in those which 
immcdiutoly preceded the fall of the lirxt empire. Finding no con- 
fjenitt! employnieut under the Boiirbotia, Court pi-occcded to Persia, 
stayed lon<,' enough in that country to acquire the language, mode 
his way thenee, in companionship with Avitabile, to Labor, ami 
offered his services to Ranji't Singh. That very able aavcrcigu 
panted the two adventurers an audience, questioned them thoronghlj, 
and Boon perceived that whilst Avitabile was fit only for civil em- 
liloyraeut, Court was a real soldier. He then and there conferi-ed upon 
the latter im23) tho command of a regiment, promoted him very soon 
aftcrwurdii to a brigade, and finally placed a diviijiou of the Sikh army 
in his liaiids. Court was a very able soldier, and it was duo to him an^ 
to Ventura that the Sikh ai'my wiis brought to the state of efiicidHj 
which enabled it to fight so well at FiVuzshahar. Before that event 
had liappeued. Court had quitted it, to return, with a well-earaed 
competency, to Europe. The paper which follows, written by 
General Court m 1811, and which describes the anarchy at Lihor 
following the death of the Lion of the Poujdb, came, game yeui 
back, into the hands of the Editor, who considers that its import- 
ance jnstifies its literal translation and its appearuioo in thii 
Magazi ne . — Ku.] 

Oh the death of Banjit Singh, which took place Bhorfcly afts 
his internew with Lord Auckland, the sceptre of this BOVereigB .1 
— vbo has a just title to be ranked amongst the illustrious mioi I 
who rise in every age to accomplish great things — devolved i 
peaceably upon his son, Earak Sing^. Xho peaceful character I 
of the BQCceHsion waa due mainly to two fiwts : the one that the I 
EngUsh who, in the belief of the Sikhs, nourished their own j 
I opon the PniyU), were completely occupied in Afglulu- J 



A/l^'r Himjit Singh's Dcfilh. G5 

isti'in : tlif otiier, tluit tlic Afyhiina, who might otherwise have 
tried to ri-coviT Pt'uhitwar, were coutroUed by tlie Eugli^h. 

K»rak Sinflh, a man witlioiit oatTffy, nlmost witliout an idea, 
feelins himself wliolJy iniioiiipetent to direct the affairs of the 
kin^ilora, ontrnsted tlie maniij;<>iiient of them to I>h!iiiiii Kingh, 
who had liefii trained under and beeorae a favourite of liis 
fiitliei'. If tlie direction in the hands of this man fell somewhat 
short of the vigour and HnnnoKS which ha<l eliaracterised it 
under his great master, it at nil events maintained the 
esialilislied order of thinRn. In a short space of time, however, 
Karak Singh placed himself in the jwwer of a favonrite, Ajit 
Siiijjh, and it heeamo the aim aiid object of this man to thwart 
the minister in every ]wissihle manner. The son of Karak Singh, 
Nao Nihal Singh, wlio was at the moment at the head of the 
enth-e Sikh army at PtHhawar to co-operate with the English, 
when informed of the state of affairs, urged by his own ambition, 
determined to reraody the evil. In his view, the moat effectual 
remedy was virtually to supplant liis father, and to gather all 
the power of the State into his own hands, l-fe therelbre so\ to 
wwk without delay to gain all the Sikh and French generals 
aboQt him, men who had an interest equal to his own in the 
maintetiaiice of a strong government in the Punjab. Nao Nih^l 
Sogh, ha^'ing been promised their support, prociteded to Luhor, 
entered auddunly the fort by night, slew all tlut guards wlio 
opposed him, snatched from the side of the inonEU'eh liiti 
hvonrite, Ajit Singh, and slew him and his <'»tn<(i'(i'/fr before hia 
vyea. In this act Nao Nih&l Singh was personally aided by 
Golfib Singh, elder brother of the minister. 

Seixing the actaal power, and leaving to his fatlier only 

the empty shadow, Nao Nihal Singh notified his accession to 

the army. Whilst the high officers of this army welcomed the 

ebange itself, there were many amongst them wlio regretted the 

anneoeflaary violence with which it had been accomx>anied, and 

eqwcially ^e afEront to Karak Singh, for whom, iu spite of his 

i^oto/f tiiey had, aa sou of Hanjit Bingh, a cei-tain sort of vene- 

wtioii. GeneraU Ventura and Court were the only generals who, 

oo this ooeasion, refrained from any manifestation of opinion. 

r The firmness and energy of Nao Nihil Singh, and, above all, 

jl' hie desire to deserve the esteem of hia sabjecta, soon restored 

I the Paajab to its pristine oonditioQ. Hia public acta were, 

' indeed, marked by a tact which reminded the old nobles of the 

L best days of his grandfather, and it waa felt everywhere that in 

Uu±U|^ tha iiiiaiB of the Fuy&b was oaanred. Gbadoally, 



66 After Ranjit Singh's Death. 

however, a secret feeling of hostility gre^: up between him and 
the family of his m^'nis^er, Dha'an Singa. This minister and 
his brotliers, loids of the mountain tract of Jamii, close to 
Kashmir, were men of great influence and ability ; and Nao Nihal 
Singh was brought to think by his trusted councillors, Raiu 
Singh ard Kochal Sir-^^V tlat their destitution was necessary 
to the consolida.'ion of his power. Dhaian Singh, well informed 
of this tliate of affairs, and believing that destitution would lead 
to destruction, resolved to strike the firsi blow, to uproot the 
dynasty of his benefactor in favour of his own family. From 
the time he conceived this idea the court of Labor became the 
scene of intrigues and machinations of the lowest character. 

The faction of wh^ch Dhaian Singh was the head, had the 
folly about this time to affront the English Government by 
refusing a passage across the Punjjib to a convoy intended for 
Afghanistan. The terms of refusal were so unmistakably 
hostile, that for a time a rupture seemed imminent. Ultimately, 
however, Dhaian Singh yielded to the 13ritisli demand. 

On the other hand, although the Prince was full of attention 
to his father, and saw him surrounded by comforts, the confi- 
dants of the latter induced him to jjrotest against his son's 
usurpation, and even to claim the support of the English 
Government. This action on the part of Karak Singh caused his 
destruction; for, to prevent the possibility of any such interven- 
tion, his enemies — if public rumour is to be believed — caused a 
slow poison to be administered to him. It is certainly a fact 
that from this date the Maharaja, who had till then enjoyed 
excellent health, fell suddenly into a sort of decline ; and tiiat 
in proportion as the English troops approached the frontier, hift 
sickness increased. Before they had crossed it, he died. 

The day of the Maharajii's death was the day of the celebra- 
tion of his funeral. At those funeral rites Nao Nihal Singh was 
present. But, as he was on his way to make the customary 
ablutions, the brick balustrade of the gateway of the fortresa 
fell ui)on him and fractured his skull. Many persons of his 
suite, amongst them the eldest son of Gulab Bingh, were killed 
on the spot by the fall. The young prnce was transported in a 
dying state to his palace, and expired without having been aUft 
to utter a word. 

This fatal accident, which carried off a prince fall of pxomue^ 
and which put an end to the dynasty of Baigit Singh, 

regarded by the fanatical party as a punishment from ^ .. 

Others, however, beheld in it the hand of the ambitiooa Jiiitti^ 



AfUr liaiijit Singh's Death. G7 

of the Prime Xrinister. Under instructions from that high 
officer, the death of tlie Prince wns coiiceale<l from the public 
for forty-eisht Iioiir^. diirinj;; which timo tht> Rciici-als present 
at court met to tlcliberftte as to the choiee of a BUccessor. 
After much dissusKion, it was resolved to mmimon Fiince Shcr 
Singh, an adopted son of Ranjit Singh, and then on his eatates 
at V'atala, as tlie only member of the family who, at aneh a 
time, coiild snide the fortunes of the State. Thus fiummoued. 
SLer Sinf;h hastened to Luhor. In compliance wiUi the Sikh 
customs, be abstained from any interference in State affairs 
until the obsequies of his unfortunate predecessor had been 
performed. These lasted twelve days. The delay was fatal to 
Sher Singh, for it gave time to the absent generals, amongst 
them Guliib Singh and Attar Singh Kindhanwiilii, to reach 
Labor. These two personages, by the;r intrigues and audacity, 
so influenced the other generals, that they recanted their 
previous decision, excluded expressly Slier Singli from the 
Gorurnment, and, on the pretext that one of the wives of the 
deceased prince was enrcinlc, jiroclaimed his mother, widow of 
Earak Singh, to be Regent of the kingdom. The two generals 
who caused this change were both actuated by the ambition 
of gaining the throne : Gulub Singh, by manning the Regc^nt ; 
Attar Singh, by euccceding to it on her death. As to the other 
they one and all believed that, under the reign of a 
they vould be allowed to live independently on their 
eatates, and voold not be tormented, as they had been under 
Bazyit Sing and his successor, by the fear of being suddenly 
dflprived of them. The only general who continued to espouse 
the eaoae of the prince, was General Court, who foresaw that a 
deviation from the hereditary principle would cause a civil war, 
■nd tend to the ruin of the Sikh monarchy. 

The resolution of the Council was duty notified to the Prince, 
■octnnpanied by an announcement that he would he granted as 
~ ipensation an allowance of a thousand rupees a day, iu 
itiou to the jaghirs he already held. Although inwardly 

lua at the condact of hia generals, Sher Singh accepted with 

outward complacency the decision they announced. He knew 
well by experience that, in the Punj&b, force alone insured 
pOBSCAsion, and tliat, for the moment, he was helpless. The 
~ ;etic tone, however, which he adopted in his reply, having 
ioced the generals tliat sooner or later he would endeavonr 
j^OB of them advised the Begent to bare 
"^ '|(Rbe advice was adopted in. ^piimciBAft ; 
5 • 



68 .tJUir lldiijit Siii(}h'.t l>mth. 

and it was agroi-«l that, on Iiik cumins to ask leave ti> i-etuni to 
his estates, lie should 1«? shot. One of the noldiers of the guard 
to which tile duty had henn ontnisted warned Sher yiiifjh, how- 
ever, of the plot, and he abruptly quitted the eoui-t. The same 
day he proceeded to the uiiiiip to induce the divitiiiou com- 
manded hy (JenLTal Court to take up iiniis in his favour. That 
Keneral, however, dissuaded him from the attempt, on the 
frronnd that the monu-nt was inopiwrtune: luid that though 
the general feeliny in the army was favourahle to liim, it was 
necessary to prepari' it for action hefon^ iictin^ ; and that it 
was, in every case, prudent to await the iin-ival of General 
Ventura, then shortly expected. " IV-sides," added he, " the 
Government is sure to commit hluudei-s, to become discredited 
in public opinion, and tlitii your rij^hts will come to you of 
their own accord." The I'riiice yielded to this reasoning, and, 
setting out at once for his estates, began to prepare the coup 
iVctiit which he meditated. 

On his departure the Queen-Ue^ent appointed a Council to 
administer tlie affairs of IStato. This Council was composed of 
the minister Dhaii'm Singh, of his brother Guh'ib Singh, of the 
geneiiils Koehal Singh and Attar Singh, and of the fakir B&m 
Singh. 8ucl] a Government was discredited before its forma- 
tion because the chief of the State, the Queen Mother, by her 
dissolute manners and her intrigues, which had led her huBband 
and her son to death, had lost the public esteem- On the other 
hand, the presence in her Council of two rival pai'ties, each 
liitterl}' hating the other, was ruinous to the conduct of affairs. 
jVll men of sense regarded it as an absurd Government, which 
could not last. 

A very short time proved the truth of this opinion. The 
minister, Dhaian Singh, withdrew, in disgust, to his eatatet 
Hia departure was a death-blow to the Govemmont. In it> 
uncertain course it knocked its foot against every stone, and 
did everything wrong. Its incapacity with respect to ths 
administration of the army waa ao marked that, whilst it 
disorganised, it made discontented the men who compoaed fl> 
^Vith respect to civil affairs, both adminiatratora and Bdmimi- 
trated came to a dead-lock ; the funds of the State 'were di» 
aipated, and everything seemed to presage ita rain. The x 
at large cried oat for a man I 

Affaira were in this condition when Genaral Yentonb a 
upon the acene, retnming from bis btilliant c _ _ 
datriotB north-east of Uult&n. The court gan migaP" 



AJier Eatijil Singh's Death. 69 

in bis bonour; and the ai'tillery fiml salvos in honour of the 
capture of Kamalin, a fortress which, to that day, had heon 
considered imprcgnahle. 

As, before his arrival, Vuntura had come to an understanding 
with Sher Singh, ho hcpan at onto to prepare the way of his 
return to power. In his efforts he was considerably aided by 
[tublic opinion ; a Rreat deal by the strong feeling of the rank 
and file of the army. The chief difficulty was to gain the 
generals commanding the si'veral corps, and who, bearing in 
mind their recent hostile attitude towards the prince, dared not 
approach him. But Ventura explained to tliem very clearly 
that, unless Sher Singh were supported, the certain result of 
the existing crisis would be the seizure of the royal power by 
the Jamu family, and that theu short work would be made with 
them and with the army ; that it was imperative that they 
should forget the past, and recall Hher 8ing]i — a man whose 
coora^e was incontestible, and who, mure than anyone else, had 
at heart the maintenance of the Sikh nation on the pinnacle on 
which it had been placed by Ranjit Singh. Convinced by this 
reasoning, the generals gave way, and sent secret emissarien 
to the Prince to give and receive guarantees. Finally, it wan 
lesolTed that on the next great holiday, then approaching, when 
all the troops of the garrison of Li'ihor would be under arms to 
line, on both sides, the road to tlie sacred ediUce, they should 
seize the opportunity of the Court being between the two liue-i, 
to pronounce the deposition of tlie Itcgont, and to ])roclaiiii 
Sh£r Singh king of the Funj.ib. One of the divisions of tlie 
army having, in the intcr>'al, revolted against its general, the 
Prince, impatient for action, determined to throw himself in 
their ranks, and rally them to his cause. He did appear 
amongst them at sanset on the 13th of January, and was at 
onise sainted by a salvo of artillery. This was a fatal blow to 
the partisans of the Regent, for it proved a signal of revolt 
ipinat that lady to the forty thousand men at Labor and in 
itii environs. Amongst the divisions that went over was the 
diviflion of General Coort, unaccompanied, however, by that 
general, who, though sympathising with the Prince, felt himself 
bound by Ins oath of Melity to stand by the Regent. During the 
night. Shi'r Siugh'.s party was continually augmented. At day- 
bre^ok, thanks to the co-operation of the division of Eooh&l Singh, 
be was in n position to attack the fort with every prospect of 
mceeas; bat he confined him^lf to seising an advantageous 
This delay gave time to QviSb Sin^ to take all 



70 After Jlanjit Sinfjlis Death. 

possible measurcfl for defence, and to introduce into the fort 
three thousand of his own hill troops. The division of Man 
Singh, a battalion of Gurkhas, and a great number of Gur- 
churas, were already beliind its walls. Aided by other gonemls 
still faithful to the llegent, Guliib Singh provided also for the 
defence of the city, manning the ramparts and gates with 
artillery and infantry. 

At daybreak the following morning, 15th January, the Prince, 
massing his troops, marched along the north face of the town, 
and entered it by the gate Tankssili without firing a shot. As 
he did this, from th(^ artillery parks in the city and from the 
giuis on the ramparts a salvo of artillery saluted him — a 
suflicient proof to the adherents of the Kegent that Fortune 
had abandoned them. They WTre, however, still obstinate, and 
bade defiance to Sher Singh from tlie fort. 

The Prince, observing this attitude, and hoping to attain his 
end without bloodshed, detached the division of General Court 
into the garden, called Bagli Hazuri, in the hope that on its 
appearance the garrison w-ould open the gates. This so far 
succeeded, that the leading regiment of the division penetrated 
into the fort without being filled upon. It was asserted that 
this abstention from firing was a consequence of the orders of 
Gulitb Singh, who, believing that tlie Prince himself would lead 
the movement, had laid in wait for him, trusting that his death 
would put an end to the revolution. Deceived, however, in his 
anticipations, and seting that the Prince was preparing to 
batter the walls, he opened suddenly upon his troops a fire so 
close and so murderous that it produced among them something 
approachhig to a panic. Tliey had not been expecting an 
attack, werij huddli.'d together in groups, and were forced to 
take the attitude of men sm'prised at a disadvantage. 

The Prince at onc(^ turned liis attention to his infantry, re- 
formed them bi^hind his guns, and then opened upon the fort a 
very heavy artillery fire. This fire continued without cessation 
during the 15th, ItJth, and 17th January. During this period, 
likewise, several murderous hand-to-hand encounters ensned 
between the partisans of the several chiefs, the latter inciting 
their followers by profuse gifts of gold and silver. The besiegers, 
in the open and unprotected, suffered gi'eatly from the fire of 
the garrison. But nothing could stop their intrepidity. Thej 
marched night after night to the foot of the ynJls of the fort» 
which Colonel Delaroche had mined at several points, and 
demanded with loud cries that the match should be lighted, tQ 



After llanjit Singh's Death. 71 

•lixe thfiu an opening for the assault. The Prince, however, 
animated by the feav lest tljcy should pillage the treasures 
iimnsKt'd by Ranjit Singh, always kept them back. 

On th{! 17tli, all the gcncralu who had till thtn held aloof 
made their submission to Sher Singh. He received them with 
•rreat affability, but he could not refrain a smile of satisfaction 
whtii ho atecpted the na^nhta* of GenernlH ^'eutm-a and 
t'ourt. From that momcni; the first-uamed became the right 
arm of the Prince, and directed all his affairs. The Punjitb, in 
tile critical times when everytbiug seemed to presa-^e a terrible 
ilisordtr, ought to esteem itself fortunate that this general used 
to so good a purpose the extraordinary popularity he enjoyed 
amongst the Sikh iroops. But for b<s infiueuce, many generals 
would have become victims to their own soldiers. As it was, 
this fatal period saw the introduction into the Sikh amiy of a 
license quite unrestrained. It went so far, that a ba Ltalion of Tej 
Singh's troops dared to present themselves to the Prince with a 
request that that general should be made over to them, for the 
express purjiose of being massacred. Tej Singli owed his life 
solely to General Ventura's influence with his soldiers. 

The same day, at midday, the garrison, harassed and dis- 
cooraged, and seeing no signs of the reinforcements promised 
by Gul&b Singh, offered to capitulate. At the news of this 
<^er the be&iegers raised mingled shouts of joy and rage, and 
iwore that they would give no quai'ter. A great number of 
them ran to force the Prince to refuse all couilitions. The 
diBorder became terrible ; the bugle-cry ordering cessntion of 
6ze vaa not listened to, and all was chaos. Suddenly Dhaian 
Singh and his brother, GulAb Singh, appeared upon the sceno. 
Then this purging mass made a rush to extern'nate these, 
their chiefest enemies. The Prince could onlj' save them by 
taking refuge with them in a sacred editiee. This action only 
ineieaaed t^e fury of the crowd thirsting for blood. Geueral 
TeDtura, despairing of any other mode of appeasing their, 
nored vith difficulty to a position in their rear, and, summoning 
tham to him, offered them money in quantities. This action 
dtgbaeied their attention ; and the night which tollowed put an 
Old to this terrible scene, worthy of cannibals. Ventura and 
hifl conlidants hastened to profit 1^ it to canse the garrison to 
^uit the fort. The Begent, on the invitation of the Prince, 
I'lemained in it. 



m ptrMD of Tsnk paji lib ratpsota to & prince. — Sd. 



72 After llavjit Siugh's l)eath. 

On tho 18tb the entire artillery in Lahor announced hy a 
salvo the trimnph of Hher Sinj^li. Mounted on an elephant, 
and followed by his ^[enerals, the new Kinf;; traversed tho front 
of the line, conj^ratulated the troo])s on their intrepidity, dis- 
tributed to them money, and promised to reward still raort* 
those who had deserwd the most. He then dismissed them to 
their quarters. 

The troops obeyed this order — but, their minds still exaspe- 
rated by the furious resistance made them by the garrison, th<'y 
suddenly revolted against their ollicers, slc^w pitilessly the most 
severe of them, rudely expelled others, and kept only those who 
were ready to flatter and minister to their pride. From this 
moment massacre became the order of the day in the Sikh 
army, and the redress by murder of personal wrongs the rule. 
The soldiers indulged their grudge specially against their pay- 
masters, who had paid them only according to defined regu- 
lations, and every one; of these men suflfered death. At thr 
instigation, moreover, of some of the younger officers, ambitious 
of high rank, the soldiers dared (?ven to attemjjt the lives o( 
some of the older commanders who, whilst they had shown 
great solicitude for tin? comfort of the rank and file, had not 
the less been rigorous upholders of discipline. They made it a 
crime of these men that during the three days of the siege they 
had not appeared amongst them. They would not iniderstaiid 
that those generals had been kept at their posts near the Queen- 
Regent, in spite of their secret wishes, by their oath. They did 
not the less jnllage and devastate their houses. 

The house of General Court — a charming residence bestowed 
upon him by lianjit Kiiigh — was not spared on this occasion. 
In spite of the knowledge they possessed of the devotion of 
this general to Sher Singh, the soldiers sacked it. The family 
of the General were exposed to givat risks, and, but for the 
opportune anival of the commandant of the royal guard, sent 
expressly by Sher Singh, would have been murdered. Some 
few days later. General Court, acting on the earnest repre- 
sentations of Genei-al Ventura, retired across the Satlq to 
Firuzpiir, in British teiTitor^'. As to Ventura himself, he had 
a right to esteem himself fortunate that his own troops were 
not still occupied in the district beyond Mult&n. 

The city of L&hor ran the greatest danger of being pillaged. 
But General Ventura, by patrolling the streets with his awB 
men, and taking other vigorous measures for the pnhlic safe^v 
succeeded in averting that calamity. 



After Ranjii Singh's Death. 7S 

The Prince, petrified by this unexampled revolt, did not dare 
to proeet'd af^iiinst the barbarians to whom hi' owed liis throne. 
He hastened, nevertlieless, to send amongst them his orderly 
officers, to lirinj:^ tliem to reason. But it was in vain. At a 
general parade whieli he ordered two days hitcr, thi; greater 
part of tlie troops appeared with the ^uns loaded and th(^ 
niaiches lighted. Sher Singh did not tlu' less attempt to 
bring them luick to a sense of duty, telling them pUiinly that, 
whilst willing to forgive the past, he was rt'solved to i)roceed 
with the gi'eatest severity against thosr who should attempt to 
repeat sueh conduct. He then ordered that live months' pay 
— which was in arrears — and one months' as a gratification, 
should be disbursed to them. He also increasi>d their pay by 
a rupee per month all round. The lirst regiment which came 
to receive the pay and the gratification demanded more. The 
soldiers had even the audacitv to <lechire that if the Prince did 
not comply with their demands, they would make him descend 
from the throne on which they had placed him, and seat upon 
it someone more complaisant. Forced to temporise, Sher Singli 
granted all they asked for, the mori* readily as he could do so 
without indenting on the royal treasury; for ht^ had at his 
disposal the fifteen millions which his predecessor, Nao Nilial 
Singh, had left in his private treasure-chest. 

On the great day of the sacred festival, Sher Singli seated 
himself on the throne of the Panjal). The ceremonial was 
magnificent, but the tumult was great, for indiscipline conthuied 
to he the order of the day. 

Snch was the result of this revohition — a revolution sur- 
passing, in the extremity which it reached, those of the times 
of the emperors Galba and Otho ; for then, though the Prae- 
torians showed great audacity, they ni^ver ]>ushed their fury 
to excesses such as those which marked the revolution of 
Lihor. 

In this revolt of the Sikh anny some have thought they 
recognised the hand of a secret enemy desirous of <lestroying 
its Emnopean organisation. However that nuiy be, it is certain 
that a mortal blow has been dealt to it ; for its discipline — 
tliat YJbnting nerve without which no army can exint — can with 
SUiBaify he restored after so total a disruption. 



*• JfT?- ••* I- -- 



By a General Officeb. 



Afteb many years service in the Royal Artillery at home, in 
the colonies, in the Crimea, and in India, I venture to think that 
I have had an experience which should enable me to form a JMt 
opinion of the' existing condition of the army ; and I offer the 
following remarks with the greater confidence from the fact that 
I believe I shall be supported by the great preponderance td. 
military opinion, of any considerable eiperieace, throaghoot aO 
ranks and all arms. 

I do not think I exaggerate when I say that a very genenl 
feeling of dissatisfaction exists as regards the fitness of the ann; 
to enter upon any really serious struggle, in which EuropeM 
complications might cause this country to be involved in 8d^ 
defence. 

It cannot be denied that the artillery is a very efficient am 
as regards its separate merits, viz., batteries of Horse and Pieli 
Artillery, and when the field guns have been improved (as it i<] 
only reasonable to believe they must be at once *) ; and as Ha 
period for which the men enlist is considerable, it may be Bafe^i 
considered that this arm is as good as that of any country in ^ 
world, to say the least. The cavalry also, as far as its strengA, 
goes, is excellent, as to personal discipline, horses, and cquipmeoit^ 
Bat, when we come to consider the infantry, forming as it doe^^ 
numerically, the mass of the army, it is sad to think that its coa' 
-dition is such as to leave much to be desired. 

■ It in sitisl 
p&TAd for introi 



Shart Remarks on Short Service. 76 

Without venturing to enter on so comprehensive a subject as 
the general organisation of tliis or any other arm, I will confine 
myself to considering the condition of the infantry generally, as 
illustrated in a single battalion, without reference to anyone in 
particular. 

I have it on good military medical authority, that the physique 
is extremely bad — in fact, to quote the expression used to me, 
** we have no infantry." Physical statistics prove this. 

Bj this was meant that the age of the men, accompanied of 
necessity by physical shortcomings, their chest measurement, 
their power to stand climate and resist disease, render the force 
of small value. 

But apart from these considerations, the conditions of service 
recently existing were such as to preclude the possibility of a 
battalion possessing those high qualities of discipline and esprit 
^^ coipSy to which, with the desired quality of good physique, we 
<^an alone with reason trust for the proper performance of the 
functions of the infantry, in standing the severe trials of a 
possible conflict, in which it might be opposed to the highly- 
gained troops of some of the belligerent powers of Europe. 

If the cause of this state of aflfairs is asked, I should reply that 
it is mainly, if not altogether, attributable to the Short Service 
System, than which I can conceive nothing worse adapted to 
the continuous, multifarious, and very distant requirements of 
this great empire. 

It is said by its few advocates, and I presume as its strongest 
apology, that, in the present state of the country, short service 
^^ a necessity, the only alternative being general conscription. 

I am by no means willing to admit the accuracy of this 
^Pxxiion, and I have no doubt that a plentiful supply of recruits 
^^lild be obtained at all times were the old system of bounty on 
^'^listment, or an increased rate of pay while serving, to meet 
"^^ high rate of the labour market, with pension at the expira- 
"^^ of service, again resorted to ; and especially if efforts were 
P^^de to secure employment for capable men, of good character, 
"^ Various Government establishments. 

I would also parenthetically suggest that the means of em- 
P^^oyment might be immensely increased by inviting the co- 
^I^earation, to this end, of the various municipalities throughout 
*'t^e country : their local influence with the mercantile community 
^^xild hardly fail to have substantial eflfect. 
^ To suppose, for a moment, that under any system a con- 
siderable number of a superior class of young men could be 



76 Short Remarks on Short Service. 

induced to onlist appears to nic most Utopian ; and, for my 
part, I should say that they would, in lar«;e numbers, form a 
most undesirable element in the ranks of the army. 

Good healthy labourers form a much more promising material 
out of which to shape well-disciplin(;d and drilled soldiers, than 
the general run of failures in other walks of life, of which the 
ideal ** superior class of young men " would principally consist. 

It is also pleaded, as an excuse for the short service system, 
that it will be the means of amassing a large reserve force : and 
no doubt this is a point of very high importance*: but I am 
sure that the quality of the first fighting force cannot prudently 
bo sacrificed even for the purpose of forming a numerous 
reserve. 

To admit that tliis was justifiable would be rquicah'nt to a 
consent to bi* defeated in a first batth\ in the hope that such 
a disaster might be retrieved in a second battle — than which a 
more fallacious princii)le could not be advancc^d. 

Not only is shcu't service condemned by almost all professionally 
cx)mp(^tent to judge, but suj^port would be givt-n to this vii'dicb 
by every employer of labour, if informed that the moment of his 
service when a soldier is arrived at full possession of the physical 
and technical qualities which render him most efficient is the 
very one at which he is generally dischargetl, even though it be 
with liabilitv to serve in the reserve. 

In the various employments of civil life, a contrary principle 
prevails and is acted on. 

Modified though the original short service system has been> 
an adherence to it even in its present form appears to me most 
undesirable. 

With all due respect to a great suj^porter of the system, 1 may 
mention an anecdote in which shrewd common sense is shown* 
such as, I trust, in the interests of the country, will sbortly 
prevail throughout it. 

A labouring man said to me, about the time of the expedition 
to Egj'pt, " Ain't Sir G. Wolseley a great man for short 
senice? " and to my reply, "Yes," he said, " Well, sir, it seems 
to me when he goes out hisself he takes care to take a good lot 
of old ones with 'im." 

In view of recent events and representations, this, to my 
mind, speaks volumes. 



* Recent ■tAtisticii, publiBhod in the TYiMft, show that eTen the 
eal reBnlts in dpTclopmcnt of the Reserrcs have not bcon rcftliwdf nmoli IBM 
deairecl 



Short Uemarh on Short Si'.rnce. 77 

Tliere arc miiny coiise«{ueiice3 of short service (of which I will 
notice a. Tew) wliieh are most prejudicial to the efficiency oftho 
infiintrj". 

Foremost amoiif; these may be mciitioDL'd tlie increased dif- 
ficulty of st;ttiiif^ yiiod n on -commissioned officers, on wliom so 
mneli in the wjiy of discijilinc aa well as elementary instruction 
must depend. 

It is the more important that non-commissioned oiHcors 
tihouM ln> enpahlc? and judicions in the oxt^rciKQ of niitbority when 
the tnasiji of tln> men are young. Though tlio i)ower to aifor<:e 
ohedieiiet! to tlioir orders must naturally he vi'stetl in non-coni- 
missit^iiied offiL-ers, an injiidieiftHs exorcise of authority, esiMJcially 
with viiung soldit-rn, is most detrimental, and often disgusts and 
Fpoils a man who niiylit with tact b<' firmly yuided into the right 
path. 

Huch discretion as is n^qnircd for this is rarely to he found in 
the young c^^rporal. while old seasoned non-commissioned 
officers, who through obedience in their several gratles have 
leamt to e^mininnd, often show a taut in dealing wicli their 
mes, which is the means of preventing insnbordiuatiou rather 
fl»an of aggravating hesitiition to obey info the more serious 



Then, again, the necessities of tlio serviet; reqnire so much 
inatroction other than the matter of drill and use of the rifle. 
Classes have to bo fonnod for gymnastics, signalling, tclegraph- 
iogi cooking, &e. &c., besides the regular regimental school 
natine, and these have all to ho kept up to thcii* full numbers ; 
■0 that with these, in addition to the ordinary daily duties, time 
is yery fully occupied — properly, no doubt, — but it often happens 
Uiat a soldier is found to be possessed of many accorapUsliments, 
though he may present on parade a sorry appearance, and be an 
ilwolatfl obstacle in the manccuvres of his company. 

It may at first sight seem that it is not fair to attribute such 

zeralta to short serviee, but as a matter of fact, they are more 

at Imb directly brought about by so much being crowded into 

Am Uttle time a man has with the colours. 

Think of the five years — it was, the seven now — that a man has 

\ 1o BCTve, and observe what has to be done. Drills, rifle instruc- 

I tioD, judging distance, school, goardB, marches, field-days, campa 

I of instruction, periods in hospital, moves at home from station 

I to station, transport to India, period of acolimatisation, and 

1 inw much remains for the peiformance of ordinary duty. 

b^KfaBk-in:faaWT^lDBB the ooontry get in retnm for the freah 



78 Short Itemarhs on Short Service. 

expense of enlistment, instruction, clothing, maintenance, and 
transport in the case of a soldier doomed to be discharged just 
as he arrives at professional maturity ? 

I set asidi? all matters of sentiment, such as are experienced 
by the various grades of officers, who cannot, however, fail to 
feel that instead of matter of satisfaction and pride in their 
commands, they experience what was well described by Mr. 
Mantalini when turning the mangle. 

I am aware that thcTe are some modifications of the terms of 
service, such as re-engagement under certain restrictions or con- 
ditions, but I do not think they are on a scale to materially 
aflfect the circumstances.* 

Tliere is another view of the subject in a general political 
sense, which is no doubt more a matter for the consideration of 
the legislator than the military critic, but which, however, I 
would venture to notice. 

A very great result of the short service system is the casting 
loose on society, in very large numbers, of half-disciplined men 
fau'ly instructed as soldiers, without pension, without employ- 
ment, and a large proportion of them, i.e. those of indifferent 
or bad character, unfit for most fixed employments, and of 
adventurous spirit. 

Surely in these days, when it is patent to every obser\'er that 
a great wave of democracy is sweeping through the world, and 
when, in parts of our o^vn country, the spirit of law-breaking 
and sedition is rife, surely it might be wise to pause and consider 
whether this result of short service may not be fraught with 
danger. 

It may, perhaps, be urged that all these suggestions are bufa 
series of theories ; but I would reply, what have been our 
experiences of our infantry as a fighting-machine during the last 
few years ? 

Have we not seen in India, at the Cape, yes, and even in 
Egypt, cases in which most serious shortcomingB have been 
shown ? 

Is it not a fa<;t that the feeling on the part of the offioers, aa 
to confidence in their men, is not what could be desired ? Was 
it not the case that that very brilliant exploit, the mazeh from 
Cabal to Candahar was performed by a carefolly sdeeted fona 



* Recently published General Orderi, howeyer, hftTJBg rtffl ftgtfwr i . ■.■...^^.y^ ^ . 



opportunity of extension of serriee, let us hope that the weakaMi of tbi ^^fiiHi^m^ ^4 
ahcri serriee is beginning to be reoognised. ''*' ' " ' ^ 



Short llemarkx oil Short Service. 79 

of till' oldost fioldicrs avaikltlu ? and was it not the cn.sc that, 
inclu'liiig all braneht's of the Hcrvico in the cxpcilition to Effjpt, 
ihe proportion of Muldiers of eoiisiderabk- scrviei' was very largo 
indt'id '? Waw this not so iirraiigi-d bocnnse tlie very stroiii;oHt 
i>tipiK)rters of the system di<t not care to trust events to yomig 
soldiers ? 

I tiniiiy believe that onr shorteoniinffH nf late have ariwii in 
thf main from the large leaven of young aoldit'rs with whieh the 
strength, the integrity, of our battalions ia diluted. It would 
indeed Ik: humiliating to supiKise that the initional spirit in 
changed, or that, proix-rly dealt with, this eonntry can no longer 
find ail infantry capable of maintaining tlio glorious rejiutation 
of jMist days ; but we should not shut our oyes to the fact that 
the l>eBt fabric may be ruined by tho introduction of an element 
misuitablo hi quahty or quantity into its manufacture. 

Whether it be that the short period of service, occupied as it 
is, does not a£Ford sufficient time for a proper and eHicacious 
iDstnictioD in the use of the ritle, I cannot say ; but it is 
notorious (whatever the elaborately tabnlated returns of riflc- 
■hooting on the practice grounds may show) the results in real 
practice against an enemy ari' contemptibly and ridiculously 
bad. 

I recently learnt from an old ritie iiistnictor (entirely at a loss 
to account for it) that in Afghanistan he saw a regiment so 
atterlf powerless to fire with elft>ct uptm the enemy, though at 
short range, that some officers and i)ieked marksmen fi-11 out, 
ran round the head of a ravine, and posting themselves among 
meka where mounted Afghans below at some l.'>0 yards distance 
eonld not get at them, blazed away for some time and only 
soeceeded in wounding one man ! 

An officer commanding a native regiment at one of the battles 
in Alghanistan told me that he saw a regiment of the Line 
filing upon a force of Afghans advancing towards them over 
1,600 yuds of gronnd, and th&t the casaalties our men inflicted 
VWB almost ml. 

Bow ia all this? It is bad indeed. There must be some- 

ttdng ladieally irrong where not only the marksman fails, but 

' even where the collective results of infantry fire are next to 

nothing. In the varioas skirmishes in Egypt the results appear 

to have been of like character. 

StcndinesH of firing and observance of necessary instructions are 
most to be expected when there is high discipline, and that this 
the mass of the Boldiers are vary young then 



so Short Remarks on Short Service. 

<*an be no doubt. I therefore believe that the bad shooting of 
the infantiy, synchronous as it is with short service, is in a 
great measure a consequence of that system ; at any rate, if the 
period of service were longer, there would undoubtedly be greater 
opportunity of greater skill being shown. 

It is not improbable that I may now be met with the argu- 
ment, ** But look how well the army did in Egypt." Well, let us 
look. 

There are several points of view from which to consider this 
subject. 

1st. As an effectual carrying out of our policy, it cannot be 
denied that it was a great success, and that much credit is 
due. 

2ndly. As an illustration of our army system, I reply distinctly 
it is none at all. Short service was not tested. In the main 
young soldiers w^ere discarded from the force, their places filled 
by older men, to the great deterioration of the battalions from 
which they were taken, by a call upon the reserve, in entire 
<lepartiu:e from the i)rincii3le on which it is formed ; and further 
by the emj^loyment of the Guards, the cavalry, artillery, and 
marines. The actual number of young soldiers was small 
indeed. 

3rdly. From the strictly military point of view, it may be 
briefly summed up — 

The best force we could muster of all arms, supplemented by 
an important contingent from India, aided by the boats of the 
fleet, supplying means of transport, which was most defective, 
succeeded in reducing to subjection a disorganised EgyptiaB 
army, reinforced by raw levies from the peasantry, all acting 
under the orders of an ofiicial in rebellion against the Viceroyj 
who was very doubtfully supported by his sovereign. 

The climate no doubt was a serious difficulty, but fortune 
signally favoured us, and the end was a success, of which, by the 
way, we have heard a good deal. 

Let us not, then, imagine that the merits of our system, oi 
the quality of battalions of young soldiers, have been in anj 
way tested ; or suppose from our recent success, that we shoal€ 
80 easily prevail, if opposed to the highly trained troops o 
Europe. 

That the general character of the representations of events ii 
Egypt has this tendency there can be no doubt. I might mor< 
correctly have said misrepresentations, for anything more pre 
posterous than the comparison of the distinction earned by th< 



Short Hemarkx on Short Service. 81 

infantry at Tel-el-Kebir with an}/ exploit of former days could 
not be. 

Thou<;h to succeed iu attack with few casualties is, of course, 
a happy circumstance, indicative of good manaj^ement, yet the 
proportion of casualties to the numbers engaged is the only 
int-rriiiK teHt of the severity of conflict. Thus an occasion such 
1)3 Tel-el-Kcbir, where the casualties were no more then 4 per 
'ent., cannot bear comparison with numerous instances of 
'tnii^glt.-s, in which the proportion was enormous, culminating 
it Albnera, where 75 per cent, was the price of yictory {ride 
>iapier). 

I have ■nTitten thoughtfully, but very earnestly, for 1 am 
'ouviuced that we are misguided ; that the system whutse 
weakness in practically illustrated in the hour of need is fraught 
with the highest peril to this country. I have limited myself to 
a few points ; much more might be said in objection to it, 
bat I know not one argument iu its favour save those to which 
1 have replied. 

In these days, when the possibility is admitted that our naval 
power might not be sufficient to prevent a landing on our shores 
— when a tunnel under the Straits of Dover is contemplated, 
and may Heaven forbid its cotistnirtiim .' — useful as it might be 
to the enemy, not as a means of invasion, but of subsoi^uent 
communication for supplies, &c.— surely it behoves us to be 
euefol that the small army, which alone this country will 
inaintn.in permanently, shall not be allowed to deteriorate in 
qulity, and that its organisation may be such as to ensure 
fiwility of ezpansion. 

Wfl have a precious treasure to guard in the independence of 
ttte Britiah nation — a golden prize in its wealth to tempt the 
graad of nations whose principles might not prove sufficiently 
Idf^ to hold them back, should a plausible excuse for attack 
ooanr. 

Th^ Bee, they know the weakness of a system they can well 

jndgB of; they emile — nay, sneer — at the undue importance 

' a to recent events ; and they may think we 

It jt fool's paradise. 

! efherwise, and may the views of a very small 

idnority ho set aside iu conaideration of the vast mqority of 

aperienc(;d opinions, and a gradnal return to increased length 

I service be brought about ! 

However great importance nu^ be attaohed, and properly, to 
iltber anne. it should never be f6r|{otten that " la neteirt at 
6 



82 Short Remarks on Short Service. 

toujours avec les gros battalions,*' that infantry is the main-spring 
of battles, and that to experimentalise with the infantry, unless 
in the direction of a higher discipline, instruction, and solidity, 
is to incur a risk which may, we know not how soon, be the 
means of hurling this country from its pinnacle of greatness to 
irretrievable ruin. 

The course which I have now endeavoured to advocate is one 
which no party interests or feelings should be permitted to 
affect ; and in the firm belief that it is a matter of vital im- 
portance, I would venture to say to all who in power, or who 
by their votes and opinions, can influence the future con- 
ditions of service, 

** Aide qui pent.** 



% gettrmintb Spirit. 

A TBTJE STOET, 

IlLUSTIUTIVE of the ChABAOTES of the CrUBEEA.. 



JuBHUi Thapfa, Gurkha, 'was a private in one of our Gurkha 
r^imenta. He took unto himself the cast-off irife of a comrade, 
ud, as she was not permitted to reside in the lines of his regi- 
meat, he procured for her lodging in the hut of a zemindai' 
(bnher) in a neighbouring villago. In this but Jaibhan was 
in tbfl habit of keeping considerable supplies of food, also a 
■Wttdi ui old revolver, and some ammunition. 

Ona day, when returning from a shooting excursion, with bis 
double-barrel gaa over bia shoulder, ami Lis kuki'ie {Gurkba 
knife) in hia girdle, be saw tbe zemindar disputing with tbo 
former busbaud of bis wife, and auotber comrade, about some 
debts incun-ed by the woman. His passion was at once aroused, 
and be augi'Uy assei'ted bis right to settle all sucli claims. A 
quarrel ensued. Tbe zemindar endeavoured to pass a rope 
round Jaibbau's neck, wbeu the latter promptly shot bim dead. 
Tbe other two men, fearing a similar fate, ran for their lives. 

Jaibhan bud now lost all control over his temper, and, seeing 
the wife of one of the fagitives standing near, be fired tbe othtr 
barrel of bis gun at her, wounding her aligbtly. 

Jaibhan Tbappa despised and hated tbe police. He also 
understood tbe principles of tbe "defence of a bouse." He 
accordingly decided t^i stand a wiege in the zemindar's but, 
ib^ady stocked with food and ammunition for fourteen days. 
Having provided himself with an ample supply of water, barri- 
caded tbo door and windows, and loop-holed the upper storey, 
be sat himself down, quietly and cheerfully, to await the arrival 
of the police- 

Id due coarse the native inspector of police arrived, attended 
by some of hia foUowei-s, and proceeded to examine the corpse of 



84 A Determined Spirit. 

the murdered man, which lay a few yards from one of Jaibhan'R 
loop-holes. 

Such a chance the defender miirht not again have, so he aayc 
the inspector a charge of eliigs in his left arm, severely woundinf; 
him, and putting to flight h'3 followers. 

The aid of the military was now applied for, and the district 
superintendent of police arrived with a very considerable 
reinforcement. 

In a very short time twenty soldiers and forty police stir- 
rounded the fortress of the resolute .Jaihhan; but it waa 
impregnable to everything but artillery or mines. Jaibban was 
dnly summoned to suiTonder. He agreed to do so provided the 
two soldiers and the woman, who wore the cause of the quarrel, 
were brought before his loop-holes. He also added that he bad 
no wish to take the life of any sahib, or of his comrades; but 
that ho would shoot any policeman who came within range. 

Evening drew on, and the police grew impatient, and deter- 
mined to storm Jaibhan's stronghoM. They crept up to the 
door, keeping close to the walls, ard, taking a huge log with 
them, which they used as a battering ram, they proceeded to 
baiter in the door. They succeeded in getting it open for abont 
six inches ; but Jaibhan's double-barrel knocked two of them 
over like nine-pins, wounding one severely and the other slightly. 
The remainder beat a hasty retreat. 

It was now getting dark, so all offensive operations were 
abandoned for the night, and the besiegers set about placing ft 
cordon of sentries. 

A Guikha sepoy incautiously showed a portion of his head: 
the beleaguered man thought it belonged to a policeman, and 
Itromptly put a bullet through it, mortally wounding the 
nnfortunate owner. 

The advantage up to the present entirely lay with the defence, 
the assailants having lost in killed, one semindar ; mortally 
wounded, one sepoy ; severely wounded, two policemen ; eligh^ 
wounded, one policeman, and one woman. Total, six caBu^ties. 

On the following morning, the superintendent of police, aeoom- 
panied by n European for whom J'aibhan wee in the habit of 
shooting birds, and who stated that he would be able topamiade 
him to give himself up, went to have a consultation with the 
beaieged from inside another hut, wfaioh was oloea alongaide. 
TFhe conference apparently produced no effect. 

The superintendent and the European then consulted ae to ] 
fnrtber opentionu, when Jaibfaan eoddenly appeared in Hie t), 




A Determined Spirit. 86 

armed to the teeth, with hia douhle-barrel gun at full-cock, a 
iiaked tulwar (native Bword), and a kukrie, and said that he in- 
tended going to the kotwuli {policti station). The police sentriee 
were ao astonished at hia appearanci.', that they ft'll back on 
ttvery side. Jaibhan saw the police superinteiidoiit and the 
other European, and invited them to accompany him, which 
ibey did. On seeing the men of his regiment, who had been sent 
10 assist the police, he called to them to fall in bebind him. 

On being asked by the superintendent of police to give up his 
arms, he replied that he had not the slightest intention of doing 
ra until he reached the kotwuli. 

On the way there, be drank some water from a fouutaiu, and 
ate some sweetmeats, which the police oEhcer htvd procured 
ior him. 

On arrival at the police station, he kept his promise, and 
made over to the superintendent all his arms, saying, " Now, 
S&hib, I am your prisoner." 

[q due course the man was tried, firstly, for the murder of the 
umindar, and, secondly, for the murder of the Ourkha aepoy, 
wlio had died from the effects of the wound he had received in 
tba head. He was found guilty, and sentenced to death. 

The night before the sentence was to be carried into execution, 
the jailorB had neglected to put on his handcuffs, although the 
Isg-irona were left on. Jaibhan was a powerful man, and detei*- 
mmed to have another struggle. He wrenched off one of his 
log-ironi, and with it dug out some of the bricks fvom the walls 
of his cell. In the morning, when the police-guard came to take 
hha to the scaffold, he pelted them with the bricks, and fairly 
drore them from the cell. 

The magiBtrate and doctor then came on the scene, and 
neoeedad ia persuading him to give himself up quietly ; but 
onlj on ocaiditionB that he should be allowed to walk with them, 
U a free man, to the scaffold, himself place the rope around 
hk neok, and give the signal for the holt of the drop to be 
dnnm. Thau conditionB were dnly carried out. 




86 



i\t %k\m\ Campaign of 1878-80. 

A FEW MILITAEY DEDUCTIONS. 
By Major M. J. King-Haiiman, Bengal Staff Corps. 



{Continued from page 586, vol. F.) 

In my humble opinion the system of skirmishing adopted in 
the British army is entirely unsuited to Asiatic warfare. Long 
lines of scattered skirmishers never can work properly in a hilly 
country, such as Afghanistan and the intervening independent 
territories, and are entirely out of place when fighting against an 
enemy of great numerical superiority, who are very formidable 
in hand-to-hand fighting. This applies to British soldiers, and 
consequently with much greater force to native troops, who hav« 
so few British officers to guide or rally them. In India certainly 
our men should be trained to fight on hilly ground in compact 
but handy formation, thereby ensuring unity of action and 
control of fire, while at the same time the men will work with 
greater confidence and dash. 

We have long ago recognised the fact that the conditions of 
Asiatic are totally different from those of European warfaro, bat 
we insist on one and the same set of regulations for the condoet 
of both. The very best lesson (as we will not learn from onr own 
experience) is to be found in General SkobelefTs instraotions toUt 
troops before the battle of Oeok Teppe in December 1880. whidi 
are published in the Journal of the B. U. S. Institution for 1881| 
Vol. XXY. No. CXII. I believe that a careful study of OeB^ 
coupled with an equally careful study of the manner in whicih 
our numerous fights in Asia have been condnoted ainee ihfl 
Umbeyla Campaign of 1868-64, will show how entirdyimmg 
our present system is. 

The time has now arrived for a complete altomtioii ia ib^- 
present system of mnsketxy instmction and fire taotus 1^101 M 



The Afghan Campaign of 1878-80. 87 

does iivt make the maBs of our soldiers good sbotis on service. To 
begin with control of fire ; this is extremely difficult in the inde- 
pendent firing of British troops with regular company officers, 
but it is almost an impossibility in a native infanti? regiment. 
And it is allowed by all that uncontrolled fire is generally un- 
aimed, unproductive of results, extremely wasteful of ammuni- 
tion, and very demoralising ; therefore we come to this, that the 
skirmishing line should be less extended than s,t present, tlrnt 
th€'rc should be more British officers to control its fire and 
movements, and that the firing should be as much as possible 
by groups or sections in volleys. Then, again, there is too great 
a tendency to shoot at long ranges, a practice to which officers 
ftnd men are alike liable to be tempted by the possession of a 
far-ranging weapon. 

The careful instruction of officers, too, is most necessary, so as 
to accustom them to control and direct to the best advantage 
tbe fire of their men, and to teacb them the necessity of 
eHmomiaing tbeir ammunition, and, above all, of hitting the 
object at which their fire is directed. 1 cannot do better here 
than to quote the words of Captain K. Brooke of the 15th Foot, 
in his lecture at the U. S. Institute on 16th January, 1875, on 
the olgect of musketry instruction. " This I hold to be the 
frsimilg of soldiers, to inflict the maximum of loss on the enemy 
in the minimTim of time ; and this condition can only be fulfilled 
vhen troops have been trained to fire with extreme accuracy, 
tnd aiao when this accuracy has been practised under conditions 
H nearly as possible representing tbe actual battie-fiold." 

Onr present system of instruction and money prizes seems 
mora calcolated to produce a few good marksmen in each 
ngimeni than a large body of fair average shots. Soldiers 
ihoald be taught as far as possible never to fire until they are 
fntfy Bore of hitting, and to reserve their fire for close quarters, 
kng-ntige fire being confined to selected marksmen only ; and, 
■bofe all, we should remember that the great merit of a breecfa- 
HiltiflEug rifle is that it is a quick loading, as distinguished from a 
quick firing weapon, and that what is reaUy required is good 
footing, and not much shooting; and, above all, I would urge 
the necessity for tbe more carefxU selection of musketry 
iostnictors, and D.A.A. genends: such men should be real 
Jiportsmun and good shots in the field, and, not as some of them 
-liave been, mere target shots, and theoretical prize-hnnten. 
■Jl» an example of camfiil shooting in the part war I Traold 
pienUon the action of Uatocnn 'm the Etwt Yallcfy, and the 



88 T}ie Afghan Camiaigii of 1878-80. 

Bazar Valley expedition : in the latter, on tlie 22nd December 
1878, Brigadier-General Tjtier's Brigade, covering the retire- 
ment, was lighting all da;, and only expended 1,029 rounda of 
nfle ammiinition ; but in nearly all the engagenienta of th« 
campaign, reckless, rapid, uncontrolled fire at long ranges was 
the usual practice. 

It may be instructive here to mention that at the intipection of 
a certain brigade during the winter of 1880-81 , a crack battalion 
of British infantry wan beaten both in actual hits and points bv 
two regiments of native infantry quartered at the same station, 
the former being armed with Martini-Henry rifles, and the latter 
with 8nider6. Further comment is needless. All officers and 
men armed with revolvers should l>e frequently and carefully 
uxercised in the use of these weapons. 

On the Eqvipiient and Clothing of Tboops. 

The accoutrements worn by our infantry are a great improvt- 
meut on what they were fifty years ago, but they can be easily 
improved still further, and Dr. Oliver's accoutrements are far 
superior in every way to those now in use. One great point 
about accoutrements, after comfort and ease to the wearer, and 
suitability for the requirements of war, is that they should be bo 
made that a man can put on and take off everything by himself 
without requiring the assistance of a comrade to fasten a bnttOD 
here, or to tighten a buckle there, or rub the pipe-elay off hia 
coat in another place ; and this also applies to the long knee- 
boots worn by the artillery and cavalry, for no man can poll off 
his own boots if they fit him properly (boot-jacks not being 
carried on service). 

The ball bag now used is au eyesore aud a great encombnmce 
to a man, and bad in every way. 

The water-bottle used by the ]}ritish troops is a moat niuei- 
viceable article, and should be replaced by a white metal Twirl 
covered with felt, those for the mounted branches being of ft 
special shape to fit into or to strap on to one of the wallets. 
Those for native infantry are extremely bad, inasmuch that they 
cannot be cleaned inside, and a new one answering this refoin^ 
meni should be adopted tbrougbout India ; for if there ii OM 
thing a native is more particular about than another, it ii to to 
able to clean well with his hands both the inside and Hg^. 
outside of hia dhnking-vesBel, and few of them will drink otH 
of one that he knows to be dirty. The very beet dtKcriptiou < ' 
water-pot that I have ever seen is the one in nse with tibe i 



77m AfyUn Campau/a of 1878-80. 8^ 

Bengal Light Iiifnntry, which was devised by the lute General 
Colin Troop, after the experiences of the Afghan War of 1838-41. 
The best one for cavalry thut I have Bceu is the one made up foe 
lie 3rd Bengal Cavalry by Colonel Mackenzie. A good water- 
Mttle ie a most important article of a soldier's equipment, and 
ihould be carefully considered by Government, lu like manner 
here should be regulation patterns of water-bottle and havrcsaek 
or officers, which should be worn by them always on inarching 
irdcr parades and inspections, and form part of their equipment 
or ser^iee. liegulatione are also urgently rwinired for service- 
felts and pistols for all ofhcers, as well as regarding the carrying 
>f the great-coat by both mounted and dismounted oflieers on 
^he line of march and on service, for it is no exaggeration to say 
ibat at present no otticcr carries his gi'eat-coat. There is no 
LUthorised description of sword-belt in the Euglitili ai'my that is 
suited for service, and as yet a pistol is not a nTin}imtii iveapmi 
for an officer. 

Uonting-BaddleB should be at once and for f.'Vt-v abolished, and 
^ staff and mounted infantry officers should he ordered to adopt 
the nair pattern staff saddle. All mounted oftici'i-s should carry 
in marching order a small hobble and peg hy which to fasten 
their horaeB. The long knee-boot for artillery and cavalry, and 
far mounted officers, should be discontinued on service, and 
replaoed by an officially recognised black leather spring-sided 
gaiter, which is neat-looking, comfortable, and extremely service- 
able in every way. The officers of the Punjab Mountain 
Battoiee alwaye wore these gaiters, and you may be sure that 
thej never wore anything that was not serviceable. The 
"Gravee" combined boot and gaiter is uuseiiiiceable and un- 
Bomfortable, and the men who have tried them hate them. 

The regulation "ammunition" boot, ae worn by the British 
in&ntry is, when made well and of good materials, and tho- 
raii^i]y well softened with castor oil, as good a boot for the 
pnenU reqAirementsof a soldier as can be imagined. The weak 
pact about it is the &stening by means of leather thongs, which 
I, and is a matter of some difficulty in the dark, or 
a hands are numbed by cold, and it would not be difficult 
I practical bootmaker to devise a neat and effective mode of 

fltening hy means of one, or at most two, croBS-strape and 
irink" buckles, so that the boot could be taken off or put on 

ii'kly and with ease. 
\.k wdXahXti foot-covering for native Boldiem is a different 
^hcr, for they have to supply their own, and there- 



«0 The Afghan Campaign of 1878-80. 

fore cannot afford to buy exjienHive articlea ; and, moreoTer, 
they cannot afford to buy good socks, which are absolutely 
neccHsary when EngUsb boots are worn. Of all regiments in 
the Indian army, the one that has paid most attention to this 
BubJGct is the 12th Bombay Infantry, and they appear to have 
BOlved the question in a satisfactory manner, at any rate to 
themselves, by adopting well-made English boots, made by 
Messenger & Co., and by wearing gi-eascd rags instead of 
stockings, nftor the German custom. In this regiment the ^ict 
was first recognised that the native foot differs m shape from 
that of the European, and therefore requires a differently- 
shaped boot to the ordinary " Ammunition " ; so they had eacfa 
man's foot carefully measured, and the boots mode Id aiea 
accordingly. 

For iny own part, I consider that the best description of foot- 
coveting for a native soldier on service is the one that he is 
accustomed to wear at his own home ; but the commEmding 
officer of a regiment should pay particular attention to the 
quality of the materials and workmanship, and not allow hia 
men to save a few annas by buying articles of inferior moke ; 
and hu should also alwa^'s have a sufficient stock in reserve. Of 
course, in particular eases, such as the Gurkhas, where the 
men, OH a rule, have a special liking for English boots, they 
shonlil be allowed to wear them, provided that they can nurdk 
ctintimwmhi in them nithout gcttinp snre feet. 

The wearing of boots in the Madras aimy is compulsory ; and 
the resnltu of this are shown in the official report of 1878, in 
which we iind that in twenty-seven regiments serious complainta 
were made of footborcncss, cauHcil by wearing English or badly- 
fitting boots ; and the medical officers almost withont exception 
condemn the boot as worn withont stockings, and recommenci 
the adoption of the native shoe or " chuppal." Daring tin 
field operations of 1876 there were B,089 men, or 3 per cent, of 
the native troops on sOiTice, admitted to hospital with sore bat 
attributed to bad hoots. No statistics for Bombay and M&dxii 
can be found for 1879 showing the number of footsore dmd 
amongst the regiments in the field ; but amongat the Fniyab 
and Bengal regiments that were on service during that jf 
there were 198 cases in the former and 1,470 in the latter, 
of the above I attribute entirely to want of practice in marcbiii 
to want of core on the part of commaoding oJHccrs, nnd { 
wearing unsoftened ammunition boots that were made for T 
-differeDtly-shaped feet of the British soldier. 



The Afghan Campaign of 1878-SO. 91 

military and medical men utterly condemn the native shoe as 
being nnEtuitable for service in a rough country like AfghaniBtan; 
but ill this \icw, after considerable experience, I am unable to 
coincide. 

The war in AfghaniBtau (1878-81) is most remarkable as 
having given rise to that most unfortunate, unpatriotic, and 
extremely erroneous idea that the land forces of Her Majesty 
tlie Queen of England are no longer able to contend suecesBfuUy 
against her foes if they arc clad in the world-renowned scarlet 
uniform which has been worn heretofore by our victorious 
aimies in all parts of the world, but that directly they appear 
in the presence of an enemy it is absolutely necessary for their 
safety and success that they must carefully hide away the 
honourable colour that is beloved by all ranks, sanctioned by 
Her Majesty, approved of by the country, and that has always 
been feared by their foes, and dresB themselves up in such a 
way as to be as unlike the soldiers of Great Britain as possible, 
thus adopting an extremely slovenly-looking sort of fancy dress 
under the erroneous impression that it deludes the enemy and 
is safer for the wearer. No language is strong enough to 
eondemn such a practice ; the colour that was good enough 
iar the Peninsula and Waterloo, for Flassey and Hubraon, for 
Alma and Inkennan, is still the colour which should now and 
ever be vom by England's soldiers both in peace and in war; 
and I protest against the national colour being hidden and 
diahoiioiired in order to satisfy the whims of a few unpractical 
theorists. Could anyone imagine the brigade of Guards covering 
thenuelTes np in garments made of duut-coloured drill, before 
tanung out to repel the attack of a Russian force ? 

It is an acknowledged fact that the style of clothing ordered 
to be wom by oiScers and men is utterly unsuited for service ; 
bnt the only step that has been taken to remedy this great evil 
is to discard, for the time, the regulation dress, and to adopt a 
Tariefy of &ncy ones. The most suitable and workmanlike 
t lea n imagine for officers and men of the whole army, 
^^ i Native, is a blouse of atont scarlet serge, 
1 over the hips, and trimmed with regimental 
Jelts being worn over it. 

The lower extremities should be clothed either in Ipng tronsers 
[ or good roomy knickerbockers, made of stout dark-bine serge, 
" putties " or gaiters. Such a dress wonld answer eqnally 
1 for the plains in the cold weather, or for active serrioe 
I should be adopted in lien of the present short- 



92 The A/ghaii Campaujn of 1878-80. 

cut tight coats and patrol jacketH now in use. Brority is the 
Boul of wit, but is most iuappiicahle to tlic ^anuL-nts of a uoldii-r. 
A short coat nffonds the eji', no mattir who the wearer is, aiid 
is particularly hateful to all native Boldicrs, besides afifordiiig 
much less protection to the wearer than a lonj; one, Howivtr, 
having discovered a costume whicli is admittedly unserviceable, 
we are pretty coitain to stick to it as long as possible. This, 
also, is oue of our singular insuhir prejudices. 

With refercuce to the oft-rupeatod ututemont that a uiiiu 
clothed ill kbukee drill is lent^ liable to lie shot than anotber 
who is clad in scarlet, 1 take leave to deny it in toto ; in the 
sort of shooting that occuih in war, the colour of a man's coat 
cannot posdbly affect his safety in any way^the whole idea is a 
myth, a flight of fancy, and is not capable of proof; hut what 
really does affeet it, is the amount of intelligence displayed by 
the iudividual in skirmishing and other movements in the pre- 
sence of an enemy, and it wouM ho far better if oiu: would-be 
reformers directed their attention to that point and left the 
national colour alone. 

If it is considered absolutely necessary that drill clothing 
should be worn during the hot weather, I know of no reason 
why the coats should not be mmle of scarlet yam dyed drill ; 
but 1 believe, myself, that thin serge would be much better. 

It has always been a mystery to mc why helmets should be 
white, for as nothing can be more ugly than a big glaring white 
helmet on the top of a man dre^sud in dark uniform, and as the 
slightest splash of mud or the mark of a dirty finger deatroj'S 
its appearance, it could not have been selected for its beanty; 
and I cannot discover any precedent for a white head-dress is 
the army of Great Britiiiu or of any other country. Therefore, aa 
there is not one singli; ymnt in favour of, and there being many 
obvious objections to, white helmets, both for officers and men, 
I recommend that they should henceforth be coloured, and I 
would prefer a (juite shade of grey or drab. White belts 
having at last been condemned, white helmets and white hanv- 
sacks should also be done away with, unless there is boqib 
special reason unknown to me for retaining them of that 
colour. 

Furthermore, no one under the rank of waniint c 
be allowed to wear spikes in their hehnets when i 
thse spikes are always in the way, and are at times c 
gerous, as in the case of a driver hamessirg his ~ 
Moreover, all spikes and chin-stiaps worn bj offices, a 



The Af<jhan Cmipaiijii of 1878-80. 93 

bronzed, for there can be no object in btiving them made of 
shining brans at any time. 

H7(i«tfc«.— rConsidering the extreme ditBculty that very fre- 
qiii-ntly occurs in bearing bugle-souuds during the heat of an 
t-ntiagemcnt, when tlie almost deafening noise caused by the 
roar of cannon ami the interminable rattle of musketry is inten- 
Eilie<l by the echoes from the Burroimding hille, it is a, matter of 
considerable importance that all officers as well as non-commis- 
sioned officers ehoidd be proride<l with a whiatle, but it should 
1m' a regular " l>oats\>'ain's whistle," the shrill piercing notes of 
vhich can I>c heard in the heaviest storm, not the useless 
twopenny-halfpenny thing that is supplictl to sergeants at pre- 
sent : and having got this whistle, all officers should he taught 
how to use it, which is not such an easy matter as may appear 
at tirst sight. One call to denote the " Cease fire," and another 
for the " Charge " are all that are required. 

Genkral Ueiusks. 
Vamp Equipnge.— Fox the immense improvements that have 
beea effected in the service camp equipage for oHicers and 
British troops, as also in the reduction iu baggage and in the 
number of followers, the ai'my is solely indebted to the present 
Qnartermaster-Geueral, Sir C. M. MacGregor, K.G B., who ever 
since his well known contribution to the first number of the Journal 
of ihe United Service Inatitution of India more than ten years ago, 
bos never ceased to work at the impoi-tant subject of the field 
cqaipment of troops, and no one knows their requirements better 
tlun he does. Now that a service pattern tent has been 
officially recognised, it should be the only description of tents 
with regiments or batteries, as it is equally suited for use in 
ounps of exercise in the cold weather and for service beyond the 
frontier. And i would recommend that u eei'taiu proportion 
only of the present large E. F. and S. 8. tents be kept in eEwh 
Motoninents in charge of one of the regiments, for use in cholera 
fiunps or on exceptional occasions, and that a large supply of 
Umdi be kept stored in eaeh fort and arsenal in the charge of 
llm Ordnwoen Depirtment. 

{To be eontinH«d.) 




gtbitlDs anb loffs. 



Ah Indus Novel. Pftriksh^-Guru [the Guide to Diflcrimina- 
tion]. By Lalii Sri Nivras Das. Dihli: Sodadars PieBS, 



This book is one of considetable general interest, for it is the 
first attempt ever made to write a novel in the Hindi laogna^. 
The Hindi, we may explain, is the most widely diffused verna- 
cular of northern India, spoken by a population of our swarthy 
fellow-subjects certainly t^ice as numerous as that of Great 
Britain and Ireland combined. The language has long been 
kept out of sight by the film of officialdom, nhich has found 
it convenient to caiTy on the administration of the country in a 
strange tongue by the aid of an army of interpreters. Suob a 
system could not be maintained after the light of personal 
and political freedom had been slied over the land ; accoi'dingly 
we find that during the last twenty years the speakers of Hindi 
have availed themselves of tlieir liberty, and have published 
books and newspapers in ^aat numbers in their oviiii vernacular, 
much to the astonishment of those who denied the existence of 
any dialect other than that in which they chose to carry on 
their office work. Quite recently the Hindi speakers have taken 
higher ground. They have sought to absorb the lateai resnlto 
of English scholarship, and a series of sound histcnieil 
and scientific works have seen the light, of which any aocb 
nation might well he proud. A yet bolder attempt has wnr 
been made to create a literature worthy of the remaaAab^ 
flexible and expressive character of the Hindi language. Si! 
Niwas Das, an inhabitant of Dihli, has essayed the task of pro- \ 
ducing an original novel in the dialect of that district ; and | 
he has been sufficiently successful to dogorvf the thanks of 
his compatriots. He shows in his Preface tbnt be io aw 
(^ the difficulties which beaet a man who nttempta, for thp i 
time, to adapt an imperfectly developed language to i 



Reviews and Notes. 95 

?sigencies of a foreign style of composition; but he also 
shows that he has no proper idea of what ie understood by 
a novel on this side of the world. Ho telU us (we translate 
From his Hindi) — " The method of wi-iting dramas and novels is 
Bltogether different. In dramas the names of the speakers aro 
placed at the beginnings of the paragraphs which are understood 
to rejiresent their speeches ; but, in novels, what the speakers 
say is enclosed in inverted commas, and tlic names of the 
speakers are inserted in the middle, or at the ends of the 
speeclies, at the convenience of the writer," Acting on this 
canon, he has produced a book, divided into chapters, with 
little mottoes from famous ^vriters at the head of each ; the 
chapters give excellent and moral conversations nmoiig a set 
nf acquaintances, with the words of each speaker carefully 
included in inverted commas. Here, then, is the complete form 
of the novel ; but the essential feature of novel literature is 
wanting. There is no tale — no story — to bind these conversa- 
tions together, and makethera lead up to some conclusion. The 
Antbor asks for suggestions by which he might profit in the 
fatore ; and we therefore add, for his benefit, that a novel is 
intendad to show, by means of an imagined example, the result 
of a particular course of action. The chapters of a novel are 
Hke the scenes in a drama, each contributing its part towards 
Bhowing how the final result in the last chapter is brought 
about. Having said thus much, there is no need to describe 
Qie eeriee of chapters, consisting of conversations on the gratifi- 
cation of thesens^, on diseiimination of chai'actcr, on hcedful- 
iHfla or prudence, on the advantages of useful occupation, on 
geotletDUily tone and life, on the true secret of happiness, 
la., Ac., &c., the only bond of union between which is that the 
ipeakers are the same in every chapter. We hope sri Niwas 
Mb will set himself to master the spirit as well as the form of 
BOrd literature, and then have another trial ; for he is a good 
~B*i^d evidcutlj a man of information and wide reading. 
Waxe some good bita of hnmorous writing in his hook, as 
't Chapter Vlll., where a Pandit, who claims to know a great 
»l, is amusingly cbaffed for his ignorance. In another place 
t satirizes an English dealer, who Bells Bome French glass to 
Inative gentleman at an enhanced price " because he is his 
iend." And elsewhere he represents a Hindfi as grieving over 
e nnpatriotio conduct of his oonntrymen in giving high prices 
r Eonipeaii wares to the neglect of native industry, and who 
^ea drivcK home In a new English phaeton. 



96 Reviews and Notes. 

One other thing deserves special commendation in this b 
-and that is, the Author has had the courage and the good s 
to avoid the prevailing love of fine writing, and has wri 
his book in the actual colloquial of Dihli. This circumsti 
will induce all students of Hindi to read his book with n 
attention. The startling rapidity with which the En^ 
language is penetrating the vernaculars of India is cle 
shown by such works as that before us. We meet with i 
words as ** editor,** ** article,'* "report,** "order,** "post-ca 
" neck-lace,*' " pocket-chain,** " fashion,** " polish,** 
numerous other similar words completely assimilated in 
<*olloquial of the people. It is clear that the Author hai 
<^.xcellent knowledge of the English language, this being sh 
not only by the appositeness with which he quotes I 
Cowper, Byron, and Shakespeare, but by the skill with whic 
has even rendered extracts from those writers into Hindi v« 
On p. 10 he has had the hardihood to attempt Shakespi 
famous lines beginning " The quality of mercy is not strain 
and it need not occasion surprise that the result is not 
happy; but on p. Ill he makes amends by a really spL 
rendering of Byron's eve of Waterloo, beginning " There w 
sound of revelry by night.** 

It will be seen, therefore, that in despite of the failure of 
i-urious work as a novel, it yet contains much that is : 
resting and illustrative of the great change passing over 80( 
in India. 



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THE ARMY AND NAVY 
MAGAZINE. 



fnbian fistricts hring t^e ^thlt. 

By H. G. Kebne, CLE. 



VII. 
MtiB-KAST of Agra lies the dintrict of Mynpoory — or Mainpuri, 
■ anr spelt — which affords but aeanty material for our 
■nitne, but that little of a Bomewhat peculiar character. The 
fiMetofiGeer was Mr. John Power, a name full of pleasant 
"WilMtiollB (o all who remember the stately presence, the 
fignified demaanoor of one who, though he has been called 
tta bidiui Bnimmell," was a man of a far higher type than hia 

I raitjlisli prcflecosaor. A dandy Mr. Power certainly wfis, but 
"was not in ii cockney way by any raoanK. liiy elegance being 
"'amaKsivo and monumcntat character. The special commin- 
"woer, Mr. Cocks, who was at that time district judge, represents 
»fr. Power, on the 19t)i May as " rushing into the room where 
''* [Mr. Cocks] was sleeping, to inform him that he had just 
heard of the mutiny of the 9th Native Infantry at Aligarh." 
■'■Ht might be Wr. Cocks' recollection of the event eighteen 
ttonUis after (hia report bears date 18th November 1858), hut 
™. Power recorded at the time (c. his letter, in the supplement 
wW Mynpoory, the 2iith May 1857, in the first excitement) 
i"iatit wa6 on the 22nd that the news reached him, and that 
* " immediately pri>rc(dcd to Mr. CocLs" house to considt him." 
J"> Cocks was certainly wrong in the date; Mr. Power could 
W mistaken, writing at the time ; and the word " proceed " 

_^ 1 much more in accordance with Mr. Power's usual bearing, 
""it we may be sure tlmt the "rush" is a mistake also. Mr. 



98 Indian Districts during the Revolt. 

Power could not, under any circumstances, have " rushed " in 
any direction ; indeed, had the news by any chance reached him 
in his dressing-room, he would not have even "proceeded" tc 
announce it to anyone until his toilet was completed to the lasl 
button, and the last touch of the hair-brush. 

The result of the consultation was that " fourteen females 
consisting of ladies, sergeants' and writers' wives, with thei] 
children (an imlimited number), left " for Agra, which the^ 
reached in safety. The military force — consisting of thre( 
companies of the mutinous 9th — was then taken out unde: 
Lieutenant de Kantzow, a very gallant young officer, a smal 
guard being left at the Treasury. It was now past four in th< 
morning of the 23rd, and Lieutenant Crawford, the senio: 
officer, followed the route taken by de Kantzow, w^ith tin 
intention of joining the force, which was to encamp a 
Bhaongaon, about eight miles off. Scarcely had the civilian: 
(Messrs. Cocks and Power, and James Power,t Dr. Watsoi 
and the chaplain, the liev. P. Kellner), lain down to get a littL 
sleep, when Crawford galloped back with the information tha 
his men were in open mutiny, had fired their muskets at him 
and had probably murdered de Kantzow. 

Through the pretty little ** station " of Mainpuri flows the Isan 
a small stream, which the road leading from the officers' bunga 
lows to the public offices crosses by a masonry bridge. Here Mr 
Power took post, accompanied by his brother, and here the; 
were joined by Dr. Watson and two or three European subordi 
nates. Meantime, de Kantzow had not been mm-dered, thougl 
his men mutinied and defied his orders ; many muskets wer 
levelled at him, but the aim was always diverted by the better 
disposed sepoys, de Kantzow being of a frank and generou 
character with many friends among the men. Dragging hu: 
with them, the mutineers returned to their lines, loading th 
spare ammunition contained there on camels which the 
appropriated for the purpose. De Kantzow's nerve neve 
failed him ; urgently he appealed to the men to return t 
their duty, and restrain the excesses of the lawless. Heedles 
of his appeals, they marched to the treasury, still taking hir 
along with them. Here they were met by the jail-guard an 
native officials, who prepared to resist them, and gave d 
Kantzow all the assistance that could be expected from undc 
thirty untrained men acting against ten times their number c 
infuriated soldiers. " For three dreary hours he stood againt 

* A younger brother of Mr. Power's at that time serv-ing as his assistant. 



Indian Districts during^ the Jiewlt, 99 

the rebels at tlio immineut peril of his life." Meanwhile, the 
Eii<;lish lit tlio bridflo, half-a-ilozen in number, had been joined 
by Jino llljawtliii iiiiiigh, cousin of the rajii — the local head of the 
Oiaiihtin Iiajputs — with a »iimll escort. Thi^ smiill force, the 
Piao was persuaded, would be iiisuflicient to reinforce de Kantzow ; 
and a message i)resently eanie from the heroic yonng man 
bfj:j;injf them not to run the hazard, adding that the mutineers 
Were, he tlionglit, coolin*; down. On tliis the liao resolved to go 
to lliem himself, iiml happily succeeded in persiLading them to 
di'pnrt with sueh jduiider as they ha<l already obtained. Do 
Kantzow ni>w joined the party at the hrid;^e, and they went to 
the olUec, wheri: they found the treasury still semire. Mr. 
I'owi-r explains that lii' had held the bridjje long enough to keep 
Imirk the Uatl eharactei-s of the '" city " (as it is the Anglo-Indian 
fasliion to Fiptak of all ehief towns), and that when the s('jH>ys 
Were known to have dipnrted, the urban 2)opulation at onee 
cahned down. 

On the 'iJlrd came more bad news ; and Tower, by sanction of 
Gorenimcnt, raised a troop of horse for the maintenance of 
order, which was eonnuanded by Lieutenant de Kantxnw. The 
magistrate himscIC t<H)k up his post in the " Kutcherry," or 
offico-building, whieh he fortilied by the aiil of some sc-rgeanta 
Berving in the JJcpartuient of Public AVorlis. One feature nf Uio 
defence is too extraordinary to he left out of this record. Thu 
Chief Court of the North-West Provinces was then called "Tlie 
Sndder," and the Sudder had lately issurd strict circular 
orders to all district judges and magistrates for the prepttralion 
and maintenance of the records of canes, upon a ]ilan which 
Bome of those local olticials considere<l pedantic and trouble- 
acme. In the hei(;ht of the excitement (only two days, in fact, 
aha the terrible morning aliovc describe<l). Mr, Power found 
himself unable to avoid a triumphant celebration of the " base 
uses" to whieh these records had come at last. These are liia 
ifocdB: — 

** All tha FanjdBTi records " (thoBe of crimiual triulH) ■■ liavo been takon ii|i to 

0w root ol the Kutoherry , anil being placed behind its railiu^; lorm mi cxcalleiit 

kfaMtwork. This miitter had better be reportedto the Sudder ; but at the anmo 

1lm» at DBftj ba nuntianed that the record-room han uudertj;ono a thorouKh 

1 hy tha [iiirpoBe to which its contents have been applied. I may 

in, (or DiB Court's information, that a gpoi, stout Khaanjiauii miil" 

f (record of an affrny cata) " prrpaTHl iifler Ike Court't html ruk'n inid ihirki ntd vi'lk 

icollant article of defonra ; and has, by experimeat, been 

4 to ba bullt<t-[ir<>o(." 



100 Indian Distncts during tJu HevolL 

irrepressible fromle wielded by a gallant spirit at a time when 
surely few would have indulged in professional sarcasm. 

In this gloomy sanctuary, with perjury imployed as a protec- 
tion in the most unexpected and unusual fashion, the two brave 
magistrates and the doctor,* witli two or three military officei-s 
(they had been joined by Major Hayes t and Captain Carey, 
Lieutenant Barber and Mr. Fa>Ter, who brought with them 
some of the Oudh Irregular Cavalry), held their own for some 
considerable time. The troopers were posted under Barber and 
Fayrer at Bhaungaon, where the road from Mainpuri falls into 
the grand trunk road leading to Cawnporo and Calcutta, and 
on the 1st Jmie Hayes and Carey started to join them. The 
troopers had proceeded up the road to Karaoli, and there the 
officers found them, drawn up in parade order. But the native 
officers advanced, and warned them that treachery was intended. 
Hayrs and Carey turned their horses' heads back, and rode in 
the direction by which they had anived. The troopers spread 
over the plain in pursuit. Hay<*s was overtaken, and fell dead 
with a sabre-cut over the head ; Carey, a lighter weight, escaped, 
and got safely back to Mainpuri ; Barber and Fayrer were mur- 
dered about the same time at Karaoli ; but the worthy lord of 
the manor, Lachman Singh (afterwards ennobled by Govern- 
ment), rescued all three of the bodies, and taking them to 
Mainpuri, delivered them to Mr. Power, who duly bimed them 
in consecrated gi'ound. 

The rascally troopers departed to Lucknow, where they 
doubtless took part in the siege. Their place was taken by 
seventy sabres of the Gwalior Contingent (1st Cavalry), under 
Major Kaikes, who accepted the services of the hard-riding 
Carey as his second in command. A few Sikh sepoys from 
disbanded eoi^ps, and about a dozen faithful sepoys of the 
mutinous 9th who had remained faithful to de Kantzow, formed 
the infantry nucleus. A telegi-aph-office was opened, and a 
couple of European refugees were brought in. The local horse, 
mider de Kantzow, amounted to 100 sabres, with three native 
officers who had left various cavahy corps to come to their homefl 
at Mainpuri on furlough. With these forces the town and station 
were patrolled, and some insm'gent villages punished. Early in 
June they fought a severe engagement with a strong party of 

• Messrs. Cooks and Kellner had gone to Agra, when the former Mxm looni 
other fields of osefuhiess, as abready described. 

t He was Secretary to the Oudh GoTemznent, and an ardent itodnl* Bl» - 
valnable library perished in the Residency. ■ » ^ 



Indian Districts during the Revolt. 101 

rebels at Bhaungaon ; the rebels beat them ofif, and killed the 

Thajiadar, or native sub-inspector of police, who died bravely in 

tho defence of his post. In this action de Kantzow was severely 

\ronjided. An unfortunate turnpike-keeper was about the sam6 

tiirxG murdered on the trimk road. All the neighbouring districts 

^^ex"« now lost, and Mainpuri was nothing more than an imper- 

oasis of partial order in the midst of a political wilderness. 

trunk road swarmed with mutineers, and the Raja of 

MTjiinpuri, whose kinsman had behaved so well on the 23rd May, 

Imown to be planning a treacherous outbreak. The district 

rapidly out of hand, some of the sub-collectors and police- 

^fti<3er8 fled, others joined the rebellion, but honourable exceptions 

^'^^^■^« duly noted. Among these last were both Muhamadans 

^^'^<i Hindus, the subordinate judge, the Kotwdl (head police 

^^^S-cser), the deputy collector, and, chief of all. Raja Lachman 

^h of Karaoli — a charming old man, whom to know was to 



io\,r^ai — tjy ^iiose good- will and vigilance authority was maintained 



tile teeth of almost overwhelming diflBculties and dangers, and 

- march of mutineers constantly impeded by the abandonment 

"Villages and absence of supplies ; other landholders, here and 

, evinced the same spirit, and it is indeed creditable to the 

dan character that when such men were faithful it was in no 

inary measure, life and wealth were freely hazarded in the 

se of the alien Government. 

o wore on thS month of June, the worst of that bad year. 

end was drawing nigh, when no prospect was apparent 

a desperate attempt at escape, with the alternative of a 

ier's death, or a long uncertain ride through deadly heat to 

oubtful refuge. On the 28th the approach of the Jhansi 

iineers, two regiments out of the entire brigade, was 

^p^^^nounced, and on the 29th theii* advanced guard reached 

^^«dnpuri, where they were joined by the Raja's people and by 

-ast of Power's pohce and levies. They threw open the jail and 

--* — ^menced a regular plunder of the place ; and now the last 

*^*"^ ^ision had to be taken. Formally consigning the responsibility 

Government property to the Raja and Bhawani Singh, Mr. 

-^ "Ver marched out, accompanied by Raikes, Carey, and half-a- 

'^^ ^en other Englishmen, escorted by the Gwalior cavalry, and 

^^ceded by Watson, de Kantzow, and James Power. The 

alior men deserted peaceably on the road, the rest of the 

y arrived in safety at Agra and joined the refugees in the 

The district was recovered about the beginning of 1858, 

order was without difliculty restored. 




102 Indian Districts during tlie Revolt. 

Mil. 

We next come to the district of Etawa, and meet with increas- 
ing peculiarities. The land lies upon the Jumna, on whose 
banks the " city," or chief town, is situated. The ravines have» 
from of old, been haunted by tribes of semi-savages, called Aliirs, 
whoso criminal propensities are with difficulty restrained even in 
times of the profoundest peace.^ In the uplands a mixed 
population prevails, though the larger estates are held by 
Bajput colonists who have been settled there for many genera- 
tions. The Jumna runs through the whole district, having the 
Chumbal as a parallel as far as Etawa. The population at the 
time was about 365 to the square mile, about one in five being 
Musalmans. The area is 1,698 square miles. 

The magistrate at the time of the outbreak was a man of 
smgular character. Hiiherto we have had to describe the deeds 
of men of the old type of the Company's civil officers, born of the 
patrician or equestrian orders, brought up in the old imscientific 
public-school fashion, with no desire for display, doing and 
enduring what fell in their way with the cheerful stoicism of 
their class, and narrating their adventures with artless simplicity 
as if performing the last and least agreeable portion of an 
unpleasant task. 

Mr. Allan Octavian Hume was by no means a man of that 
class, if indeed his peculiar character can be brought into any 
class at all. A younger son of the late Joseph Hume — ^that 
prosperous and energetic surgeon who died, after a long and 
useful career of public service m 1858, amid the general respect 
and regret of his countrymen — Mr. Hume had entered the 
service about eight years before the Mutiny. Quickly distin- 
guished 1)y his activity and acuteness, he had obtained the 
first grt^at prize of the service — the charge of a district — in an 
unusually short space of time, and had been selected for what 
was deemed a post of special difficulty, as magistrate and 
collector of Etawa. His qualities are reflected in his official 
Narrative. Though he was absent during the greater part of 
fifty-seven, t and though order was not restored till the end of 
the following year, he contrived to give his report — ^written, as 

* In or about 1848 these people murdered an EngUsh traveller whom thqr 
mistook for Mr. Unwin, a magistrate who had oflFended them in the diiinhaiy 
of his duty. 

t The narrative is dated November 18th, 1858, and states in the opening psia* 
graphs that the district contains " here and there bands of rebels too diiipitili 
or too blood-stained to listen to our gracious Qneen*s late mewafs of mmit^** 
This was a year after order had been restored in the nei^bouring dhMola 



Jiidiaii Dhfrictii during the Jlevolt. 103 

b<' assures lis, in twenty-four liourH — the air of a chapter of 
history coiiiiv)Sud iu the style of the hite Sir A. Aliaon. As we 
shall prvjtfiitiy hvl; however, the abnormal prolongation of 
diH)rder in Etawa waa not llr. Hume's fault ; and in courage 
and iuitiativi^ hv nhowed himself no unworthy colloaguu of the 
Diinlops. Spanktos, and others, whenever he was able to 
eumiuand thf due amount of force. But it in a drawback to 
his reiKirt that it takes a triumphant tone where most men in 
the same position would eitlier have said nothing, or would have 
Ui'ii content with a more "apologetic" treatment, to use the 
word in its classical rather than its social sense. 

The early abandonment of Etiiwa was due, in part at least, to 
the same cause that led to the evacuation of Maini)uri. Here 
also was a dctacbmt^nt of the faitbleKs !>th Native Infantry, and 
here, even earlier than in Jfainpuri, the approach of the Jhansi 
mutineers made itself felt. Mr. Hum«.''s hands were apiiarently, 
liut only apparently, strengthened by the arrival of the Grenadier 
Begiment of the Gwalior Contingent, by whoso aid lie was enabled 
to return to his station for a fuw days, after being dnven out by 
the first outbreak. Th^^ ladies were wisely sent into Agra, and 
with the aid of an exielltrnt native subordinate (still in the 
service), named Kunwar Lachnian Singli, Mr. Himfie kept order, 
as best he could, until the middle of .Tune. But on the l(itli of 
that month the news an-ived that the Gwalior Contingent had 
mutinied and driven the Chrit^tians from Gwalior. No further 
dependence was to be placed on the grenadiers, who plotted 
toeaaon within earshot of their commandant. Major Hennessey's 
record of the conversation — so far as was overlieard by him that 
night — deserves record as a specimen of tlie Hort of fuelings that 
were then being disaeminated by agitators : — 

WlUlperad coaveraation took place, of which tlie foUowinK cau<>lit my car: 

" Whkt is this that Iikb happened at CrwaUur 7 " 

"They hkve given themBelveu u bail Dame." 

"Tma," laid the emiMsry ; " but all the world kuonx that for the lutt three or 
(our JMM the Farinir'iurhaveexeroiHedRreat oppreniiion ; they have mined, aud 
Usn the landa of, all CBBpectabls Kemindara and {■iveu them to ISamat (mer- 
Ttilt niMi). n ia time to get rid at them. Tliere is no lunt (prc'iipf) about 
lUr qnbmi; they will neither make an Emperor themsolveH aor allow anyone 
iketo be Emperw : now, too, they attempt to destroy our religion."* 

Thua vanied, and aware thaitbeJh&nsi mutineers were within 
days' march, the British officers departed, taking up on the 
1 fugitives from Ealpi and Jalaun, of whom two were 
HAefaing the faithful Lachman Singh to muntain 
■ DUtrta Nan^tivt, App.V. 



104 Indian Dutricts during the Revolt. 

order, and writing to all landholders in whom he confided, Mr, 
Hume took his post at Agra, where he served with the right half • 
battery in the action at Sucheta, and was not able to return to hip 
district till the end of December. This must have been felt by 
him as a severe misfortune ; but it hardly warrants the claims to 
exceptional loyalty on behalf of his district which pervades the 
pages of hiH Narrative. Constant disturbance prevailed, though 
several of Mr. Hume's native friends behaved with creditable 
spirit ; and even when he got back on the 30th of December, he 
found one Eup Singh, and other " refractory Zemindars," at the 
head of large forces, and rendering his position, as he himself 
says, **a very critical one.*' He seems to have acted with 
vigour. Before the end of January he had raised a respectable 
force, with which, "strengthened by a detachment of Alexander's 
Horse," he took the field on the 7th of February, and fought a 
successful action near Anantram, on the Kalpi road, in which 
it was believed that the rebels lost 150 men. A month later 
the Raja of Euru, a rebel leader, lost heart and committed 
suicide. But the forces of Eup Singh remained in possession 
of a whole Pargana (subdiyision), having a bridge of boats in 
their rear, by which reinforcements and supplies were constantly 
reaching them from the other side of the Jumna. The Western 
tract, spoken of by Mr. Hume as the Jumna-Chambal Dudb, was 
held by Raja Khushdl Singh and his son, who remained in 
defiant occupation till September. 

Mr. Hume's narrative now, and for nearly twelve months 
more, is little but a record of fighting ; and certainly no oflicer 
of his cloth saw more purely military service. It is clear 
from his own admissions that for a long time he neither col- 
lected revenue nor exercised any other species of authority much 
beyond the limits of his own camp. Thus, at p. 13 he says : 
** Soon after the outbreak I, on my own responsibility, suspended 
the Government demand." And elsewhere he records that, up 
to March 1858, he " had collected no money but what was 
required for immediate use "; and even then it was only " the 
Zemindars of Bhartna and Etawa," who ** were directed to pay 
up the revenue." In a third paragraph he states that " care 
was taken to do nothing, and [to] issue no order in regard to 
any not openly against us, calculated to provoke opposition or 
disobedience." He was about this time joined by a column 
under Colonel Riddell — composition and strength not given. 

Great contention raged in and round a village, or town, called 
Ajitmal, a few miles south of Anantram, in the neighbourhood of 



Indian Dislrklx during the Bevoll. 105 

wliich Eup Sin^h was maintaiiiiug disorder. On the 10th March 
tile I'tliels attacked and phindored Phaphund — near to which is 
ijiw a station of the liast Indian Ifailway — and on tlie 30th Mr. 
lliimc felt hiinsdf Ktrung enough to move against tliem in view of 
cliAstiseiueut. Driving them out of Ajitmal, he chased them 
into lilt; ravines of the Jumna, a trifling loss oucuiTing on cither 
'^iiv. Ml this time Kalpi was the head-quartei-s of a large liody 
"f niiitimerfi, and Kup Singh, obtaining i-einforccments from 
tiicni-f, surrounded Mr. Hume on the 11th April, and drove 
him lia^k towards Etiiwa. (renoral disorganisation ensued, only 
l^rtiBlly arrested l>y a renewed attack on the 2lBt. The levies 
then moved on to the river — horse, foot, and artillery— and 
f^'iii-il the forrv-boat, inflicting some loss on the retreating 
tiii-niv. In all these skirmishes Mr, Hume seems to havf acted 
will] great personal courage, ably seconded by Mr. Macouochie, 
liii deimty, and ifr. C. l>oyle, who had joined him from Meerut 
>ftir Duulop'a Volnnterrs — with whom he ser^'ed tJiere — had 
Wn broken up. Lieutenant Furncll, auother volunteer, who 
■ud been in practice at Mussoorie as a dentist, but wat) given a 
local commis»ion for liis military scrviceH in the Mecnit district, 
■jw displayed signal gallantry. Both, indeed, were 8id)seijuently 
killed in action. The name of Mr. Furnell does not occur in 
Mr, Hume's Xurralin-, which makcH it the more necessary to 
'wird it here : especially should it be noted for the chivalry of 
"i* death. When lying mortally wounded, this heroic young 
"'•B — not a professional soldier, he it remembered — showed only 
one anxiety, and that was as to the prospect of his associate, 
Ideotenant Chapman, obtaining tlie Victoria Cross. 

Operations on a more conspicuous scale were at haml. In 
™e b^inning of April, Sir Hugh Rose* had taken Jhansi, and 
^Bn)ted the rest of the month to resting his troops, and pre- 
Pwng them for the advance upon Kalpi, whore were collected 
^buit all the remaining leaders of the revolt : the Kilni of 
"'I'lui, Tantia Topi, and the Naua's brother. The banner of 
flu Eesbwa now floated over the last stmnghold of rebellion; 
^i<I l^Oiie, nith fin tinny tUciniated by disease and death in 
baHlf, had to move in tliL' tiiTible summer of those regions 
I iBonia- to remove the lawt barrier that restrained communica- 

I betwec^n Central India and the main army under Lord Clyde. 

II On the 5lh May he had advanced within ten miles of Ealpi ; on 
T&K Itith, beiug joined by Colonel Maxwell with the Connaught 

•fiaofiers, the Camel Corps, and some companies of Sikhs, Bose 
n i^imi J'ield-iUarBluJ Lord StnUuwirn, a.C.B.L 



106 Indian Disiricis during the RevolL 

felt strong enough to attack the place. On the following day 
after a hard-fought hattle, the town was evacuated, and He: 
Majesty's bu*thday was celebrated in the last and lost fortresi 
of the rebellion among the trophies of the previous day's victory 
Tantia and the Rani doubled back on Gwalior — with what resul 
is known to all readers of Malleson — but a large body of th< 
rebels crossed the Duab in search of an asylum in the still 
distiu-bed province of Oudh. 

These events kept the Etdwa district — especially the portioi 
of it washed by the Jumna — in turmoil during the greater par 
of May and June, and large bodies of mutineers passed whon 
Colonel Riddell did not feel strong enough to attack. On th< 
2nd July Mr. Hume was forced by ill -health to make over charge 
of the district to Mr. G. E. Lance, command of the local leviei 
being assumed by Lieutenant L. Forbes of the 2nd Native 
Infantry. Eup Singh once more crossed the Jumna, am 
totally destroyed the unfortunate town of Ajitmal on the 6th 
Two days later Mr. Lance, with a force consisting of 20( 
bayonets, 120 sabres, and 5 guns, drove them out of the ruins 
and back into the ravines. This sort of work went on, sloi? 
but sure, for the next two months. On the 6th September 
the last focus of disorder fell — a place called Chakarnagar— 
and the last fight (with one exception) , took place at Parli or 
the 23rd October, when some of the forces of the indefatigabl* 
Kup Singh were defeated by the local levies mider Lieutenan. 
Allen, with the loss of over thirty men, the whole of theL 
ammunition, baggage, and means of transport. 

Order having been, as he hoped, finally restored, Mr. Hum_ 
— ^who had resumed charge of his district — wrote the Narrative 
to which we have mainly owed our information. After makin. 
mention of those who had been his chief subordinates an- 
supporters, he proceeds to devote a few paragraphs to varioix 
details of his administration during the trj'^ing times just passec 
As to finance, he explains the reason of his having left tbf 
revenue uncollected. He shrewdly remarks that, having loa 
five lakhs of rupees by the plunder of his treasuries, he judges 
that the revenue would, just then, be ** safer in the hands of 
thousand landholders than in a treasm-y guarded by sepoys tcz 
likely to mutiny." When he set himself in earnest to tlr 
business of collection, he succeeded in realising the large sum a 
over twelve lakhs, and the balance was left to be recovered her* 
after. He had the satisfaction of reporting that in many plac* 
the village-schools had been kept open ; that '' the little la£ 



Indian DistriciH during the fterolt. 107 

fere evprjTrhere bumming away at tbeir leHsoiis*'; and that, 
vbt'u lie wrote, there M'cre 179 schools open witli an attendance 
of nearly four thousand scholars. The remainder of tlio report 
if dnoted to an examination of tht: causes to which the excep- 
tionnl loyalty of his district was to be attributed. There is also 
I briif account of the method by which the villagers were led to 
"■inbiuit to arbitration the ndjuetmeTit of the cost of their 
tran»},Te8sion8." Of these " jtriiuhavii cases," Mr. JIumo 
infonna us there were 520, " some of which includoil the whole 
ol the inhabitants of one or more viilaRCS." If one of these 
fllakmpnts should seem to militate against the other, there can 
be at least no doubt but that Mr. Hume surmounted his difticul- 
lies— whatever they were — with tact, humanity, and resolution. 

Uis greatest trial was yet to come. His report is dated 
Norember 18th, 185B. Three weeks later tli<> district was 
invailed by Pii-oz Shlih, a member of the late royiil family of 
Dehli, and the only one who displayed courage and conduct. 
Eectping southwards from Lord Clyde when the Oudh Begam, 
Uk Nana, and soine other leaders tied into Nepal, the heroic 
{■rince, whose hands were free from innocent blood, and who 
ni^t have secured a pardon and a pension by simple surrender, 
(Rfened to cut his way through the British ten'itories. 

Od the 6th December vague rumours of tlie upgu'oaeh of a 
Inee, HOpposed to be headed by the Xanit, reached Etiiwu, and 
Hr. Hnme immediately took the field, sending information at 
the Bune time to the military authorities at Oawnporo on the 
one ode, and Agra on the other. His own force was composed 
cf nme 200 infantry, 140 cavalry, 4 guns, and a troop of the 
utnit monnted police : the whole under the command of 
tiUOtenant Forbes already mentioned. They marched with the 
ntention of defending a fort called Harchandpnr, held by a loyal 
■ttdholder; and on the morning of the 8th, having driven in 
■batemy'B pickets, found themselves con&outecT by a fine force 
ptutitiiunia horae, estimated at 1,400 sabres, with nearly 200 
■Ultntry of the iSth Eengnl Regiment. The enemy's baggage 
**! transport were guarded by a strong reserve. These men 
Vereondently no unskilled rillage-rabble, but a body of trained 
•oidierB, whose bushiess was to cut their way throagh all oppo- 
ntiou, or perish in the attempt ; and the sequel showed alike 
■eircapacity and their resolution. At first, perhaps, surprised, 
\*^^3 KpMidily formed under cover of a village, sending off their 
''ggige towards a bridge crossing the canal. Lieutenant Forbes 
:^ic>al bQtae— ondor Mi. Doyle — on his right, and the 



108 Indian Districts during the llevolt. 

Moerut troop on his left, opened fire from the centre undei 
Messrs. Hume and Maconochie. The enemy, accepting thi 
challenge, advanced so as to outflank the levies, on seeing whid 
Forbes took Doyle's horsemen against the left attack, while th( 
guns played upon the enemy's advance. The charge was onl; 
partially successful : Doyle's horse being wounded, the rider fel 
and was cut to pieces ; his men retreated in more or less order 
Meanwliile another party of the enemy came down on the Englid 
left, but were checked by two successive charges of the Meeru 
police, ably and bravely led b,y thciir Rasaldiir, Asadulla Hian 
This excellent native officer rc^ceived a severe wound in thi 
vidrc. But a third body presently got round to the rear 
and became engaged with the Etawa foot. Mr. Hume's positioi 
now became very critical ; and probably disaster was onl; 
averted by the firmness of the remaining foot-soldiers, aiK 
the presence of mind of a non-commissioned oflicer nam» 
Edmmids, who was in charge of the largest of the guns. SucI 
clouds of dust were raised by the ti-ampling of the bold an 
** ubiquitous " horsemen as, added to the smoke from th' 
guns, prevented anything being clearly seen but the constan 
flash of the flickering sabres. Amid the confusion the levie 
formed square with commendabki coolness, while Edmundfl 
with ** conspicuous address," swung round his 12-pounder gm 
and poured grape into the flank of the assailants. The hoiBe 
were thrown into a state of terror, the men lost heart on secinj 
the resistance of the square, and the attack ceased after i 
dm-ation of fully three hours. Each side drew off in gOO< 
order, and the Etawa force occupied their original objective- 
Harchandpur, while the enemy proceeded on their route. 

Well might the (lovernor- General, a man not given to enthu 
siasm, characterise this as ** a daring exploit," and express hi 
" warm commendation of the courage, skill, and determinatioi 
which marked it." His Excellency gave his thanks to Lieutexum 
Forbes, to ^lessrs. Himie and Maconochie, and to Sergeant 
Major Edmunds. Doyle's family received a i)en8ion, and At 
brave Basald&r receival a decoration and the title of " Sardtf 
Bahadur." Mr. Hume was deservedly made G.B. 

The enemy, who were well-mounted and equipped, compriaed 
men of the Ist and 2nd Bengal Light Cavalry, the lltbi UA 
and 18th Irregulars, and a number of unattached rebeb uA 
mutineers, many of whom were Afghan and Sikh soIdiflEVif 
fortune. They lost fifty-eight killed, among whom HM jM 
ez-N&zim of Farrakhabad — a man who had long 




Indian Districts during the Revolt. lOO* 

the district ; many more were wounded, most of 'whom 
ily removed in ambulance " doolies," or litters, with which 
els were well provided. 

British loss was twenty-one killed and nineteen wounded. 
!er the Hon. Percy Herbert, coming up from Cawnpore, 
with some of the fugitives — for such they soon became — 
Elicted on them a further loss in material and men ; and 
er Showers arrived from Agra on the 11th, having 
d seventy-five miles in forty hours : he did not, however, 

in adding to the enemy's loss. 

unfortunate prince probably separated from his men, 
entually — as it is understood — made his way to Mecca. 
> never, so far as I am aware, been seen or heard of 

was the end of disturbance in the district of Etdwa, which 
ately fell into its usual routine. To conclude with the 
magistrate's fervid words :— 

le turned : and then popular goodwill blossomed out and gave fruit iu 
ly restoration of peace and order : and now, though here and there 
d and desolate villages and bands of rebels, too desperate or too blood- 
o listen to our gracious Queen's late message of mercy,* remind us of 
our people are once again quiet and contented, our fields are rich with 
ops, and we can look forward hopefully to the future, and cheerfully to 
ors that shall make that future all, and more, than in the past we ever 
of. 

age, indeed, is the calmness with which the simple folk of 
Jtan could plough their land and sow their seed in such 
and the readiness with which they accepted disorder and 
toration of order alike, ** with a heart for any fate." 

November 1st 1858 the Hoyal Proclamation, translated into twenty 
es, and promulgated throughout the country, announced that Her 
had assumed the direct sway of the Indian Empire. So we created a 
Utlast! 



110 



(jii^e llational gtftnas of Slutben. 



By Carl Siewehs. 



It is but natural that the question of reorganising the Nation 
deft?nees which is at present before the Swedish Nation, shoul 
by a people which can boast of a Gustavus Adolphus and 
Charles XIL, be considered vital to its very existence, and 
propose in the present article to discuss the measures which i 
now proposed to enable this historically militant nation to def€ 
its native soil in the present age of encroachment and conqnei 
The army of Sweden has for the last two hundred years b< 
raised by a system which is, I believe, wholly foreign to evi 
other country, and consists of '* stamtropper,*' i.r?. regular troo 
and reserves. Tlie former are, however, raised in a very rema 
able manner, viz. by common enlistment " viirfvning " and 
" indelning." By the *' indelning," adapted in order to ease 
biu'thens of conscription, the so-called ** rusthall," i.v, rural 1 
payers, and the " roter,'' Lc. landowners, furnish the 1 
soldiery and the cavalry, and are thereby exempted from perao 
service while also reducing their taxes to the Crown. There 
at present on the rolls 20,17G ** roter " and 3,000 " rustha 
who furnish the **indelta" infantry, and 200 double "lofa 
and 8,505 '' rusthall '* who furnish the cavalry. The artOli 
engineers, train, &c., are, on the other hand, raised by oomi 
enlistment. The Swedish army is now almost completely id 
up of " indelta " soldiers, who enlist for thirty years and iAml 
not live in garrison, but receive a small farm, " torpt'' lor H 
use. The regular forces of the army number at pr^ent S^ 
officers and men, and of these more than 17,000 are niMi 
the *' indelning " system. The nmnber of recmits reqfanHk 
year is 1,200, but the non-commissioned oflBmn ''^ ' 
''indelta" soldiers are drawn from the " 




The National Defences of Sweden. Ill 

reserves or ** bevaring," with officers, are raised by conscription 
by ballot and number nominally 135,000 men, besides 8,000 who 
are raised only in and for the defence of the island of Gotland in 
the Baltic. There are also in the Swedish army 18,000 voluntary 
riflemen, whose officers are chosen by the king. On the present 
principle the total strength of the aimy both in peace and war is 
therefore now the same, viz. 200,000 men all told. 

For a considerable number of years this system has, however, 
been considered by military men in Sweden to be too elaborate 
and old-fashioned, and one on which the nation could not rely 
with security in case of war. Several propositions have therefore 
been made by the Government to place the army in a position 
to meet modern requirements, and it is not uninteresting to 
note that these measures have been the outcome of external 
commotions, which seem for a time to have stimulated their 
efforts to amend a state of the national defences which leaves 
the country at the mercy of almost any foe. Thus the first bill 
introduced by the Government in 1869 was caused by the Danish 
*nd Austrian wars, and the second in 1871 by the Franco- 
German war. Both these measures proposed to retain the 
"indelning" system referred to above, but merely to effect some 
important changes as regards the **rote" and **rust hallare," 
i.e. by those classes in the State who furnish the army. These 
propositions were, however, rejected by the Chamber, which 
declared it could not give its sanction to any organisation which 
retained the old system, but that the requirements of the nation 
^W8 an army raised by the conscriptive system in a modified 
fonn. It will be early understood that it has not been an easy 
matter for the Government to frame a measure which by a stroke 
of the pen will uproot social conditions and customs of several 
centuries growth and standing. Nevertheless, they submitted to 
the representatives of the nation in 1875 a bill for the reorgani- 
sation of the army, which proposed to abolish the ** indelning" 
system and to raise an army instead by conscription only This 
Proposition was, however, also rejected by the Chamber, and in 
consequence the Government again framed a measure in 1877 to 
meet the views of the Representation, which appeared to be that 
the army shoul(f be raised by a general conscription, from which 
a limited regular force should be elected by ballot as a standing 
force, and the rest form a reserve subjected to a ninety days' service 
^th the colours in all. This Government proposition was 
^^^jected too, and since then the question of national defence has 
^ been before the Swedish nation. 



112 The Xntioml Defetum of Surden. 

It will be soL'H from the fate of thes<' propositions tliat tlicrt is 
a strong antipathy among tht- bulk of the Swedes to a gentml 
conecription, tho " indelta " system being originated in order tti 
avoid the name "(.-onseription," which is undoubtedly fostered 
by the circumatance that Sweden i-ose to the rank of one of tin- 
great Powers of ]^un)pe without it, and by the seventy Tears of 
unbroken peace which the nation has enjoyed, Ktill, those men 
who have governed the conntry for the last few years, and tlit' 
intelligent military portion of the nation, have long clearly*' 
realised tlitit tho existing army, while excellent in peace, would l»* 
utterly dofieient in case of attnek. and it is ivith this view befoir* 
him, and with a due regard to the susceptibilities of the uatiox »■ 
that th(^ preoent llinister of War has framed a scheme for tl-» '' 
reorganisation of the amiy on the basis of the proixisition ^3' 
187B, which, to some extent at all events, is, as will be 8ee«^> 
based on the English imlitary system. 

The proposition now made is to abolish the "indelnmg 
systt^ni and to raise an army in the following manner. — ^ 
standing nnny with a war establishnient of abont 100,000 m^ n 
will be tho limit of the regular forces of infantry and cavalrj^yf 
and of thesis it is proposed to obtain from 20,000 to 30.000 t^J" 
moans of viduntavy enlistment, and the rest by conscription, .^fcs 
regar<ls the former, they will consist of volunteers between tfc«e 
age of 18 and lil— which class is estimated to mimber 1SO,OCW 
men of the p<)i)ulation — who enlist for a term of at least two ^3i 
at most six years, and of these it is estimated that 5,500 recrui.'fc 
will be reqiiireil a year. viz. 3'(i per cent, of the male population- 
The men may n-i iilist up to the age of 33. If they enUet for ■ 
tenii of two years only they would have to serve twt ]i(y iiioiitbB in 
the infantry, but the full two years in the artillery- and caval 
They will live in gairison and receive, besides uniform, food 
lodging, kr. 10 (lis) per month as well as 5 ore (Jd.) per day 
addition, and a bounty for each of the first five jcAts of Id. 
{^2 6s.), and for each of the following kr. 80 (,t4 IDs.); 
total remuneration for a soldier who enlists foi six years 
thus be about £'1S. 

The force which will be raised by general eouscription will 
number, it is estimated, 70.000 men. The conlbriptioQ will be 
general at the age of '22, and ever)- Swede will have to serve with 
the colours ninety days, i.e. thirty days for three yeare. Thus, if o 
man who has not done his conscriptive service enlistfl before tbii* 
age, he will still on the expiry of such service be inble to ' 
days' conscriptire sernce, bat if be has enlisted to\ 



The National Defences of Swedefi. 1 1^^ 

will have thirty days less for every year after the two first, 

and then be exempted altogether if having been five years 

with the colours. It will thus be in the interest of the country 

to obtain as young men as possible for the voluntary service, 

as the men after their time will form part of the first army 

reserves, while their training already attained will be of great 

benefit to both recruits^ and their oflScers. The combatant 

forces of Sweden by the new system will thus be about 103,000 

men, to which may be added 33,000 non-combatant men, 40,000 

garrison troops, making a total therefore in the field of 

176,000 men. There will also be a second reserve, or so-called 

" landstorm," comprising all able-bodied men in the country 

up to the age of 50, which will also embrace the three services, 

but will only be employed in case of war within the borders 

of the kingdom. This last reserve, it is estimated, would number 

25,000 to 30,000 men. Sweden would therefore, in case of need, 

be in a position to mobilise an army of 200,000 to 206,000 men. 

If we compare the existing system with that proposed, we 

shall immediately observe the advantages of the latter. While 

thus the regular forces are now stated to number 24,000 men, of 

whom 17,000 live spread all over the country, the new system 

^ provide the nation with a trained and homogeneous army of 

8»y 30,000 men; and while by the old system the '^indelta" 

soldiers are retained in the service until old age, the new army 

^ consist of comparatively young men, of whom about 5 per 

^^^. are yearly recruited, and thus contribute to maintain the 

spirit of energy and amour propre so essential to the morale of 

^Idiers ; and while the present soldiers live, as stated, in ** torps '* 

^ over the country, those of the new type will be lodged in 

S^rtson and trained as a compact body, which latter enormous 

^Vantage is obvious to every military student. And whereas 

^«e small number of really fully developed and trained men, 

^^- the 6,000 enlisted men under the old system, would have to 

^ almost entirely employed as non-commissioned officers for 

^ ^^ reserves in case of war, the new system will offer a force of 

*^^000 men to choose these from ! It will also easily be con- 

^^ticeived that of the 17,000 " indelta *' men now on the rolls, 

^Xne 20 per cent, perhaps will, on being called, be found unfit 

^^ duty through age and failing health, while on the efficiency 

^^d full strength of the new army the nation could always rely 

^^th confidence. 

^ Still there is no class of the service which would benefit more 
^^ the change than the reserves. This class, the chief one for 
VOL, VI. 8 



114 The National Defences of Sweden. 

defence in case of war, is now put down at 135,000 men, of 
whom those mature for service serve thirty days with the colours, 
viz. fifteen days in tw^o years ; and leaving out the question of 
the doubtful numerical strength of this body in case of war, their 
efficicnc}' and so-called training is certainly below the lowest in 
any army in Europe. Although the reserves in Sweden are in 
the field for fifteen days in a year, there is not, perhaps, one man 
in a hundred who has ever fired a gun during such service ! As 
an illustration of this deplorable system I may state that last 
summer, when a regiment of the regular army was practising 
rifle shooting, in Scania, the ** beviiring," or reserves then under 
arms, were commanded to be present and ** look on," in order to 
benefit thereby. This was all the instructions these reserves 
received in this important science, and, in commenting on this 
not unusual occurrence, the Journal of the .Academy of Military 
Science {Krifjsi'Ctciiskapsakadcmiens tidskrift) p. 87, exclaims with 
justice : ** For whom, friend or foe, would the fire from such 
soldiers be most dangerous ? " 

Instead of this untrained force the new system would furnish 
a regular army of some 70,000 men, a great many of whom had 
been in the voluntary army and remaining subject to a ninety 
days' service with the colours. 

The relative advantages of the system now proposed are so 
great that they need hardly be discussed. While thus the old 
** indelning " system in twenty years gives only a nominal army 
of 24,000 men, in peace as well as in war, without non- 
commissioned officers, the new scheme will in the same period 
furnish a fully numerical army of 110,000 men provided with 
oxpcTienced non-commissioned officers. Instead of the four 
months* scanty drill a year which the '* indelta " soldiers receive, 
the new ones will be carefully trained for ten. Another change 
would be ejGTected as regards the officers, who now receive 
exorbitant allowances in proportion to the work they have fo get 
through. 

Still the new scheme has met with a most violent oppoflitioii 
in certain quarters. Although the reform is strongly advised 
by a Boyal Defence Committee, appointed by the Minist^ of Vfnx, 
and nine of the ablest Swedish generals, the " peasant " party in 
the country is strongly opposed to it, firstly* by the dislike to 
reforms and uprooting of traditional customs, common enoa^ 
to a race of mountaineers ; and secondly, by a iliftftlinatifln to 
make a personal sacrifice where their own private interaetB- ill. 
opposed to those of the nation at large. It has alao InM 



The National Defences of Sweden. 115 

asserted, that the enlistment system and the consequent garrison 
life will tend to demoralise the soldiers and render them 
"homeless." But if this were so, it would follow that those 
regiments which now do garrison duty should have this vice, 
while it is a well-known fact that a finer, more spirited, and 
moral regiment than, for instance, '' Yarmlands faltjagare " is 
not to be found in the Swedish army. Their argument is not 
an original one, viz. that whatever suited our fathers ought to 
suit ourselves ; and by this narrow-minded view of the require- 
ments of our altered times and circumstances, a reform urgently 
demanded by the ablest and most intelligent party of the Swedish 
nation, to ensure its very existence, will, perhaps, be lost. It is 
also asserted, more with a feeling of sentiment than of wisdom, 
that it was the old system which produced the heroes of Liitzen 
and Poltawa, while it is entirely forgotten that the soldiers of 
the Great Gustavus, brave as they may have been, had as little 
in common with those of the present day as the leather 
gun of the Hero King with the modem Armstrong. Although 
I have no hesitation in asserting that a finer body of men 
than the present Swedish army could not be easily found, and 
that the Swede of the 19th century will respond as enthusiasti- 
cally to the call of a fiemadotte as did his ancestor of the 
the 17th to that of Gustavus Adolphus, an impartial observer 
is bound to admit that the existing force is more an army 
of peace than of war, its strength being less in the former than 
the latter condition, while it is undoubtedly wanting in that 
kind of development which is now considered indispensable to 
the modem soldier. 

If we turn to the expenses which will be- incurred by the 
country if the new army organisation scheme is adopted, we find 
that the cost of the present army is about jB890,000 a year, 
^hile the cost of the new is estimated at £1,100,000 during the 
fifteen years which will be required for its complete development, 
^d from one to two hundred thousand pounds more after the 
y^^ 1897. But it should be borne in mind that the actual 
outlay is not the difference between these sums, as a greater part 
^f the keep of the soldiers would be provided by the Government, 
^d not, as heretofore, by certain taxpayers. The total Budget 
^f Sweden is, for the year 1883-1884, £4,530,000, and the 
Papulation estimated at 5,300,000 individuals. 

^ith regard to the Swedish Navy, this branch of the defences 
^' the country is based on the same '' indelta " system as the 
*^y. Simultaneoasly, therefore, with the proposition to re- 

8 ♦ 



11 G The National Defences of Sweden. 

organise the army, the navy will also be remodelled, chiefly on 
the same principle as that laid down for the army. 

The Minister of Marine thus proposes to raise the regular 
naval force to 4,000 men (at present about 2,000), of which 3,000 
shall be combatant sailors and marines, 2,000 to be stationed at 
Carlskrona, the ** Portsmouth of Sweden," and 1,000 in 
Stockholm. The men will enlist for a period of ten years, by the 
end of which time they would be considered sailors of the second 
class, but may recapitulate up to the age of 32. After such a 
term of ser\'ice, the discharged men would belong to the first 
naval reserve. The number of men which would be requii-ed to 
enlist annually, in order to maintain the force, would be 350, 
and as their actual service would be limited to about half of the 
period, as during some six months snow and ice impede 
navigation in Swedish waters, they would be allowed to obtain 
suitable occupation within the kingdom, when not in training. 
Their pay would be as follows : On enlistment, a bounty of kr. 60 
(£'2 16s.) ; the first year, kr. 100 (.£'5 12s.) ; second year, kr. 110 
{£6 38.) ; third yearj kr. 120 {m 14s.) ; the fourth year, kr. 130 
(£7 5s.) ; the fifth 3'ear, kr. 140 (£7 15s.) ; the sixth year and 
following four years, ki\ 150 (i'8 Gs.) per year. Besides the 
fixed pay, the sailors will be allowed kr. 10 (lis.) every time they 
are called to or discharged from the stations. The remaining 
yearly contingent required for the navy will be raised by 
ordinary conscription among the nautical class of the country. 
The number of conscripts on the rolls liable to service is 1,500 
men a year ; but as this number is chiefly composed of pilots and 
their apprentices, the Minister of the Navy proposes in time ol 
peace only to call 500 of this class a year, in order, as is obvious, 
not to embarrass the mercantile marine of the comitry. He 
further proposes that mercantile sailor conscripts who when 
liable to service have for four years been registered as A.B.'s in 
this branch, and for twelvii months have served in foreign waters, 
shall in time of peace be exempted from all service, as these men 
must naturally by such service have acquired the elements 
which the country indispensably demands from her sons who 
furrow the seas. The number of boys in training will be 400 a 
year. 

The cost of the Swedish navy is at present about £840,000 a 
year, and the increased expenditure necessitated by the new 
system is estimated at £440,000 a year. 

It was my intention in connection with this subjeot also to 
haye dealt with a certain proposali viz., the Nflntralinntirm cl 



The Xatianal Defences of Stoeden. 117 

Scandinavia, recently made by a few men who, no doubt, have 
their purse more than the honour of their country at heart, but 
as this hare-brained scheme has already been rejected by the 
Committee of the Swedish Parliament, and will not, I trust, 
cigain be brought forward until the era of the millennium, I will 
merely conclude my task by hoping that the Representatives of 
the Swedish nation will, ere too late, adopt the measures which 
lire imperatively demanded for the; honour iind protection of that 
;;;loriou8 history and liberty for which the great Gustavus and 
'' Alexander of the North " oJBfered their lives in the days of 
vore. 



h- :-^*j 



f orlr Jatohe: % J^Htljtr of % ^ni\s)^ Itabg. 

By George C. Y. Holmes. 



The " Father of the British Navy "; such was the title which 
Keppel bestowed on Lord Hawke in the House of Commons, 
and those who are well acquainted with this famous man's histor 
will readily acknowledge that not one of our great naval 
has a better claim to the title ; for Hawke not only won grea 
victories at sea, and saved his country from foreign invasion, 
him belongs the merit of having contributed more than any o 
his contemporaries towards reforming the morale, the materiel, anc 
the tactics of the Eoyal Navy at a period when such reformatioi 
was sorely needed. He also may be said to have discovered an* 
trained Bodney and Howe, whose fame has perhaps unjustl. 
dimmed the glory of their illustrious chief ; for the public 
large are certainly unaware that to a comparatively unknow 
cbmmander belongs the distinguished title quoted above. 
therefore the more readily welcome the admirable life of La 
Hawke,* which has recently been written by Captain Mon 
Burrows, B.N., and which will, without doubt, do much 
restore to its proper place the fame of one of our moi 
illustrious commanders. Captain Burrows' competency to wri 
such a work rests not merely on his connection with the na 
he is also, as is well-known, the Chichele Professor of Mode: 
History in the University of Oxford, and his book, as might 
expected, is strictly historical in its method. It is much mo: 
than a mere personal biography of the man whose life it p: 
fesses to relate, for it contains a striking and well-told accoi 
of the state of parties, and of home and foreign politics 
the time when Hawke was fulfilling his career; and also 

* Life of Admiral Lord Uawkt^ by Montagu Burrows, GapUin, R.N. ( 
List), and Chichele Professor of Modem History in the Unirersity of Omti 
London : Messrs. W. H. Allen & Co., 18 Waterloo Place. 







Lord Hawke. 119 



W valuable sketch of the condition and administration of the navy, 

&nd the system of naval tactics then in vogue. 

The book opens with an account of the origin of the great 

wars in the reign of George II., the first of which broke out with 

Spain in the year 1739, but on which was soon superposed the 

xtx emorable conflict with Spain's protector and ally, France. 

Tliis war, which lasted — broken only by a short truce — for all 

bvxt a quarter of a century, was ** in many respects the most 

*^=ciportant, as well as the most arduous, conflict in which Great 

^^X"itain ever engaged ; for in the course of twenty-four years, it 

■^^soed in the foundation and establishment of the British 

xapire." The great wars of the time of Marlborough had 

"suited in glory and little else to this country ; they certainly 

►ntributed in no direct way to the establishment of the empire, 

the only material acquisitions gained by this country at the 

se of Utrecht were Gibraltar and Minorca ; these were the 

returns for the huge expenditure of blood and treasure, and 

I" one of the most brilliant succession of victories ever recorded. 

Or the rest it was, we may suppose, deemed suflficient compen- 

^tion to have averted (using the words of the treaty) " the great 

^nger which threatened the liberties and safety of all Europe 

om the too close conjunction of the kingdoms of Spain and 

^'^Jice." Gibraltar has since become of immense importance to 

coimtry. Its capture was indeed the first of a series of 

which eventually, for a time, turned the Mediterranean into 

firitish lake. But the circumstances which were soon to 

er it an invaluable acquisition had at the time of its captiure 

o existence, and of such slight importance was the fortress rock 

_^^ld to be in the early days of the Hanoverian dynasty, that 

^orge I. on more than one occasion entered into negociations 

Spain for its restitution. These negociations, fortunately, 

to no result, and the retention by England of the fortress 

^^luch cut the French and Spanish sea-boards into two uncon- 

T^^oted and unsupported halves, was a source of perpetual 

^^^"^tation to both these Powers, and was undoubtedly the 

"^^ixicipal, though not the ostensible, incentive to the war of 

"^"^39. The other main cause of hostilities was the arrogant 

^J-titude which Spain, acting under the secret encouragement of 

* ^^'^nce, assumed towards Great Britain in the matter of the 

^■^■^de with the West Indies. It seems utterly incredible that 

^ifi country, which then, as now, claimed to be the mistress 

^^*^ the seas, and which only a few years before had been the 

^^incipal agent in humbling the ambition and defeating the 



120 Lord Hawke. 

combinations of the great French monarch, should ever have 
submitted to the arrogant ambition of a Power like Spain, 
which was then in the full swing of political decay. Yet to this 
depth of humiliation had Sir Eobert Walpole brought his 
country. For years the Spaniards had, in spite of treaties, 
insisted on the right of search for contraband merchan- 
dise on the high seas, and had claimed to themselves the 
exclusive right to the navigation of the West Indian seas, and 
the trade with the West Indian islands. The famous petition of 
the West Indian merchants to the House of Commons in 1737 
narrates that — 

For many years past thoir ships have not only been frequently stopped and 
searched, but also forcibly and arbitrarily seized upon the high seas, by Spmniah 
ships fitted out to cmise, under the plausible pretence of guarding their own 
coasts; that the commanders thereof, with their crews, have been inhumanly 
treated, and their ships carried into some of the Spanish ports, and there condenoLiied 
with their cargoes, in manifest violation of the treaties subsisting between the two 
Orowns ; that the remonstrances of His Majesty's ministers receive no attention at 
Madrid, and that insnltK and plunder must soon destroy their trade. 

Yet Walpole was not to be moved. The House passed 
resolutions which endorsed the petitions. In these resolutions 
Walpole acquiesced, but it was for the time impossible to rouse 
him into action. He continued to endeavour to obtain satis- 
faction and full reparation by peaceable means, and insisted 
that ** we ought not to involve the nation in a war from the 
event of which we have a great deal to fear." On another 
occasion he stated that ''it may sometimes be for the benefit 
of the nation to pocket an affront." In fact, anything more 
cowardly and mean than was Walpolc's policy at this period it 
is impossible to imagine. Had he shown a firm front when 
these insults were first attempted, the war might, with Spain at 
least, have been avoided. As it was, in proportion as onr 
meekness and impotence became more apparent, the arrogance 
and pretensions of the Spaniards grew ; and at length our 
ships' crews were denied the ancient rights of cutting logwood 
in the Bay of Campeacliy, and of collecting salt in the island 
of Sal Tortugas, and the British salt fieet, though convoyed by 
a man-of-war, was actually attacked by two Spanish ships of 
the line, and only escaped through the daring of Captain 
Thomas Durrell, who was in charge of the convoy, and who 
with his little twenty-gun ship engaged the enemy's two liners 
so long that thirty-two out of the thirty-six merchant vessels 
were enabled to escape. For two years more WaliK>le tern* 
porised, but the nation was gradually being lashed into a state 



Lmi Uau-ie. 121 

of fui-j", and at It^ngth bis own supporters coiuIhiiwI witli the 
OiM>o^>tiot), iiiul forced liim to declare war ; and Hhortly after- 
wanh he war hurled from power. 

'W't' should be neglecting the teachings of history, and failing 
coiupK'ti-ly to derive the greatost of the benefitH which historical 
studies can confer, unless we applied the lessons to be learned 
from the results of Walpole's pusillanimoug conduct to the 
circumntancf f< of to-day. In his desire for peaco, lie landed his 
cKUiitrr in a war which lasted a quarter of a century, and which 
cAusviI euormoua sacrifices. That, in the end, the war turned 
out fortunately for uh, wa-s iio merit of Walpole's, and is more- 
over Wide the question. Captain Burrows verj' aptly quotes 
a s&jiiig of Machiavelli's, which shows how the llonians in- 
VHriably acted under similar circunitstances, and the moral of 
tli&t saying is as applicable now us it was ever : " Tlie Romans 
ntvrr swallowed an injury to put off a wai", for thej" knew that 
»ar vas not avoided, but deferred thereby, and commonly with 
w advantage to the enemy." Have we not lately, in this 
wuntrj', been swallowing injuries, and defeats even, and 
poclteting affronts, to jnit off u war, and will not the result 
JD the end be probably as disastrous and as disappointing as 
Iliatory shows tliat it always has been ? 

The eircuiustances al)ove briefly desc^ribed were suih as 
*D>*ted when Hawke (irst made his appearance on the scene. 
*he Bon of a barrister of Lincoln's Inn, who bad settled in 
Korfolljj he was born in 1705, ajid appears to have first entered 
the navy when twelve years old. He owed his appointment to 
ois matemaJ uncle. Colonel Martin Bladen, a man of consider- 
*>le influence, who appears to have acted, as long as he lived, as 
' >ort of providence to young Hawke. His earlier services were 
l^te tineventfal, and we first find him prominently distinguishing 
"ttliaelfin Admiral Mathews' action with the cnnibined French 
**id Spanish fleets off Toulon in 1644. Captain Hawke, as he 
*4atheQ, was the only ofScer on the British side who came out 
<^ Uub action with any credit to himself, be having captured the 
■olitirj vessel which was token on either side during tlie 
«ngag(,]n,.i,t. This battle will be more particularly referred to 
u^uattor ; but before considering the remainder of Hawke's 
*AtiTe uttrvcr, it may be of interest to glance at the condition of 
Hie Qftvy about the time of the opening of the war. 

^iVlien Hawke fii-st entered the navy there had been a dearth 
"^ grimt tif&cers for nearly a centnry. During the reigns of 
-farMll-rHL W'A';^ "' u^ Muy, the eonntry had developed its 



122 Lord Haw1c4!. 

fighting strength on land to a surprising extent, but the naTy 
had been correspondingly neglected. The quality of the officers 
was anything but satisfactory. Courts-martial were numerous, 
'' It is plain that there was an abundance of courage without 
conduct, sometimes a deficiency of the first and most necessary 
quality ; for the exigencies of war bring out what a time of 
peace may fail to discover." As an instance of the conduct of 
officers, we may mention that in the year 1742 no less than 
three post-captains were severely punished for improper treat- 
ment of their men, viz. Captains Fanshaw, Sir Yelverton Peyton, 
and the Hon. William Harvey, the two former for hiring out 
their men to merchants. ** Another contemporary captain, of 
good family, was executed for murdering an elder brother whom 
he had decoj-ed on board his frigate for that purpose." As 
another instance of the quality of officers at this period, we 
may cite what took place in Mathews' action above referred 
to. The indecisive character of this action was in large 
measure due to the jealousy wliic-h existed between the com- 
mander-in-chief and Lestock, his second in command. Lestock 
actually declined to join in the engagement, when his inter- 
vention would probabl}' have been decisive, simply because 
Mathews, in the heat of the action, had forgotten to give hiffl 
the formal signal to engage ; and on the day but one foUowiiigi 
when pursuing the combined fleets with every chance of over- 
taking tliem, Mathews suddenly gave the signal to cease 
pursuit, because, as it was supposed, Lestock, of whom he wtf 
jealous, occupied such a position that, in the event of battle, h€ 
would have sustained the brunt of the fight, and might hav< 
carried off the lion's share of the glory. During the 8ami 
action, many captains behaved so disgracefully that they wert 
afterwards court-martialled and broke. These are but a few 
instances out of many, but they serve to illustrate the prevaJlinf 
condition of things, and they show the raw material with whid 
Hawke had to deal, and out of which he contrived to rear thi 
splendid body of officers — men of the type of Rodney, How 
and Eeppel — who commanded the vessels of his fleet daring hii 
later actions. The quality of the seamen was probably as gMM 
as could anywhere be found. They were, of oourse, ImpiomA 
and in this way a large sprinkling of inferior men was intoO 
daced : but the coimtry had then, as now, a large merohant 019! 
filled with skilled seamen to fall back upon. The treat|Mpi|>!^ 
the men by their officers varied according to the rhaimjlpjg 
the officers ; but their lot, at best of times, was a hard ono^;.:) jf. 



Lord Hau-ke. 12ft 

It was. one of the greatest pointK in Hawkc's favour, and one 
which contributed most to his subsequent successes, that he 
devoted himself to the welfare of his meu, and in this respect 
tile brat of bis captains followed his exam[)U'. The greatest 
hudships of the crews were due to the bud Kanitarj' conditions 
which prevailed. The rotten state of the sliips, which were 
oHitiiiued in commission long after they should have been 
brukeii up, made matterK worse ; for diseases of various kinds 
iTure due to this cause alone. The scurvy was then, of course, 
Ibo terrible ticourge of the fleet. The only remedy known against 
the diiiease, when fresh provisions could not be obtained, was 
beer, and " beer was often tlie only an<l always the chief beverage 
of the men." Often the beer was Irad, and this simply meant 
death and inefficiency. It is dillieult, now-a-days, when the 
disease is almost unknown, to [lut ourselves in the position of 
the uavat tuiumandi-r of those days. The scurvy was tu him a 
ti mori! terrible foe than the enemy, and often bniugbt him to 
VtsKs of whiih we can have no conception. As an illustration 
of the state of things which then existed, we may tpiotc the 
figures from a .summary drawn up at the end of the Seven Years' 
Vw, Irum which it appears that in all the uaval battles of that 
*u there were only 1,51'1 sailors and marines killeil, as against 
flie ■ppalling number of l:)8,708 who had died of diseiise or were 
niiuiig. 

Id odu important respeet we were far behind Ixitli France and 

fipun all through the war, and tiiis was the art of building and 

"iniiig men-of-war. We were, however, nut long left without 

""idelj to copy from. The Priiia'Kii. taken from the Simnianla. 

•"i the Mttfjnaninie, from the French, each by a sujierior force, 

^ kfter a gallant resistantH-, supplied iis with infoiTuation 

'^ddi we were not alow to avail ourselves of. The I'rinccta was 

Mlf u large again as the ships of corresponding rate in our own 

^'^- These captures convhieed the home authorities that we 

ndheen allowed to fall shamefully behindhand : and there was 

I "* IfflR excnw for hU this, becaus<> only a centui'j- before 

I "'''K eiientti England led the world in all matters relating to 

i'^BTal architeeture. it ia not generally known that the four 

I otuut kings devoted much attention to this subject. Jamee L 

Itopioyed— BO Captain Burrows informs us — one Peter Pett, a 

[UUhcnuticiau, to make ships of a superior design. lu Pett's 

rwitily the art watt retained for more than one generation. 

I u>arW 1. worked in the same direction, " and it was with the 

E^^ilJB^jb^ .(irovidad with the doomed ship-money that 



124 fjord Hawke. 

Cromwell and Blake conquered the Dutch." James II. was not 
only a distinguished admiral who did much to revolutionise 
the naval tactics of the day, he was also a scientific naval 
architect. 

The stagnation which overtook the Navy in the reign of 
William III, ajBfected even the art of shipbuilding ; in fact, from 
that time forward till the present century we were totally 
dependent for our improved models on vessels captured from 
our various enemies, whether French, Spanish, or American. 
At the beginning of the war our materiel was terribly over- 
matched by that of the enemy, ** and it was not till the end of 
the Seven Years' War that the energy of Anson and his peers, 
acting on the hints supplied by captured ships, had made up for 
the loss of half a century.*' And yet Anson could only have 
taught his coimtrymen slavishly to copy ; they evidently were 
without the scientific knowledge which would have enabled them 
to originate, for we hear the same complaints again in the time 
of Nelson, and in 1812, when at war with the United States, we 
found their ships to be double the size of ours of the con^- 
sponding rate, and armed with guns throwing shot of twice the 
size of ours, in consequence of all which we sustained a succes- 
sion of severe defeats. In our own days we have witnessed 
something of the same sort. The French were beforehand with 
us in the introduction of screw line-of-battle ships, of armour- 
clad vessels, and, lastly, in the introduction of steel. If we are 
to believe what we have been told in recent debates in Parlia- 
ment, they are again leading us in the size and aimament of 
their ships. Fortunately, however, now-a-days, the fault, if fault 
there be, lies not with our naval architects, for we possess in 
them a race of men wht) have restored to this country the 
pre-eminence in scientific shipbuilding which she enjoyed in 
the time of the Stuart kings. Wlien the war first broke out, 
and for long aftenvards, our officers found themselves out-sailed 
and over-matched by the enemies' ships. Our naval artillery 
was as inferior as the ships. The larger vessel was, of course, 
able to carry the heavier gun. When this was found out we 
attempted to put on board our ships heavier guns than they 
would bear, with the result of making them crank and bad 
sea-boats ; and it was not till 1782 that the proportion of guns 
to tonnage was fixed substantially as it remained down to the 
time of the final abandonment of sailing ships. The ships were 
not only imperfect in themselves, but there was a great dearth 
^f frigatt^s and the smaller class of vessels generally. The 



Lord Hawke. 125< 

system of signalling was also most deficient, and there was a 
total absence of trustworthy charts of the enemy's coasts. 

The last point in connection with naval matters at that time 
which deserves special mention, is the system of tactics which 
was in vogue. The system of fighting in line, which was first 
completely developed during the wars with the Dutch in the 
time of Cromwell and Charles 11. had continued to be the recog- 
nised method of engaging down to the time of Hawke. When 
first introduced, it was no doubt a necessary change, for fleets 
were in those days exceedingly large, and some orderly manner of 
fighting had become indispensable. 

The miin reasons for fighting in line, broadside to broadside, each division 
niliog opposite to its connterpart in the enemy's line, were these : The admiral's 
Botiou might in this way, and this alone, be accurately followed, and the signals 
att«ided to, and thus the disasters proceeding from isolation and independent action 
00 the part of captains of ships, often at first imperfectly trained, and likely 
enough to make mistakes of all kinds, were minimised. The fleet was, theoretically 
at lea«t, one vast machine. Still more advantageous was the system when fleets 
eonH be long kept together. The constant practice of sailing in close order, 
*x*KiRiDg as it did all the skill and vigilance of the officers, and teaching those of 
Mch ship to regard themselves as a factor in the whole body, caused them to 
acqaire a habit of comprehending what was required of them, and performing it as 
Hbymstinct 

There can now be no doubt, however, but that the system was 
gfOfislj abused in the hands of men wanting in originality, and 
devoid of the true military instinct which has always enabled 
great conunanders ta revolutionise the system of tactics when 
rircumstances required the change. Instead of being made use 
of when best adapted to the work to be done, the tactics of line 
fighting were invariably employed. Though its introduction did 
i&Qch to systematise the methods of sea fighting, and raise the 
letter out of the condition of a mere melee or scramble, it was, 
•fter all, but a very elementary stage in tactics. In the hands of 
tte mediocre commanders who filled the interval between the 
great naval wars with the Dutch, and the time of which we are 
speaking, it led to the result of indecisive actions. It was 
fesened for Hawke to break through this established tradition, 
wid to put naval tactics once more upon a rational footing. 
Whenever the old system did not apply, he resolutely disregarded 
^ by disregarding the line of battle. The change in his hand 
^^, no doubt, gradual, but it is a remarkable fact that, in the 
very first general engagement in which he was employed as 
^tain of a line-of-battle ship, he, of his own initiative, threw 
the regulations to one side, and bore down out of the line on the 
Spanish ship, the PodeVy and captured her after a sharp engage- 



1 26 Lord Hawke. 

ment. The Poder was the only vessel that struck durii^ the 
<;ngageiucnt, and (the was so well fought that before Havkc bore 
down on her she had driven two Bnglish ships out of the line, 
jind hod kept several more at bay. 

What )ie commenced as a subordinate in Mathews' action, be 
continued as commander in the battle which he fought on tbe 
14th of October 1847, and he finally destroyed the old traditiona 
in his magnificent battle at Quiberon, which was, in many 
respects, the finest victory tver won by the British navy. The 
work which Hawko so sueccHsfulIy commenced, was continued 
and developed by his illustrious pupils, Rodney and Howe. We 
call them pupils advisedly, because they both served undn 
Ilawke, and he is well known to have taken the greatest pains in 
instructing his captains. To Rodney, as is well known, belong! 
the supreme merit of having invented the system of breaking the 
enemy's line, and of doubling the attack on each ship cut off; 
but in assigning to Bodney his proper place as a nanl 
commander, we must consider how far his method was a meie 
development of the system of tactics adopted by his gmt 
predecessor. When once the old tradition had been broken 
through by Hawke, tlic development of the revolution waa • 
comparatively easy task. We do not for a moment wish to 
under-rate the great merit of Bodney; he fnlly proved, within* 
year of Hawke's death, that on him had descended that greit 
man's mantle, and his achievement must he the more hi^itf 
valued when we find that so considerable an officer as Keppel' 
the favourite pupil of Hawke^was, when deprived of Mi 
master's guidance, utterly unable to put his precepts into 
practice, and allowed a golden opportunity of winning a deeiBiTt 
victory over the French off Ushant to escape him, because h«,j 
was imable to evade the tradition of fighting in line. 1 

We can now consider more particularly Hawke's active cares 1 
at sea. It has already been mentioned that the first cuut^idersliie 
affair in which he was engaged was Mathews' indecisive actim 
with the alhed fleets in 1744. Into the particulars of this conflict j 
it is needless to enter here. It was a golden opportunity ulioww ' 
to slip. Had the British commanderB been less jenloiis of en^ ' 
other, the French and Spanish naval power in tht: Mcditenv' 
neon might have been irretrievably mined quite ewdy in tku 
war, and it is impoaaible to foretell what might ham bMAgB 
inflae&ofl of a deciaive naval victory at this poiod (tttha ftnfl 
ooDTBe of hoBtilitiea. Of all the ofBoatB who took |iart lalH 
action, Hawke waa the onl; one who dietiiigiiiBhed himself, Ufl 



iT^ 



IS 



% 



Lord Hawke. 127 

condact, contrasting as it did in strong relief with that of 

his colleagues and superiors, had no small effect in bringing his 

great qualities under notice at home. He had but lately joined 

the fleet in the Berwick, having been engaged previously on 

convoy duty. During his voyage out from England he was 

greatly troubled by sickness amongst the crew ; at one time he 

reports that he has 128 working men ill, and that the rest of the 

crew continued to fall ill by tens and twenties at a time, con- 

nisting as they did for the most part of "poor, puny fellows," 

picked up by the press-gangs in London. This circumstance 

deserves mention, otherwise we can but half appreciate the fine 

Work which Hawke succeeded in getting out of his raw and 

partially disabled crew when the day of trial arrived. The 

-Berwick was a ship of seventy guns, and was attached to the 

van division under Bear-Admiral Rowley. Her station was 

towards the rear of the van, which was engaged with the centre 

of the allied fleets. Her first opponent was the Spanish ship, 

the Neptuno, which, after an hour's engagement, was driven out 

of the line with the loss of her captain, first lieutenant, four 

other officers, and 200 men. In spite of these losses she did not 

strike. At the end of this conflict, Hawke found himself within 

iH) great distance of another Spanish ship, the Poder, which was 

Wng splendidly fought, and which was, in fact, engaging ten 

British ships, belonging chiefly to the central division. Of these 

she had driven two, the Princesa and the Somerset, out of the 

line, while she kept the others at bay, Hawke, seeing this 

disgraceful state of things, determined to put a stop to it. 

"Bearing down upon her within pistol, or half musket shot, his 

fcst broadside killed twenty-seven of her men, and dismounted 

several of her lower-deck guns. In twenty minutes he had 

^masted her, and at the end of a two hours' conflict at close 

fiarters, during which the Poder lost 200 men killed and 

bounded, the brave Spaniard struck his colours." The loss to 

^Berivick was only five men wounded. More than one of the 

J>«kals which had previously been kept at bay, and which had 

Messed the Spaniard strike, had the audacity to send off boats' 

^W8 to take possession of the Poder ; ** but the captain would 

^Ter his sword to no one but the officer sent by the ship to 

^hich be had Btruck, pointing to the Berwick, and saying, at the 

^e time, that he held the others in the greatest contempt." 

' ^ well, indeed, he might, for of the captains with whom he 

^ engaged that day no less than six were ordered to be tried 

yy eourt-martial for their conduct in the battle ; of these, two 



128 Lord Hawke. 

only were acquitted, one deserted from the service when on 
way home to be tried, and three were cashiered or dismissed. 
After this battle Hawke was employed imder Admiral How 
in the Mediterranean in the command of ^nsiderable squadn 
till the close of the year 1745, when he returned home a 
spent the greater part of the next year on shore. This \ 
a year of naval disasters, which followed thick and close c 
on the other. Peyton in the East and Mitchell in the W 
Indies fought engagements with the French, for which they w 
ordered to be tried by court-martial. Peyton died before 
trial took place, but Mitchell was broke. In the same y 
Lestock, the unruly subordinate of Mathews at Toulon, i 
with disaster at L'Orient. These events throw a flood of li 
on the unsatisfactory condition of the navy at that time ; 
from thenceforward a real improvement took place, the credit 
which is due to Anson, who was at the Admiralt}', and 
Hawke, who from that time forward was the right arm of 
naval power of Britain. In the year 1747 Anson, learaig 
Admiralty for a time, took the command of a large fleet, a 
went off in the hope of intercepting two French squadroj 
one of which was destined to attack Cape Breton, and the oti 
was intended to assist Dupleix in India. Anson caught the t' 
squadrons off Cape Finisterre, just where they were expectt 
and beuig himself in overwhelmmg force he captured all tli( 
ships. The officer who was second in command to Anson 
this engagement. Sir Peter Warren, bore the principal bruut 
the fighting, and succeeded to the command of the enti 
squadron when his chief resumed his place at the Admirall 
Just at this time Hawke was promoted to the rank of ree 
admiral, thanks to the personal intervention of the King, w 
was never slow to encourage merit, and who had not forgott 
our hero's behaviour in the Mediterranean. He was fortune 
in being placed under Warren's command, who, in consequer 
of his bad state of health, was forced to beg the Admiral 
to allow Hawke to hold the command for him. This requ( 
was complied with, but only with extreme diflSdence, 
account of Hawke's youth. It is greatly to Warren's ere* 
that he discerned the abilities and aptitude of the youth 
admiral, and afforded him a chance of distinguishing hims 
and of rendering important services to his country. In 1 
autmnn of the same year Warren's health had become so I 
that he finally relinquished his post, and Hawke was appoint 
to take the independent command of the '' Western Squadroi 



Lord Ifmrke. 129 

uitmiR cnllcil, which conHieted of nineteen large ships, eeveu 
frigates, and two fire-ships. His instructions were, " to cruise 
lietKeen Ushant and Cape Finisterre, twent; leagues to the 
westward of each c^pe ; to make the land of Ushant every 
fortnight, and to station one of his best sailing ships and 
frifnleH off each cape to communicate with the Admiralty." 
He bad not long to wait, for on the 14th October he discovered 
an iinmenae fleet of French merchantmen (some 900 sail) 
cimvoyeJ by nine line-of-battle ships and several frlRateH. Hih 
nwn wjuadron consisted of fourteen ships of the line, which 
were, however, for the most part considerably inferior to the 
French ships in size, thickness of sides, and number and weight 
"f gims. Finding that he lost time in endeavouring to form 
line of battle, Hawke gave the signal for the whole squadron to 
fhfLse, and 11.80 a.m. he gave orders for the foremost ships to 
engage. His flagship, the Dcioiuhiic, of sixty-six guns, bore the 
principal brunt of the fighting, for out of six ships captured no 
leiw than three, viz, the Terrible, of seventy-fotur, the Trident, 
of siitj-four, and the Severn, of fifty guns, were captured or 
silfliiced by her ; while the Tonnant, of eighty guns, would most 
[Robably have shared the same fate had not the whole of the 
«>*fir-deck guns of the Devonshire carried away their breechings 
*t a critical moment in the attack, thus becoming imserviceablc 
till the defect could be remedied. This accident was a proof of 
the imoiint of work which Hawke got out of his guns. It is 
kBown from other sources that he paid immense attention to the 
■■■lyect of quick firing ; and the practice which he thus intro- 
daaed into the navy stood it in good stead in the subsequent 
tin, and contributed, as much as any other circumstance, to 
ttt BnocesBea which were afterwards attained. It is curious 
tbat with anch a large Beet so little was done by the other ships, 
vlun we remember that amongst their captains were such 
dBtingiUBhed men oa Rodney, Baunders, Watson, Saumarez, 
lod Harland. This circumstance speaks volumes for the 
and energy of the admiral. The French, 
1 L'Etenduiie, fought splmdidly on this occasion. 
It ifl'muoh to their credit that they 
^ any of their ahipa. Their own loss in 
I was 6CX}, while they inflicted a lose of 700 
llwi^ fonght as well, the empire of the seas 
Wk SO uaily acquired. Their action for the 
LVed the convoy, which esc^wd imder the protection of 
tes and a line-of-battla ship. ThonkB, however, to 

9 




130 Lord IJmckf. 

Hawke'fi energy, a large part of it was eventually captured ; for 
the day after the battle he sent off an express to Commodore 
Legge, who commanded off the Leeward Islands, informing him 
of the destination of the convoy. Legge was dead when the 
message arrived, but his successor — Pocock — promptly acted 
upon it, and, intercepting the convoy, captured a very large 
number of ships. 

For this victory Hawke was made a Knight of the Bath, and 
received a seat in Parliament as member for Portsmouth. Sir 
Peter Warren having now recovered his health, Hawke, at his 
own request, continued to serve under him as second in com- 
mand till July 1748, when Warren definitely retired, and was 
succeeded in the supreme command by Ilawke, who held the 
post till November 1752. This was a period of truce, for the 
Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle had been signed in 1748. 

For the next two years and a half he was unemployed, bnt at 
the commencement of the Seven Years War he again receives 
orders to hoist his flag, and continues in active service till aboat 
the period of the signature of the Peace of Paris. We may 
appropriately conclude the notice of this portion of Hawke'e 
career with the following quotation from Captain Burrovs' 
work : — 

The cITcct produced by the action of the Royal Navy was, indeed, the solagranc 
on which the country could claim a peace. The land forces had neTer had a hk 
chance, and nearly eifrhty millions of debt had been incurred, chiefly in mbridiai Mii 
the pay of Ilanovorian troops. Bnt the navy of France had been most Mrioad; 
crippled in battles and single fights, her hostile colonial enterprisea effactiTel; 
chorked, and hor support of Spain had fallen still more ruinoualy than erer oaths 
docaying state. The commerce of all three nations had suffered enonnooaly; ha 
the balance of prizes was estimated to be in favour of Great Britain by two millioa 
sterling. 

Into the circumstances which led up to the Seven Yean' Wa 
it would be impossible now to enter. Whatever may have beei 
the apparent issues of European politics, the conflict betweei 
this country and France was at bottom one for maritizne, com 
mercial, and colonial supremacy. Hence the immenBe intera 
which attaches to the doings of the navy during this epoch ; n 
of all that was done by the navy the greatest and tibe iuMh 
part was borne by Hawke. The war commenced diBMfaNwib 
A great deal of the new spirit which had been infiised intp ft 
navy daring the last years of the old war, appears to hamljMi 
lost during the peace. The matiriel of the fleet had wim 
neglected, and nothing could well have been irarse 
victuallii^; or the sanitaiy arrangements generally. Tim: 




Lord Hatcke. ] 31 

ranean was left to tako care of itaelf, though it was known that 
the French were openly preparing an expedition to Minorca. 

Xothtng seemed able to rouse Newcastle's Government. It was 
not till thirteen months after they had received intelligence of 
the French preparations, that Byng was ordered to equip a fleet 
of fcn bne-of-hattle ships for the protection of Minorca. A worse 
i^inippHl or more ill-manned expedition never left our shores. 
It met with nothing but had luck on its way out, and its ultimate 
fate, as also that of its unfortunate commander, are so well 
biowii that it is uuneceHsary here to refer to them. The fury of 
the nution at the failure of the expedition wan unbounded, and, 
like all national fury, it was cruelly unjust. 

The reading of the histor}' of that year is not pleasant work. 
The whole nation seemed at fault, from the Government down- 
^T9, and behaved disgracefully to the unfortunate Bj-ng. One 
gond thing, however, rcHulted from all this evil, the miserable 
•nd incompetent Government was driven from office, and Pitt 
hewmefl the soul, if not the head, of the new administration. 
Fnait henceforward he is the preponderating Egure in the 
"ffldnct of the war. The mainspring of every movement, his 
finy eoergy seems to animate the whole nation, and to infuse 
■Kw vigour into every service. Well might Frederick the Great 
ciclum that, the travail pams of England had been long and 
<l>treniiig, but that at length she had been delivered of a man. 
Like his great contemporary, Pitt commenced his career with a 
•uceasion of failures which only had the effect of teaching him 
Im (or the future to command success. With one of these 
&vke was conneeted, though he was in no way responsible 
b tiu result. We allude to the ineffectual expedition to 
fi<>(lielbrt. Pitt was determined to divert the attention of the 
nodi from their eastern frontier, and at the same time to 
pnent them from sending succour to their North American 
to India, hy carrying out a succession of descents on 

m and western coasts. That his policy in the 

tocceedcd, and that he not only expelled the French from 
'^ii& and Canada, but utterly destroyed France as a colomsing 
pOTer, is known to every child ; but his earlier expeditions to 
K>e French coast were anything bat Buccessful, and, what is more, 
BH holt of their ill-socoeBS must be laid principally at Pitt's 
Awr. 

Tht first of these was the descent on Bochefort, a naval 
^*:8a which was created by Colbert in the time of Loois XIV., 
tejy^i^^i. i a ja ^aoh an inoeeeBsible position that the French 



132 Lord ffaivke. 

Admiral, Anbe, writing Rome little time ago in the Rerue des Di']tx 
Momle», names it as one of the three naval arsenals of Enropp 
which cannot be taken by sea. Hawke was selected for the 
command of the naval portion of the expedition, while Sir John 
Mordaunt commanded the troops ; and Wolfe, afterwards » 
famous, was quartermaster-general. The fleet was composed of 
sixteen line-of-hattle shipB, aevcn frigates, two bomh-ketchea, 
two lire- ships, two busses, one horse-iship, and fifty-five trannporta, 
which latter carried ten infantry regiments, two of marines, 
a train of field-gims, and sixty light horse. There was do 
siefie- artillery ; for the wlmle expedition was kept a profound 
secret, and the place was intended to be surprised and taken b; 
escalade. It was arranged that the expedition should leave 
Spithead about the middle of August, but, owing to the tonnage 
of the transports necessary to carry so large a force having been 
miscalculated, great delays took place, and the fleet could not 
start till September lOtli, only a fortnight before the equinoi, 
which was far too late. 

Nothing was known about Rochefort ; there were no charts, 
and no English pilots ; the waters into which this great fleet had 
to be taken were excessively intricate, and none of the English 
seamen knew anything about their navigation. Everything had 
to be trusted to a French pilot, who turned out to be very 
ignorant of the waters. During the voyage the breezes were 
light and mostly contrax}', so that the fleet did not si^t the 
islands of Bh6 and Oleron till the 20th, about noon. The admiral 
attempted to get into Basque roads that night, but could not 
succeed. The next day also the weather proved unfavourable, 
and it was not till the day following at 9 p.n. that he succeeded 
in entering the roads. 

As three days were thus unavoidably lost outside, all hopei 
of effecting a surprise had to be abandoned ; and as it turned 
out that the French hod had ample warning from an English apfi 
before Hawke himself knew that the expedition was in contem- 
plation, a surprise could in no case have been effected. Odh 
inside the roads Hawkes responsibilitieB were over. The farthv 
initiative rested with the military officers, and they -pmA 
themselves to be men devoid of resolution. Thej vasted Ant , 
days in holding councils of war, and finally resolved to do ' 
nothing. The expedition then returned, not a man having boeo 
landed, and thus a miHion of the public money was absolutcl; 
squandered. 

Looking back upon the expeditum from this i^ 



Ijord Hawke. 133 

:and with the wisdom which always follows the event, we can 

-eome to no other conclusion but that the generals by their 

irresolation, and want of dash, saved the country from a frightful 

ciisaster. The enterprise depended for its success upon too 

znany chances, any one of which going against it would inevitably 

liave led to failure. As it was, every single chance turned out 

3^ver8ely, and Pitt ought to have been thankful that nothing 

'v^orse came of it ; but it was an expedition planned by himself, 

>&nd which he forced upon the reluctant king, and his fury at 

its failure knew no bounds. At the opening of Parliament he 

so far forgot himself as to express himself in the following 

ignoble manner : — 

He deelju-ed solemnly that his belief was that there was. a determined resolution, 
both in the naval and military commanders, against any vigorous exertion of the 
national power. He affirmed that though His Majesty appeared ready to embrace 
^'^erj measure proposed by his ministers for the honour and interest of his British 
Nonunions, yet scarce a man could be found with whom the execution of any one 
plan, in which there was the least appearance of danger, could with confidence be 
tmated. 

The only excuse the Great Commoner could have had for using 
such violent language, was that the number of the disasters 
^hieh befel him just about this time may have caused him to 
lose his head; for a few weeks before the termination of the 
Hocbefort expedition, the Duke of Cumberland had been all but 
driven into the sea by Marshall Richelieu, and had signed the 
notorious convention of Closter-seven. 

Thus the autmnn of 1757 closed in gloom, with disaster on 
^ery side ; but it was fortunately the gloom of the darkness 
which precedes the dawn, for the grand spirit of the nation was 
now thoroughly roused, and from thenceforward king, people, 
nuuisters, and officers vied with each other in the efforts which 
*hey made, and the sacrifices which they endured, to raise the 
^^en fortunes of the country. And nobly were their efforts, and 
*he corresponding exertions of their allies, rewarded. The great 
^I'ederick turned the tide with his victory at Rossbach, followed 
quickly by that of Leuthen, and before Christmas he had rolled 
*>ack the invading hosts of French, Russians, and Swedes from 
^e districts which they had occupied. The army which 
^^pitulated at Closter-seven was, moreover, set free by the 
*<^tion of its capturers. 

^ In the next year, in April, Hawke destroyed the French expe- 
^tdon which was destined to sail from Rochefort to the reUef of 
•^^OTusbourg; in July, Boscawen and Amherst recaptured the latter 
l^^ace from the French, together with the whole of Cape Breton 



184 Lord Hawke. 

and St. John, and secured both bauks of the month of the 
St. Laurence, thus catting off the French to Canada from all 
BUpport from Europe; and on the French coasts Kowe and 
General Bligh succeeded ui doing a good deal of damage, bnming 
a quantity of sliipping and stores at St. Maloes, and destrojing 
the basin and forts of Cherbourg ; this latter expedition, hoveTei, 
ended unfortunately in the disaster at St. Cas. Lastly, (lom 
India came the news of Clive's great victory of Plassy won in the 
previous year. 

The year 1759 brings us to the most famous events in the life 
of Hawkc. After an eleven months' leave of absence, caused by 
ill-health, he hoists his flag in ^fay on the iininilie'i, and takes 
command of the large fleet of twenty-five line-of-battle shipB 
destined to blockade Brest. The French Government, Iwliering 
that England had expended all its strength on distant expeditions, 
determined to make a grand effort to turn tlu' balance of fortnne 
nearer home. An invasion in force of this country was deter- 
mined on, and a large naval forci, destined to cover the invading 
force, was fitted out at Brest. It became Hawke's duty to 
watch, and, if possible, to destroy this naval force, and tbns 
to check tlie threatened invasion. For six months he ke^ 
np the blockade, under circumstances of exceptional difficnl^- 
Whenever a westerly gale set in, there was great difficulty 
of the fleet being driven on shore, while on the other hand tb9 
French could not come out till the wind changed. HATk& 
had, therefore, to withdraw his ships to a place of aafetj", aoett 
as Plymouth or Torhay, and be on his station again when th& 
gale moderated, before the French should have time to come 
out. The vigilance and the energy required to carry out thiB 
work successfully were extraordinary, while at the same time the- 
dilhculties of victualling the fleet, of maintaining the healtb 
of the men on such a long cruise, and of keepmg his ships clau 
and fit, were such as to tax to the uttermost the adminl'9 
powers of organisation. In those days copper-bottoms had not 
yet been invented, and vessels consequently soon got bnlr 
especially so when engaged in blockade irork. 

The summer and antmnn seem to have been exceptionally 
stormy, for we find the admiral aeveral times driven oS h!» 
station, and on each of these occasions there was the atmost 
anxiefy at home lest the French should get ont. 

When we read the history of this long blookade, and of t^ 
magQifieent nctor; which concluded it, ve soaroelf know vhidi 
most to admire, the nntip^g patience, TigUwuS) and 



Lord Hawke. 135 

rhich the admiral displayed while watching the enemy's coasts, 
r the dare-devil courage and masterly skill which enabled him 
^ destroy their fleet under the circumstances which will presently 
•e narrated. 

The policy of the French was, of course, to remain in Brest as 
mg as possible, in order to wear out the British ships and sailors 
y the trials of the long blockade, and also to take eventual 
dvantage of any storm which might either destroy the hostile 
eet or drive it ofif the station. In this wise policy they nearly 
acceeded, and would most probably have done so but for the 
plendid behaviour of Hawke. 

On November the 10th we find that he had been driven by a 
remendous westerly gale, against which he had struggled for 
aree days, into Torbay, and he writes that he was lucky enough 
3 get in there. He is off again on the 12th, but is driven back 
n the 13th. He shifts his flag to the Royal George, his old 
Lagship having become water-logged whenever it blew hard. On 
he 14th the wind changes once more, and he is enabled to pro- 
eed to his station. This was the opportunity which the French 
lad waited for so long. The change of wind which had enabled 
lawke to get back, also permitted them to come out. The 
British fleet was gone, and they probably, and with reason, 
oncluded that it had been scattered or destroyed by the 
einpest. 

On the evening of the 16th one of the victuallers reported to 
he admiral that the French had been seen at sea working to the 
'-astward. It so happened that Admiral Bompart had been 
carried into Brest by the very gale which drove Hawke ofif, and 
sported the absence of the British fleet. Marshal Conflans acted 
^th great decision on receipt of this news ; he put Bombart's 
-^perienced sailors on board his own ships, and set sail on 
he 14th with twenty-one line-of-battle ships and three frigates, 
he very day on which Hawke left Torbay. His first destination 
^^e Quiberon bay, where Duffs squadron of frigates would be 
^Bily disposed of; next he intended to take up the trans- 
^^Tts with the land forces at Morbihan, and endeavour to 
^^3jLe a descent on our coasts before the British admiral could 
^*xd him out. He was destined, however, never to get beyond 
i^iberon bay. He was in the very act of fulfilling the first part 
^^ his programme when the ever-watchful Hawke pounced upon 
^ii3L Having heard of his escape on the evening of the 16th, 
^^^ conclnding that his destination was Quiberon, he at once 
^ts off in pursuit, and reports to the Admiralty on the 17 th : 



186 Lord Haivke. 

** I have carried a press of sail all night, with a hard gale at 
S.8.E., in pursuit of the enemy, and make no doubt of coming 
up with them either at sea or in Quiberon bay." On the 18th 
and 19th the winds were very variable but more favourable, and 
on the morning of the 20th, at half-past 8, to the great joy 
of the whole squadron, the Maidstone frigate, which was ahead 
of the squadron, let fly her top gallant-sheets, which was the 
signal for seeing a fleet. Hawke immediately made the signal 
for line abreast in order to draw all the ships of the squadron 
up with him. At a quarter to 10 the Magnanime, which had 
been sent ahead to make the land, also made the signal of 
seeing the enemy. On being discovered, the enemy's fleet, 
which was in the act of pursuing Duflf 's squadron, endeavoured 
to make ofif, and put right before the wind towards the shore, 
whereupon the admiral made the signal for the seven ships 
nearest them to chase and to draw into line of battle ahead 
of him, and endeavour to stop the French till the rest of 
the squadron had time tb come up; the other ships had 
also orders to form as they chased so that no time might 
be lost. At half-past 2 the action began to the southward 
of Belleisle, the French admiral leading round the Cardinals 
while his rear was in action. All day it was blowing a great 
gale at N.W. and W.N.W. with heavy squalls ; and the fleet 
was now on a part of the coast amidst rocks, islands, and 
shoals which were quite unknown to the English, who were 
without chart and without a pilot, while the French were 
familiar with every inch of the navigation. 

So few hours of daylight remained that it was necessary to 
make quick work, and, indeed, no time was lost. The first 
vessel to strike was the French rear-admiral's ship the Fomiidahle^ 
of eighty guns, at 4 p.m. She had been engaged by the Heso- 
liUioriy Captain Speke, and also by the Torhayy Captain Eeppel, 
but the Resolution had the principal share in subduing her. 
The admiral gave the master of his flagship, the Royal George^ 
orders to lay him alongside the French admiral's ship, the 
Soleil Royal. The master remonstrated, believing that to do 
so would wreck the ship on a shoal. Hawke replied in the 
memorable words, ** You have done your duty, Sir, in showing 
the danger; you are now to comply with my order, and lay 
me alongside the Soleil Royal. The two ships exchanged a 
few broadsides, but the French admiral then made off, though 
he did not succeed in saving his ship, which next day was driven 
ashore and burned. The Royal Oeorge had no sooner driven off 



iMrd nmvke. 187 

the French admiral, than kIk- ■kiw attacked hy four otli«i- shipa, 
■hii-li [Kjured tlit-ir bi'oudisides into her in succeHoion. Tlie last 
of tbcw, Le Su2>frhe, met with a terrible fate, as Hawko poured 
bis whole broadeiile into her at once, and, repeating tiie same, 
tank lier alonjrsidc of bim with her whole crew of SUO hands. 
Tlif Riiniil (iforife was now engaged with seven of tlie enemy's 
BLips ximultaneouKly, Init Kevoral English Hhips coming ap to 
bisiKi Iit>r, and darkness, fortunately for tlic Frencli. coming 
on, they n-treated. hi addition to the ships muiitioned above, 
Ihe Tlirtff, of seventy-four guiiH, was sunk by Keppel, and the 
whoK' of bcr crow lost ; and the Heron, of Kovonty-four, struck 
It 5v.)i. to Lord Howe in the Mafiitunime, but so gi'eat was 
the Btorm that no Iwat could be sent to take possexsion of her. 
The ./w/r, of Bcvcnty guns, was also driven on the Chnrpentier 
rodiH und wrecked. In mldition to tlie aix thus taken or 
destroyed in the action, seven others threw all their guns and 
rtores overboard, and crept next day into the river Vilaine, but 
in trosMug the bar of the river four of them broke their backs. 
The remaining ships esi^nped under cover of the night to 
Roehefort, and were there dirim:mtled and warped several 
miles through the mud of the Oharente, in order to sav(^ them 
^om Keppel's squadron which was detached in pursuit. 

^e night after the battle miint have lieen a tirrible one 
n» Tietore and vnnquished alike. 'ITie storm increased, the 
WTes broke with redoubled force, and the night was pitchy 
•A, while minute guns as signals of distreBs were being 
nntintially fired off, bat in consequence of the darkness and 
■u nma nobody was able to render assistance. 

The condition of things that night has been thus described 
b Ihteleray'B life of Chatham :— 

^ luRsn of tfaa ooBit. tha darknani of the nitfht. tbu fun- »r the temp«Bt. all 
*^ to parplox the w:>tt«red fleeU both ol EnttUad und Fnim-u. Although 
**■>• |na wars heard od evarj Hide, jet nunc rould atlord relief tu aithor friend 
*^ To tha ballowin^ of tha waTaa from beloir, and tha thunderH of hs*f en 

^•fcoia, wu added thBconitanl roar of niniian rrom the ahipa. 

"Bke neit mornicf; the SoUil Royal and the lieroa, which 
I ■"ttder cover of the night had anchored amidst the Uritish fleet, 
I lot and ran ashore, ajid were burned. The Euex was detached 
I n pursue the former ship, bat unfortunately got upon the four 
I —f*^ ftsd was wrecked, and the vietorionB He/tolutimi had also been 
I z["^ on the same shoal during the night and was totally lost. 
I Ihe better partfl of thti crewa of both veasels were saved. The 
■^PlylwBes which the BritiBh nutained were due to the tempest. 



138 Lord Hawke. 

Thus ended the famouR battle of Quiberon, the greatest victory 
which the English fleet had won since the defeat of the Spanish 
Armada, perhaps in many respects the greatest which it hag 
ever achieved ; for Hawke fought and conquered three foes, of 
which the French fleet was the least formidable, the tempest 
and the unknown rocks and shoals of the lee shore were to him 
far more dangerous. It may safely be said that not one of his 
contemporaries and one only of his successors would have dared 
to engage the French squadnm, on the short afternoon of that 
November day, in a violent gale, and so near the unknown shore 
that ten thousand Frenchmen on land witnessed the defeat and 
destruction of the fleet which was the last one their country 
had to look to. But Hawke had not waited patiently during six 
months for nothing. He knew his duty, and did not hesitate 
for a moment. That duty was to save liis countr}' at all hazards 
from the chance of invasion, and he knew that he could do 
this, even at the risk of the loss of his own fleet and perhaps of 
his own reputation. Whatever happened to him, he felt con- 
fident that if he attacked, the Freneli fleet must be destroyed- 
His experience of the previous year at llochefort had taught him 
that in their efforts to save themselves they would incur destruc- 
tion, and the result most fully confirmed his anticipations ; ioft 
what the sh(ui; hours of daylight obliged him to spare, the 
French themselves rendered mcapable of further harm. Sncli 
were the facts, and the mere statement of them appeals with sueli 
force to the imagination that further commentary is unneces- 
sary. At one blow, not only the expedition but the whole nar3 
of France was shattered irretrievably, so far as this war wa4 
concerned. Henceforward the French gave but little trouble ^1 
sea. Hawke had nothing more to do. He had rendered himsel 
unnecc^ssary. His career at sea, though not over, was practicalLj 
finished, for the remainder of it was quite uneventful. 

He hoisted his flag for the last time at Spithead on board {h^ 
Royal Geotye in April 1762, and cruised with a squadron of tai 
line-of-battle ships off the north-west coast of Spain, and b 
August he put into Torbay to refit, and obtained Lord Biito*i 
permission to haul down his flag, for there was nothing to dOaiCM 
the preliminaries of peace were as good as signed. 

The news of Hawke's victory at Quiberon was xecemd •> 
home with frantic expressions of delight. During fha iQPAl 
blockade which had preceded it, the nation was kept ina 8lili^fB|l 
perpetual anxiety and alarm. When Hawke was diif«%i|dK^ 
Torbay by the storms in November, the foxy of the 







Lord Uawhe. 189 

BO bounds. They made no allowances for circumstances which 
he coald not control, and on the very day that he was destroy- 
ing the French fleet at Qulberon, he waa being burnt in effigy 
at Plmouth by an infuriated rabble of his own countrymen. 
Tmly there have been occasions in our Iiistory when we hare 
iiTatled the reputation of the Carthagenians for ingratitude. As 
I TCicBnl for the victory, Hawke received a penaion of i'2,000 a 
jear, assigned for his own life and for that of his two sons, but 
be vaij given no other distinction. An(<on had received a peerage 
forxervices which were inHigniticant compared with Hawke's, 
ud there was no oxcuHe for passing liim over at this time, 
for he possessed ample wealth to support a title. 

Shortly before Hawke concluded his last cruise, bis old friend 
Anson died, and the position of First Lord of the Admiralty 
became vacant. During his long tenure of officii Anson had done 
vooders towards improving the administration and condition of 
^ navy. Hawke had been his rigbt-hand man at sea, and no 
we waB better qualified, both by his knowledge of tlif service 
md his general talents, to succeed him ; but he was passed over, 
wd the post was held by a succession of very incomix-tent 
BnliaoB. ^Vhen Lord Chatham re8ume<l olBce in 176U, he 
dctaniiied to have a naval First Lord, and again passed over 
Hiwke, because he ascertained that Admiral Saunders, who had 
tliBHly held high office at the Board, would retire if any naval 
"ffieer were placed over his head. Saunders' retirement would 
■ihb iavolTed the resignation of Keppel, and tlif: Board would 
■Bmbn^en up. He was accordingly appointed First Lord, but 
■> neigaed i^ter holding the post for two months, and Hawke 
*■* inmiediately selected to All the vacant place, which he held 
** fiw years. An incident connected with Kaunders' appoint- 
iMit may here be mentioned as an illustration of the generous 
Vtit which distinguished Hawke. Admiral Sir George Pocock, 
™o vu one of the most distinguished othcers of the day, and, 
lib Hawke. much senior to Sir Charles E^aunders, was extremely 
k ^^gnanl when he heard of the appointment, and immediately 
I sailed on Hawke, and complained to him warmly of the indignity 
I lo himself and the other senior officers. He found Hawke in the 
f^ty <Kt of going out to congratulate Saunders in person on his 
ffflnotion. Hawke's example had such a marked influence with 
^ovoclc, that he moderated his anger, and even went so far as to- 
I VnifitHtulate Saunders himself. 

During his tenure of office he devoted himself, as Ear as the 
^|>^a^^^horities would allow him, to incwmring the strwigth 



140 Lord Hawke. 

of the navy. It was he who laid down the maxim which ha 
since become a standing principle, tliough unfortunately to 
often neglected, ''that our enemies being peculiarly attentive t 
their marine, our fleet could only be termed considerable in th 
proportion it bore to that of the House of Bourbon " ; or, a 
Captain Burrows interprets it, '* the British fleet must always b 
kept in such a state that it would be a match for France an 
Spain combined, the only nations which could, in that day, I 
thought of as hostile maritime powers." While he was in powc 
he was obliged to break up fourteen line-of-battle ships whic 
had become worn out, but he built thirteen new ones, and le 
fifteen on the stocks when he went out of office. He also di 
much to improve the pay and position of naval officers. 

In 1770, when Chatham was succeeded by Lord North, Hawb 
was induced to retain his position at the Admiralty. It wa 
unfortimate that he did so, for he soon ** found himself i 
opposition to his old, and feebly supported by his new friends. 
The new Board contained no other naval men, and Hawke wa 
left alone to bear the burthen of preparing for war with Spaii 
The supplies for the navy had been cramped by a succession c 
Governments, and he had the greatest difficulty in keeping u 
the proper establishment of ships. His health broke dowi 
under the strain to which it was subjected, and he was com 
pelled to resign office in January 1771. Here was anothe 
opportunity of conferring upon him the honours which he h» 
so amply deserved, but it was again allowed to pass ; and i 
was not till 1776 that the peerage was conferred on hin 
which he should have received after his great victory o 
Quiberon. 

After his retirement from the Admiralty, the navy wa 
allowed to fall into a state of decay; and when the America: 
War broke out, and France and Spain once more joined againe 
us, the strain on the national resources was exceedingly severe 
Keppel missed the golden opportunity of destroying the Frenc! 
fleet off Ushant, and Sir Charles Hardy, who afterwards too 
the command, found himself in the humiliating condition of bein 
forced to keep sixty-six hostile line-of-battle ships at bay with 
fleet of little more than half the size. 

Lord Hawke died in 1781, just six months too soon to witnee 
the restoration of the naval power of his country by Rodney' 
great victory of the 12th April 1782. In forming our estimat 
of him, we have to consider much besides his great qualities a 
.a fighting seaman. He possessed the rare power of raising th 



Lord Hawke. 141 

iotdlectual and moral level of those who were about him, and 
he knew how to attach them to liimself. He could never have 
met irith the miefortune which befel Mathews off Toulon, 
bHSnse hie officere would have been incapable of behaving to 
him SB they did to Klathcws. During the whole of his career, 
he had never to deal with a case of mutiny, for tlu' nimple 
reai^n that he never allowed tlic conditions to obtain which 
engender discontent. His correspondence throughout Iiis whole 
caieer proves that he treated hie superiors and inferiors alike 
irith consideration and kindly respect. He was exceedingly 
firm m checking official abuses : had he been less so, he 
could never have maintained the six months' blockade off 
Brest; the inefficiency of the home authorities would have 
nined the condition of his fleet ; and instead of being able, 
u he was, to bring his whole fighting strength into action 
when the day of battle arrived, a less far-seeing and energetic 
eommander would have hod half his ships undergoing refit, 
and half their crews stricken down with fever and scurvy. 
The great merits displayed during the conduct of that blockade, 
ud the battle which followed it, have never, at least in 
osr timeB, been fully appreciated. They should rank with 
tht my higheat feats of the greatest of our naval officers. 
SlA meQ as Howe are called fortunate. The appellation is a 
■UHDer. They obtain success because they know how to 
tODUund it. If they are fortunate, it is because they trust 
■Mthing to Fortune's chances and favours ; but rather, so far as 
Ihnited human intelligence is able, because they provide with 
fcXBf^t for every contingency. In the words of Juvenal : 

Knllam nnmen nliut li «it Prndentia : noHts 
T« luimni, FortanB, deim. 




Cbe Jfgban Campatp of 1878-80. 

A FEW MILITARY DEDUCTIONS. 
By Major M. J. Eimo-Harmah, Bengal Staff Cobps. 



{Continued from page 93.) 

Teleokaphh. — The present system, which obliges Govenunent 
otficers to pay to GoverameDt in cash for every telegram nnt 
by them on Government service or received by them " bearingi 
and then to recover the amount again from the same Gotoh- 
ment by contingent bills, is so unintelligible, so vexations, in t 
word, BO senseless, and gives rise to such nnnecesBary Metion 
in peace time, that it is a perfect marvel that it was eitf 
allowed to stand for more than one day ; but wheo we find tint 
the same system is obligatory with an army on active Beniea in 
the field, it becomes a very serious matter indeed. 

The gross iniquity of the system is, however, bo patent to fSk 
that further explanations are not required. The obli^rtc? 
payment of cash for doing Government work is the weak poist 
in an otherwise splendidly-organieed department, wfaiflh ptr 
formed invaluable services during the past war, and lAkh tl 
surely able to devise some simple arrangement of truudbTt V 
telegraph cheque-books. 

The rapidity with which the Government Civil Telegrapb W* 
laid was most remarkable. On the 8rd October 1871 ind«n 
were issued for the supply of 200 miles of Bemi-permanent ffin 
for the Eohat Force, and 260 miles for the line from Qiietts to 
Kandahar. By the 8th November an office was opened at ThuUi 
a distance of six^-sii miles ; and on tiie 10th January 161? . 
another waa opened at Feiwar; and on the other linijrikJ 



The Afghan Campaign of 1878-80. 143 

miles were laid to Gulistan Kerroz by the 8th January. From 
thence to Chnmmun, twenty-three miles, crossing the Khojuck 
pass, was constructed in five days ; and in twenty-five days 
more the remaining seventy-seven miles into Kandahar was 
I'ompleted. 

As an instance of the great difficulties that the department 
had to contend against, I may add that the 108 miles of wire 
on the Khyber line was cut ninety-eight times during the first 
phase of the war, and a total length of sixty miles was carried 
off and never recovered. 

Correspondence, dtc. — As a rule, the written and telegraphic 
<lespatcheB from and to commanders in the field were too long 
and verbose ; the talent of compressing the maximum of mean- 
^g into the fewest words is not possessed by all ; but the art 
should be studied, and I would venture to give here what I 
<^n8ider to be a model despatch, short but full of meaning, 
feeling and ardour, from the President of the United States 
Army at Washington to Major-General McClellan, commanding 
in the field :— 

'* 15th September 1862, 2.45 p.m. 
** Your despatch of to-day received. God bless you and all 
^th you. Destroy the rebel army if possible. 

" A. Lincoln." 

One universal system is required for the supply of clerks and 

^tionery for all military offices. At present some receive a 

Monthly allowance for the purpose, and others receive no allow- 

^ce, but are supplied by Government. It is not too much to 

^7 that such a mixed arrangement is very objectionable in 

^^^e time, and caused a great deal of unnecessary trouble 

^^ing the past war. I would therefore strongly advocate the 

^*H>lition of all such allowances throughout India, and the 

^l^i'verBal supply of all office requirements free of cost by 

government ; al«o that a regular roll be kept of qualified clerks 

*^Oxn which men should be selected to fill vacancies wherever 

^^^ occur. 

.^^ In like manner I consider it most desirable that there should 
^ one code of regulations on aU points throughout India. 

Cutting. — Further, I submit that all the barrack accommoda- 
^^H for native troops should be provided by, and should be the 
^^l^perty of, Government ; and in this way would be avoided all 
^^ trouble that was caused during the past two years by the 
^^tting money system that is in force in the Bengal army, 



144 Tlie Afghan Campaign of 1878-80. 

regiments bein^ paid a fixed allowance, and made to build their 
own barracks. 

Natire. Army, — The experiences of the past war have shown us 
plainly that there are a certain number of Bengal infantry 
regiments that are not fit for active service, and it has also again 
shown the great advantage of ** class" over ** mixed " regiraeiib, 
and 1 claim for thesi* numerous and manifest advantages that 
they are political as well as military, and am therefore a strong 
advocate for tlio gradual reorganisation of all the Bombay 
regiments, and of all but a few specially selected coi-ps in 
Bengal, and for commencing at once with the so-called '* low- 
class '' regiments in the latter Presidency, two of which might 
advantageously and with gi-cat ease be converted into pioneer 
corps c()mp(^sed of good men, such as the Bhurtpore Jats ; and 
one could be made into a ()th Gurkha regiment by with- 
drawing all Gurkhas from such of the others as have not 8i)ecial 
permission to enlist them, at the same time strictly prohibiting^ 
the unauthorised and mischievous enlistment of these men ; the 
presence of a few Gurkhas can never make a bad regiment 
good, while at the same time these sturdy little aliens are lik€ 
fish out of water, hate their isolated position, and by th&ii 
consequent discontent increase the difficulty, already greA>i 
enough, of obtaining good recmits for the regular Gurkkiii 
regiments and such others as are specially allowed to enlis' 
them. 

The paucity of British officers with all our native regiments ii 
a source of national danger, and has been favourably consideied 
I believe, by the Army Organisation Committee ; but I would hen 
venture to suggest the following as the strength for an inbntz? 
battalion, supposing that only ten officers are allowed : — 

1 commandant — to hold appointment for five years only, no^ 
time before attauiing substantive rank of Lieutenant- 
Colonel to count as part of the five years. 

8 company leaders—/.^, one for each double company — the 
regiment being divided into six companies. 

8 company subalterns — ue. one to each doable oompuiy. 

1 adjutant. 

1 quartermaster. 

1 instructor in musketry and signalling. 

6 subahdars \ l* ec 
c • «- J } native officers. 
6 jemadars ) 

1 native adjutant. 




The Afghan Campaign of 1878-80. 145 

« 

42 havildars. 
42 naicks. 

24 drummers, and 24 buglers and fifers. 
800 sepo}'s divided into six companies. And no band to be 
allowed for any regiment that was raised after 1856. 

Every officer will then have his own duty to do ; each double 
company will have its British company leader as well as two 
native officers, instead of the present system of wing commanders 
and wing officers, which is as senseless as it is detrimental to 
regimental efficiency. 

Entrenchxug Tools. — Although the regimental entrenching 
tools were hut seldom made use of, yet they should still form 
part of the regular equipment of each battalion of infantrj', 
should l)e carried on the regimental animals at all marching 
and field exercise parades, and the men made more acquainted 
with their use. 

The tools now issued to regiments of native infantry are 
QDBerviceable because they are unsuitable to the nature and 
habits of the men who are intended to use them, and who, being 
unacquainted with the use of spades and shovels, would do double 
the amount of work if allowed to use the instruments commonlv 
onployed by them at their own homes, for which reason it would 
•ppear only common sense to make " phowrahs " or ** mamootii^s " 
^ pickaxes the standard entrenching tools for native regi- 
^b^bsAa] and I am not at all sure that, considering the fact that a 
^^^ proportion of men in British regiments are enlisted in 
'^'V&B, and have never used a spade before entering the army, 
^ ''phowrahs " would not be a more efficient tool for the whole 
^'niy than the spade. Felling axes should be increased to three 
F^r company, and at least 5 per cent, of spare handles should be 
'^Kgatory — at present none are allowed ! 

, ^nmuniUon. — ^An improved and recognised manner of carry- 
^ reserve ammunition for artillery and infantry is very 
^B^tly required ; several make-shifts were tried during the war, 
i'tt none of ihem were satisfactory. Every regiment of cavalry 
^ infaiitry should have a fixed number of solid leather cases, 
^*^ oaae being so made as to contain one box of small-arm 
^^^^VUunition, and capable of being quickly and firmly attached 
"^ tqr cbMription of pack-saddle. 

COHMUNIGATIONS. 

^dt^fkiiMfcify tnd eflSoiency of the lines of communication 
fofply of the army" in the field with provisions^ 

10 




146 The Afghan Campaign of 1878-80. 

ammunition, and men ; and it was owing to the long lines of 
roads from Kandahai*, Peiwar, and Kabul, to the nearest \yomis 
of the railway, that so much difficulty was found in keeping up 
regular supplies of food, clothing, &c. for the advanced troops. 
Had the railway from the Indus to Sibi been completed in the 
autumn of 1876, as was strongly recommended by that far- 
seeing man, Sir Andrew Clarke, R.E., the great losses that 
occurred in marching between those places would have been 
avoided, and much valuable time gained. In like manner, had 
the railway from Jhelum to Peshawar been steadily pushed on 
while there was time, before the war commenced, the advantages 
gained thereby would have more than repaid the cost of con- 
struction. As the chief safety of a long line of road in an 
enemy's country lies in the judicious selection and careful con- 
struction of fortified posts along its length, it is necessary that 
the particular attention of generals in command should be given 
to this important point. At the outbreak of hostilities a selected 
officer should be detailed as permanent commandant of each 
post to be established ; he should be entirely responsible for 
everything connected with the place, and his authority should 
never be interfered with by other officers passing through, even 
though of senior rank. Notwithstanding that the posts on the 
Khyber and Kurrum lines were well and rapidly constructed, yet 
very great inconvenience was caused by the want of a respon- 
sible permanent commandant for each, to look after the 
defences, conservancy, &c. On the Kandahar line there were xu) 
fortified posts of any sort as far as Quetta, and to the north of 
the Khojuck they were all very badly and insufficiently pro- 
tected, with the sole exception of Ghummun, which was strong; 
and although situated in the enemy's country, they were held by 
local Pathan levies. This state of things continued until the 
night of the 16th April 1880, when the post of Dubrai ws^ 
attacked by some 400 men supposed to belong to the Morsai an^ 
Achukhzai tribes, and the gallant Major Wandby (Boad Com- 
mandant) with two sepoys and one sowar of his escort iren 
killed after a noble defence. The very next day, detachmflotB d 
Bombay Infantry were sent to each post, Mondi Hissar ui 
Abdul-Bahman were strengthened, and an Engineer officer iriih 
some sappers was sent to put all in a defensible state ; but evM 
then the work progressed very slowly indeed, owing to tt^ 
difficulty in procnring local labour. 

There should also be fixed roles regarding the eaornKfUtlj^'i ; 
all posts, as it is well known that the exhalatiaDfl gNMsM^ 



TItf. Afghan Campaign of 187B-80. 147 

frotii liiidly-constnicteil and half-lilled-in latnues, or the total 
absence of latrine trenches, and the decomposition of animal 
mattc-r, are rapidly taken up hy the atmosphere, and in hot 
vcathcr may produce an epidemic. A good water-supply ia also 
of the hif^hcst importance, and it eeeme extraordinary that no 
attempt wan made to nsc Norton's tuhc wells alon;^ the road to 
Kandahar, where water is scarce, and in some places bad. 
Gc-ueiul Phayrc's water-channel at Doziin, in the Bolan, was a 
great work. 

While on the subject of communication, it may be well to say 
a few wordfi regardini^ the line from the Indue to Kandahar. 
Javolmbad was established many years iifro as the advanced 
frontier post on this line, and its retention is stUl advisable as 
the best place from which to command and protect the Sciude 
border ; but the garrison should be at once much re<]uced, and 
part of it pushed on as a support to Quetta, or to some good posi- 
tion on the Hank of tlte JIarri country. Quetta itself is an open 
eultomncnt, and might easily be raided any night by a hundred 
determined men, who could destroy the bazaar and do much 
damage in a very short time. Thiu and all other advanced 
posts should be defended by enti'enchments of some sort. More- 
over Qnetta is unhealthy, and there is no reason why part of the 
gnrriHOn should not be located in and about the Guzurhund pass, 
ten miles further north, where watei* is abundant. 

The garrison of Kurrachi should be much increased, and so 
ttam a reserve from which to support Jacobabad and Quetta, 
and the railway should be pushed on at once through the hills 
to the wett and clear of tlie Bolan pass, where it would run 
throogh the comparatively friendly cotmtry occupied by the 
Selachis. 

The IndoB at Snlikur shoold be bridged as quickly as possible, 
Ar wiUi the present arrangements only V2D loaded vehicles can 
be erossed ^ily under the moat favourable circumstances ; a 
B matter if it were found necessary to send large rein- 
B to Qa etta. 

Ijittle need be said here of the invaluable services 

I Lieutenant Whistler Smith, B.E., Captains 

i^ynne, and Lieutenant Dickie, B.E., in organising 

1 working the viBOBl Bignalling on the different lines ; for it 

s owing to the ^01, intelligence, and indefatigable exertions 

• officers, mi of tiifl others working under them, that 

the eole exemption tii General Buzrows' brigade) at all 

c troope MXb alwwi in oammnnieatiirai with each other 



148 The Afghan Campaign of 1878-80. 

and with army head-quarters ; and the great value of aigualli^^oig 
by heliographs, flags, aud lamps, was clearly domoDBti'atrd to 

the world at large — so much so, indeed, that the Russians ha' ve 

adopted the system in its entirety. 

We know that in the American War of Independence, t^l be 
army of the Potomac had a regulsj' signalling corps, whi^ cb 
rendered important services throughout the campaign of 1861-^33, 

formed of officerB and men from different regiments instruct ed 

in signalling with flagn and torches, and portable insulate eif 
telegraph-wire. 

It is essential that alt British officers belonging to native re .£]- 
ments in all three preBideucies should be instructed in visLraaJ 
signalling, and such instruction should be compuisory; it is a JLstv 
very desirable that in every regiment three or four men i^wr 
troop or company should he carefully instructed in sigmilli-Zig 
with flags and heliograph in English, and for this purpose 
trovemment Bhould supply the necessary apparatus free of cost, 
and the signallers should, after passing a satisfactory examina- 
tion, receive two rupeoa a month each as an addition to th«u: 
pay- The course of instruction will be rather a severe one foT 
sepoys, involving a thorough knowledge of English ; therefore, 
the men should be excused all duties during that time. Xti* 
present arrangement of allowing the men to be taught, bnt not 
allowing thom the means of instruction or rewarding them for 
learning, is not jadicioua. 

/'()«(((/. — The postal arrangements on the Ehyber and KTzmx«3i 
lines were most satisfactory, owing to the great energy of tlis 
officers and suboi'dinates of that department, who inTari&blj 
eaiTied the mails in pony-carts and tongas,* whenever the ro»«^ 
wore good enough for wheeled traffic. On the Kandahar litt^i 
from Sibi upwards, no tongas were used, although the road vr^f 
perfectly easy all the way to Eandaliar. Sir Bobert Sandem^-n 
reported officially that a tonga postal service had been estahlisli^^ 
on the 9th February 1680, but it does not appear that it reilXj 
was ever carried out, and the mails were carried by local eoK^* 
tractors on raw-boned half-etarved ponies at the rate of aboK*' 
five miles an hour, while on the Khyber line they were earriede 
nearly double that pace. 

Forda. — The necessity for carefully mm-lcing out all forda vet 
made painfully evident by the dieaster on the night of the 81^1 
March 1879, when a squadron of the 10th EnsaarB, crossing tli^l 

* Law ■pring-MHt on two vliedi, drawn by twv p) 



The Afghan Campaign of 1878-80. 149 

JBCabul river in half sections, missed the ford, and were suddenly 

4sri^ept over a rapid into water six or seven feet deep and running 

a mill-race, in which they lost one officer, forty-six men, 

d thirteen horses. It seems that this long and intricate ford 

not staked out, owing to objections on the part of the poli- 

which were listened to by the General. 

A^gadiiy on the 5th January 1880, live men of the Carabineers 

^jre drowned whilst fording the Kabul river near the Dorunta 

rg^e, by an easy ford over which natives were crossing on foot 

^lie time. 

JFi<dlways, — The value of our railway system in India has been 

elt on in the essays of last year on transport ; but it may not 

generally known that the Scinde, Punjab, and Delhi Eailway 

g the war carried by train 8,645 camels, a feat which 

oixld never have been dreamt of ten years ago. The one great 

t is a regular set of military train time-tables for the whole 

Xndia, after the pattern proposed by Mr. David Eoss, C.I.E., 

able traffic manager of the Scinde and Punjab Railway. 

tables, if drawn up in time of peace and altered yearly 

^■^^cording to the necessities of the service, would enable an army 

J^ l>6 concentrated at any point in a very short time and without 

'"'^^Urxy, confusion, or friction ; and the few details that require 

^^^i^Bid^ation before publishing them, should be at once settled 

the intelligence branch of the Quartermaster-General's depart- 

, in communication with the agents of the different railway 

panies, and officially confirmed by the Supreme Government. 

^^oUticals. — One of the miUtary deductions from the past war 

tliat the mere presence of non-military political officers with a 

ive army in a foreign country is most objectionable ; while 

uncontrolled and uncontrollable actions of these gentlemen, 

► are in reality quite independent of the general commanding, 

who are not amenable to military discipline, are frequently 

ght with danger to our troops, and constantly tend to lower 

prestige of our armies and to embarrass and hamper our 

'^^^O.erals. General Burrows was held responsible for the 

^^^.ivand disaster ; but Major St. John, the political officer, was 

yO "blame all through for invariably giving the General unreliablq^^^ 

^^*^f ormation. He, moreover, usurped to himself the position of 

^xie chief military commander in reporting direct to the Viceroy 

^'ll events as they happened, and in attempting to dictate to the 

^^eneral what course he should pursue ; and it was not until the 

^^^val of General Roberts, and afterwards of General Phayre, 

**^at he was forced, by the latter, to revert to his proper position 



150 The Afghan Campaign of 1878-80. 

as political assistant to the commander of the troops. In all 
wars, the subordination of the military point of view to the 
political, is necessary ; but that does not mean that the action of 
military commanders in the field is to be hampered by the 
special whims of civil political officers, who (as in the past war} 
were often yoimg and ^inexperienced, though it cannot be denied 
that there were some good sound men, such as Hastings, Arthur 
ConoUy, Loch, Warburton, Clifford, Prothero, Evan Smith, and 
Biscoe, all of whom, by the way, were military officers in either 
permanent or temporary civil employ. Surely the first Kabul 
war of 1888-41 contained sufficiently numerous and good exam- 
ples of the danger of employing political officers on service, and 
the gallant General Nott's out-spoken censure of the system 
should have saved us from a repetition of it. If political officers 
are considered necessary, they should be employed only as assis- 
tants to, and on the staff of, the commander, without whose 
permission they should do nothing whatever, the General himself 
being the chief military as well as political officer, and possessed 
of full powers, independent of the Foreign Office, to carry out the 
orders of Government conveyed to him in all cases through the 
commander-in-chief, and all "intelligence" work being carried 
out by his officers of the Quartermaster-General's department, in 
the same way as was done by Colonel Lockhart at Kabul, and. 
only assisted by the political officer when considered necessary.. 
We have, however, become so wedded to the old and dangerous^ 
practice of allowing meddlesome politicals to interfere constantlj^X.i 
in the work of our generals, that it is improbable that 
another disaster like Maiwand will cause an alteration in it. 

Furthermore, I consider the presence of a semi-independen*j 
civil political in the field, with his durbar tents, munshis, an#, 
rag-tag and bob-tail, to be a standing insult to the army, h* 
whom he is at times looked upon as a dangerous lunatic, 
always as an insufferable nuisance ; while in nine cases out • 
ten the people of the country, with whom he attempts to deal - Ji 
a lordly, patronising style, hood-wink him in every possitoB^^ih 
manner. 

What greater insult could be offered to an army than ii «-• ib 
despatch of the inexperienced Mr. Griffin to do work wh.i» -S^cJ 
would have been performed much more efficiently, and w i"-^^ i 
greater dignity and effect, by such proved leaders of men as ^^SSit 
Donald Stewart or Sir Frederick Roberts ? 

Reserves, — The want of reserves for native regiments x^^"^ 
sorely felt, and it is a very serious question ; but notwithstandi — ^^S 



The Afghan Campaign of 1878-80. 151 

the Government do not appear disposed to take it up or 
•fere in any way ; and after the lapse of another year it is 
) than probable that it will have been forgotten altogether, 
y proposals have been made regarding the best way of 
[ning a reserve, but most of them are upsetting and unprac- 
, and the only good and practicable one that I have seen 
smitten by Lieutenant Barrow, in the Journal of the United 
ice Institution of India, Vol. VIII., No. 39, of 1879, and well 
•ves the attention of the Supreme Government, 
certain limited number of ** Oomedwars " or candidates, say 
ty-five or thirty, should also be allowed with each regiment ; 
\ men to receive subsistence allowance from the State until 
are enlisted, on condition that during this time they are 
ling their drill, and otherwise fitting themselves for the 
ce. 

pply of Horses for Native Cavalry, — The past war has 
n how difficult it is on extraordinary occasions to obtain a 
lient supply of good remounts for our native cavalry, and as 
as the country is over-run by numbers of unsound screaming 
try-bred stallions, that difficulty will continue. There is 
one remedy for this, which is at the same time cheap, 
le, and effectual, and that is to impose such a heavy tax on 
) animals throughout India, as to make their retention in 
large numbers an impossibility, and at the same time to 
ide, free of cost, trained native assistant veterinary surgeons 
tries), and the requisite implements and medicines for the 
ose of gelding all entire horses and ponies, and even donkies ; 
the natural effect (if continued for ten years) of this 
iure, coupled with the present liberal supply of well-bred 
d Government stallions, would be an almost unlimited 
ly of good serviceable horses, ponies, a^id mules, which 
d free the Government from all anxiety regarding cavalry 
•tints, and would be of inestimable benefit to the country 
rally. No philanthropic ideas should be allowed to interfere 
the immediate passing of such a law. 

commenced by stating how impossible it was to compress 
30 small a space all the deductions from the past war, and 
st now close this paper, though many have been omitted 
necessity, and not from want of materials ; but before con- 
ng, let me draw attention to the words of the French 
nission on Organisation, which Hime has brought to notice 
B famous prize essay :—** The army is the annual premium 
3iurance against foreign invasion and the dismemberment of 



1 52 Tlie Afghan Campaign of 1878-80. 

our territory. You cannot diminish the premium without at thi 
same time diminishing the safeguard of the country ; forgetful 
ness of this fact cost us two of our most patriotic provincei 
and five milliards." 

In the Afghan war of 1871-81 we have received one moi 
serious warning, and we can scarcely expect or hope for another 
and if, therefore, we persist in ignoring the lessons of the pac 
war, and return to our former state of unreadiness, and at an 
future time have to fight with a power which is numerically ver 
superior, and which is perfectly prepared for and constant! 
exercised in war, a catastrophe will be inevitable ; and instead c 
beating off and utterly destroying our enemy, we shall find om 
selves engaged in a terrible struggle for existence which wil 
shake the British empire to its foundations. Our watchwon 
should, therefore, always be ** Prepare," and we should set t 
work at once to prepare in real earnest for the great struggl 
which we know is being gradually forced upon us, so that whe 
the crash comes we may be ready to meet it. "What is wanted : 
a sufficient and efficient fighting army ; and the great problei 
is to provide it in the best and most economical manner. 

In conclusion, I may say that the principal military dedu^ 
tion to be drawn from the events of the past war in Afghanista 
is that the military power in India, on which alone the safety • 
the country depends, has been forced during the past thur 
years to hold too secondary a place, from which it follows as 
matter of course that everything connected with the army h 
received far less attention than it deserves or requires, and thr 
unfortunately, is likely to continue, so long as the head of tT 
army, the Commander-in-Chief, is entrusted with so little powa 
The safety of the country depends on an efficient aimy, and tl 
efficiency of this,army depends in such a very great degree » 
the amount of i>ower and authority possessed by its chief com 
mander, that his authority should be paramount ; and, therefoc 
I say that the Commander-in-Chief of the Indian army shod 
also be the Governor-General of the whole country, and I sta.- 
without fear of contradiction, that in the present head of t:: 
army we have a man who would make as good a Viceroy as e^ 
came to the countiy. 



Tlx Afyhan Campaign of 1878-80. 



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Mar |lrmhnns on fife |1oIicit$. 

By Spencer C. Thombon, Manaoeb of the Standuid Life 
ASBUHANCB CoMraNY. 



My atk^ntion has been drawn to a series of articles in CoUmn't 
United Serrirr Mdijnziiie on the subject of "War Fremiuma (W 
Life Policies," and as I have some experience of the infttter 
from the point of ^■icw of tin! officcH, I beg to offer a contributioii 
to the fair discussion of the question. Colonel Brackenbury hu 
already done much, in hiR vcr}- sensible letter on the subject io 
the magazine in <|ucstion, to show that the severe terms in 
which the Life Offices an^ nferred to in the series are un- 
deserved, and I wonld merely, before proceeding with wh»t 1 
have to say, protest in the strongest manner against theoM 
of the woi-ds "iniquity," "victims," "exactions," "extortions," 
"harvest of spoil," "charlatanism," "negligence and incapaci^, 
and the like, as by any possibihty applicable to the dealings of 
any but the merest fraction of offices transacting life businefl- 
To none of those whose names are known to the public Iw* 
they any a-pplieation whatever. For this I can answer. 

The boards of directors have no desire to act in any way tat 
foirly towards all their constituents ; and even if it were ottw- 
wise, the keen competition which exists between offiuea woola 
prevent their carrying on their business successfiilly on any other 
plan. 

In the several articles of the seiies I am replying to, it is Mf 
admitted that the charge of an extra premium for war risfa i^ 
JQstiiiable, so that the only questions which call for practical 
consideration are — first, the sufficiency or otherwise of tbt 
charges usually made; and second, whether the manner of 
charging such extras at present in practice is the most oan- 
▼enient and equitable. Towards the first of these poiuts lb* 
writera contribate no statiaticB whateTer, saying th at ti»i 
is one for actaarieB ; bat this does not 



War Premiums on Life Policies. 155 

» I have above quoted regarding a question on which 
tininformed. It would surely have been better to call 
- offices in plain words to justify their charges, than to 
^ them unheard and in ignorance of any explanations 
iy have to offer. 

)ment's reflection will show that the war risk of one 
jn cannot be deduced with any certainty from the war 
)thers which have gone before it ; nevertheless (where no 
3nt premium is paid year by year to cover this risk), the 
' directors are called upon, on the outbreak of a war, to 
) account such facts as the following, and to deduce a 
1 therefrom : (a) the probable duration of the war^ 
imate at diBferent periods of the year of the country in 
e campaign is to take place, (c) the organisation and 
I of the armies with which our troops have to contend, 
appliances for their comfort and attention during 
&c. &c. With so many varying elements to be con- 
i is little wonder if directors do not always arrive at 
conclusion, though considerable uniformity is preserved 
Bees acting in concert with one another. The rate of 
3as per cent, extra premium has, however, been pretty 
)f recent years, and it may naturally be asked how 
large is justified by past experience as a whole. 
1 ** Note on War Mortality in Recent Campaigns," by 
. Mackenzie, F.F.A., published in the transactions of 
larial Society of Edinburgh for 1881, I extract the 
table : — 









Losses 

per 100 

from 

Battle. 


Proportion 
of total 
Losses 

from Battle. 


Losses 
per 100 
from 
Disease. 


Proportion 

of total 

Losses 

from 

Disease. 


Total 

Losses 

per 

100. 


War 
















h per annum 


• 


3-3 


•262 


9^3 


•738 


12-6 


t 




• 


3-4 


•219 


12-1 


•781 


15^6 


I War — 
















1st year 


• 


• 


1-7 


•254 


5- 


•746 


6^7 


4 years 


• 


• 


3-9 


•345 


7.4 


•645 


112 


russian War, 


1866 


1 










m losses. 


7 weeks 


1-4 


•488 


1^8 


•562 


3-2 



res here given (which include the deaths of both 

md men) show at a glance how impossible it is to 

16 probable death-rate in one campaign from any one 
which preceded it. 



166 War l^remiiimi on Life l^olictea.. 

It is only in the case of the Franco-G-erman war of 1870-71 
tliat Mr. Mackenzie's tables draw distinction between officoa 
and men, the following being the resnlts reported : — 

Killed in Died through Totid 
Battle. Siekneu. Dotbt. 
Per Cent. Per Cent, Per C«iit. 
German Army — 
Combatant officers . . 8-08 -82 8*90 
Men, including non-commis- 
sioned officers . . . 3-12 1-36 4-50 

So that as regards thio war at lec^t, the percentage of dealb 
amongst Gei-man officers was about double that amongst thl 
men. No statement of the French losses is giveo, but they m 
hardly likely to have been less than those on the Gemian sidt 

Mr. ^lackenzie does not give the statistics of the AbysBiniii 
or South African wars, but, from figm-es furnished to the A>8>- 
ciation of Scottish Life Offices by the War OfBce in 1674, it 
appears that of ir>B officers exposed to war risk in Aahant^ 
15 were killed in action or died of disease, besides 27 wooiiW 
and 44 invalided. 

On the basis of the facts relating to the Franco-German Wtf 
Mr. Mackenzie proceeds to draw up a table of " estunated eital 
premiums to cover European war risk for one year's CBmpsigiMft 
based upon deaths among German officers in war of l&lO-tl i 
tlie result being that the extra premium which (without idditM 
for expenses, &c.) should have been charged for Boch risk, hi 
it been ascertainable beforehand, would have been £8 18b. |>^ 
cent, for combatant officers, or at the rate of £15 &s. f 
annum. Nor do the figures above given take any accoaul 
the detei-ioration to health from wounds and disease, will 
cannot hut have been considerable. The figures for t 
Aahantee war would justify a still higher extra premium. 

Looking, therefore, to such data as 1 have been able (u ^ 
I do not think it can be maintained that the extra prcDinif 
which have commonly been charged by the Companies for* 
have been excessive, or at all more than is required to cover 
risk involved. 

With reference to the return of any portion of extra prfenu — 
paid, I think this is only justified where the life assured hai i 
incurred imy war risk whatever. The extra charged in the " 
instance is based, as it moat be, on an assumption, and va^ 
more or less than the risk which will be really ine arwti 
«B the oEBce» cannot be called on at the termination^^! 



War Premiums on Life Policies. 157 

ny more than they have originally been charged, so the 
lould not be expected to pay back anything in the event 
isk terminating in their favour. That the risk is likely, 
ko past experience, to evolve more frequently in favour of 
red than of the oflSce, I have already shown to be borne 
the actual facts, so far as these are available. It would 
satisfactory, however, if the authorities were to publish 

statistics of the proportion of deaths from war and 
and of wounded and invalided, in all the campaigns in 
ritish troops have been engaged of recent years. 
maximum sum were to be charged, which would be likely 
unify the office under all circumstances, and from which 
• or smaller return would be made according to the 
y rate as ascertained at the end of the war, a very much 
barge would be required, say ^20 or J925 per cent., 
ould not certainly be more popular with the service than 
ent practice. 

Jy to a request at the end of the war by those assured 
3 Company with which I am connected, that a portion 
jxtra of five guineas per cent, paid for war risk should 
ided to them on the ground of the campaign having 
jted a few months, my directors replied, and I think 
Btice : ** The premium charged was an average one to 
campaign of one year or less, not for a year certain. 

charged you for a year certain, with an agreement for 
For the unexpired portion of the year, we should have 
1 to charge you, to commence with, very considerably 
lan you actually paid. We regret, therefore, that your 
cannot be complied with." 

aware that a contrary practice has been followed by a 
number of offices, but their course was not justified by 
e, and was only adopted as a matter of expediency or 
of advertisement, and to such extent the interests of 
sral body of policy holders were sacrificed, 
iioards of management of the different offices are not 
the fact that it falls hardly on an officer to be called 
I his own resources to pay a heavy extra premium for 
:, but the question in relation to his pay is one for the 
' authorities entirely, and all that the offices can be 
1 to concern themselves with is that military men should 
a every opportunity of paying the charge in the way 
Qvenient to themselves if they will avail themselves of it, 
1 the office is put to no disadvantage thereby. 



168 War Premiums on Life Policies. 

This brings us to the second question which I propounded f^^^ 
discussion, viz. whether the manner of charging such extras ^^ 
present in practice is the most convenient and equitable tti^^ 
could be devised. 

Colonel Brackenbury explains the practice of the office "^iHx 
which he is connected, to charge, namely, a uniform anaviaJ 
extra of one pound per cent, for whole world and war poUcfesB, 
but admits that the service has not availed itself of the option 
to the extent he would have expected. 

Without any desire to set one plan against the other, I would 
desire to mention that the office of which I know the most — 
the *' Standard " office — which from its wide connection in India 
and other parts of the world must be, perhaps, a more familiax 
name to the members of the service than any other, has loT 
some thirty-five years past been in the habit, of requiring all 
military men in India, not in civil employ, to pay a constant 
extra (in addition to the rate for climate) of ten shillings pair 
cent, per annum on the sum assured, covering war risk ; and 
more recently they have been allowed the option of continiuiL0 
this payment when in civil employ, or while resident in th£^ 
country, so as to cover the contingency of being unexpectedly 
called into active service. 

Officers assured through the offices of the Company in thi^ 
country are also now allowed the same privileges. For the m( 
part, however, the members of the service have declined to ai 
themselves of this last voluntary provision, preferring, while no^* 
on active service, to pay only the ordinary rate, and to run theE** 
chance of being called on to take part in war with the heav3^ 
consequent extra. As regards the extra premium for climab^ 
in India, the rate charged by this Company is calculated, I inar^ 
mention, in accordance with the past mortality experience 9' 
the Company there, and the rates are reduced to the home scaL^^ 
immediately on return to Europe, without certificate of health. 

We have, further, at all times been ready to quote terms ib^ 
miUtary risk, including whole world residence, as is done \if 
Colonel Brackenbury's office ; but as we have rarely, if ever, 
been asked to do so, we have not made the plan a feature of 
our prospectus, officers apparently preferring to pay the climate 
risk according to their place of residence at the time. 

I do not at all claim for the '' Standard " a monopoly of the 
plan of charging a permanent annual extra of teii shillingp 
per cent, to cover war risk. Many others of the best offices no 
doubt offer the same facilities, and still more would probaUy 



War PTemiwiix oh Life L*olicxes. 159 

do 60 if tbe matter was brought bomc! to them in the same way 
■E it has been to iia by oiir large military connection. With 
BQcli facilities offered tbem, military men have only themselves 
lo biaini' if they incur the risk of paying a heavy war extra in 
Me sum at the outbreak of war, when their other expenses 
aie Joubtlest) heavy, instead of meeting it by small instalments 
Bpr«ad over their whole period of military service. 

Tbe cases in which this Company charged any additional 
eitra for the late war were: (1.) Where the life assured had 
eltttod not to pay the permanent extra charge of ten Bhilliugs per 
cent, (this charge being imperative only for military Bervice in 
hidia, us I have explained). (2.) Wliere a military man pro- 
pceal to assure with the company after the outbreak of the war, 
in vijich case the permanent extra of ten shillings per cent. 
woald be manifestly insufficient. In such instances the directors 
charged an extra of five guineas per cent, (in a. few cases five 
paandg fifteen shillings per cent.), it^d the statistics which I 
htte given of former wars show that the rate was by no means 
■mnecessaiily high. 

He case to which I understand the writers refer on page 151 
of the February number of tbe United Sernce Magazine, in con- 
■Mctioii with this question, was one in which the proposal was 
Bide after the outbreak of the war, the life assured accepting 
li policy in full knowledge of the extra charge. As the life 
Wund had been under fire, no return could be made to him. 

I do not enter into the question of the terms on which loans 
W pasted by the life offices, which is an altogether different 
Mlgeet, fnrther than to say that the contention that when a 
pdi^ for donble the amount of a loan is taken, tbe war pre- 
■inm abonld only be chai^;ed on one half the risk, is altogether 
■itotable. There is just as much reason for not charging any 
inminm whatever upon that half. If the practice contended for 
«m followed, the hdrs of the assured would, in the event of hia 
l^cstli, get tb<? benefit of a policy on which an insufficient 
^emium bad been paid, of course at the expense of the other 
^licy boldere of the Company. 




160 



COU)XEL :M)tii foot. 

[A BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH.] 
By H. M. C. 






Now that the Ordnance Survey of North Britain is announced 
as completed, the time appears opi)ortune to recall the memory 
of one who was associated with its earliest beginnings — ^Major 
General \Vm. lloy, ** the first Briti.sh geodesist." 

To soldiers of the present day his name is well-nigh unknown. 
Indeed, it is a question if any man of his time, of equal calibre, 
has remained so little know to posterity or has been mow 
persistently made the victim of biographical blundering. To 
cite a few instances in point : — In the Encifdopo'dia Jirttoiwic*, 
8th edition,* article lioy, and also in the late General PortloA*B 
*' Memoir of General Colby," in Vol. III. of Papers on Sutjedt 
contivcted with the Corpa of Royal Kngineera, Roy is described 
as a ** Colonel of Artillery," and in the former work he to 
stated to have in that capacity executed a survey of ScotianA 
for the Duke of Cumberland. In other recognised works of 
reference, as in Gentleman h Magazine (1790, Part II.), like state- 
ments occur, accompanied by minute details equally inaccurate. 
The facts are, that Boy was never in the Artillery — ^bis whola 
service having been passed in the Engineer Department aoA 
the line — and that when the survey of Scotland commenced, hiB- 
position was the humble one of a hired clerk or draughtsman in 
the office of Colonel Justinian Watson, then Depaty Qoarter* 
master General in North Britain. 

Yet, despite the comparative neglect with which hia maaixf 
has been treated, the career of Boy was a remarkable one, aii 
deserves to be better know. He was the prototype of a "yHMfkf: 
few, of whom Lambton of the 88rd Foot, who eommeneedttS^ 
Trigonometrical Survey of India, and Kater of the ISIh 
well known by his elaborate mathematical reaearcheOy 

* Li the new edition of the Enofdopvaiia BriUumiea^ mim iji p Mrii 
win be eoxreeted on inf omution 8iti]|ilied by the wxiter of tUi dulak. 




Maj.^Gen. William Roy, F.R.S. 161 

examples — men who, in days when the acquisition of knowledge 

^as immeasurably more difficult than at present, had never the 

special training even then enjoyed by those of the scientific 

corps, but yet were men of science, in the true sense of the 

phrase, as well as hard-working regimental officers. For a 

soldier of fortune in the British service in those days, his rise 

was rapid, almost beyond precedent ; but his subsequent services 

were many, and the more important of them were as original 

in their character, at the time, as they have been enduring and 

nsefol in their results. 

For trustworthy particulars of the parentage and birth of 
General Boy we are indebted to the painstaking researches 
wnong parochial and other records of the editors of Dr. Chambers' 
Biographixial Dictionary of Eminent Scotsmen (revised edition, 
1870, Vol. m.). From this source we learn that Williapa Boy 
WES bom in the little parish of Carluke, Lanarkshire, on 4th 
May 1726 ; that his father was gardener or bailiff to a neigh- 
booring laird ; and that the General, together with his brother, 
afterwards minister of Prestonpans, received his education at ' 
I ttie parish school, and afterwards at the grammar school at 
Lanark. 

The biographers go on to say that ''no record has been 
discovered of the early career of General Boy," adding that, ** he 
^ first brought under notice in 1746, when he was employed 
ky the Government to make a survey of Scotland." This state- 
oient needs some qualification. 

At the time in question, immediately after the suppression of 

tbe rebellion of '45, a force of five line regiments, those after- 

^arfs known as 12th, 16th, 19th, 21st (Boyal North British 

^Wliers), and 27th (Inniskilling) Begiments of Foot — were en- 

^ped near Inverness, under command of Major-General Lord 

"^^eney, for road-making and other military purposes in the 

^hlands. Colonel, afterwards Lieutenant-General Justinian 

•^atfion, " one of His Majesty's engineers," was Deputy Quarter- 

^^^ter-General of this force, and to this officer was entrusted 

^e duty of making a survey of the Highlands, which was 

^^rwarde extended to the whole of Scotland. The original 

^^traction of this survey, or rather sketch, in eighty-four large 

^lls, is now in the King's library, at the British Museum, and 

^ generally known as the '' Duke of Cumberland's Map." In 

'^«of his scientific memoirs, Boy mentions incidentally that 

t fell to his lot, when an '* assistant quartermaster " in the 

^mp at Inverness, to commence '' this magnificent military 

YOL. VI. 11 



11)2 Maj.-Geii. WillMm Roy, F.E.S. 

sketch." In later years, the results were reduced by him to • 
single sheet, lueasurtng 18 inches by 23 inches, which is knom 
as tlie " King's Map" of Scotland* 

The earliest official mention of Roy's name which the writer 
of this sketch has been able to discover, occurs in a "Lisid 
Warrants passed by Right Honble. Wm. Pitt, Faj'Oiastc^ 
General of our Forces, and which are signed by H.R.H. tbe 
Duke and other our General Officers at Home and Abroad." 
The list is dated 26th March 1750, and is preserved among tbe 
Treasury Papers, in the Public Record Office. The warrant! 
themselves are of earlier dates, covering various " eitrt 
ordinaries" for the period 1746-49. Among them is record of 
a payment of £2i Ss., due on 28th December 1748, to Lient 
Stewart and Williaoi Roy, as assistants in ihe office of Colonel 
Watson, at Fort Augustus, N.B. 

After this Roy appears to have reeeivod the appoiutraent, 
although the warrant has not been found.t One or two casnil 
references in his posthumous work, .Military Antiquitiet of lii 
Romans, show that during the period 1747-65 he was ehieflj 
employed, "with other young people," in the execution of tbe 
aforesaid survey of Scotland, under the superintendence li 
Colonel Watson and Captain G. Morrison.:^ 

At the commencement of the Seven Years War, ten fr«ah 
regiments of infantry were added to the British line, and among 
the names of the lieutenants appointed thereto appear thoie 
of Engineers Wm. Roy, A. Durnford, and Lieut.-Fu^wo^ 
David Uundas.§ the date of their several commissions being 
4th January 1756. Roy, then in his thirtieth year, was lunni- 
nated to Colonel Napier's Foot, afterwards known as the 61it 
Light Infantry, and now the Ist E. 0. South Yorkshire Beg^ 
ment, and among his brother officers were Bailey, aftemril 
Treasurer of Greenwich Hospital and tbe famous Bembriaft- 
esque engraver, who became captain of the grenadier 
and Bisset, who long afterwards succeeded Roy as 

* Thia mmp, which wu inMndad to iUiutrata tha Roiaan mllitar; 
Brhaia,hM » clavn^pm-aod inkTlgnetto by Roy, of m franadier in I 
■aatad amid Roman i«Uca, b«an Uta titlo : Mappa S^tattrimaUt fa 
Mouiihw niiitiK lUPiHiiiaafsraai d^ela tx JRieardo Oiriaui NMMdU'. 
Oolonela Wataon and R07. 

t Tbs englnMr bnneb of the Ordiuuico — not j^ a aapante oolp 
ol 1 chief eni^aeer, S directora, 9 aab-dlncton (of whom Oolanel 
9 en^oeors in Drdinary, 7 enginoen axtraordinaiT, S f ' 
Uonen. Tha praotitionera got 8a. a daj. 

t Allarwarda Oenaral Uoniaen, OoIoBel 4th Toot and 

{ Aftarwarda 




Maj.-Gen. Waiiam Roy, F.R.S. 168 

General of England. The rendezvous of Napier's regiment 
as at Exeter, and thither the lieutenants and ensigns 
ere directed in the London Oazette to repair, " on approval," 
I which event, provided the appearance and approval took 
ace before a named date in March 1756, they were to receive 
eir commissions and pay. The new regiment soon afterwards 
oved into the West Riding, with which it has ever since been 
sociated, to complete its establishment, and in 1758 embarked 
r the seat of war in Germany. 

Boy by this time was senior lieutenant, and after the battle 
Minden, on 1st August 1759, where the 51st bore a distin- 
Lished part, his talents as a military draughtsman appear to 
kve brought him to the special notice of Prince Ferdinand of 
nmswick, who commanded the allied troops. The incident 
related in a forgotten book of Scottish memoirs,'^ and is worth 
loting, alike as almost the only contemporary notice of Boy 
ave a pleasant homely anecdote told by Dr. Chambers), and 
flo for the sake of its amusingly naive tone of patronage. The 
inator, whose name then was Callender, had joined the 51st, 
B a boy-ensign of fifteen, just before the battle, and says : — 

Ifbea I was yet at my father's house at Craij^orth, a year or two before my 
ipartnre for (}«nzuuiy, I met there a Mr. Roy, a highly respectable land-snrveyor, 
io hid been employed by my father in taking a plan of one or two of his iields 
Mr Stirling. He afterwards adopted the military profession, but it chanced that 
hd never heard of him until wo met and recognised after the battle of Minden 
.... As this was the first great battle in the gaining of which the British had 
Nidpatedf His Serene Highness the Commander-in-Chief was pleased to require 
kit phns of it should be presented to him by the engineers of the army, in addition 
b those which were furnished by the gentlemen whose province it was to prepare 
^n/tanm in their official capacity. Mr. Roy was one of those who volunteered 
Hi Mrrieee on this occasion, and from his previous habits combined with his 
Mfttior ability, he succeeded in exhibiting the operations of the day in a much 
Mn intelligible and satisfactory form than had yet been attempted by the military 
The plans received from the others were prepared in the only way 
tt the time, showing upon one paper the first foimation of the army in 
ol bttitle, and on another the formation when the enemy gave way. Mr. Roy's 
M|ft was totally different. As the basis of his plan he first made a general 
■iNMitation of the field of battle, and, as during the day there were three distinct 
^■■gM of position of the allied armies, he had made three separate papers, which 
^■1 ftdjiflted so as to coincide in aU fixed positions, as roads and rivulets, with 
.^groiiid plan, which formed the base of the work, and were so adapted and 
'^^odiid to it as to convey a much clearer conception of the relative positions of the 
'^'^ tt the three most critical and important periods than could be effected by 
[ttiiBiiy iBflthod8.t The idea, in short, was entirely new, and the Prince was' so 
*"<^ pleased with it that Mr. Roy was soon after attached to His Serene Highness' 
**«ri staff. 

*^tmmn Sir J. CampMl (Edinburgh, 1882> 

jThla plan, tlM original of which is also m the King's library, at the British 
is drawn with the pen (vertical style) in colours, with a marginal journal 

11 ♦ 



164 Maj.'Gen. William Roy, F.R.S. 

As a matter of fact. Boy was immediately afterwards promote! 
to a company in the 87 th Highlanders, then forming at Perth out 
of certain companies of the Black Watch, his commission therein 
bearing date 25th August 1759. 

The 87th (Keith's) Highlanders and its linked battalion, the 
88th (Campbell's) Boyal Highland Volunteers — the oflScers and 
men of the two corps were interchangeable, as in a modem " terri- 
torial regiment — won great fame on subsequent fields, at Zeiren- 
berg, Kirch-Denkern, and elsewhere, but Boy was not with them. 
He was re-transferred to the Ordnance as engineer in ordioazj 
with the rank of captain, and was appointed deputy-assistant 
quartermaster-general at the head-quarters of the Marquis of 
Granby, who succeeded to the command of the English contingent 
of the allied army immediately after the battle of Minden. Id 
this capacity Boy appears, from Lord Granby's order book, to 
have made the campaigns of 1760-61-62 in Germany. Oa 
23rd July 1762, he was promoted to the rank of lieateoant- 
colonel in the army, and then, or immediately afterwards, m 
appointed deputy quartermaster-general in South Britain, i 
post he held until his death, twent3*-eight years later. 

It seems to have been in contemplation at this time to haw 
a survey of England executed, the conduct of which was tobt 
entrusted to Lieut.-Golonel Boy, but the scheme fell throng 
A new appointment was, however, created for the exercise of Ui 
special talents — that of Surveyor-General of Coasts. Tk» 
Warrant, dated 19th July 1765, is preserved among the HooM 
Ofiice papers. It directs, " Lieut.-Golonel William Boy, one rf 
our engineers, to survey and make reports from time to tiiM 
on the state of the coasts and districts of country adjoining fit 
coasts of this Kingdom and the Islands thereto belonging.*' 

The remuneration is fixed at " twenty shillings a day, in tar 
quarterly payments yearly," — not an extravagant fdlowaM 
remembering that the military departments then swarmed ink 
sinecurists drawing larger stipends for doing nothing by depiff*, 
The results of Boy's industry are to be found at the War OA^i 
and Admiralty, and may also be seen in two neatly* 
MS. volumes, now in the British Museum, which exUbiti % 
remarkable degree, his powers of military obBervation. 
first of these books is entitled, A Military DetcnpUm 4' 

of the operations. Portions of other plans, to the aame Naltfe 
stitched upon it — in the f sahion of a pen-wiper if the elmib it 
by laying each 0at on the base map in tnn« the niooeeilva 
the troops from 27th July to 2ttd August axe shown. 



Maj.'Gen. William Roy, F.R.S. 165 

Snuth'Eojst of England, and is dated 17th July 1765. It 
purports to be the result of slight sketches and observations 
made some eight or nine years previously applied by the light 
of the writer's later military experience. ** They are such," the 
preface modestly sets forth, ** as usually do strike the eyes of 
military men in riding over a country, and are hereby oflFered 
with the intention only of assisting in giving general ideas to 
inch, whose time being employed in matters of infinitely higher 
moment, have not leisure or opportunity of examining things of 
this nature themselves, without pretensions to exactness, which 
<(mld never take place in sketches made in a hurry." 

The second book bears the title, A General Description of the 
S(m(h Part of Ireland, made during a Tour of about Three Weeks 
kikai Country in the Month of August 1765. It is dated July 
1766. It notices the physical features and chief military posi- 
tions in that part of the island, and, among other things, 
suggests the utility in any military operations there of the small 
flying columns which have since been so largely employed. 

About the last-named date Boy appears to have been also 
employed on special service at Dunkirk, in connection with 
ibe destruction of the defences there. It had been agreed by 
Art. Xin. of the Treaty of Fontainebleau that the fortifications 
Hxf the town and port should be razed as soon as possible after 
tte exchange of the ratifications; but the work proceeded 
haltingly, and a question arose as to whether the cunette was 
^ indispensable to the health of the place. General Lord 
Idgonier was sent to report, but the French, not unnaturally, 
burred to his lordship's engineering capacity, and. some 
English engineers, including Colonel Roy, were despatched 
thither. Roy's claim for expenses in the Home OflBce Records 
Aows that he was employed for a period of 119 days 
(lith Colonel Desmarets and Mr. A. Frazer), in taking levels, 
•fe., from 26th October 1766 to 2l8t February 1766, for which 
he received special remuneration at the rate of £3 a day. 

Boy became a colonel on 29th August 1777. The rest of his 
Bulitary service was spent as Deputy Quartermaster-General at 
the Horse Guards, in which capacity he was present during the 
; Kots of 1780. Together with this post he combined the oflSce 
<rf Surveyor-General of the Coasts, and latterly of Commissary 
^eral of England. 

His scientific labours during these years were unremitting and 
^ed, the most important among them being his barometrical 
^^cperiments made in conjunction with Sir Geo. Schuckburg, 



166 Maj.'Getu fViUiam Roy, F.R.S. 

F.E.S., which are contained in Philos, Trans. 1111 y andin£j^ 
menu and Observations inade in Britain in order to attain a Ru 
for Measuring Heights with the Barometer (London 1778), an 
his antiquarian researches and surveys which were embodie 
in that fine work, Military Antiquities of Great Britain (Londo 
1793), first pubhshed after the author's death at the costc 
the Eoyal Society of Antiquaries. He became a Fellow of tt 
Boyal Society and of the Boyal Society of Antiquaries, Londoi 
On 18th October 1781, he was promoted to the rank of majo] 
general, retaining his staff appointments. 

Three years later Soy undertook the measurement of tt 
Base Line on Hounslow Heath, for which he received tb 
Copley Medal of the Boyal Society, and which, together wit 
the subsequent trigonometrical operations for connecting tl 
Meridians of Paris and Greenwich, were the first geodeticj 
measurements ever attempted in Britain — the first stage in thi 
long series of scientific labours which in many indirect waj 
have contributed so largely to human welfare and progi-ess, an 
have made the work of the British ordnance surveyors famoi 
throughout the world. 

From a memoir by Boy in Philos, Trans,, 1785, it appea 
that when, at the end of the Seven Years War, the Governmei 
of the day, as before said, contemplated a public survey 
Great Britain, it was proposed to entrust the work to Boy, ai 
to utilize the survey of Scotland, already alluded to, by carryii 
the English system of triangulation across the border, and fillii 
in the details from the ** Duke of Cumberland's " map. Th 
scheme, however, was allowed to drop, and various events in tl 
course of the next twenty years prevented its renewal. He go 
on to say : — 

The peace of 1783 haviDg been concluded, and official bnsinesK having deUin 
me in or near London all through that summer, I embraced the opportunity i 
my own private amusement to measure a base of 7744*3 feet across the (Marjl 
bone) fields between Jews Harp, Marybone, and Black Lane, St. Pancras, i» 
foundation for a series of triangles carried on at the same time for determining ti 
relative positions of the different steeples and other places in and about the capHi 
with reference to each other, and to the Observatory at Greenwich. The priscip 
object that I had in view (besides that it might probably servo as a hint tot 
public for the revival of the now forgotten scheme of 1763), was to facilitate t' 
comparison of observations made by the lovers of astronomy within the hiiiitt 
the projected survey, vizt. Richmond and Harrow on the west, and Shooters Hill ai 
Wanstead on the east ; and thinking that a paper containing the results of tha 
trigonometrical observations might not prove unacceptable to the Royal Soeiei 
I was engaged in making the computations for that purpose, when very unexpected 
I found that an operation of the same nature, but much more important in its nitu 
was really in agitation. This I saw would supersede, at least for the present, n 



Maj.-Gen. William Boy, F.B.S, 1('>7 

«npT7Tata obii»rTBtioiit, and perhopfi render thorn wbollT uBcteM. nnloaa it wore 

iutudiimill imtrnmeiil (a. quidrunt uf IS! inchea rniliuN) vould ugreo with 
Ikavfoindad on u much larger hum and unfttea delerminpd by ■ rircalur inatni- 
BKl. buQi; that propoved sa the boat that could he miide luw ol! in the openitiona. 

The circuiDBtaiices referred to may be briefly told as follows : 
lo the autumn of 1783, Comte d'Atlliemar, French Ambatisador 
■t St, James', tranHmitted to Mr. Fox, then Foreign Secretary, 
a memoir drawn np by the eminent French geodeHi»t, Cai^Hini de 
ThuT}-, setting forth the advantages which would accrne to aHtro- 
nomical science and navigation hy the carrying of n Kcries of 
triangles from the neighbourhood of London to Dover, to be 
connected with the triaugulation already made in Fi-auce, with 
» new to the more exact determination of the relative [xjai- 
tioDSDf the Royal OhHervatories of Greenwich and Paris. 

By the King's command the matter was refcn-ed to Sir Joseph 
Banks, then president of the Royal Society, who suugested that 
General Roy should undertake the triangulation in question. 
Ilarlj in the following year the council of the Royal Society 
petitioiied King George III. to place funds nt the dispowal of the 
Wmty, to carry out the work ; anil on the 24th June 1784, Sir 
'oKph Bonks was enabled to inform the council that the King 
W ngnified his approval, and "permitted Major-General Roy 
to poeeed witli the task under the direction of the President 
■ad Conncil of Om Boyal Society." ^ 

A beginning had, by this time, been already made on Uoun- 
^ Heath, which was selected for its lon^ stretch of level 
*iite ; and as it was considered that soldiers would prove more 
(■^Ail than ordioaiy workmen, a party of the 12th Foot had 
■Ml bronght from Windsor to assiHt in the operations and act 
»gDard.t 

1^ first portion of the base was measured on Kith June 
^784, uid thenceforward, during mauy succeeding weeks of that 
Wmiuer. the work was carried steadily on by soldier hands, 
"""ler tile close scrutiny of all the leading men of science cf the 
^;. and amid the very scenes which had witnessed the page- 
^tij- and riot of King James' lawless camp just 100 years 
Witte— a not unworthy illustration of the great changes 
^Qgbt in that time. The total measured length of base 
'(^nced to the sea-level), was 27,404-89 feet, or, in romid 

Wald'n Hitlary Ruyal Serif tif, foL iL 
^tWiiuUit HOI Dot then b> Gonrdii' nation. The llith Foot, m Uw Mnior eorpaat 
dttaveii dI Oilimllar, hii4 bwn ordoed to WladMr altv It* ntnni hamm, 
l>«t«4 vltlmiurkeddiHlinotionbjthaKlBK. 



168 Maj.-Gen. William Roy, F.R.S. 

numbers, about 5^ miles. The measurement was made parti] 
with a 100-ft. steel chain of peculiar construction, partly wit! 
deal rods cut out of the heart of a long-seasoned New Englanc 
mast, and tipped with bell-metal caps, partly with glass tubes 
like magnified thermometer tubes. Of the indomitable ingenuity 
and skill displayed in ensuring the mathematical straightnesf 
of the line of measurement, the rigidity of the measuring ban 
and the perfect contact of their extremities, in determininj 
the corrections necessitated by variations of temperature and 
humidity, and a hundred other geodesic niceties, for which, it 
must be remembered, few or no guiding data then existed, it 
is unnecessary here to speak. The plain unembellished details 
recorded in Philos. Trans,, 1785, are sufficient testimony to the 
skill displayed and the success achieved. For this work, ag 
before mentioned. Boy was awarded the Copley gold medal oi 
the Eoyal Society. 

It may be noted that Boy's assistants were all volunteei 
for the work, and with the exception of Colonel Pringle, E.E., 
were not meipbers of the ordnance corps. Among thei 
may be mentioned Lieut.-Colonel Calderwood, F.E.S., ^ 
the 1st Troop Horse Guards,! a young man of wealth an 
scientific tastes, who died soon after at the early age of twenty 
seven ; and Ensign T. Vincent Eeynolds, of the depot 84th Foot, « 
by whom the preliminary surveys of the Heath were made ; alfiC 
Mr. Lloyd, F.E.S., and Mr. Isaac Dolby, afterwards professor ol 
mathematics at the Eoyal Military Academy, Woolwich. 

The construction of the great theodolite to be used in the 
triangulation — a magnificent instrument, now in possession oj 
the Eoyal Society, with a horizontal circle 8 feet in diameter 
graduated with unprecedented care and minuteness, and carry 
ing telescopes of 36 inches focal length — had been entru8te< 
to the famous maker, Eamsden ; but the delays involved in thi 
task postponed the further progress of the operations until th 
summer of 1787. The instrument — it is in sixty pieces, packe 
in four large cases — being at last completed, the work recom 
menced on 3rd July 1787. 

With the aid of Colonel Williams § and Captain Mudge, 

♦ Died of yellow fever at Grenada, 1798. 

t Now part of Ist Life Guards. 

} Afterwards major and brevet lientenant-colonel 30th Foot. Retired from tl 
service 1801. 

§ Died 1802. 

II Afterwards Major-General Wm. Mndge, R.A, F.R.S., Lient.-Oovemor Roy 
Kilitary Academy. Died 1817. 



Maj.'Gen. William Roy, F.R.S. 169 

B.A., — the officers to whom the extension of the triangula- 
tion was entrusted after Roy's death — and 2nd Lieutenant 
A. Brice, R.A.,* the work was speedily carried down from 
HoudbIow Heath to the Kentish coast, and in October 1787 
Boy had the satisfaction of seeing it completed by obser- 
vations connecting the French and English survey stations, 
which were made in the presence of the French mathematicians 
Cassini, Mechain, and Legeudre, who came over to Dover for 
the purpose.t 

A '* base of verification " measured by Captain Mudge and 
Lieatenaiit Bryce on Bomney Marsh, at the same time, showed a 
discrepancy of 28 inches only as compared with the measure- 
ment on Hounslow Heath, thus evidencing what in those days 
was justly regarded as an altogether remarkable example of 
precision in measurement. The object in view having been 
accomplished, the work of tiiangulation was discontinued, and 
not renewed until after the "first English geodesist" was laid 
in his grave, when the extension of Boy's triangulation by 
Mudge (for Colonel Williams had but a brief connection with 
the work) commenced the Ordnance Survey of Great Britain. 

General Roy, who had been appointed Colonel 30th (Cam- 
Ittidgeshire) Eegiment of Foot, on 15tli November 1786, had for 
fnnetime been in failing health, which necessitated his winter- 
^ in Lisbon. He died, rather suddenly, at his residence, 
% Argyll Street, on 1st July 1790, just as the last proof sheets 
^ hia memoir on the Triangulation of 1787, published in Philos. 
IVmif. 1790, had been placed in the printer's hands. 
^ Thus passed away, in harness, a modest but untiring worker 
m the cause of science, a good and meritorious soldier, of whose 
BMniory the BritiBh army has every reason to be proud. 

'Afttfwarda Lieiit-Genera] Sir Alexander Bryce. R.E. Died 1827. 

tite longer distances were obserTed ut night with tho aid of white lighta. From 
*M&Mfta in the Britiah Musenm we Icam that tho latter. were produced with a 
^'■pMittaD of twenty-ei^t parta nitre, four saltpetre, and two orpiment, finely 
V>nM together and homed before powerful reflcctora. They were the invention 
^ttsaUv OoBgreTOt and gave the brightest and steadiest flame then obtainable. 



^ 



Ctoo Xobfs, 



Who can doubt that all hi» rapture 
Would be slowly, surely quelled. 

If the poet could but capture 
All the l)eauty he beheld ? 

Only let your Dante marry, 

He would tind that marriage meanii 
Beatrice Portinari 

In the kitchen cooking beanu. 

Or, if I muHt have the Real 
Fit for u»e, and truly mine ; 

Let me keep the bleHsed Ideal, 
Hallowod in a sacred ahrine. 

Though the one, a thing of beauty, 
Be, in silent bourii, adored ; 

StUl the other claims my duty 

From the tongue, the pen, the sword. 



^re-emiiuiite iii WSinx. 

By Muob F. W. Graham. 



" It h*a beoD « greiit kod long debftt« whether suooees in wkt is moat owing 
to bodily ■trength or mental abititiee; tor ob couasel is ueoeEaarj before we 
enter npon action, after measures are duly ooncerted speedy execution ie 
•qnally neo oan ary ; ao that, neither of these being Hofficient singly, they prevail 
Mily by the aasiatanoe of each other." — Siu-dst (Boae'a translation). 

Was affecta the character, the policy, and the vital intereetB of 
saUonB ; it may be popular ; on the other band it may be foohsh 
■od eccentric ; again, it may be just, even necesearj', or it may 
be entered npon for the aggrandisement of his comitry by a 
iatfotie monarch. 

Those who discnsa and analyse the causes of war, who- 
mtimmna to show the justice, neceasity, or, on the other 
huA, oppoae the extreme measure, are the representatives of a 
aititm — Btateemen — in whose hands the helm is placed, guiding 
the Ktatf through the hIiouIs of diiilomacy ; they liiscuss the 
question of peact or war on wrtain ]iriiifii)k>s tcudint; to prove 
the justice and necesiiity for the action ; they endeavour to show 
., HitA the interests of the country are clearly involved ; and it is 
[ bcmnbent on them to prove that the objects for which the war 
' it undertaken are probable, or at least possible, of attainment, 
tnd also that the ttud proposed to be accomplished is worth the 
I eo8t of the sacrifice about to be incurred. 

I The canses which have led to wars may be summed for the 
[present purpose, and denominated the policy which initiated 
I (he war ; and it will be found on investigation that the war will 
pilentimes take its cliaracter from this policy, and that the 
ppolioy initnences the spirit with which a wai- is entered upon 
bbid carried out, and that it is in intimate comiection with the 
Bbltimate buccess which crowns the endeavours of one side or the 

I W»pier Bays : " A cause manifestly imjust is a heavy weight 



172 Pre-eminence in War. 

npon the operations of a General ; it reconciles men to desertio: 
sanctifies want of zeal, furnishes pretext for cowardice, rende 
hardships more irksome, dangers more obnoxious, glory le 
satisfactory to the mind of the soldier." Book I. chap. i. p. 5. 

The interests of nations and states are interwoven in tl 
most diversified and changeable manner, and it is through tl 
pohtical intercourse of governments and states that war is call< 
forth ; it can never be separated from political intercourse, whi< 
also leads to the establishment of leagues and alliances betwe< 
states whose line of policy may be similar ; these alliances • 
mutual understandings, contracted during peace time, a 
fraught with n^st important results when the state assumes 
warlike attitude, and are a source of power to be wielded 1 
the ministers of the state, together with a vigorous policy ai 
a,stute diplomacy, under the cloak of which the preparations f 
war are oftentimes carried on. 

War having been determined upon, the representatives of 
state must be at hand with the means to carry out the extren 
measure, both with honour to the nation and to those th< 
•employ as the instruments of their policy ; and in the hap] 
event of the state coming victorious out of the struggle, it 
A duty incumbent on it either to hold by the sword that whi( 
has been obtained by the sword, or else by such good gover 
ment as will preclude its further use ; for many empires found 
on the blood of valiant men have been lost through t] 
negligence of princes and ministers, who have thrown awj 
that which their soldiers have won. 

The object of war has been defined as Victory, the disarniii 
of the enemy, the destruction of his military force, conquest 
his country, subjugation of his will, by which he is forced 
make peace. The agents by which this object is carried out a 
armies and navies, representing the armed force of the natioi 
at the head of the armed forces are placed the leaders, w] 
develop the two leading characteristics which form the basis 
military operations, viz. strategy and tactics. 

Pre-eminence is an attribute, or a term, which may 
applied to an individual, or, in a collective sense, to a natio 
Applying the term to individuals in war, we have instances 
the roll of David's mighty men recorded in 2 Sam. xxiii. ; the 
were pre-eminent men, the cause of whose pre-eminence w 
apparently to be foimd in the number of men they had sla 
and spoiled. Betreat in those times being almost impossib! 
defeat was followed by the annihilation of the variquifthe 



Pre-eminence in War. ITS^- 

iience the number of slain and the pre-eminence of David's 

captains. 

Using the term in a collective sense as applied to nations in 
wajTy it is natural to infer that the nation to which it applies is 
ruled by great statesmen, and that the administration and 
direction of the national forces are in able hands ; but the causes 
of pre-eminence of nations in war are not to be found solely in 
great statesmen and leaders, these are only some of the elements. 
Hajinibal was the greatest leader of his time, but the Bomans 
carae oflF victorious in the final decision of the Punic wars. 
The term cannot, therefore, be held to apply solely to individuals 
in the sense in which it is under discussion ; still, in treating 
of the term, the individual cannot be thrown out of the case,. 
fc>r what record is there of a war in which the individual leader 
tas not borne a prominent part ? 

We have alluded to the political and military objects of war 
wid stated that policy declares war, war being only the instru- 
ttient to attain the political or ultimate object of war ; the 
^"^^ilitary object is secondary, but at the same time it would appear 
^Sk,t the military conduct of a war in every case must determine 
^^ pre-eminence, or otherwise, of the nations engaged; and, 
**^rther, it would appear that when a nation has been assailed 
^^ provoked, or engaged in war during a long series of years, 
^^d has always been enabled to carry out successfully the 
'^^ilitary objective, viz. the " disarmament of its enemies," such 
^ nation may be justly called pre-eminent in war. 

If the successful attainment of theobjects of war, as previously 
stated, and pre-eminence in war be synonymous, then the 
^^ses which have led to the first will be those which have 
"^^Ught about the second, or the pre-eminence of nations in war. 

The agents of victory are armies, whose constitution, charac- 
*^^8tics, and conduct may be investigated under three heads : — 

thirst. — The military institutions of the country. 

Second. — The strategy, political and military, which presides 
Qver and gives direction to the war. 

^hird. — The tactical forms used on the field of battle ; arma- 
ment, &c. 

I. — Military Institutions. 

. 1^0 the struggle of small states in the beginning of their career 
^^Ixer with their neighbours, to gain a footing in some new 
^^xatry, or to establish themselves on an equality with other 
^oj:-^ powerful states, may be attributed the foundation of 
m^itary institutions and the growth of military power ; which 



174 Pre-eminence in War. 

again appears from history to decline as luxury and bad govern- 
ment creep in, and the state in turn is attacked by one more 
healthy and vigorous than itself. 

Philip of Maccdon developed a standing army out of the 
militia of Greece, with which he obtained complete ascendancy 
in that country. His troops were divided into distinct classes, 
the masses again of his troops were sub-divided into phalanxes, 
and a complete system of castrametation, discipline, and rewards 
fur military service was instituted in his armies. To thi^ 
methodical arrangement and development of force, coupled witl^L 
the great intelligence of the people, are attributable the victorie^s 
of Philip of Macedon. The defeat of Philip and the Macedoniair^ 
host at Gynoscephalie was not the result of mere fortune. Tli'^s 
shrunken population of his country could but fill the ranks of bL xs 
army with young boys and decrepid men; but the militar^y 
institutions of the country and the training of a few, solidi£e«3 
these into masses which withstood the attack of the soldiers civ f 
Eome who had fought the Carthaginians. The army handed 
over by Philip to Perseus was perfect, but its formation ba.^^ 
not been changed, and although it defeated the Roman army cf 
Licinius, composed of raw recruits, at Sjeuriiun, the short bi:»t 
murderous battle at Pydna not only decided the &te of &M. ^ 
phalanx formation, but that of the Macedonian monarchy. 

Let US take another instance from Greek history. PhilopcemeK3 > 
a Greek, jealous of liberty, and a soldier passionately fond 0^ 
his art, by his own individual exertions rescued the AchoeikXi 
League fi-om a state of dependence for protection on a foreigf' 
power, and raised it to one of military pre-eminence BJD,atM.ff 
the provinces of Greece. The Achcean citizens had depended 
on a mercenary force for their defence, their habits were foreign 
to a military life, and they were adicted to Inxury and ostenta- 
tion. Fhilopcemen reorganised their army and changed UxO 
whole course of theii' social usages, tastes, and feelings ; their anoy 
was soon rc-ai-med, and trained to the complicated evolatioiifl of 
the Macedonian phalanx ; the tastes of the yonth of the ooimixy 
were directed to pursuits where personal emalation in ioQ^ 
hardships, and dangers supplanted the effeminate loxniy wiA 
which they had vied with one another. The profideney of tbil 
state in military art led to the victory of Montinea. 

Polybius and Strabo assign the decay of Greece to the decay 1 
of its financial resources and its population, brought about bf 
bad goTemment, intestine warfare, foreign invasiou, and & 
long eontinuanee of destmetiTe vara ; bat the evil hiy i[eep«r 



I 

I 



Pre-eminence in War. 176 

Jie ravages of war, for the period immediately preceding 
tablishment of the Roman Government was a period of 
rd and comparative prosperity ; bat even then the popola- 
'as sinking rapidly, through causes intimately connected 
the moral character and habits of society itself. The 
e from republican to monarchical institutions was in 
il beneficial to Greece and was marked by the growth of 
alonies and the restoration of received cities. But even if 
pirit of the ancient institutions had remained in all its 
, it could have availed nothing, when the body which it 
I have animated was so nearly wasted away. Luxury took 
lace of the primitive simplicity among those who had the 
} of indulging it. The intercourse which Alexander's 
est opened in the East caused this change of manners to 
into Greece, and finally ruined it. 

t power of Rome sprang from warrior citizens. The state, 
at first, fosters their martial qualities, and the renowned 
is the fruit of their military intuition. Their knowledge 
tics, castrametation and topography surpassed anything of 
me, and all of this was gained from the experiences of 
soldiers in incessant warfare in Africa, Spain, Greece, 
ajiy, Gaul and Britain. 

3 needless here to describe the Roman legion, its deeds 
corded on the pages of history ; but it may be said that the 
ent and ingenuity displayed in its organisation was most 
kable. The rigid discipline of the Roman armies, com- 
with the exercises and training, rendered the Roman 
r individually superior to any other of his time. Arms, 
•y and discipline gained most of the Roman victories, 
points, together with the creative genius of their generals, 
he foundation of the military power of the Romans. The 
I of their dominions was owing to the military spirit 
3d in the institutions of the country, which required an 
in conquest. The experience they gained always added 
ir knowledge of the military art : defeated by Hannibal at 
^hey quickly learned his manceuvres. 
a military empire such as the Roman, girt about with 
:e nations, the highly-disciplined forces of the Empire 
in a manner kept from deteriorating by the constant 
Qd for their service. They incorporated territory with the 
re by means of colonies, and by the diffusion of their 
.ers and customs. These colonies bordered on states 
ally disimited with their neighbours, various in character 



176 Pre-eminence in War. 

and distinct in interests ; and these states served Borne 
line of outposts against the attacks of the barbarous trib 
Asia and Europe. When these states were merged into 
vinces, the Empire came into direct communication with 
under the pressure of the warlike tribes beyond them. E: 
sion went beyond bounds, and brought down the barbarian 
Rome at a time when the military spirit was found wanting 

After the defeat of Varus, the efforts that were mad 
recruit the legions by conscription, made it apparent thai 
ancient military spirit of Rome and Italy had decayed and 
its citizens. 

Out of the enfeebled generation a new regime springs 
not of a pure and sound description, but marked by vio 
and prevailing corruption. The power of gold and the for 
arms were the means employed at this later period to ii 
tain the few in the lap of luxiury, and to keep the man 
misery and abasement. Evils crept readily into the a 
and discipline suffered. The soldiers served not their coi 
but their leaders, and they did not serve them from obedi* 
but from offers and promises of gain. 

Without doubt, towards the close of the second cen 
civilisation had gained in extent ; the arts and ti 
flourished, and literature increased; but patriotic feeling 
civic virtue decayed. The old Roman spirit had gone ; 
laws made for the Republic suited not the Empire. Folio 
the example of Asiatic nations with whom they had con 
contact, slavish splendour, unbounded profusion were i 
duced, exhausting the finances of the Empire and deterior 
its citizens. 

Greece through the strife and jealousy of her cities to7 
one another, and Italy through the decay of all oner^ 
character and all martial spirit in the people, lost the 
eminence of station which had belonged to them, whilst 
were injuriously affected by contact with the East, v 
voluptuous habits they copied, instead of imparting the 
civilisation they possessed. 

One principle cause of the downfall of Carthage wag 
inferiority of its military institutions to those of the Ron 
and the want of a native army. The citizens of Carthage 
essentially a trading people. The life of an industrious 
chant — of a Carthagenian — ^was far too precious to be r 
as long as it was possible to substitute advantageously ] 
that of a barbarian from Spain or Gaul. The military ini 



Pre-emineHce in War. Vll 

lions of the Romans gave their armies, drawn from a hardy 
l>opiilation and perfected in war, a great superiority over those 
of any of the people they had to contend with. They were 
orgranised with great care and rapidity. As long as these 
institutions continued superior to those of other people, the 
discords and civil wars so frequent at Home did not prevent the 
lloznans from triumphing. Immediately that military service 
began to be avoided by the inhabitants of Italy, and that 
pffexninate inhabitants were suffered to buy themselves off from 
service, the power of Rome began to decline, and its military 
institutions to decay. 

The causes which led to the pre-eminence of these nations in 
^ar above others, was the simplicity and hardihood of their 
citizens in the pristine state of the nation ; the foundation of 
niilitary institutions in the country tending to incorporate the 
army with the people ; the good government which presided over 
their destinies, and the superior knowledge of the military art 
aeq^iiired by practice and studj' ; and, as made visible in their 
helical formations, discipline, training, and armaments. Some 
of the causes which have led to their decay have been touched 
^"pon. Among those chiefly to be remembered ai-e the decay of 
the martial spirit, the corruption and voluptuousness that crept 
^'fco the nations on the increase of wealth, and the deterioration 
or Uie race by admixture with the East. 

lii modern times the history of Prussia furnishes a striking 

^'Kistration of the value of military institutions. Sprung from 

'^'^.xnble origin in the fifteenth century, in the sixteenth 

"*'^Mick William formed the design of obtaining for Prussia a 

Pl^l-oe among European powers by means of a strong military 

^fiEoisation ; strict economy and discipline perfected in his 

'^^^le 60,000 men. It is stated he regarded his army like a miser 

'^Sudfl his money, and it was left to his son and successor, 

™^derick the Great, to use the weapon bequeathed to him. As 

^ lifineral he was not at first distinguished, but his career as a 

^^^irior was established at the close of the Seven Years War. 

^^^^iraigthe great coalition against him, backed by the funds 

^^Mt Ktt placed at his disposal, his energy, and the unity and 

^^onqr of a strong dictatorship, enabled him to triumph over 

^^ naiiy enemies, whose jealousies, slackness, and dissensions 

^ toew how to profit by. 

%t^ FlmaBiaa troops of that period were perfect in all the 

oal parts of the military calling; but it was not till after 

if Tilsit in ISOTy when Prussia was bound not to keep 
4<i 



178 Pre~emiiieiu'e in IVar, 

morti than -12,000 men iiii<Ior arms, tbat the principles npon 
whicli tli(> pi'CHi'iit military iiiittitutioiiB of tbe nation are foundei] 
were intro<liice<l. To the imparalloled exccllouce of these institu- 
tions may chiefly be traced the belief whicli has grown up "tliat 
tbp vast ]K>litical ftunius of the present Chancellor, coupled with 
tbe Ricjit military triumplis of the nation, combine in giving tLe 
Gennan nation more weight in the councils of Europe thau ercn 
belonged to Napoleon at the time of Ansterlitz and Jena." Ho» 
nmcli cif this is due to statcsnitmship. how miicli to generalship 
or to military institutions, it is difficult to Kay, but that a por- 
tion at leant is due to the latter will lie readily conceded, 
considcriufi that there is htudly a nation in Europe which has 
not at one time or another hornnved something from the Pru- 
DianH, either in military <UesH, diBciiilijie, or organisation. 

The history of tbe Fnissian Army di\ides itself into t«'i 
periods : the one eomiirising the time between the reign of the 
Grca,t I'llcctor and thtf battle of Jena ; the other dating from the 
l>attK' of -Tena up to the ])rescnt time- Tho army th&t 
FrediTick the Greiit inherited was vei-y differently constituted 
to the L'niHsian armies of the present day ; for the fltftte wm 
then so small, it wiis obliged to fill the ranks of the army with 
foreigners. From a pnpulation of two-and-a-half millions, it 
has increased to ()ni' of twenty-four millions, with a sway owr 
the minor states of Germnny which makc» the Noiih Gemiw 
Confederation tho most formidable military power in Europe- 

The last remains of thr nriiiy of Frederick may be said to h»Te 
perished at the battle of Jena: but not so its traditions, or the 
spirit infused into the country by long-establisbed military insti- 
tutions. These trailitions and institutions bavo not been blindlj 
adliered to, but have been adapted to the changing requhemen^ 
of tbe age, and, familiarised as the nation ia with military li^t 
when any new system becomes requisite, or is forced upon thmu 
it comes upon the nation rather as an improvement tban f" 
uitroduction of something new. 

Ilie astonishment caused by the appearance Of PmBma intbB 
field in 1812 with a well-apiminted army of 200.000 nun« ■■ 
vividly expressed by a French writer (M. Ballyett when 1" 
Bays : " The dead Prussian army rose up behind us. complsh^J 
organised, like a spectre from tbe tomb, called forth by the gcniv* 
of vengeance." Its cadres now open to recdreibe whole pop"" 
lation; every German is liable to militaty ««nrice. and vo 
BubstitateB are allowed. Persons unfit to serre under ar m* >gfa 
liable to 8uch service as they are fitted for in the army. ^^^| 



Pre-eminence in War. 179 

The liability to serve in the army and Landwehr lasts twelve 
years — three years in the standing army, four in the reserve, and 
five in the Landwehr. In addition to this, there is the levy of 
aJJ the manhood of the nation from seventeen years of age to 
forty-two ; this body, called the Landsturm, can only be called 
out in ease of invasion. 

The annual contingent required for education in the army is 
regulated by the requirements of the army itself. In 1814 it was 
fixed at 40,000 ; since then it has increased, in 1867 it was 
100,000 men. 

The military organisation is based on territorial divisions 
corresponding generally to civil ones. Provinces corresponding 
to Corps d'Armee, districts to brigades, circles to Landwehr 
battalions, circles again are divided into company districts. 

The Prussian army and reserves form four distinct classes in 
peae^, >iz. :— 

1- Standing army of men actually in the ranks. 

2- Heserves : men who have passed through the ranks, and 
8J*eli5^ble to return to the active army when required. 

^- Xandwehr : men who have served in the army and reserve, 

and x>.ow separately organised as Landwehr battalions. 
^' Ursatz reserve : men entirely mitramed, but called in to 

rtpl^nish depots when required in war. 
*^e war with Austria in 1866 afforded an opportunity of 

testing the whole system ; but although success attended their 
anna on that occasion, they did not on that account rest 
contented with wliat had hitherto been done. Whenever the 
experience there gained showed that further alterations might 
P^ made with advantage, the necessary modifications were 
^mediately taken in hand ; and the successful termination 
J^' the great struggle in which Germany and France have since 
'•^en engaged, is the best proof of the efficiency of the present 
Military system of North Germany. 

Prance, in the latter half of the sixteenth century, was looked 
^Pon as the wealthiest power in Europe ; her compact and fertile 
•^^Titory, the natiural activity and enterprise of her people, were 
^^^ chief sources of wealth, and enabled her to set on foot such 
^^ceg as had never been seen since the downfall of the Koman 
^^pire. 

^Uring the sixteenth century the French recruited their army 
y Voluntary enlistment. 
,-^e wars of the Bevolution ushered in great changes in the 

^**tajy institntions of France, the organisation into brigades 

12 « 



180 Pre-eminence in if ar. 

and divisions that had exiuted, was perfected in the Corp ^ —s ^ 
d'Armge that aseemblcd at the camp of Bologne, and. accordin^^f g 
to the national vanity, the moat gloiioUH page of the history o ^t 
Franco is found during the Napoleonic wars. 

The suecosses of Napoleon were owing to the originality of th» ^«ie 
systems he introduced. The army, as it was the sole basis of hi -f: is 
power, was also, at all times, the primary object of his thoughtt?^* .s. 
The conscription law of 1798 acquired, under him, th«r ^le 
character of a settled and regular part of the national syBtenr mzm. 
The distribution of the army into corps under tried leaderr —us, 
tho celerity imparted to strategic movements by the comhinatioKr^Dii 
of the system of requisition with that of contracts, a real con^ — .u- 
hinod action of the three arms in battle, crushing of the enem; — ^^'« 
centre by artillery fire, followed by powerful atrokes of cavalcr _iy 
and infantry, all these combined to form part of his system ; b ■^ut 
tho Pdimtry was drained of ita manhood by conscriptions, and c^w-on 
his e\ili.' the coimtry sank into revolution, and its military pm^e- 
eminence faded for want of an individual great both in t~ lut- 
council and the field. 

The Second Empire had left the French military systt — ^ui 
entirely unaltered, and in no way rendered the army more oHV a 
national institution. 

In 1870 the French army was kept up by compulsory serv^Z-et, 
modilied by substitutes. The military results were unsatiac^ -ac- 
tory ; in 186!), out of a contingent of 75,000 men, 42,000paid -«lie 
bounty of i'9'2 for substitutes, thus the proportion of conscrm.^ 
was very small, and tlie numbrr of those who shirked milib'Srr 
service great, and indifferent men obtained. 

The classes into into which the army was divided were : — 

1. The active army, in which the men served five years. 

2. The reserve, in which they scr^'ed four years. 

3. The mobile national guard, who were drilled for fiftWff 

days annually, officered by civilians. 

Gaps in the field army were filled from the depots, of wbieli 
there were 120 battalions, 60 squadrons, and 144 guns. 

In the war of 1870 it would appear tiiat, trom the outset, tl» 
decision of tho campaign depended on the organisation oftiw 
contending armies. 

Ab compared with the German organisation, the PVeneh W 
foulty ; the army was not ready organised into inanmuvriot' 
onitB. France bad no'pennanent brigades, divisions, or corp^; 
the country was divided into territorial diBtriots under ^ 



Pre-eminence in War. 181 

:and, in case of war, troops had to be hurried up to form the 
uriit of command. 

However perfect the organisation may be, a certain time must 
•ela.pse for mobilisation, and the great problem of the national 
Armies of the present day is ; frst, to organise them in sufficient 
numbers, and second, to turn them quickly into the field. 

The forethought displayed in the military institutions of 
Prussia in the location of certain portions of force to certain 
territorial divisions of country, and the decentralisation thereby 
obtained, as contrasted with the system of centraUsatiou 
-adopted by the French, served in a very short time to place tlie 
Prussian army in the field fully equipped and prepared for war. 

As soon as war was determined on, the French pushed forward 
their peace garrisons towards the frontier. The organisation of 
these garrisons was perfect on paper, but they were not on a 
^ar-footing, and when they commenced to collect the comple- 
ments for the different regiments, brigades, and divisions, in rear 
^^ the railway junctions from whence they were to be conveyed 
^ their corps, a scene of the most utter disorder and confusion 
^^^^tirred. 

The difference of the systems may be stated as follows : — 
The Prussians organise first, and then concentrate ; the French 
<^ncentrate first, and then organise. 

-T^rance was over-matched in the war of 1870 ; her army on a 
P^ftce-footing was inferior to that of Germany by 50,000 men. 

The whole available reserves of France to fill and support her 
^^"^^^uies in the field consisted of some contingents of the second 
"^^a^s of conscripts and of the newly created Garde Mobile, both 
forces being wholly untrained, if we except five months passed at 
^^pots, and, therefore, useless at first as soldiers ; their numbers 
ti^Ve been estimated at 262,000 men. 

The reserves of Germany, on the other hand, divided into the 
^^Berve proper, and the Landwehr of north and south Germany, 
^^^e 800,000 (rained soldiers in the highest state of efficiency, 
^Vei^ soldier having passed three years in the ranks. 

There is, perhaps, no point in which the inferiority of the 

^^Xich institutions to those of the German is more conspicuous 

^^^»ii in the rapid prostration of the French after their defeats in 

^^ early part of the war. While the Prussians day after day 

'e pouring fresh levies, fully disciplined and organised, into 

ice, the power of bringing . forward disciplined reserves 

^^^^tially did not exist in the French organisation. 

^^■astlyy the Germans had during peace time studed the science 




182 Pre-eminence in IVar. 

of communications as applied to the use of railways in war ; 
knowledge thus obtained enabled them to keep the great mai 
of men and horses supplied with munitions of war and food. 

It is not the object of this essay to enter into a description oi 
even a comparison between, the different military institutions 
the nations of the world ; an investigation of one or two instar 
of undoubted supremacy is sufficient to point out the cause 
that supremacy ; and the attention which is being directed 
every nation in Europe at the present day to the reorganisai 
of its armed forces, is only an acknowledgment of the correcti 
of the example displayed in the forces of the German empire. 

Before concluding this portion of the subject let us no 
Russia. The progress of Russia within little more than a centur 
almost as extraordinary as that of Prussia, and offers a pc 
liarity which, in its bearing on the military as well as on ot 
institutions, deserves to be noticed. It is thus described by 
late Lord Macaulay (Macaulay's life by Trevelyan) : — 

Within the last 120 years a nation which had previously been in a stal 
barbarous as that in which our ancestors were before the Crusades, has gradi 
emerged from the ignorance in which it was sunk, and has taken its f 
among civilised nations. I bpeak of Russia. There is now in that count 
large educated class, abounding with persons fit to serve the State in the hig 
functions. And how was the change effected ? Not by flattering national 
judices ; not by feeding the mind of the young Muscovite with the old worn 
stories which his rude fathers had believed; not by lying legends a] 
St. Nicholas, d'c. ; but by teaching him those foreign languages in which 
greatest mass of information has been laid up, and thus putting aU 
information within his reach. The languages of western Europe have civil 
Russia. 

It may be said that moral influences, such as the religi 
and political enthusiasm which inspired the pikemen of Cromv! 
the patriotic ardour of devotion to a great leader which influen 
the old guard of Napoleon, national characteristics, characte 
a General, have also considerable effect in pre-eminence in v 
Any or all of these things may be lying dormant hi an ai 
during peace, and require but the call to arms to dev( 
them. 

The stubborn valour and implicit subordination, which are 
distinguishing characteristics of the Russian soldiery at 
present day, were instilled into thein at Pultowa, where t 
beat the previously invincible Swedes ; before that time they ; 
been a disorderly and irresolute rabble. 

The Prussian army took the field in 1866 after nearly £ 
years peace. Their efficient condition after such a long peae 
to be ascribed to the excellence of their militarv institntio 



Pre-eminence in War. 183 

^nd this, combined with their able generalship and superior 
^^niament, is the cause of their success. 

In the military institutions of a country lie the seeds of 

<iurable success. An army by its institutions is, as it were, 

'^^elded into the state to which it belongs, if we comprehend 

^^^der the term institution all that relates to the recruitment, 

^^ganiflation, discipline, formation, and manoeuvres, the rules 

'^hich regulate first appointment and promotion, the relations 

■between oflScers and soldiers amongst themselves, and the 

^composition and education of an efiBcient staff. 

The military institutions of a country have more of the 
^^^itarj' and less of the civil element in their nature, according 
^8 the national force approaches more or less to the nature of a 
standing army. When the force is a regular standing army, 
^inost the only part of its institutions which is both civil and 
^■^ilitary is the recruitment; but whether these institutions 
pBJrtake more or less of the civil element, they are not the less 
important as regards the causes of success in war. 

The political circumstances in which a nation is placed regu- 
late to a great extent the number of troops to be kept up, as well 
^5i the constitution of its army ; but if the military organisation 
^^8 on a sound basis, after providing a sufficient force to ensure 
*ihe execution of the laws, to maintain order at home, and repel 
^i^y sudden aggression of foreign armies, it should further 
provide the means of putting forth the whole strength of the 
country in case of need. 

This preparation for war during peace is a vast question, 
Evolving the concentration of men and material at certain 
Points, ready to move in any required direction, and in the 
shortest possible space of time. 

A vast amount of information, requiring constant revision 
^^d correction, has also to be collected, so as to keep with the 
^haixges which are always going on in the surrounding world. 
. *' The science of war has reached a point when to be unready 
^^"^ to be undone." 

The second French Empire failed to renew the military glories 
^^ the first, because its miUtary institutions did not admit of its 
Pitting forth the whole strength of the country; instead of a 
Proper gradation of responsibility there was the curse of over- 
^^tralisation. ** The whole nation was imbued with over-confi- 
^^ce, springing from a want of knowledge and favouritism, 
^hich destroys a high tone of thought, teaching the members of 
^ ^oble profession to become sycophants, and leading inevitably 



184 Vre'Cminence in War. 

to a false condition of discipline, kept up only by fear, and 
certain to break down in the first hour of trial." 

'' Courage and the spirit of an army have in all ages multiplied 
its physical powers, and will continue to do so in future. A supe- 
riority in the organisation and equipment of an army has also at 
times given a great moral preponderance ; but armies are now so 
inuch on a par in regard to arms and equipment, that there is nu 
very notable difference between the best and the worst in these 
things ; so that except the commander-in-chief, a thing entiiely 
dependent on chance, there is nothing now but habituation to war 
which can give one army a decided sui)eriority over another." 
(tJlciuiiewiiz.) 

The nearer armies approach to a state of equality in aD these 
things, the more decisive becomes the relation in point of 
numbers. 

II. The Strategy, Political and Military, which presides 

over and gives direction to the war. 

Clausewitz says that "war is an insti-ument of policy"; and in 
the examination of this definition goes on to state that " if war 
belongs to policy it will naturally take its character from thence; 
and although it is true the political element does not sink deep 
into the details of war, its influence is great in the formation of 
a plan for the whole war. 

"The subordination of the political to the military point of 
view would be contrary to common sense, for policy declares 
war. The subordination of the military to the political iSf 
therefore, the only thuig possible ; hence the leading outlines of 
a war are determined by the Cabinet. 

"If the policy promiseH itself a right effect from the war, 
then it acts favourably ; if, on the other hand, it promises itself 
a wrong effect, or in its conduct is wrong, then it is prejudicial. 

" The art of war is a policy which fights battles instead of 
writing notes." 

From the general plan of a war results the particular plan of 
operation relative to the different countries where the war is to 
be carried on ; but in the formation of the general plan is to ta 
found the genius of the leader, which influences the whoto; lad 
it is absolutely necessary that all those who aspire to the ftMt 
military ranks should possess the great knowledge neeeeeiiy fi: 
form the general plan of a war. 

When war has been determined on, and the g^nenl.Wift^ 
thereof baa been Gommitted to the hands of the rBSSiiBi!!ftWllii^^ 



Pre-eminence in War. 186 

ihe character of the war, whether offensive or defensive, is, or 
ought to be, founded exclusively on military and not on political 
grounds. 

Bustow says : ** To carry constitutional principles into warfare 
is fatal to whoever does it." 

Strategy teaches us how to plan a campaign, and the bases on 
which to build up a plan are comprised under three heads, viz., 
geographical, historical, and statistical ; or, in other words, an 
-accurate knowledge of the theatre of war, a close study of the 
military operations that have been transacted on the same 
Aeatre in former wars, and a knowledge of the resources of the 
territory in the proposed zone of operations. 

The end to be obtained is the ruin and destruction of the 
^emy*8 army, which means victory in the field ; and neither 
political objects or causes have anything to do with the actual 
inilitary operations which lead the shortest road to our ends. 

However great Alexander appears in his victories, perhaps 
his greatness is still more apparent in his general plans. 

Wien we see Alexander leave Macedon with 30,000 foot, 6,000 
horse, and cross the Hellespont for the conquest of Asia, the 
'enterprise seems more than human. 

The solidity of his plan and the great extent of his genius is 
^ forth in his speech to the generals. 

"He does not see how Egypt is to be easily attacked while 
tte Persians are masters of the sea, Aor can he pursue Darius, 
having behind so large a tract of country suspected, at least, if 
Dot real enemies. These matters would not only prostrate his 
^^, but perhaps ruin the affairs of Greece." 

.j^^ enemies," he says, " may recover the maritime towns in our absence, and 

*7^f »fter augmenting their naval army, transport the war into our own country 

|,r^* *e are pursuing Darius on the plains of Babylon. This is more to be feared, 

^*^» *e are at open war with the Lacedemonians, and that the Athenians continue 

- <^ P*rty rather from fear than from love. But, if we are masters of Tyre, we 

^j^" »oon have all PhGenicia, and deprive the Persians of half of their naval army, 

, ^Mch is composed of the fleet of that province. For it is not possible to imagine 

JP^t, after seeing us in possession of their towns, they will still remain in the 

^ ^'ce of our enemies. It will then follow that Cyprus will be surrendered to us, 

>e can easily conquer it, and even Egypt itself, if we are once masters of the 

^^ And thus, having nothing to fear for our country, we can with more glory and 

^urance undertake the conquest of Persia.** 

^ In these few words is the great plan of Alexander comprised. 

^^ points out to his generals the necessity of the conquest of 

'i^e and the maritime towns of Egypt, and by these measures 

^^ may carry his army as far as he pleases. His rear will ever 

covered, and his communication with Greece secured. We 



186 Pre'eminence in War. 

have only to compare his general plan with the map o 
country, to be convinced of the truth. 

By taking the maritime towns one by one he deprivec 
Persian fleet of their harbours of refuge and the possibiU 
recruiting, and eventually dispersed them, as his own flee 
not powerful enough to attack them. 

We cannot attribute Alexander's science and conduct of \^ 
long experience or to that fickle element fortune, but must a 
the cause of his pre-eminence to his great military capacit; 
to the distinguished talents nature had imited in his p( 
Having perfectly studied the rules and principles of the sc 
of war, by the time he had attained the age of twenty-six, 
far successfully applied them, that at the head of his smal 
perfectly disciplined and warlike army he prevailed agains 
forces of Darius in three battles and conquered Asia. 

Having conquered the Persians he knew how to accomm 
himself to the manners of those people. He mixed the Pei 
among his phalanx, and the most illustrious he placed i 
companies. This was a i)iece of Alexander's politics. 

Let us take another instance from Grecian history. 

The Lacedemonians had leagued themselves with several 
States of the Peloponnesas to attack the Athenians, simpl 
of jealousy of their power. 

The celebrated speech of Pericles, recorded in Thucydi( 
an exposition both of policy and a general plan of war. 

He points out to his countrymen that, in spite of ex 
treaties, the Lacedemonians wish to pick a quarrel and dec 
by arms. 

He tells them not to imagine that to obtain peace they 
simply to annul a decree which is the cause of the war : on 
he adds, depends your whole force and empire. If you 
they will immediately impose new laws on you, as to a ] 
they regard as inferiors and have made afraid of t 
whereas, if you resist vigorously, they will be constrain 
treat you as equals. We must either yield our power, or dii 
by the way of arms, what is demanded of us. 

He then goes on to show that the Lacedemonians ai 
agricultural people, strong by land but weak by sea ; that 
are composed of many small states, each having equal auth 
and who, having different interests, do not pursue the 
object ; they have no public council which provides again 
events and puts everything in order in an instant, and the 
unable to support a long war against a nation more rid 



Pre-eminence in War. 187 

oxerfal than themselves ; that tlioiigh thoy should put garriwons 
iitlie frontiers, aniJ blockade the Athenian towns, yet they can 
iCTcr prevent the Athenian navies from ravaging their coasts 
.nil liringing in provisions. 
Sacli was the situation of the enemy's affiiirs. 
Hf then goes on to say that the Athenians were Iree from all 
hex defects, and had other great advantages. " If they attack 
mr country by land we mil invade theirs by sea, and if we ruin 
nJy a part of the I'cloponnessas tliey will be greater sufferers 
Lfaan we can he if they lay waste the whole country of Athens, 
BflMUse they have no other rcsoume, but we iiosseas other states 
Ixitb on the islands and on the continent. This shows how 
imporlant it is to be sovereign of the seas," 

He then counsels them not to risk a hiittle by land, by which 
tbej might in case of defeat lose their alliew, but to abandon the 
low countries and retire into .\tliens ; ami lastl}', bids them not 
to degenerate from th<; valour of tlu^r forefathers, who failed 
Dot to resist the Persians with more courage than foree, nor to 
hxK the state to their successors m a worse condition than 
it wtB received over from their ancestors. 

The design of Pericles' harangue was to lead the .\thenians to 
dtelue vv against the Lacedemonians. 

In this speech, which has not been given at length, there is 
fte moHt careful examination and exposition of the [Kilitical 
^item of the adversary, and also of other lowers ; the circum- 
teee whether they would interest themselves for or against the 
Aflwiimg is discussed, the advantages or disadvantages that 
vonld proceed from the war, the means to he employed for 
■itick or defence; and allusion is also made to the suceour 
cqeeted from outlying colonies and states, and the neutrality of 
<tten. 

Hie eacefol investigation of these points, and the judgment 
Uneed therefrom at the outset of a war. must certainly be 
dMsd among the elements which tend to bring about a 
BtMftil iennination. 

The results of the firmness of the Bomau Senate during the 
iMnii Piuiic War can hardly be over-rated. If Rome had 
■lie peace, however good the terms, the very fact of her 
n»iiiK to peace would hare been a tacit acknowledgment of 
! superiority of the Carthaginians. The dread of the Bomon 
^Qiu, which was a great moral aoziliary to them, would never 
*e beso the same, and it would have been difficult to keep the 
[t« i n sub jection. 



188 I're-emineiice in It or. 

The emxiire held by Philip II. of Spain was imquestionablj 
gained by all the artti of policy and war. Spain was then Uk 
land of KtatcHmen and Eoldiertt ; thii skill of the Spanish diplo- 
matiato was rtinowncd throughout Europe ; the soverei;^ lutioi 
waH unrivalled, both in regular and irregular irarfare. The 
impetuous chivalry of France, the serried phalanx of Svitur- 
land, were alike found wanting when brought face to face with 
the Spanish infantry. 

Overleap 100 years, and look at Spain since end of ITtb 
century. Macaulay says, in one of his foreign essays : " Foreign 
conquest had begun to eat into every part of the gigantit 
empire, and within there was an incurable decay. All the 
cauBeft of this decay resolve themselves into one cause, hai 
gorcrnmiiit." 

During the reign of Louis XIV. France occupied a voj 
important position in Europe. The names of Bichelien, Lionne, 
LouYois, and Colbert are associated with that period, but no 
monarch ever kept a£Fairs more in his own hands than did die 
King of France himself; therefore, it is only fair to allow tiut 
the high position of France at that time was, in a great measnKi 
■dtiB to the abilities of the Sovereign. 

It was reserved for Alarlborough to put a check on tbt 
aggrandising spirit of the French. In this great man wtR 
united the qualities of a statesman and a general. For tn 
jcars he took the general direction of the war in Flanders ui 
Spain, besides managing every negociation with the alfo- 
This intimate knowledge of the causes of the war and thiir 
bearing on the interests of the nation, enabled him fully lo 
carr.y out the wishes of the Government by whom he «*s 
■employed. 

.\h a statesman, tlie high qualities of Marlborough were o\ni«l 
by his bitterest foes. " Over the confederacy," sayB Bolingbroif. 
"he, a new, a private man, acquired by merit and managemfOl 
A more decided influence than high birth, confirmet) autdoritt. 
and even the Crown of Great Britain had given t« Kinif 
William." But great as he was in council, he wob even ^cat^ 
in the field. He stands alone in his unbroken gond (ortuat- 
Voltairc notes that he never besieged a fortress that he did nol 
take, or fought a battle that he did not win. Bis difficdtts 
•esme not from the enemy, hut from the ignorance and timtJil? 
of his own allies. He was never defeated in the field, ti^ 
victory after victory was snatched from him by the i) 
fais officen or the Htubbomncss of the Dntch. 



Pre-eminence in War. 189' 

Mr. Pitt's admin istratiou in this country affords an illustration 
the i^reat influence which may be brought to bear in war by 
>se who take no part in the actual operations in the field. 
'. want to call England/* he said, as he took office, '* out of the 
enate state in which 20,000 men from Prance can shako her." 
is call was soon answered ; he at once breathed his own loftv 
irit into the country he served, as he communicated something 
his own grandeur to the men who served him. 
'*Xo man," said a soldier of the time, ** ever entered Mr. 
tt's closet who did not feel himself braver when he came out 
m when he went in." 

"England has been a long time in labour,** exclaimed 
rederick of Prussia, '' but she has at length brought forth a 
An." If we look at the history of that period, it is no oxag- 
.'ration to say that three of the many victories which then took 
lue determined, for ages to come, the destinies of the world. 
t*itli the victory of Rossbach began that great political changes 
I Germany which was to lead, in our own day, to tlie creation 
fa united empire under the leadership of Prussia. With the 
cinmph of Wolfe, on the heights of Abraham, may be said to 
IT8 begun the history of the United States ; for the fall of 
locbec, by extinguishing the power of the French in Canada, 
emored the enemy whose dread had hitherto knit the colonists 
the mother country, and flung open to their energies the 
onndlesB plains of the West. By the victory of Plassey, the 
nfinence of Europe told for thi^ first time, since the days of 
^leunder, on the nations of the East. 

(To he. continued.) 






190 



lebiftois anb |lotes. 



Egypt : Native Eulers and Foreign Interference. By Bakon 
Malortie, Author of Diplomatic Sketches, Mr. Gladstone . 
the Greek Question, &c. &c. London : "William Eidgway, 
Piccadilly. 1882. 

The truth of the very apt motto attached to this book, " Max 
semper in rebus humanis momenti iEgyptus fuit," was ne 
so much appreciated by Europe as at the present moment, 
are bound to add, that no writer upon the subject has been 
successful as the author in placing before the public a calm a 
statesman-like review of the more recent past, in suggesting 
practical line of conduct for the future. It is in all respects 
most excellent book. It points out, in the clearest langaa( 
the mistakes which have been committed, and indicates t 
mischiefs which have resulted from the interference of forei| 
powers. Whilst upon this point, we may note that altbouj 
the English Government has nominally abolished the dn 
control, it has allowed many English officers to remain drawii 
large salaries for doing nothing. The excuse preferred by the 
gentlemen is that they do not belong to the Control. Thouj 
this may be technically true, it partakes nevertheless of tl 
<5haracter of a subterfuge, a subterfuge moreover of a vei 
dangerous character, for it stereotypes the evil which caii» 
the main agitation amongst the Egyptian population — that 
allowing lazy Europeans to draw large salaries from tl 
revenues of the country, exempt from taxation. 

One important matter dwelt upon by the author, and oi 
which, we believe, has occupied for some time the attention 
the Government, is the advisability of purchasing fromitl 
Sultan the right of suzerainty over the country. This is a st 
preliminary to further action. As it is, our troops remain 
the country, not because the English Government is anxio' 
they should remain, but because their withdrawal would be tl 
signal for anarchy. For the present, we believe, the remei 
chiefly indicated by Lord DuiBferin, and viewed not unfavouiaW 
by the author of the work under review, that of placing f 
Khedive in the position of an Indian ruler, resting on £n(^ 



Itecinrs and \otes. 191 

;^>r<»t>rt<-tl hy England, with a lioriiilont at hia Court, is tht 
solution of tile qiU'Htion. lint to enable tho romler mi- 
liar with |)olitics to foiin anv opinion itt nil on the mibject, 
tifi-fs^ary that hi' should read tlic most aldo and instructive 

k of iiaron do Malortic. 

IF.A, TliK llEliMlT N-VTION. liV Wnj.lAM Kl.I.IOT GlllKFIPI. latf 

if thf hnpcrial Univcrsilv of Tokio. .TajHin. Anthor of '/Vc- 
\Iihul..\ Knipin:. London : W. I!. Allen A Co. 188'2. 
'.. GnrKKiH has in this fascinating voliiinu introduced tlu- 
ader to a new world — u world not long niiitod to thu old one 
t means of American diploniaey — and displaying features 
hich i-annot fail to attratt the geologist, the man of Bcieiiee, 
hi- M-liolar, the linguist, the jiolitioiil economist, and the 
nisMoiiary. The task has heen performed with the same 
ability, the same eloiiuence, the same n-seareh which charae- 
lerised tile author's work on the Mikado's empire, and is even 
note interesting, inasmuuli as his suhject is less generally 
bom. The chapter on the mudern and recent history of the 
wmtry possesses all the fascination of n romance. It shows 
kow gndiially, step hy step, the links were riveted which now 
Ibd the Corea to its older sister lands. A lory copious apix'ndix 
|nea eihaontiTC details rugiirding the Itmguage, the literatnre, 
the veigbts and measures, the coinage, and tho cartography of 
tile country. It is difficult for anvonc who takes np the hook 
to lay it down again; and when wo add that it is heautiftilly 
pmted on fine paper, reijuiring no pa por-c utter, we add tho last 
vord of praiae to a book which, from the tirst page to tho last, in 
A B>m of inBtmction and delight. 

b RnamAiia at Mkrv and Heilit, and iiikib Po^'xit o>' 
BTiniHa Ihdia. By Charles Marvin. London : W. II. Alien 
A Co. 1B83. 

H> Martin has done good service hy exposing the secret 
lOOfthts and asgiirations of the Busaian war party. These 
>Vt^tioDs conlirm the views of that English party which 
>n»tcd the abandonment of Kandahar. It will be in the 
KOlletition of somu of our readers that Colonel Malleson, cm 
IB return bora India upwards of two years ago, declared, in 
^imt hv dolivcreil on the abandonment of Kandahar, that 
K tesall of that retrograde movement wonld be that native 
pMon tended to the conolouon that when the English should 



192 Beviews and Notes. 

assemble their armies to repulse the Bussian invader & 
the north, the independent Indian princes would seize 
opportunity to rise in their rear. Compare this prophecy, 
result of special investigation, with the repeated declaratii 
of Soboleff and other Bussian generals that already India 
undermined, and that when the Bussian invasion does t 
place the English army will find a very formidable enemy 
its communications. It is within the personal knowledge 
the writer of this notice that ten years ago, a Mah&n 
whose territories would play a very important part in the ev 
of a Bussian invasion, asked, at a private and secret audien 
a German traveller who happened to be at his Court, whethe: 
were true that the Bussians were more powerful than the Engli 
as, if they were, he would have to shape his course according 
Every page of this most valuable work testifies to the folly, 
absolute, the incredible folly, of the abandonment of Eandah 
and, by that abandonment, of the renunciation of the powei 
influencing Herat. Herat is to the Bussians what the fi 
Napoleon declared that a fortified Cherbourg would be 
France. It is an eye to see and an arm to strike. Mr. Mar 
proves that Bussia is already within striking distance of Hei 
From that new basis she will be a standing menace to India ! 
We have space only to indicate the contention of this valua 
work. It deserves deep study from every politician, especia 
from politicians now in ofl&ce. There is yet time, barely tii 
but just time, to repair some of the mischief. Mr. Mar 
indicates how. We greatly fear, however, that a Minis 
which has proved itself so careless of the traditions of 
empire will be deaf and blind even to these open avowals of 
pretensions of the great rival of England in the East. 



TO C0BBESP0NDENT8. 



All MSS. intended for insertion must be directed to the Editors, Army 
Navy Magazine, 13, Waterloo Place, London, S.W., and must contain name 
address of the writer. Name and address on letters is insufficient. 

It is requested that ruled paper be used^ the pages numbered^ fastened togei 
and a small margin left. 

Every care will be taken ; but neither the Editors nor the Publishers cax 
responsible for the loss of MSS. through the post or otherwise. When MSS. 
desired to be returned, stamps must be enclosed. 

Beviews of Books and Notes on salient matters connected with the Army 
Navy will be continued each month. 



London : Printed by W. H. AUen & Co., 18 Waterloo Place, Ball lUU, &W. 



THE ARMY AND NAVY 
MAGAZINE. 



JULY 1883. 



Iitbian Jistritts kring t\t |lt&olt. 

By H. G. Keene, CLE. 



VIIL 

Lr this and the next section the treatment must be somewhat 
different from that adopted hitherto. From Sah&ranpor to 
Ettwa there was no interregnmn of pm-e belligerence ; the civil 
officers being left to deal with the anarchy with such aid as was 
from time to time available. ** Martial law " was generally 
proclaimed ; but the magistracy were, on the whole, the directors 
of events ; and succeeded, in longer or shorter time. In Cawn- 
pore and Farrukhabad, on the contrary, there was a long period 
when all semblance of authority was obliterated ; and the civil 
officers were scarcely of any weight in affairs, but were mainly 
restricted to fighting or foraging in association with their 
comrades of the army, and only gradually employed in restoring 
order as the tide of war subsided. 

Still, in order to complete a civilian's view of the country 
^^hnically known as ** Hindustan " — which was the focus and 
cWef scene of the outbreak — a few circumstances may be noted 
wch as may have escaped the attention of the ordinary 
Wstorian. 

Cawnpore is the chief town of a district, of the same name, 
^]^g on the right bank of the Ganges, on the opposite side of 
™ch is the province of Audh — or Oude. It was selected as a 
^tonment so far back as 1777, and formed the basis for the 
^^ks of the British conquerors upon Bohilkand and Dehli. 
^t the time of the outbreak it contained a population of about 
VOL, VI. 13 



1J)4 Indian Districts during the Revolt. 

100,000, chiefly traders and operatives, in fact the onlinuj 
Indian urban population. At Bithur — a village some miles 
higher up the river — lived a Mahratta of rank, named Dhimdu 
Panth, but most commonly known by the title (not unusual 
among noble MahrattaB) of "NAna Sfihib." He had been adopted 
in 1832 by the deposed Peghwa, Baji Rao, and inherited his 
private property. But Lord Dallioueie had decided that the 
titular dignity of Peshwa (head of the Mahratta confedencj) 
should not pass under the adoption, and the political penooo 
and salute of guns were discontinued on Bfiji's death iu lB£i. 
During the next few years the Nana spent a good deal of moiie; 
in trying to bring his wrongs before the Queen's OoTemment in 
England, employing for that purpose a Muslim adventoiv 
named Azimuila Khkn, who had been made his private secretuj, 
and who was an accomplished rascal of the Gil Bias, or Gasanon, 
type. While this man was intriguing with third-rate politiciani, 
and philandering with credulous females iu Europe, his masts 
shut himself up in his palace at Bithur, where he sulked in 
splendour, and nursed his wrongs in the society of Baba Bhatt, 
B41a Rao, and other chosen companions. On stated occasion! a 
British ci^il officer visited him ; and about November there WH 
a religious fair on the river, when re&eslmients were proTidii 
for European visitors. But the Nfina never willingly associated, 
in the slightest degree, with persons of that race from tiie d^ 
on which the Peshwa, his adoptive father, died. 

The garrison, at the time of the outbreak, comprieed tb 
'2nd Bengal Light Cavalry, a detail of artillery, and three regi- 
ments of Bengal Infantry ; all the rank and £le of which VM 
natives of India. The British troops had fallen below the po- 
portion proper to such a force, a detachment having been Btftt 
to the aid of Sir Henry Lawrence at Luoknow. Those t' 
remained at Cawnpore were as follows : — 

Artillery — One battery of 6 guns with 69 men ; 
Infantry— m men H. M. 84th. 

74 invalids H. M. 32nd. 

18 1st Madras FosilierB. 
The whole under the command of a diatinguished ofGcer <A A' ' 
company's army, Sir Hugh Maaaey Wheeler, K.G.B. The oini 
chief was the magistrate and collector, Mr. Hillersdon, of llit 
Bengal Civil Bervice. 

Aboat eighty mileB higher up the river iras the station o\ 
Fnttehgarh, the official centre of a dirtiiet named after j^ 
neighbouring oify of Farokbibftd. Hen mS^fl^fflHH 



the po- 

iea sent i 
ose tint 

i 



Indian Districts during the BevoU. 195 

Native Infantry, a regiment posted there for the protection 
gun-carriage factory in the fort. The civil officer was 
'. Greorge Probyn, C.S., the military command being vested 
)nel Smith. After the receipt of the news of the Meerat 
7, the men of the 10th continued for some time to behave 
tensibly, though in conversation with Mr. Probyn's native 
ants they admitted that if other sepoys were to attack the 
3ans they would not oppose them in arms. All they could 
tee was that they would not kill their own officers. Amid 
inister omens the Europeans prepared for the worst. 
. Phillipps and Bramly came in from neighbouring 
is, but passed on to Agra where we have already had 
n to notice their services; other refugees afterwards 
including Mr. W. Edwards, the magistrate of Badaon in 
band, brother of the B. M. Edwards, mentioned above in 
tion with the Mazafamagar district, 
dng these, to be followed hereafter in a few concise sen- 
we return for the present to Cawnpore, where General 
ir and Mr. Hillersdon were taking counsel as to the best 
i of weathering the storm until they should receive the 
nee that they expected from Calcutta. That city, it 
be added, was 628 miles off, only a small portion of the 
je being covered by a railway. The people of Cawnpore, 
ire, were somewhat in the same situation as that in which 
)ple of Edinburgh had been in 1745. 
what passed at the first we have to trust chiefly to con- 
. But I have been so far fortunate as to obtain the 
Dce of Mr. J. W. Sherer, C.S.I., who came up with the 
lief in July. It is this gentleman's opinion that the steps 
)y the civil and miUtary chiefs at this crisis, which led to 
Astrous results that have obtained such sad notoriety, 
itirely justified by the circumstances. It is proper to bear 
id that they had peculiar opportunities for forming a 
t. Wheeler was a thorough '' sepoy-officer " : his habits 
sociations were those of the old school ; he understood, 
life-long experience, the feelings of native troops ; he was 
krily in receipt of the most trustworthy information, 
don, for his part, had a brother in command of one of the 
regiments; and was, himself, personally intimate with 
)f the men, among whom he was a favourite. A month 
Colonel Hillersdon told Mr. Sherer — who happened to be 
sH at Cawnpore — that his men had discussed the question 
suspected cartridges^ and had declared themselves willing 

13 • 




-> . mk '^ui^ra v> jimr i& "2^7 ^ms^ i^sizcseti jq j^at »if zhc end 
%i;it ▼♦^r* :u'in rwujnsi ii ViHtii 'git^m -vim ^Xft=£r fct«h. Th 
*iir>nr^ ^iiac Zit^LiiiL ZtiQus v-in :n:t STnutoi in. ^zrm&^irse irii 
•*i«> 3ii*ru S«;r Tai* 3i»i 5iaa :i3«iIt ^uzscL^ : .31 ibe coQtnr 
jiS^itindrXu Li okizj^^^i V; iar-^ bki r«ais:iL 3:r iiopm^z that, I 
>r ;muiincr v^ ;ccAi:i iii^ .aimr^gacns sc jolt oi^flJcd lor in vai 

Tr»A nr, trA"i:i^iioc. h^w-ien ase X^na and me sep^ysw ISThatev 
'V>tr.rr.v;«l<!3itovr«^ zzsk^ Eat^ r-a^fiei b#=CTPB«L AjfrnnIIa and tl 
Ov^.:"^ f*i Jj^hll — and i* i* zr^j p«^s:cal belief ihAS such had be 
m^irr — ohr: £aet ihA*. a* iL^r frss ni-i^y, ^e troops started f 
iMhli i.^ % proof thac they -sr-rr'^ zux then acting with the Bith 
l^fi^jr. Tfift brizish aoihoritLes. I repeat, had to provide agair 
t>iTfA«lt iirlhinq brjm the departure of the natire troops, and z 
icifi ^hXj fA the seven or ei^t hon^ired white non-combataia 
nntil tbej eonld obtain aseistaziee from Calcutta. It was &] 
neee$it%arT that the magazine ahooLi be eoarded, so that the b 
r;hara<rterr-t of the town shoold not obtain arms. All now seems 
yAx%i to the eonclnsion that it was Azimulla who, on retnmi 
ifffm ¥Lnrr]fpe and becoming aware of the discontents of Que 
Zinat )fahl at Delhi, thought he saw his way to fame a 
frprinne an a political creator. The Nana was to stand forth 
PIenifK/t^:ntiary of the restored Emperor ; though it might be 
work of time and trouble to persuade the chiefs of the army 
w.cjqA thi» part of the programme. But we ought not to bla: 
ilillerH^lon for not knowing all this, or for thinking that it v 
\fi'Mi, in hift perplexed situation, to endeavour to outbid thesep^ 
for th^; only alliance that had a chance of safety in it. He p 
bably thought, as above suggested, that he could secure ^ 
N^na by promising a reconsideration of his case as the rew^i 
of his adherence. Only, unhappily, Azimulla had watched 
Crimfjan collapse (see Busseirs book on the war, where 
mentions having received a visit from the gay rascal in 1 
trenches before Sebastopol). He had also been in correspai 
(jnc(5 with foes of England on the Continent (the letters fi 
(1 rafts were found at Bithur and fell into the hands of an ofiS 
of 13engal Artillery). The Persian war seemed to hiin a pari 
tlio advance of Eussia, and he had just enough knowledge of ■ 
political drama to be " a dangerous thing," first to Hillersd* 
and ultimately to himself and its cause. As will be preseu 
Hliown, there is evidence that he negotiated with some agents 
leaders of the sepoys before they mutiniedi though their 0* 



Indian Districts during the Revolt, 197 

sequent murch towards Delhi renders it <lotibtful how far these 
negutiatioiiK had been ratillcd by the men in general, 

Cirlainly the first events boro out tho plans of the Brititih 
officials. A temporary refuge was seeurcd on the Calcutta side 
of tile town ; tlio troops moved up tho Dehli road ; the Xana took 
cbargeof the magazine. Lastly, siuee the first batch of the 84tli 
hail actually reached Cawnirore from Calcutta, after the newb of 
llie Meerut mutiny had been received there, WLetler was amply 
jujtitied in expecting timely relief and in eommiuiicating his 
luipehto Hillersdon. 

How all turned to sorrow and destruction is known to the 
naJurs of Mr. Trevelyan's graphic work, aud has been duly 
ehiouided in history. When the troops had reached their 
vDcftupiueut on the second stage, the Nana joined them, and 
iMceeded in pereuading them tliat it was not their interest to 
leave liim. The Peshwa had, for some time before the conijucst 
ODiJer Lake, represented the Mughal Empire, and carried od 
{thrangh his Deputy) the administration of Hindustan. It was 
utnral to identify the cause of the Nana, as Peshwa, with the 
-Wne being defended at Dehli; largesse and the promise of 
^Doder did the rest. The troops returned to Cawuporo, and 
JCHnal in attacking the entrenchment. 

The condact of the N&ua is an illustration of two truths that 
inut never again be lost sight of in Indian a£fairs. The first is, 
tUt we cannot predict what Asiatics will do ou grounds 
^»ed from our own notions of what ia their duty, or eveu their 
intsKat. The second, that we must pat no confidence in those 
^'■una TB have offended in a deep and enduring manner. 

The implacable Mahratta and his confederates declared them- 
*™ u foes : the skilful soldier, Tantia Topi ; the sleek tiger, 
^'unnlla, fresh from the ill-judged hospitalities of London. Ou 
w brenooa of the 7th June, they opened their heaviest bat- 
wiee on the mde pai-apsts of the entrenchments, so low, that a 
f^We from the district one day during the subsequent siege 
•"twed by leaping his horse over them. For three dreadful 
^t^s the wretched Europeans were sapped, bombarded, starved ; 
rat Uiwr courage held oat. HiUerBdon was cut in two by a 
''"uwl shot ; his cbi&f sul lordinate, McKillop, was Bhot as he 
jJM drawing water for the women from an unprotected well; 
■WonX Hillersdon and his family peiished in the fatal tneeinte. 
^ Wt came the cnJ. Despairing of succour from Calcutta, 
trusUng to the promises of the N&na — who offered plausible 
GODBented to evacuate the scene of horror, and 



198 Indian Districts during the RevqU. 

moved out on the 27th to take boat at the Sati Chanra 6 
What happened there is too well known. The banks of 
Ganges were stained with innocent blood. The surviving vict 
were marched back in captivity, with the exception of 
boat's crew, of whom four only finally escaped, two, at least 
whom are still (1883) alive. 

In the meanwhile, the Fattehgarh people had gone thro 
somewhat similar suiBferings. On the 1st of June they heard 
the outbreak at Shajah^npur, where poor Mordaunt Bicketts : 
his companions were murdered as they were worshipping 
church. On the 3rd a party of Audh troops entered the stat: 
aud the 10th men fraternised. At 1 a.m. on the 4th some of 
white inhabitants, 140 in number, left in boats, hoping 
reach Gawnpore, and unacquainted with the state to wl 
matters were tending there. All perished ultimately witl 
very few exceptions. Golonel Smith, Golonel Goldie, Mi 
Bobertson (head of the factory). Majors Munro and Phill 
with some other commissioned and non-commissioned offic< 
and a number of women and children, remained in the F* 
The fugitives were at first guarded and assisted by Har 
Baksh, an Audh landholder, who, indeed, continued faithful 
the last to all who continued to avail themselves of his ass 
ance. Of those in the boats, some sought shelter in I 
gentleman's fortified residence at Dharmpur ; but Mr. Prol 
and two others returned for a time to Fattehgarh. From he 
Probyn wrote to Dharmpur, directing that it should be defeni 
to the last, and garrisoned by 500 matchlock-men, for wh 
pay he would be responsible. On the 10th June he rejoined 
party there, accompanied by Mr. W. Edwards and two plant 
Messrs. Donald. On the 13th the bulk of the Dharmpm* refug 
returned to Fattehgarh, on the urgent invitation of Golo 
Smith. But Messrs. Probyn and Edwards, with the familj 
the former, remained in the fort of Hardeo Baksh, as they 
not trust the 10th Native Infantry. 

On the morning of the 18th their anticipations were fulfill 
The sepoys of the 10th finally abjured their allegiance, pla 
the descendant of the Muhamadan Nawabs on the thro 
divided the contents of the treasury, and disbanded quiei 
Only one man remained faithful ; his name was Edle Eh 
The Europeans in the fort now prepared for an attack. T 
ensued in a few days, being headed by the 41st Native InfanI 
who had marched inj &om Sitdpur in Audh. After a br 
defence — ^for which he had only thirty-two men — Golonel Sid 



Indian Districts during tiie llevolt. 199 

eradiated the untenable place by nigbt on the 4th July. Some 
were killed on the voyage; tboso who ran the gauntlet reached 
Bithur or Cawnpore, where they swelled the slaughter there. 
Only two escaped, Messrs. Churcher and Jones. 

The narratives — especially a supplementarj' one by Mr. C. R. 
Lindsay, Mr. Probyn's successor— afford harrowing detailsof some 
of tbesG incidents ; but they have little relation to our subject, and 
their recapitulation can serve no good purpose. Sufficient to 
Bftj that great courage was displayed by the unhappy fugitives. 
On at least one occasion they landed and chased away their 
pursuers with loss ; on another, to avoid the consequences of 
capture, the non-combatants of one boat leapt overboard, and 
were drowned or killed in the water. Our countrymen and 
couutrywomen have never been exposed to more dreadful trials, 
and never underwent trial more valiantly. One who lost 
friends in those scenes may be pardoned if he declines to dwell 
npon them. Hardeo Baksh protected Edwards and the Probyns 
ul(aigashe could, and then sent them down, disguised, by 
Wter.and handed them in safety to the British authorities (who 
Ind then recovered Cawnpore), on or about the Ist September. 

Amcanflntary glance may be allowod on the other side of the 
fti*b. At Fatehpur, Mr. Slierer, the then magistrate, executed 
t Bkilfol retreat, and conducted all committed to his charge vid 
wida to Allahabad, whence he himself presently proceeded to 
U>e Grand Trunk Road, where ho fell in with the advanced force 
■nder General Havelock. Robert Tucker, the district judge, 
" ; fell, fighting to the 
with rifles and 

tn, he defended himself and bis records desperately. 

™>oe of the assailants got into a tree which commanded the 
Wt, md flf^ upon him till his arm was broken ; they then 
Mnunsd conrage to get on to the roof and cut his throat. At 
Eunirpiir Measra. T.-K. Loyd and D. Grant, totally defenceless, 
■Dok refuge in the ravines of the Jumna, where they were fol- 
*'*4 indmeroileaBly shot down like wild animals. Such is the 
I *KVafl;e etnte to which the human race is soon reduced when 
I C^rifed of the restraints of civilisation ! Homo homini lupua, 

I IX. 

L^ ^'e ar<i not without glimpses at ciTil life in Cawnpore and 
F'&rrakhabad during those days of darltneas. Whaterer good 
■^r country may get from Indim, the good that India iriU 
E^^^j^J^.jutc^vfi 1(1 xetom la more than compensation. Bat 



"WBted on remaining at his post, where he fell, figl 
••t- Mounting to the roof of bis court-house, wit] 



200 Indian Districts during the Revolt. 

the process is slow. When the strong hand and will of i 
Imperial race were temporarily paralysed it was soon seen wh 
a poor thing was the civilisation of a people that, having be 
reduced to anarchy beneath the heel of armed violence for neai 
800 years, had been in leading strings ever since without havi 
learned to walk alone. 

Colonel Williams, whom we saw at Meerut, was sent down 
Cawnpore after the restoration of order; and he took t 
evidence of forty-two persons who had been present in Ju 
1857, among whom were Christians, Muhamadans, and Hindi 
From these it appeared that the Nana and his brother, call* 
" Bdla Sdhib," had tampered with agents of the troops as ear 
as the 1st of the month, assisted by the rascally secretai 
though — if Mr. Sherer's surmises be correct — without the troo 
being pledged to remain at Cawnpore; that the conspirato 
obtained assistance from several farmers and from the scoundri 
dom of the bazaars; that 10,000 persons assembled at t 
fatal ghat to witness the first massacre; and that the chic 
— accompanied by Tantia Topi — sate on carpets upon the estra 
before the temple, privileged spectators at the festival of ca 
nage. That, during the second massacre — when, for houi 
the women and children of our race were hacked to pieces 
the slaughter-house — these wretches sat in a neighbouring hoi 
looking on at a **nautch''; that all sorts of incompete 
ruffians were employed as police officers ; and that plunder 
the respectable citizens raged unchecked and encouraged, 
court, composed of B&ba Bhatt, AzimuUa, and some pleadei 
was formed on the 17th, which sat to hear criminal case 
but the accused were of the humbler classes and the punis 
ments were cruel and capricious. A gypsy had his hand c 
off on a charge of theft ; some poor men^s huts were razed 
the ground ** for disreputable livelihood.'' Supplies, extort 
by torture, were openly stolen by the officers and men as th 
came in. On the 1st of July the Ndna was solemnly enthron 
as Peshwa, and persons were sent into the district to colle 
revenue; on the 8rd the troops showed signs of disaffectio 
and were appeased by distribution of pay. The Ndna pass 
most of his time in pleasure at Bithur, till compelled by 1 
followers to show himself and return to Cawnpore. The arri\ 
of Havelock scattered the ruffians, never to meet again ; ai 
the British were received by the people with every sign of j 
and welcome. 

Mr. Sherer, who had — as we saw — joined Havelock an t 



Indian Districts during the Revolt. 201 

road after successfully leading his party into a place of tem- 
porary safety, assumed some kind of authority at Cawnpore, 
and at once attempted to form administrative outposts. But 
the attempt was premature ; and after two of his police ofl&cers 
liad been killed by the enemy, General Neill directed him to 
stay ftirther efforts for the present. A military police, under 
Oaptain Bruce, of the Bombay army, was organised for the 
city and immediate neighbourhood, and Mr. Grant (then in 
<;liarge of the civil administration, and afterwards, as Sir J. P. 
Grant, the successful governor of Jamaica) sanctioned these 
measures, which were deemed necessary on military grounds, to 
iwhich just then all was necessarily subordinated. Bruce was an 
a.ble and energetic man, and Sherer gave him full and willing 
co-operation, confining himself to transit and commissariat 
^vork, in which he was admirably seconded by a Brahmin Tuh- 
Jieeldar named Bholanath, whom he had known at Fatehpur- 

An idea, however, arose — as ideas will rise in times of general 
•excitement — that Mr. Grant and his civil subordinates resented 
General Neill's arrangements ; and this got so much credit in 
England, that the late Charles Dickens was led to embody it in 
^ tale in Household Words, in which much sport was made of the 
pompous obstructiveness of ** Mr. Commissioner Pordage." Like 
^ost things of the sort, it was short-Uved, and I believe the tale has 
topped — as it was only proper that it should — out of all collections 
■^f Mr. Dickens's works. Neither at Cawnpore nor anywhere else 
^d Mr. Grant obstruct any good work ; nor is it needful that 
ttus statement should be made, were it not that the calm wisdom 
of that really distinguished official is not so generally recognised 
^ might have been the case had he possessed the love of display 
^*id advertising power that are sometimes found in public men. 
Mr. Sherer well remembers referring to him about some tempo- 
^^iry difficulty about the use of the telegraph, and receiving Mr. 
Grant's answer: "Whatever you do, give no offence to the 
^lulitary authorities." On another occasion, the late Sir James 
Outram — one of Britain's truest heroes — wrote to the same 
officer: "So far from taking offence, or relaxing your en- 
deavours to aid us, you ever exerted your utmost influence in 
the district, with the most unwearied, unceasing pergonal labours 
in our behalf. Your hearty, cordial good-will and friendly assist- 
^ce were deeply felt by us all." 

This much upon an uninviting subject. Neill and Sherer and 
Bruce all worked thoroughly in concert, and there was never the 
^^ftfit misunderstanding between red-coats and black-coats. 



202 Indian Districts during the Revolt. 

After Havelock's arrival, the farmers began to negociate a 
payment of land-revenue ; but, of course, the money was 
only proof of their sincerity, and much had yet to be done 
endured before much of that demonstration could be achic 
It became clear soon that Cawnpore was only a military ] 
and that the troops collected there were not immedii 
intended for the pacification of the Du&b, but for more rei 
purposes. The new-born desire to conciliate subsided ; 
turned to Gwalior for a new dawn of disorder which had i 
promise of permanence. The best of the Bajput clans and 1 
leaders were not more than neutral. When Sir James Oul 
arrived, reorganisation proceeded more rapidly ; then came 
certainty of the fall of Dehli, and renewed offers of money, 
not much actual payment. Some native gentlemen under 
the duty of temporary tahsild&rs (sub-collectors) , but their \ 
of business-habits crippled their eflSciency ; still, it was felt t 
a beginning. The tracts bordering on the Jumna (w 
Gwalior influences were strongest) continued in open rebell 
even at Bithur a number of Bruce's police were surprised 
slaughtered at the great November festival of the Dasahra. 
fall of Dehli again filled all the tracts bordering on the Ti 
road with a demoralised soldiery ; but Greathed's coli 
cleared the way. Then the commander-in-chief crossed 
Ganges and proceeded to relieve Lucknow ) ; Cawnpore was 
to the protection of General Windham's small force ; and 
Gwalior contingent at length arrived and delivered the most 
cessful attack that was made by any of the enemy during the w 
war. When Sir Colin returned, on the 28th November, his 
care was naturally the safe departure of the rescued women 
children from Lucknow; the force under Windham was 1 
cooped up in the entrenchment, the whole town being in 
enemy's hands. On the 1st December, Captain Bruce n 
over charge to Sherer, the two despatching their business 
house which was being raked by round shot. But the triu 
, of the mistaken mutineers was soon lost. As soon as Sir C 
heard of the safe arrival at Allahabad of the precious convo; 
had done so much to rescue, he turned fiercely upon the em 
whom he chased from the district before proceeding 
relieve Farrakhabad. 

At that place, as we have already seen, power had been 
ferred by the mutineers upon a titular Nawib who lived thei 
a pension, being, in fact, the lineal representative of a Bol 
family who had usurped power there during the decline of 



Indian Districts during the Revolt. 203 

Mughal Empire. Towards the end of June the mutineers 
inaugurated his reign by the maBsaere of a score of Ghristian 
cuptivea who had survived the previous troubles. The day was 
rmij, but the spectacle attracted a large crowd to the parade- 
ground where it took place. The district was then made into 
two grand divisions, the east and west, each being placed 
under Nizims, or commissioners, one of whom was an imbecile 
drimkard, the other a ruthless tyrant. There was also a court 
oftwo {military officers), for the hearing of appellate causes; 
<uder these were Muftis, or Judges, men who had formerly held 
subordinate posts in the British administration. The Nawab 
liimself was a man of quiet character, much absorbed in the 
^e arts, as understood by him ; and his iiisignihcance was 
recogniBed after the return of the British, when his life was 
spared on condition of his retiring permanently to Mecca. His 
"hare in the administration was coiifiiied to the promulgation of 
f^iisa, borrowed from the British, for the administration 
t'Olatice and the collection of the revenue. On paper the 
'"'es look fair enough, therefore ; but M!r. Lindsay got together 
■Inuxdant proof that they had but little effect m practice. 
''£&eh man ruled as he liked; the Tahsildirs became nonenti- 
''I* ; thexa was much writing, as in our coiu'ts : in lieu of 
•■ttjp-paperB, fees were levied. Some of the decisions are 
""^OOB eoough ; in one case a Hindu murderer was released on 
ftoixiising to become a Muhamadan. In a case of rape, the 
?*fe»idant was fined two rupees and dismissed." The following 
" * ]vecept addressed to a police ofBcer in a murdei'-case : — 

* 'S^OQ are directed to go in person to the village, and collecting 
~^ of the most respectable inhabitants, write their depositions 
" ttie following manner : ' We have not killed the deceased, nor 
"^ "We aware who were the murderers.' . . . But, if they know 
l^o the criminals are, you shall write their depositions thus : 
•V e have not killed the deceased, bnt certain other persons 
7^'V«. We Bay this by our faith and on our oath.' And, when 
f^ing these depositions, yon must administer the oath in the 
■oUoniog manner : ' We swear by the Almighty God', who made 
^ and the universe.' " 

It does not appear thai any result ensued on this strange pro- 
<:eediiig, which only shows the childish imitativenesa of people 
^ho have observed farms without discovering their principle. 
^G seutenci^, however, were sometimes very severe : the 
Penalty for tbeft was amputation of the right hand ; in a oase 

O^i^nnh^ti^ THiiiil.r tlia anntnTiM ^aS that thc OOlprit WaB tO- 



204 Indian Districts during the Bevolt. 

give up his property to the complainant, or to be killed by hi 
on the failure of either of these alternatives, he was to be blc 
away from a gun. The slaughter of oxen was prohibited, tl 
wore not oven to bear burdens ; this, being, of course, a com 
8ion to the Hindu sepoys. A system of barrier-dues was impo 
in the town, the proceeds of which, together with the exc 
wont to the privy purse of the Nawab. Most articles bore an 
Vidorem duty, which in some cases reached a rate of seven 
cont. Prices were trebled, and the trade in piece-goods beca 
a monopoly. On one occasion the proceeds of the Farrukha 
oi*troi rose to 1,700 Es. in one day. Similar duties were rai 
in outlying towns, the proceeds being realised by the sep< 
Civil war went on from time to time, and one of the Nazim 
the drunkard — received a wound and lost his influence, wl: 
has boen foimdeil on a belief that he was invulnerable. Farm 
libad eontuiueil for seven months to be a centre to wl 
unsuccessful leaders repaired from time to time as they ^ 
Wilton out of other places. At length this place had to take 
turn, too. In the end of December Sir Colin appeared upon 
scouo. The Xawub fled on the 2nd January 1858, accompai 
by Firuz Shah and another of the Dehli princes who had joi 
him : ne>tt dav British authority was restored on the West 
side of the Ganges. Al>out the 18th, Brigadier Adrian H 
won a little over the rebels at Shamsabad, and the en( 
sustainoil a flnal defeat at the hands of Sir T. Seaton on the 
April at Bangaou. After May. order was rapidly and per 
nontlv r^stonni. 

In the Cawnpi>re district the progress of events was ne 
sarily s^^mowhat different. The apparent ebb and flow of Bri 
sutNN^s^* already noticed* oontiimed for some time to puzzle 
^^it<M*s on evenisi. There was no enihnsia£m felt for the Si 
who w^^ soon 2kvn to be a mejv obese voluptnary with no ta 
fi>r Affairs and no coura^ in the fleid. Bm there was, am 
the humbler cl^-SiSx^ a revival of the lawless element that 
oomo down in the Uood &v>m ihe gr>eai anarchy of the 
oea^tiirv — « £i<M<iMr nx-^vex lo be overkviei in the social qaesti 
^if liindnsiiU). Thtiv was ;al:^o a revival of dd clan-feeling, 
)\}oa2^;uv \\f fomy aiKl reprisal]. xuK^kxidrJ by the fear of 
}Vkk>rH or ibe shadow of ibe laa-isaxbert'r. The people were out 
a bo2id^^ a:t>i eii>>\\vl it like hadlT-talI^:hl dchoid-bovs. Laf 
ihe ^favnii) iha) the ivtara of firiiasii power woaM be aoo 
iSy U!>e w^^sum of liw^ as»c^^ia^{«Feitaser--«i2 evil, perl 




Indian Districts during the Revolt. 205- 

refiources come from land-revenue — enlisted many interests 
3»gain8t the cause of order. Bacon long ago remarked : — ** It 
i» certain, so many overthrown estates so many votes for 
tx-oubles."* 

But after the &ial reduction of the great rebel stronghold at 
I^ncknow in the spring of 1858, all began to cool down. The 
f^outhern parganas (hundreds) continued to feel the effect of the 
long disorders in Central India. But then came Sir Hugh Hose's 
victory at Ealpi, referred to in treating of Etawa. Temporary 
distraction was caused by Prince Firoz's last appearance ; but 
it was only temporary. By the winter the district was entirely 
reoccupied and composed. Mr. Sherer's printed narrative is 
dated 18th January 1859 ; and it concludes with a pleasing 
picture : — 

X followed but the other day close upon the retreating footsteps of Feroze Shah ; 
^^t I found the ploughman in the field, the boy singing at the well as he urged the 
bullocks down the slope, the old woman sitting at her door twisting her little cotton- 
Sizi, and her daughters grinding millet ; all supremely unconscious of the descendant 
of Timoor, who with unseemly haste had made but yesterday a royal progress 
through their Tillage. 

One more subject connected with the civil administration of 

Cawnpore deserves at least a passing notice. In an earlier 

<^hapter a story told in Mr. Bosworth Smith's Life of Lawrence, 

"^^s- quoted as an illustration of the diflBculties that attended the 

efforts of the civil oflScers to prevent hasty reprisals at the expense 

^^ more or less innocent natives of India. As such the anecdote 

^^^y pass ; but as an incident of life at Cawnpore, it is neither 

correct nor well-fancied. The ** Mess " at Cawnpore consisted 

^f men like Frederick Gubbins, Sherer, Power, Mowbray Thomp- 

^n. Dr. Tresidder, Martin, and others, with Inglis, W. H. Eussell 

Vof The Times), Layard, Grenfell, &c. for guests, none of whom 

^^I'e likely to " insult " Mr. Batten on account of due or undue 

leniency had he wished to show it, or had the power of 

^oixig 80- In fact, I believe Mr. Batten had very little voice in 

^•he earlier part of the administration ; and those who had were 

*or the most part successful and eflScient enough to be independent 

?* harsh procedure. As soon as the revenue was collected at all, 

y* came in without need for coercive measures. A fine was 

^^^posed upon the city, which was promptly paid, with one 

^^^uccessful protest conducted by an English solicitor. Neither 

?^^^ing the rebellion nor afterwards was a single sepoy blown 

^^m guns at Cawnpore. Four or five officers held special 

• Sherer's Narrative, p. IG 



206 Indian Districts during the Revolt. 

commissionB, and persons accused of crimes were tried by them, 
of whom some were properly executed, others acquitted; the 
sentences being invariably reported to the Government. General 
Neill's melodrama, of making the people clean the slaughter-housey 
was played once and then withdrawn, two persons in all being 
made to take part in it. Comparing the conduct of the authori- 
ties at Cawnpore with the reprisals of most conquerors — even 
with those of others in the like situation at the time in other 
parts of India — the recovery of power there was marked by^ a 
most singular and creditable moderation. 



207 



AND CHIEFS OP KINTAIL. 
By W. E. MnjiiKEN. 



Now mute on thy monntains, Oh Alhyn ! are heard 
Nor the voice of the song nor the harp of the hard ; 
Or its strings are hut waked hy the stem winter gale, 
As they mourn for Mackenzie, last Chief of EintaiL 

No authoritative history exists of the 78th Highland Regiment, 
•' Ross-shire Buffs," whilst that of the 72nd, ** Duke of Albany's 
-own Highlanders," by Cannon, ends with their departure on 
foreign service about forty years ago. These two corps — recently 
4Uiialgamated as the Seaforth Highlanders — together with the 
Tlst Highlanders, are the earliest example of the embodiment 
-of any particular clan for military service under the Crown.* 
In view of the prominent part they took m the recent Egyptian 
campaign as portion of the Indian contingent a few words may 
be opportunely devoted to their origin and antecedents. 
^* We passed through Glensheal with prodigious mountains on 
each side. We saw where the battle was fought in the year 
1719. . . . We soon afterwards came to Auchnasheal . . . 
we sat down on a green turf seat at the end of a house. . . 
We had a considerable circle about us men, women and 
<;hildren, all McCraas, Lord Seaforth's people. Not one of them 
could speak English. . . . The poor McCraas, whatever may 
be their present state, were of considerable estimation in the 
year 1715, when there was a line in a song — 

' And aw the hrave McCraas are coming.* " f 

* The 42nd, originally the 43rd, represent the six ** Independent Companies,'* 
known as Am Freicadhan Dhu from their sombre tartan, who were raised in 1729 
for enforcing the disarming Acts in the Highlands. In 1777 were embodied 
the old 74th (Argyllshire), 76th (Lord MacDonald's), 77th (Atholl), Slst (Aber- 
^eanahire), and 84th (Elmigrant Regiment), all of whom were reduced after the 
peace of Versailles 17S8. There were raised in Scotland a second battalion to the 
**' Black Watch" (1780), which in 1809 became the 73rd Regiment; and, daring Pitt's 
first administration, the 74th Highlanders, with the Highland companies of the 75th 
Regiment (1787), the 78th and 79th (1793), the 9l8t and 92nd (1794), and the 
^93rd (1800)— Highlanders. The 73rd and 75th have lately regained their former 
. statnJB of Highlanders. 

t The line is thus printed in Hogg^s Jacobite Bdict : " And the wild MacRae 's 
■comin." It was on this occasion that Dr. Johnson uttered his memorable saying on 
^be few and small pleasures of the indigent poor. 



208 The Seaforth Highlanders. 

So writes James Boswell when, on the 1st September 177 
he and Dr. Johnson in their tour to the Hebrides and Westei 
Isles were journeying from Glenmorison to Glenelg where th( 
were to take boat for Skye. The battle of Glensheal was tl 
outcome of an invasion of Scotland on behalf of the Chevali. 
St. George projected by the kingdom of Spain. Owing 
reverses of storm and tempest only three frigates, with 8S 
Spaniards on board, reached the western coast of Scotlam 
They wej-e commanded by James, second Duke of Ormond, iwc 
had served as captain-general and commander-in-chief un*^ 
Queen Anne and, on the accession of her successor, was 5 
peached of high treason and attainted. He was accompana 
by the banished Earl of Seaforth (William Mackenzie, S 
earl) , also labouring under attainder for his active share in 
" 'Fifteen." Disembarking near Kintail, the ancestral hc= 
of the Mackenzies, Seaforth was joined by a numerous lv< 
of Highlanders of his own and friendly clans, as well as 
William Murray, Marquess of Tullibardine, son of the Duke 
AthoU. General Wightman having marched from Invem< 
with a few regular forces and several of the Grants, Boss4 
Munroes, and other clans well aflfected to Government met the 
at Glensheal. In the engagement that ensued Seaforth vn 
dangerously wounded, a party of his people carried him to tl 
ships, others dispersed ; the Spaniards surrendered prisone: 
of war to General Wightman. Tullibardine, making good h 
escape, returned to Scotland with Charles Edward, and, afb 
sharing the fortunes of his Prince, yielded enfeebled in healt 
on the 27th April 1746 to Mr. Buchanan, of Dummakill ; take 
prisoner to the Tower, he died there the following July. Tl 
family bard composed a pathetic ode upon the disaster of Gle^ 
sheal. The rhythm is arranged to a beautiful Gaelic air, t' 
chorus being adapted to the double pull upon the oars of 
lymphad or galley, and therefore distinct from the ordinal 
jorram or boat-song. The ** Lament," translated, opens thus *' 

Farewell to Mackenneth, great Earl of the North, 
The Lord of Lochcarron, Glensheal, and Seaforth ; 
To the Chieftain this morning his course who began, 
Launching forth on the billows his bark like a swan. 
For a far foreign land he has hoisted his sail, 
Farewell to Mackenzie, High Chief of Kintail I 

According to the Record of IcolmkiU and a Charter,* beari 
date '' Kincardine, 9 January 1266," a grant of the lands 

* Mr. W. W. Skene throws doubts upon this charter ; see his Celtic Scottcmdf wo^ 
(Edinburgh : David Douglas, 1880). He would deduce the descent of the Chia^^ 
Kintail from Gillean-og (Colin the Younger), a son of the ancestor of tho Ro8S«^ 



The Seaforth Highlanders. 209 

EintaH, county Boss, thereby erected into a free barony, was 
made to Colinas Fitzgerald, son of the Earl of Eildare (or 
Desmond) of Ireland, who had settled in Scotland in 1261, for 
his defeat of Haco King of Norway at Largs in the reign of 
Alexander m. His descendants enjoy the lands to this day. 
The Geraldine's followers rose upon the downfall of the Mac- 
Donalds Lords of the Isles, and the Earls of Boss whose 
banner they at first followed in the field, to acknowledged supre- 
Enacy in the North. In the reign of King James I. of Scotland, 
their chief was leader of more than three thousand armed men. 
The barony passed from father to son, from Kenneth to Kenneth 
— ^Mackenneth having become corrupted into the English Mac- 
iLenny or Mackenzie — to the twelfth feudal baron, who, in 1609, 
was made Baron Mackenzie of Elintail. His son Colin was 
created in 1623 Earl of Seaforth. Oeorge, second Earl, Golin*s 
brother, became a steadfast adherent of Montrose ; and his son, 
ttie third Earl, suffered imprisonment for many years at the 
bands of Cromwell. Marrying Isabella, daughter of his kins- 
man, Sir John Mackenzie, of Tarbat, bart. (of whom hereafter)^ 
luB wife put to death the aged family seer who, in virtue of his 
gift of " second sight," had revealed the infidelity of her 
husband when absent in Paris. In his last moments the War- 
lock predicted the misfortunes of the house in terms which 
tctoally came to pass. " I see," he says, " into the far future, 
ft&d I read the doom of this race. The long descended line of 
Seaforth will, ere many generations have passed, end in extinc- 
tion and sorrow. I see a chief, the last of his house, both deaf 
uid dumb. He will be the father of three fair sons all of 
whom he will follow to the tomb. He will live careworn and 
die mourning, knowing that the honours of his line are to be 
extinguished for ever and that no future chief of the Mackenzies 
BhaU bear rule at Brahan or in Kintail .... the remnant of 
iuB possessions shall be inherited by a white-hooded lassie from 
the East . . . ." * Kenneth, third Earl, died in 1678. His 
eldest son, Kenneth, fourth Earl, accompanied King James II. 
to France who there created him Marquis of Seaforth. 

Notwithstanding the disabilities under which he lay, rendered 
9^ver by the attempt of 1719, a portion of the family estates 
^ere restored to William his only surviving son. His grandson, 
Kenneth, was created Baron of Ardelve, co. Wicklow, and Viscount 

* I do not quote the prophecy or rather malediction in extensOf as members of 
^'^ ftmiliea mentioned therem are yet liTing. The Warlock's portrait stiU 
^^ in Brahan Castle the ancestral home of the Chiefs of Kintail. 

VOL. VI. 14 



210 The Seaforth Highlanders. 

Fortrose, Scotland ; and in 1771 was advanced to the dignity 
Earl of Seaforth in the peerage of Ireland. When in l*! 
England, already at war with the American colonies, was mena( 
hy France, Spain, and Holland together, Lord Seaforth oflFei 
to raise a regiment from his own clansmen. Furnished w 
letters of service, he was appointed lieutenant-colonel commands 
hy commission dated the 29th December 1777. Amongst 1 
men of this at first numbered the 78th Regiment, who to \ 
number of 1,000 mustered at Elgin on the 15th May 1778, w« 
the descendants of those MacBaes, call them savages if we w 
who, with the fidelity that is commonly ascribed to a dog and 
a Highlander, carried their wounded chief through the vale 
Glensheal, and who in 1732 had marched down to Edinbur 
more than 400 strong, to lodge a portion of their rents to 
remitted to him in France.* The MacRaes, who in July 17 
misguided by the machinations of Richard Parker the mutin 
at the Nore of some years later and his fellows, encamped 
days upon Arthur's Seat in defiance of the whole force 
Scotland, and could only be quieted with formal articles 
capitulation, were the same who fought and won our battles 
Cudalore, Palacatcherry, Coimbatore, at Seringapatam, in 
Carnatic and the Mysore. Embarking for India with 
regiment in 1781, the Earl of Seaforth died on the voyage, a: 
leaving no male issue,t was Isucceeded in the chieftainship of t 
clan, and command of the regiment, by his kinsman. Ma 
Thomas Humberston Mackenzie, great-grandson Of the tbj 
Earl. Landing at Madras after a voyage of nearly ten montl 
duration, the 369 men who alone were fit for duty advanced t 
country to join Sir Eyre Coote's forces at Chingleput. I canu 
here follow in detail the glorious career of this regiment, who 

* Five hundred, including a few Frasers, came from the Chief *s own estates on 1 
mainland, about 400 from those of the Mackenzies of Scatwell, Kilooy, Appleero 
and Redcastle, all of whom had sons or brothers holding commissions in the re 
ment. The officers from the Lowlands brought 200 men, of whom seventy-fiTe ▼• 
English and Irish. The clan MacRae had for a long period been faithful adherei 
of the Caber Feigdk (the stag's head and antlers of the Mackenzies) ; so general ^ 
the name in the corps that it became known as " the MacRaes. ** 

t His only child Lady Caroline (a distinguished member of the literary * 
fashionable circles of her day, and who could boast that as a child she had uX 
the knee of Dr. Johnson, who, in allusion to her descent from King Charles H, > 
to the well-known sympathies of her race, would salute her as his little Jacot 
mistress) married Louis Malcolm Drummond, Count de Melfort, Inspector-Gene 
of Cavalry to Napoleon, then heir presumptive to the ancient but attainted earld 
of Perth and Melfort He and his two sons were in the French Hussars at Waterl* 
the 2nd battalion of the 78th being then in garrison at Brussels. The attaindtiri 
reversed in favour of the now earl about thirty years since. 



The Seaforth Highlanders. 211 

1786 were placed upon the establishment as the 72nd. After 
taking part in the reduction of the Dutch settlements in Ceylon 
they reached Scotland in August 1798. For their pre-eminent 
services in India, **Hindostan " was added to their colours and 
appointments. In 1805 they went to the Cape ; and in 1823 were 
farther distinguished by the special authorisation of the king to 
resume their national dress and to bear the title of the ** Duke 
of Albany's Own Highlanders." In the Crimea the 72nd formed 
with the 42nd, the 79th, and 93rd Highlanders, the Highland 
Brigade, commanded by General Sir Duncan Cameron. With the 
78th, their sister-regiment, the 72nd played a leading part in 
the ** Mutiny." Attached to the Bombay column, under the late 
Sir H. Roberts, despatched in 1858 to Eajpootanah they shared 
in the assault and capture of Kotah. Nor does their Indian 
fame end here ; the 72nd stood forth conspicuous throughout the 
recent Afghanistan campaign from the outbreak of the war to 
General Roberts's memorable march from Cabul and crowning 
victory at Candahar. Until the changes of last year this regi- 
ment wore the trews of the MacRae tartan, consisting of black 
green and blue chequers upon a red ground picked out with 
white yellow and black strands. 

Colonel Thomas Mackenzie, of the 72nd, did not long enjoy his 
inherited honours. Having with 2,000 men repulsed Tippoo 
Sahib, whose army numbered ten times his own at Paniane in 
November 1782 he went back to Bombay. Sailing thence in the 
^nger to rejoin the army, his vessel was attacked by the 
^hratta fleet, and after a desperate resistance of five hours 
^as captured. Every officer on board was either killed or 
bounded; the gallant colonel, shot through the body with a 
foor-pound ball, died at Geriah on the 30th April 1783. The 
command of the 72nd devolved upon James, second son of Lord 
George Murray, lieutenant-general to Prince Charles Edward, 
from the colonelcy of the recently disbanded AthoU Highlanders, 
the old 77th Regiment. The chieftainship of Kintail passed 
^ the death of Colonel Thomas to his brother Major Francis 
Mackenzie, who in 1797 was elevated to the British peerage by 
tiie title of Baron Seaforth of Kintail, co. Ross. In the person 
of his lordship the prediction of the Warlock of the Glen was 
falfiUed. 

In vain the bright course of his talents to wrong, 
Fate deadened his ear and imprisoned his tongue— 

Respite his affliction Lord Seaforth played no unimportant part 
^ the world by dint of natural ability and force of character. 

14 ♦ 



212 TJie Seaforth HighUtJiden. 

He filled sereral high offices of state, and was goremorofthe 
Barbadoes and Demarara in 1800-8. After two rebnffB from the 
Government he embodied from amongst his own people & re^- 
ment of Higblanders — the present 78tb, &b well-known, perfasps, 
hy their cherished cognomen of " Boss-shire Buflfe." Receiving 
letters of service, dated 7th March 1793, he caused the following 
notice, highly characteristic of the times, to be posted thronghont 
the 8eaforth property in Boss, Cromarty, and the Lewis. 

SEAFORTBTS HIQHLAXDEHS. 
To bo forthwith »i«ed lor tbe DEFENCE of His Oloriona SUjaaty Ktso Qvm* 
the Third, and tho ProaGrration of oar Hnppy Conititation in Charch and Stiti. 

AllIiADB of Tatie Hiani.jiH[> Blood williog to nhow their Loyaltj andSpiTilaKf 
repnir to SEAFORTH, or tho Major Ai,kx*kdek Micrekiik ot Belmadatij: orll*- 
other Commanding OfBcara nt Head-Qnnrtcn at [ ], when tbtf wiB 

TeceJTe High Bodhheb and ISuldieb-like E^TKBTAisnEin. 
The Laos of (his Regiment will Lrvx and Die together] — u thaj euBOt b* 
Dbacouted into other Itpginientn, and mnat he reduced in a BODi in thiir (WV 

CODNTBT. 

Now for ■ stroke at the Monsieara, my Bojn ' 

Kma QEOROii lor ercr 1 

HUZZA ! 

In September 1794 the 78th joined Lord Mulgrave in 
Walchcren, and the next year went to the Cape. Arriving in 
Calcutta in 1797, they in June 1808 came under the commtn' 
of General Wcllenley (Duke of Wellington) at Foonah, to wt 
against Sindiah and the Mahrattas. I must forbear to dvell 
upon the achievements of bo gallant a corps; but even stflnt 
distance of time none can read unmoved how, with the BW 
74th and 78th Highlanders, the 19th Light Dragoons, thm 
native ca^'alry and four native infantry regiments, with bB 
12-pounders, Wellington won the battle of Assaye the huM 
ever fought in India, defeating the combined armiea of Sndfe 
and the Rajah of Berar wliosc troops exceeded 30,000 mail 
how they fought in tho Peninsula, Egypt, and Persia ; and iot, 
at the head of the " Boss-shire Buffs," Havelock enteted|LiidtalBr 
after, in Sir James Ontram's own words, three moofhs of M>k 
continuous fighting as Englieh troops had never 1 
gone. No more cherished tradition exists in the t 
the words of Sir James Outram who at parade 
January 1868, used language in which no British 
ever been addressed. He deemed it advisable to 
address to writing, lest anything should be attr!(Gl 
excitement of the occasion. To Brigadier Hamilton hf wrote 

Wliat I did uj ii what / naBf/ed, and what I an aore mntt ba the ataSSsBt^ 
ot eTerj Englithman who knowa what tho 7tth IiaT* don ' ''~* 

wrighsd what I ihoidd iaj bafore I want to panda. 



The Seaforth Highlanders. 218 

The following passages occur in Sir James's written address : — 

Tour exemplary conduct, 78th, in every respect thronghont the past eventful 

I can tmly say and / do mott emphatically declare has never been surpassed 

any troops of any nation in any age, whether for steady discipline in the camji, 

for indomitable valour in the field, under an amount of fighting, hardship, and 

vation such as British troops have seldom, if ever, been before exposed to. . . . I 

sure that you, 78th, who have borne the brunt of the war so gloriously from first 

last, when you return to old England, will be hailed and rewarded by your 

tefol and admiring countrymen as the band of heroes as which you so well 

seire to be regarded." 

At Lucknow the Victoria Cross was won by Surgeon Jee, 
ieutenant Macpherson who, as Major-General, commanded the 
dian Contingent in Egypt, Colour- Sergeant Stewart Macpher- 
son, Priyates James Halliwell and Henry Ward. It was 
^JLso bestowed on the 78th as a body, who resolved that the 
Cross should be worn by Surgeon MacMaster for his intrepidity 
ajid humanity in succouring the wounded. Embarking at 
Bombay on the 18th May 1858, under the distinguished honours 
of a royal salute from the battery, and the "dressing" of the 
ships of the Indian navy, the " Saviours of India " reached 
Fort George in September after an absence of seventeen years 
^th but fifty-nine of the 530 of all ranks who had gone out 
in 1842. Their enthusiastic reception in Scotland included a 
l>&nqaet to officers and men at Brahan Castle, given by the 
Honourable Mrs. Stewart-Mackenzie, daughter of the Seaforth 
who hAd originally raised them, when they were welcomed by a 
large family gathering of the Mackenzies. On the 19th May 
1874, the 78th were brigaded with the 42nd, 79th, and 93rd 
Highlanders at Aldershot in review before the Emperor of 
Itea. These four kilted regiments had represented Scotland 
At Lucknow. The several colonels on that day — Mackenzie, 
MacBean, Macleod, and Miller — had served each with his 
respective corps in the crisis of 1857-8. Old colours of the 
72nd and 78th are preserved at Brahan Castle, in Dingwall 
<5hurch, and at Balmoral. Honorary colours were decreed by 
^^ Government of India to the three European regiments 
(74th and 78th Highlanders and 19th Light Dragoons) engaged 
^ Assaye, but the first-named alone retain theirs. The 78th 
wore the full Highland dress of the Mackenzie tartan, with buff 
facings and buff leather belts. The tartan consists of green, 
^lack, and dark-blue chequers with red, pale blue, and white 
fitreaks. Their motto is Cuidich'n Righ, meaning *' Defenders of 
the King." The Mackenzie tartan was also worn by the 71st, 
*iiother regiment raised from the clan, in 1777, by John Mac- 



•214 The Seaforth Highlanders. 

kenzie, Lord Macleod, eldest son of the third Earl of Ci 
(a descendant of Sir John Mackenzie of Tarbat), ^ 
attainted and condemed to death — though ultimately re 
at his wife's intercession — for his share in the " Tori 
Some months ago the 72nd and 78th were re-organisec 
first and second battalions of the Seaforth Highlandi 
71st and 74th as the Highland Light Infantry, with k 
trews respectively of the Mackenzie tartan, and yellow 
The former tartan of the 74th was of the Lamond Ci 
pattern, a dark blue and green checked ground relieved wii 
stripes of white. At Assaye their every ofl&cer was eithe: 
or wounded. Particularly renowned as part of the **: 
division " in the Peninsula, and for their self-sac 
discipline under Lieutenant-Colonel Seton on the wrecl 
Birkenhead, they belonged to the Highland Brigade of ^ 
part still remains in Egypt. 

With the death of Lord Seaforth in 1815, his thr< 
having predeceased him, the titles again became extin 
the chieftainship passed to a remote collateral. Of his dai 
the eldest, Mary, married, as her second husband, Al( 
Stewart, a grandson of the seventh Earl of Gallows 
thereupon took the name of Mackenzie and settled u; 
wife's property in Kintail. This lady was the " white- 
lassie from the East " of the Warlock's prophecy, she 
resided for some while in India with her first husband J 
Sir Samuel Hood. She set up in the Pettah Wall, j 
nuggar, the black granite slab in memory of her relative ( 
Mackenzie and his brother officers who fell there in 18( 
this lady Sir Walter Scott, resuming the strain 
** Lament,^' addressed the fine lines beginning, " So si 
old bard in the grief of his heart.'' The last two stan 
thus : — 

Thy sons rose around thee m light and in love, 
All a father could hope, all a friend could approve ; 
What Vails it the tale of thy sorrows to toll — 
In the spring time of youth and of promise they foil ! 
Of the line of Fitzgerald remains not a male, 
To bear the proud name of the Chief of Elintail. 

And thou, gentle Dame, who must bear to thy grief, 
For thy clan and thy coxmtry, the cares of a chief. 
Whom brief rolling moons in six changes have left 
Of thy husband and father and brethren bereft, 
To thine ear of affection how sad is the hail, 
That salutes thee the Heir of the line of Kintail ! 



216 



C|e Itabitl Strength d C^ina. 

By Lieutenant Hon. Henry H. Shore, R.N. 



)osses8ion of vast accumulations of war material, of 
ful ironclads, and heavy guns, does not necessarily place 
m in the front rank of naval powers. Behind all these 
must be a carefully-trained and well-disciplined force of 
D commanded by competent ofiScers, thoroughly versed 
various branches of modem warfare. The material for 
. force must exist, moreover, in the form of a nation which 
ely engaged in seafaring pursuits. 

hese conditions are not fulfilled, it is doubtful whether 
)8t lavish expenditure of money will ever place the naval 
of a country in the first rank ; and for this reason we 
)n whether, notwithstanding the prodigious efforts China 
ade of late years to place her naval forces on an efl&cient 
I, she is likely to prove a formidable antagonist. 
>re proceeding, it would be as well, perhaps, to recapitu- 
iefly what China has done of late years in the matter of 
reorganisation ; for there is a widespread belief that she 
nore advanced in the art of war now than she was fifty 
igo ; that her means of attack are still confined to gin- 
ind stinkpots ; and that, in the event of hostilities, our 
kds would simply have to push their way without incon- 
ce to themselves through fleets of rickety junks. 
I quite time, however, that these fallacies were exploded ; 
vhina's defeats in her last encounters with the " barba- 
forces have had no other result, they have at least opened 
58 of her statesmen to the inferiority of the Empire, in a 
ftnd military sense, to the nations they have been accus- 
to despise : a discovery which, if too unpalatable to be 
admitted, they have tacitly recognised the truth of by 
; to work in desperate earnestness to copy from their con- 
B the points in their systems which seemed to constitute 



216 The Naval Strength of China. 

a superiority. Hence the vast warlike establishments whi 
have sprung up almost simultaneously at Foochow, Shangb 
Nanking, and Tientsin, where, under foreign direction, am 
provision has been made for the construction of ships a 
engines, and the manufacture of war material on a vast scalo 

The employment of foreigners in posts of responsibility, thoi 
by no means an innovation on the traditions of the Empir< 
one of the emperors having even condescended to take lessi 
in mathematics from a Jesuit Father — shows the dire straits 
which the country was reduced at this time: and yet, if 
reforms which had been determined on were to become realiti 
such a step was absolutely necessary, in the absence of any nati 
officials who were competent to organise establishments of tl 
nature. And not only were foreigners employed in the orgar 
sation of the arsenals, but a numerous foreign staff Wi 
engaged for the purpose of supervising the various department 
as well as for instructing native citizens in the sundry mech; 
nical operations connected with the manufacture of arms at 
ammunition, and the designing and construction of ships ac 
engines. 

Each of the arsenals really merits a separate notice to itsel 
having claims on the serious attention of all who are desiroi 
of informing themselves as to the warlike resources of tl 
Empire. But we must confine our remarks here principally ' 
those at Foochow and Shanghai, as being distinctively navsJ i 
their scope and aim. Enormous sums have been spent in tl 
purchase of plant and machinery of improved type ; and as con 
petent native workmen have been trained up, the staff of foreig 
employes has been reduced, until at the present time thei 
arsenals are practically in Chinese hands, ships as well i 
engines having been constructed without any extraneous assis 
ance whatever. These establishments have been in workir 
order now for several years, and a considerable number • 
vessels have been turned out. The majority of these are of tl 
gunboat and transport class. But a fine corvette of 1,893 toi 
and 250 horse-power, armed with thirteen Whitworth guns, h( 
been built at the Foochow arsenal; while at Shanghai, the auth< 
rities being of a more ambitious turn of mind, and not contei 
with producing a very fine wooden frigate, 363 feet long, ai 
carrying twenty-eight rifled guns, the whole of which, with tl 
exception of the screw shaft and guns, was the work of nati' 
artizans, must needs try their hands on an ironclad, with 
result which does not call for any special comment here. 



The Naval Strength of China. 217 

Whether the resolte on the whole are in any way propor- 
tionate to the Bnms which have been expended on these esta- 
blisbmenta may be open to question, but in any calculations of 
tliix natare regard muat be had to the immense accession of 
■trength to the country through the development which these 
arsenals have given to native industry, and the number of skilled 
Torlmien they have been the means of training up to the ser- 
ric* of the country, as well as the knowledge of foreign arts and 
KJences they have been the means of disseminating. 

fiat the branch of modern warfare which exercises a peculiar 
&scinatioa over the Chinese mind, and which seems, moreover, 
peculiarly suited to the genius of the people, is the somewhat 
comprehensive one included under the heading of "Torpedoes"; 
and judging from the attention bestowed ou these formidable 
engines of late, there is reason to suppose they will play a pro- 
miDent part in any future war. One of the most enlightened 
■nd ftt the same time most influtintial officials of the Empire, the 
great Bi-Hung-Chang, has particularly distinguished himself by 
the active interest he has taken in the subject, and this resulted 
■ome time ago in the establishment of a Hchool of instruction, 
under an English electrician, at Tientsin, which took to itself the 
Bomevhat high-sounding name of " Imperial Torpedo College," 
vbere a number of young men, after receiving a thorough 
groonding in theoretical and practical electricity, were initiated 
"to the mysteries of torpedo warfare. It may be added that 
wveral to]i>edo-boats of improved type have recently been pur- 
chaaed in thia country as well as in Germany. 

The principal naval strength of the Empire unquestionably, how- 
*W, lies in the very formidable mosquito fleet of iron gun-boats 
•ipplied by Messrs. Armstrong and Co. of Newcastle-on-Tyne ; 
™t u full accounts of the constructive peculiarities of these 
little eraft, aa well as of their performances under steam, 
■ppeued in the daily papers at the time of their departure for 
^AtDa, it is needless to describe them again here, beyond 
tOntrking that from their light draught, good manceuvring 
Ipowen, and heavy armament — their guns being sufficiently 
|;powerfiiI to penetrate all except the most recent of our iron- 

1h — they seem admirably adapted to the special purposes for 

ieb they have been designed. While influenced, no donbt, by 

Bw utensive war preparations recently undertaken by her sanoy 

"tb- Japan, China is now augmenting her fleet by tha 

Ion of iroodadB, the first of which, conatmcted in Ger- 

l by this time probcibly reached her destination. 




218 Tlie Xaval Strength of China. 

From what has been stated, it will be seen that China's war 
preparations liave been undertaken so far rather with a view to 
defensive than ofFensive mcaeiircB ; and the acquisition of gun- 
boats adapted to the rivers and inlets on her coasts, in pre- 
ference to Bquanderiiii; thoiiHands of pounds on an imposing fleet 
of cruising ironclads, augurs powers of insight and discrimina- 
tion on the part of the responsible officials, which the stateHmen 
of smaller but more ambitions countries would do well to take 
note of. As a -matter of fact, China has no need of a large fleet 
for cruising purposes, haring no distant and widely Bepsrated 
colonial possessions to look after, or a mercantile muine 
scattered over the face of the globe, the foreign trade of the 
Empii-e being almost entirely carried in foreign bottoms ; and 
at present, at least, China entertains no aggressive desigiiB (o 
countries beyond the soas. Her earnest and often expressed 
■wish just now in to he left alone, so as to enable her to derelop 
her own vast resources, and to adapt her institutions to modem 
requirements in the manner in which she thinks fit. It mtf 
be taken for granted, then, that in any war in which China nay 
be engaged, the operations of her fleet will be confined to tbe 
protection of her extensive sea-board, and especially of tkoM 
points which afford means of access to the Tital points of the 
Empire. 

Passing on to the personnel of the fleet, it muflt be obflorred 
at tbe outset that the only systematic attempt to establiBh a 
course of naval education and training for ofBcers as well u nm 
is that which wnK set on foot some years ago at Foochow. It 
formed a pai-t of the original scheme for the eBtabliahment of th« 
arsenal, and comprised — 

Ist. A school on shore, an elementary naval college in fact, 
where young men who were intended for the naval profnoiA 
received a thorough grounding in mathematics, foreign langnigA 
and the various subjects now generally included under the hetd v 
education in Western lands. 

2nd. A training-ship, where, after having attained to a eeittf 
standard in theoretical subjects, the young gentlemen mi* 
drafted from the college on shore to be instructed in tbe fsw 
tical duties of their profession. Occasional cruizes were t^^n 
to foreign ports, exercises aloft and in boats were rcj^tarif 
oorried on ; and while every opportunity was taken advautn^ <^ 
for initiating officers and men into the mysteriee of seamuusliip- 
and everything connected with the duties of a seaman iii tbe 
widest senqe, the theoretical studies were assiduously kept i)p> 



The Naval Strength of China. 219 

d special attention was paid to gunnery, prizes being given 
* good shooting, and, according to the testimony of the 
iglish staff of instructors, the practice was often of a very 
jh order. 

Both the college on shore and the training ship were under 
) control of English officers and instructors at the time I had 
i privilege of seeing them, and from a careful inspection of 
i work, I can answer for the thoroughness with which it was 
Tied out. 

3o far as intellectual training goes, the system of education 
ves little to be desired; while by way of still further qualify- 
5 the young men for posts of responsibility, several of the most 
>mising students were sent to Europe for the purpose of com- 
^ting their studies at the naval colleges of France and 
igland ; and, finally, by arrangement with the English 
►vernment, a certain number were permitted to serve for a 
Qe on board the vessels of the Channel and Mediterranean 
eets, so as to enable them to gain a practical insight into the 
atine and internal economy of English men-of-war. 
T!hiis, it will be*seen from this brief outline of the course of 
location pursued at Foochow, that everything that forethought 
•d practical experience could suggest has been done with a 
^yf to supplying the fleet with competent officers and trained 
amen. The scheme has evidently been well thought out and 
refolly elaborated, and is worthy in every sense of a great 
vintry. If the question now be asked, With what result ? the 
^i)Wer cannot, on the whole, be a satisfactory one. 
So far as theoretical knowledge is concerned, the young officers 
io have passed through the course may be pronounced pro- 
ient — many of them, indeed, highly so, their minds having 
^n saturated with mathematics to a degree which would 
light the advocates of a more advanced mathematical training 
Qongst our own officers. Nor need we be surprised at this. 
Iheir minds are eminently adapted to the study of mathe- 
aticB " was the verdict of M. Gignel, the head of the Foochow 
"senal, in answer to my inquiries. Equally high was the 
stimony of the gentleman in charge of the college, Mr. 
troll, who informed me moreover that their powers of applica- 
^nand of protracted study were astonishing, exceeding anything 
^t had come within his experience of English students. All 
ifl is, indeed, what we might expect from the youth of a 
•^n which has been pronounced, by those who know the 
Pple best, to be intellectually quite our equals — a people^ 



1220 The Naval Strength of Chwa. 

moreover, amongst whom scholarship is held to be the sole test 
of merit, and by whom intellectual attainments are honoured 
far beyond any mere physical accomplishments. 

When, however, we come to consider the qnalificatioDB oi 
these young gentlemen in a wider sense, the verdict must Ix 
unfavourable. Various causes contribute to this, some of vhid 
are so closely bound up with the social life of the people that i 
tolerably intimate acquaintance with Chinese manners m 
customs is almost essential to a complete understanding of thi 
subject. 

It must be premised that athletics, as we understand them 
form no part of Chinese social economy ; indeed, if we excep 
such mild forms of dissipation as kite-flying on certain Stafa 
occasions, and the game of battledore and shuttlecock playec 
with the feet, the life of the well-to-do classes is essential!] 
a sedentary one ; a sort of existence in harmony with thi 
teachings of that peculiar, but harmless modem excrescence o 
British polite society — the aesthetic school. Violent physics 
exertion of any kind is eschewed as fit only for actors, sim 
professionals of an equally low social statds; and, in con 
sequence, games requiring skill of eye and hand, and which cal 
forth any extraordinary agility, powers of endurance, or wha 
we call pluck, are conspicuous by their absence amongst tb 
recreations of the youthful Celestials. Hence it was found that 
although certain hours were set apart for purposes of recrestioi 
at the Foochow College, the lads just moped about, or retires 
to their rooms, for the very simple reason, as was pointed on 
by their master, that they didn't know how to "recreate." Aw 
this antipathy to violent exercise sticks to them thronghoQ 
their career, with the result that the most of them grow up isi 
weak, puny, effeminate young gentlemen, more suited ( 
monastic occupations than the profession of arms. The opioi<)^ 
formed of the young men who were serving on board Englis 
ships, by our own officers, was that they were physically as 
constitutionally unfitted for the active duties of their profession 
lacking as they did conspicuously those hardy physical qualiti 
and powers of endurance which we consider essential for the 
who would embrace the naval profession. They seemed, mo: 
over, to have an innate aversion to manual labour, for feat 
blistering their hands or of soiling their fingers; and, horri 
to relate, a violent and unreasoning prejudice against the uac 
cold water has been laid to their charge, which, if true, db< 
only too plainly that they are deficient in some of the fio 



The Naval Strength of China. 221 

feelings of our nature ! As thesfl yoang officers took no active 
part in the duties of the ships, being, in fact, merely intelligent 
■nd Bbarp-witted observers of all that went on, it is perhaps 
ecucely fair to infer from this their inability to <lo great things 
vhen called on to act ; but I give the opinion of English officers- 
foT vbat it is worth. I can add with much pleasore, &om- 
personal experience, that socially they were pleasant fellows 
enon^, with an insatiable love, almost amounting to a passion, 
for gambling ; that, in fact, they seemed to take a far keener 
intereet in games of chance than in the more serions, if toss 
exciting, game of war. 

Another difGcnlty with which the Foochow authorities have 
had to contend has its origin in social causes. This we will 
endeavour to explain. 

Wben the scheme was first set on foot, aspirants for the naval 
}sofeB8ion were sought from amongst the best families of 
Foochow; bnt as the inducements did not prove sufficiently 
■Qining, and the proverbial " fool of the family " was not forth- 
earning in sufficient numbers, the recruiting ground was extended 
u br afield as Canton, and even to the Eritisb colony of Hong 
Kong, The limit of age was, moreover, relaxed in favour of 
ponusing youths of twenty and twenty-two, and, in course of 
tme, the requisite number of students was obtained. No sooner, 
IwweTer, did the young officers begin their professional career 
fiitn hvouritism began to display itself, the Foochow officials 
not unnaturally exhibiting a preference for their own townsmen 
in thai selectionB for promotion. But there were other and 
iBon serious obstacles in the way of the advancement of the 
TDong men from the South, more especially of those who hod 
eme from Hong Kong, many of whom having been educated in 
» Government schools of the island, though well advanced in 
■fis labjecta comprised in the Foochow curriculum, were unfor- 
tonatfily ignorant of the " Mandarin " or " Court dialect." And 
'"H I ntust remind my readers of a fact which is not very 
Vmif known ontside of China, namely, that the dialects 
* 1 in the various provinces of the empire differ 
ii the divergence in the case of those most 
being so great as almost to constitute a 
it language, the inhabitants of different provinces being 
D onintelligible to each other. Hence, strange as the fact 
m, it is no unoonuuon thing in the " treafy ports " to 
s conversing in Pidgin English, as the only aToilable 
» of linguistic tntereonne. All official boBineaa ia, however^ 




222 The Naval Strength of China. 

transacted in the dialect which prevails over the proving 
contiguous to the capital; and this is called the ''Court dialee 
Hence it follows that all aspirants for office under the Gove^ 
ment must be thoroughly conversant with the Court diale* 
and it is worthy of remark that nearly all parents of respe 
ability bring up their sons in the hope — vain as it proves in 
vast majority of cases — that one, at least, may succeed, by cl 
application to his studies, in attaining the first rung of 
official ladder, from whence a vista of glorious promise op. 
out before him, the highest posts in the empire being accessi 
— in theory — to men of the humblest parentage. 

But before all things it is necessary first to master ti 
*' official " language. This is a sine qua non of social and offici 
status. The aspirant for office may be a profound mathematiciai 
an advanced scientist, or a skilled physician ; but, unless \ 
can discourse glibly in the classical language of the countr 
and display, when need be, a wide acquaintance with i\ 
writings of the great teachers of antiquity, he will be regardc 
by the mass of his countrymen as a mere uncultivated boor. 

Anything corresponding to the "modern side" in our ov 
schools has not yet obtained a footing in the educational systec 
of China, though, indeed, in the matter of science teaching t 
can scarcely afford to throw stones at our Celestial friends, tl 
** modern side" being of only recent introduction among 
ourselves — a sort of tardy recognition on the part of the hea 
of our great educational establishments of the claims of scientL 
truth to a place in the education of the young. How hard tl 
struggle has been to get in even the thin end of the wedj 
Professors Huxley and Tyndall can tell us; a knowledge 
dead languages, which in nine cases out of ten proves of no u 
whatever in the keen struggle for existence which is the lot 
most young men on entering life, having been considered as 
more importance than even the most superficial acquaintan 
with the great laws which govern the physical universe. Tl 
worship of the past is by no means confined to China. But 
matters educational considerable progress has been made 
this country since Sidney Smith penned his caustic essay < 
"Too much Latin and Greek." His remarks, however, st 
apply with pungent force to the absurd importance attached 
classical learning amongst the Chinese. 

These remarks may seem a wide digression from the snbjec 
but if we apply them to the case of the young officers at Fooeho^ 
we shall be better able to realise the difficulties which have hi 



The Naval Strength of China. 223 

to be contended with. The very fact that the officers of the 
amy and navy do not compete for honours at the Uterary 
examinations which form so important a part of the social 
system of the Chinese, causes them to forfeit the respect of 
their countrymen ; and, in spite of Naval Discipline Acts, they 
camiot command the respect of their subordinates. Hence, to 
some extent, no doubt, may be traced the want of discipline 
which has been rather a marked characteristic of the war-ships 
mider native control. For our own part, however, we should 
hesitate before entrusting a modem war-ship to the command of 
an officer whose sole recommendation was a profound classical 
scholarship ; and unless China is desirous of courting disaster 
in war, she must be content to place her ships under the charge 
of men who, under existing circumstances, happen to be con- 
sidered ilUterate. 

As regards the seamen of the fleet, it is a singular fact that, 
iK)twithstanding the enormous population engaged in sea-faring 
pursuits, Chinese sailors do not bear a high reputation. Those 
who have been brought up in junks, and received their training 
under the peculiar school of seamanship associated with these 
antiquated specimens of naval architecture, are not of much 
nse on board ships of modern type, and for this reason Chinese 
are only employed to a very limited extent on board steamers of 
their own and of foreign nationality plying on the coast. As 
we have already remarked, an attempt was made at Foochow to 
train up a body of seamen adapted to existing requirements ; 
but, for reasons which it is needless to discuss, this has not 
been attended with the success which was looked for. And yet, 
^ &r as one can judge from the materials at his disposal, there 
seems no reason why China, with her enormous junk fleet and 
tbe vast number of men employed in the sea-fisheries, should 
'lot possess a magnificent force of seamen. We may even go 
so &r as to question whether there is any country in the world 
^ so fine a material at hand for the manning of a fleet. Such 
^ material skilfully utilised, and commanded by competent 
officers, could not be surpassed. 

^t the Chinese are not wanting in fighting capacity, or in 
b^very, has been shown over and over again. The records of 
^'^^ " ever victorious army," under the able leadership of our 
^^ ** Chinese Gordon," ought to have brought this fact home 
*^ Us, if proofs were wanting from the previous history of the 
f^^try. Chinese annals are, however, by no means deficient 
^ the records of great generals — natural leaders of men, who 



224 The Kami Strength of China. 

built np the vast empire which we find exiBting at the present 
day, men who were enthusiaBtic in the cause they were fighting 
for, and, what is of more importance, who were able to impart 
their enthusiasm to others. The achievements of these men 
mark the great epochs of Chinese history, and the power for 
good or for evil which the system of government places in tbeir 
hands is prodigious. The empire is in sore need of a gaidiog 
genius at the present time : when he appears, the attention of tbs 
world will be directed towards China with anxious gaze. 

A curious feature of the Chinese arsenals, which is vorth 
noticing, is their entire independence of each other and of mj 
central authority. But this ia the outcome of the somewhat anoma- 
lous system of government, which throws the responsibility of the 
defence of the coast-line on to the shoulders of the viceroys of the 
adjacent province. Decentralisation is all very excellent in its 
way; but in the absence of any ruling principle, each ofBcialdoes 
what seems good in his own eyes, without paying much regard to 
what his neighbours are about. So that we find each arsenal with 
its own peculiar organisation, its own system of conetniction for 
ships, and its own methods for the manufocture of war mate- 
rial, just according to the views of the official who mj*y haffoi 
to hold the reins of government at the time. Such a pemliar 
want of system must, more especially ia the case of the nan) 
Eu-senals, entail disastrous consequences in war time, and hit 
already on more than one occasion been the cause of rather 
amusing fiascos ; notably so, when some few years back it m 
proposed to assemble the naval forces of the empire for a aerigt 
of manojuvrea in the river Yang-tze. The enlightened offiditi 
with whom the idea originated pointed out with tmth that a 
Chinese fleet bad never yet manosuvred in company, and that, 
without some drill in joint evolutions and tactics, ships fighting 
in company with a common enemy were as likely to ran each 
other down as to damage the foe. The Times correspondent at 
Shanghai, in a very graphic account of the aBsembliiig of tluB 
motley flotilla of eleven ships, tells as how the eTOlutiona W* 
indefinitely postponed until someone should decide whetbv ft* 
fleet was to be commanded by a Foochow ^E~ 
and that although the officers, both c 
were Chinese, and that the ships were in j 
practical management of them was entrusted % 
under some such sobriquet as Jim or Johnny, bad been in tin 
habit of piloting merchant ships about the coasts. The wntff g 
farther pointed out a difficulty which the Chinese aathoiiMfljj|U 



The Naval Strength of China. 225 

leir exuberance of spirits at having collected together such a 
:£crmidable armada, would seem to have overlooked, namely, that 
£rom the fact of these vessels carrying a mixed armament, com- 
jprising specimens of every known system of ordnance, there 
^^old be some difficulty in keeping them supplied with the 
proper kinds of ammunition. It is easy to see that a system 
binder which such a state of things is possible must be inherently 
Irad. 

The training of the naval forces of the empire has been 
entrusted hitherto almost entirely to Englishmen ; arrangements 
have recently been made, however, for the temporary appoint- 
ment of a German naval officer for purposes of insloruction, a 
step which has been no doubt taken in consequence of the last 
addition to the fleet having been constructed in Germany, and 
navigated out to China by German officers. Why the Chinese 
have suddenly transferred their allegiance to German building 
yards, not only in the matter of ironclads, but for the supply 
of torpedo-boats, is well worth inquiring into. Such a step argues 
a want of enterprise on the part of our own ship-builders. The 
inclining sympathies of Chinese officials towards Germany, 
inay be due in some measure to reports from the Chinese 
ambassadors abroad as to the preponderating influence of 
Germany in European affairs. But it is vain to speculate on 
the motives which influence Chinese statesmen where the 
foreign relationship of the empire is concerned. Certainly no 
P^ple in the world are greater adepts at turning international 
jealousies to account as a means of neutralising foreign influence 
than are Chinese officials. Playing off foreigners of different 
'^tionalities against each other is a very old and favourite game 
^f theirs. But whether it is a wise one where the training of 
^eir naval forces is concerned, is questionable. Such tricks 
^^^xi scarcely conduce to efficiency in the public service. 

^e conclusion to which the preceding remarks point is that 
^*^ an encounter with a naval Power of even second-rate impor- 
^^><ice, the Chinese fleet, from its general want of organisation 
^^d of system, must inevitably suffer a disastrous defeat, 
^^^deed, in the opinion of competent judges the comparatively 
^^^fih state of efficiency of the Foochow contingent has been 
^xxjught about by the energy of foreigners ; and it is thought 
^^^^3t when this stay is withdrawn, the vessels will relapse into 
% state of indiscipline and neglect. It has always been found 
^>^08t difficult to instil into the official mind the amount of 
^^^tehfol care necessary to maintain such complicated meohan- 
VOL. VI. 15 



226 Tlie Naval Strength of China. 

ibms, as modem ^^ar-ships, with their engines and boilers, in a 
state of thorough efficiency and repair. Sometimes there hu 
ever been a difficulty in persuading them of the necessity of 
buying oil to keep the engines from rusting. There is a sort 
of impression even amongst those in high position that if a ship 
is bought and taken possession of, it will keep itself in order 
without further trouble or expense. Our dock-yard accounb 
would enlighten them on this matter to an extent which would 
probably surprise them; and if Chinese officials had stadied 
this sort of statistics and calculated the cost beforehand, they 
would doubtless have been less anxious to saddle their countiy 
with such ever-increasing burdens of expense as modem iron- 
clads have proved. 

As regards the organisation of the Chinese fleet, it maybe 
questioned whether at the present time there is a native ofiSdil 
of high rank competent to organise and control a fleet of modern 
construction. And here we touch on the real weakness of the 
fleet — the absolute dearth of good officers ; not only of intellir 
gent, experienced, and well-educated men, bat of higfa-mindad, 
pubUc spirited and patriotic serra^ts of the CroTm-men whne 
aim in life it is to raise the reputation of the profession to whkh 
they belong. Corruption — the canker of Chinese official U&f 
has eaten so deeply into all ranks, that it would seem to lune 
completely destroyed the sense of duty. It is impossible for fli9 
public service to be ably administered so long as self-intemt 
is the ruling motive. The moral sense of the nation has 
become so numbed through centuries of official oppreaaioii^ 
dishonesty, and extortion, that it is with difficulty officialB earn 
be found to administer the public service with clean hands* 
Here and there, amidst a perfect chaos of maladminisbaiub 
we find men who seem to be actuated in some dim sort of wagf 
by public spiritedness, but these exceptions are rare indeedi asft 
their path is a thorny one. A reformer meets with little thanks 
in a country where all are corrupt, and where extottioii 
dishonesty are recognised means of augmenting the 
salary. And then, the high officials have extreme^ 
methods of snuffing ont subordinates who displaj an 
zeal for the public welfare, and it is soon foond to bt 
and pleasanter to pull with the stream than to trj m4 
Until a marked change takes plaoe in the views ci Hm 
generally in matters connected with the sernoaoCittr 
cannot reasonably expect the naval branob of it ftp^ 
honestly administered* 




The Naval Strength of China. 227 

The large increase which has taken place lately in the arma- 
ments of Japan, with a view evidently to carrying out a more 
spirited foreign policy than has obtained of late years, taken in 
connection with the restlessness of the people, and their deter- 
mination sooner or later to measure their strength against their 
colossal neighbours, gives an additional interest at the present 
time to any inquiry into the naval resources of China. If the 
writtf was asked his opinion as to the probable result of a 
straggle between the two nations, he would be inclined to award 
the palm of victory in a naval engagement to the Japanese. 
But supposing the Japanese to be victorious, what then ? They 
would derive but small advantage from the supremacy of their 
fleet. The real issue would be as far off settlement as ever, 
haying but a remote connection with the command of the sea. 
Indeed, it is doubtful whether, even with this advantage, Japan 
could inflict any serious wound on her huge adversary. Destroy- 
a few seaport towns would have about as much effect on China 
as sticking pins into an elephant, irritating her without seriously 
injnring her constitution. The loss of a limb or two, even, would 
scarcely impair the vitality of this colossal Power. One can 
only express the fervent hope that Japan will not be rashly led 
on» by statesmen of the Olivier type, to enter on a war with her 
continental neighbour with a light heart. It may serve the 
uiterests of certain foreign employes to persuade Japanese 
statesmen into a belief in their country's capacity for carrying 
&n enterprise of this nature to a successful issue, but all well- 
wishers of the country would hesitate before advising her to 
ii^easnre her strength with China. Foreigners have done harm 
^ough already to Japan by their injudicious flattery, without 
egging her on to mad schemes of this sort. The Japanese have 
<^nly too much reason just now to exclaim, " Save me from my 
Wends." Gathering clouds in the direction of Tonquin are 
^^tracting increased attention to the East just now, and specula- 
^on is rife as to the measures Chinese diplomacy will resort to 
^th a view to maintaining her rights. China's foreign policy has 
^ot been aggressive of late years, and it would seem to aim just 
^^ at the somewhat novel but peaceful method of conquering by 
^Ionising. This great colossus of a nation, with its four hundred 
''^on of patient toilers, is becoming a factor in international 
I^Utics which cannot much longer be ignored ; while, by reason of 
^^^ pertinacity and quiet dogged industry, backed up by sheer 
'^cq of character, the Chinese are acquiring an easy ascendancy 
^^er every other Eastern race. Problems are arising in connection 

15 • 



228 The Naval Strength of China. 

with the extraordinary colonising tendencies of the people, befc 
which the petty squabbles of European states sink into insigik 
cance. It is a fact worth noting that the only two great reut 
which impress their own peculiar form of civilisation on otl^ 
are the Anglo-Saxon and the Chinese. They are also at 
present time the two great colonising races. It requires no le^ 
amount of prophetic insight to see that the great struggle 
ultimate supremacy will lie between these two races ; and 
appearances are not delusive, it would seem as if the probleixi 
the survival of the fittest was already beginning to press : 
solution in the Western States of America, and other pa^s. 

The writer trusts that the facts herein briefly stated, the rest 
of personal observation and inquiry on the spot, may help 
throw a light on the question as to China's capacity for meetix 
and overcoming the difficulties which seem to be looming ahes 
of her. 



229 



By 0. F. Gordon Gumming, 



on has of late been largely directed towards the 
ind Highlands of Scotland — an attention awakened, 
stance, by those symptoms of disaffection which so 
ested the commencement on our own shores of 
3 now desolate the Sister Isle, 
thus aroused was next riveted by the discovery of 
condition of extreme destitution to which a very 
- our countrymen have this year been reduced, by 
*e of all their ordinary means of subsistence. So 
ance was possible, these people^ ever averse to 
io let others suspect their poverty, endured their 
ze; and it was not till they were reduced to despair 
f of the Isles appealed to the world — i.e. to us, 
Great Isle of Britain^ to send help to our starving 

pitiful indeed, and such an one as may well move 
rts of all who value the comforts of their own 
)8, to lend their aid in the relief of the present 
the need is great and widespread, and large sums 
d to meet the monthly expenditure from the present 
est brings some measure of relief, 
ion Committee for the Isle of Lewis state that they 
£1^500 a month to supply the necessary meal ; as 
iricts, one of which numbers upwards of 6,000 
)y found ninety per cent, of the population absolutely 
e all over the Isle the majority of a population of 
)00 persons * are in extreme poverty, 
ist be said of the whole of the Long Island (a com- 
1 which includes the Isles of Lewis and Harris^ and 
lain of isles to the southward^ which, at low tide, 
one with another by wide fords — namely, North 
I, South Uist, and one or two out-lying isles likewise 
, and which possess a population of about 16,000 

* The population of Lewis in 1881 was 28,889. 



Our Oion Nortk'West. 



persons in addition to the aforesaid 96,000). These are genmlly 
aocouuted to be fairly well off for Eebrideans; so if thej ire 
starving, the prospeot of other isles mast be poor indeed. 

And truly the record &om one and all is alike distresmng. Ko 
sooner iras the piteoas cry from the Long Island heard, this its 
echo arose from every hill and glen in Skye, which, till then, bsd 
only attracted notice lirom the nnwise manner in which Bome of 
the crofters had sought to compel attention to their grievucei 
regarding pastures. Now it is found that the men of Skye it m 
deeply stricken as their neighbonrs. So, too, are the people of 
Moll. Indeed, neither isles nor mainland have escaped. FnHB 
Ardnamurchan to Cape Wrath, from Barra to the Batt of Lewis, 
comes the same sad tale of ntter destitution. All say adviKdlf 
that this is the worst season on record. 

From the hnndred and thirty inhabited Isles of the Onter tnil 
Inner Hebrides, from the western shores of Ross, Sutherland, ind 
Caithness, from parts of Invemess, and firom many snotbR 
quarter we hear the same low moan. Very low, for tbew in 
people accustomed at all times to endure hardship such m we knot 
nothing of — who Kice storm and tempest, and cold and hoogs, 
and who account themselves in luxury where a Southern vorkiBg 
man would deem himself on the brink of starratjon. So long w 
thpre is oatmeal to make cakes and porridge, and a fewpotatoei 
for a midday meal, these men are satisfied ; and if milk and ooek- 
sional fish be added thereto, they ore well content. "Gontartf 
wi' little and cantie wi' mair," as says the old song. 

Such diet, however, leaves small margin for redaction. A 
failure in the fisheries, a harvest jnst a trifle below the Jioor 
aTcrage, or a deficiency in the potato crop, at ones cretUi > 
serious difficulty. This year all these three causes hsTfl oomlnud 
to produce a season of such distress as has never befiirs biS 
known. There have been several years within the last half enrtuj 
which stand out in dark remembrance because of the sore distress 
occasioned either by the failure of the potatoes, or of the kelp 
trade, or of the capricious herring. The famine of 1637 and ibit 
of 1848 were due to total failara of crops. There has been i 
gradual deterioration in the produce of the land ; and the AMi 
which eighty years ago yielded fifteen and even twenty-fold, ddw 
yield an average of five-fold for s barley crop and three-luld ^ 
of oata. 

But never (ill this last bbH vear of 188U have all these Iroubln 
been crowded into one sorrowful seasoa. lu story ta like thts of i 
Job's trials, so qniokly hu blow followed blow ; >»^ ««»««« JA^J 



0^lr Oien Korth-tVest. 231 

binaself could not have been more patient under tribulation than 

h»ve ibeae frugal, harilwuiking pmpte — "patient, industriouB, 

God-feftiing people," aa they nru described to be by some who 

k«ve dwelt long amongst them. So long as they can by any means 

e»rn iheir own living, they will leave no stone uoturned, no shift 

oiitried. 80, knowing that they cannot extract even a bare sub- 

MBience from the land unless they supplement it by reaping the 

uftrTBst of the aea, the bulk of the whole population combine the 

iBrious works connected with the 6sheries with their regular 

^Ericultoral toils ; and, at the regular fishing seasons, nearly all 

the able-bodied men go off in the boats, to follow the herring 

Wlierever they may lead — perhaps as far soxith aa Aberdeen. So 

essential to these small crofters is this combination of toils by sea 

bdJ land, that out of the 1,780 occupants of land in Skye, there 

are not more than sixty who are not also fishermen. This double 

profession is not altogether advantageous however, as most of the 

work is crowded into the summer, and one labour interferes with 

the other. Necessary care for the land detains the men, so that 

tbej start late for the fishery ; and then, again, they often have to 

laava the fishing-ground too soon, lest their agricultural work 

■honld Buffer, and to they miss the finest shoals, wliich perhaps 

oome jaat after they have left. Thus great labour is often expended 

for amall profit. 

Begalar fishing stations are established at various points in Uie 
Isles, as, for instance, Stomoway, Barra, and Loch Boisdale ; and 
■t tfaesu upwards of a thousand boats may perhaps meet, to land 
their silvery anrgo, which tbey hand over to the fish-curers to be 
pnpand and packed for the market. A vast multitude of men 
toA women find employment as labourers and gutters, and in a 
good setBOn their toil is highly remunerative, and they earn a 
■am Hoffioient to snpply the deficiencies of their scanty crops. 

Oa the other hand, the herring occasionally seem to take 
Mansel and agree to forsake their accustomed waters. Vainly do 
iIm boats go forth — not a silvery fin is there to reward their toil, 
bometimes, on the other hand, the fish are there, but for some 
teasou incomprehensible to the nninitiated, there is s very smnll 
iRnand lor them, as is the case when, from any oause, the export 
11 checked, as, for instunoe, when during the Franoo-PruBBian 
par, tlie usual demand from the Baltao ceased. Whatever ba the 
■use, the result Is the same to the poor fiaheca, who have to 
ktum home empty-handed, having nttsrly loat tfaair sommer. 
I Here, iheu, is the first canse of distrsas in the dark souls of 
^^^ itytn-'i, we must look bssk to NoTembar of tbe jmrlou 



232 



(far Hivu yortb-West. 



year; for thcD, and again in Janaary I88S, our Donfaen slom 
(including the eastern coasts so far south aa Berwick) vurenept 
by terrific gnles, which, in the Isles, were accompanied bj uopre- 
cedentedly high tides. Many of the boala and muub of the fisliiog 
gear, on which the people are dependent for their subsistence, wen 
utterly destroyed. Subscriptions were, however, set on foot, ud 
this loss was in some measure made good before the herring season 
set in. Alas ! this fishery, which is, aa it were, the backboos of 
insular prosperity, utterly failed, and the men who had borrond 
money from the fish-curers to enable tbem to start for the Eut 
Coast fishing, had to borrow afresh to obtain the means of retunio| 
borne, 80 absolutely penniless were they left. 

These men arc not easily disheartened however, and, odm it 
borne, they were ready to make the best of their straitened nrcDDf 
etnnoes, and trusted that their poor little crofts would yield them 
sufBcient crops to carry on existence for the year. But ilu! 
with the lengthening summer days, came unmistakable proofs ibit 
the cruel blight had settled among the potntoea. The blackeniag 
shawB, — -the noxious, too familiar smell betrayed the evil; but ih* 
worst fears were more than realised when the time came for liflins 
them ; and in place of an abundant crop of nutritious food, ibcj 
obtained a miseruble supply of worthless diseased roots, men 
watery " blobs " the size of a pigeon's egg, not worthy to be oilU 
potatoes. 

The Chamberlain for Lewis tells bow, in one parish, be sent oat 
two men to dig, in order to raise as many potatoes aa posnbla* 
They wrought for six hours, and only obtained a baaketful of 
poor trash. One man states that he planted eight and a bi" 
barrels of seed potatoes, and only raised two barrels and « hdb 
Another mnn gives evidence that his ground generally yields thiltf 
barrels, but this season he only obtained five barrels. Others fiitnw 
their orops so worthless that it literally was not worth tominfoi* 
the ground on tfae chance of finding a few wretched roota. 

The next hope lay in the ling fishery. Once more the boat* 
Btarted, hoping to recover some of their losses. But the iiog.lil^ 
the herring, seem to have forsakeo the cousts, and this fishery like* 
wise proved a failure. 

Ac least one point of oonsolation remained. The gmiu crup) 
promised well — that is to say, they promis«d to yield fully the l<i» 
average which has now become ohronio— namely, a return of tfare* 
times the amount sown. The hay orop also looked «vll, Ixd 
Making and loog-oontinued niDB utterlj ruined it, so thai itlj^j 
QOt wOTtb ouTjrjng. Th« peiti. t00| oatmitli so much toitiHflJI 



Out Own North-West. 233 

3le supply for winter fuel, were so saturated by the summer rains 
lat tbey never dried, and could not be carried home at the right 
sasoD, 89 had to be left standing on the peat moss. 

Bat automn promised one gleam of comfort. The weather 
rightened, the crops ripened, and hope revived. It was not a rich 
BTvest indeed, such as gladdens the farmer on many parts of the 
lainland. This is far too gay with the bright scarlet poppies, 
hite and golden daisies, and blue corn flowers which betray the 
overty of the soil, and the com is poor in grain and short in 
:iaw, but none the less precious ; and anxiously did the reapers 
o forth to their work — not to follow any modem reaping machine, 
□ito work with sickles in the old simple fashion. 

The time of harvest in this bleak north-west is always uncertain, 
ad generally very late. Even on the mainland I have seen crops 
ill green at the end of October, and only fit for fodder. But last 
utamn the com was ready for cutting in September, and the 
3Qall stocks stood in the little fields all ready for carrying and 
-acking ; when, on the Ist of October, an appalling gale swept 
*?er the whole north country. From every corner of the land 
ame tidings of its ravages; but in its first force it burst over these 
^sheltered isles, sweeping all before it. It caught up the un- 
Qrnered stooks, and sportively whirled them in every direction, 
-altering them over the hill-sides, with all the grain thoroughly 
^^reshed out; the sea-beach was strewn with yellow straw, and 
^^ch was blown out to sea. Boats were destroyed or sorely 
aoQaged ; and the winter store of peats, which still stood in small 
^ks on the moor, was finally lost, for the gale whirled them in 
^ery direction, and the greater part fell back into the black bog 
'^ence they had been cut. 

When the storm subsided, the sorely-tried people went forth to 
^ what could be rescued — indeed, they did not wait till then, for 
trough all its fury they struggled to carry home what they could 
^ their poor harvest. Thus one man, who on the morning of the 
'le owned three hundred stooks of barley, succeeded in recovering 
'^^y. But most saved little indeed. One, who may be taken as 
^ype of many, states that whereas he can generally count on 
^ctring seven bolls of barley meal, he has this year been unable 
itiake one pound, and has not had wherewith to darken the door 

the mill. 

^hen came the last drop which overflowed their bitter cup. 
^iiietimes the winter haddock fishing is very successful. It had 
^*i 80 in the winter of 1881, so this opened up a ray of hope, 
d again the fishers went forth, sorely under-fed, yet still striving 



234 Our Own Karth-Wesi. 

to keep up brmTe hearts. But the haddock followed the en 
example of the ling and of the hernng, and the winter fisb 
proTed as nnsatisfactorr as those of summer and antonm. 

So that the last hope £uled, the adTerse forces of nati 
triomphed, and the poor struggling human beings hare saccumi 
for the present, and are compelled to look to their more p 
q>erous neighbours for such help as shall tide diem oyer t 
eril day. Thej do not saj much, being well trained to suffer 
silence, and baring an amazing power of endurance in beari 
troubles which ther beliere to be ordained by God. No Maho 
medan submitting to the irresistible will of Allah can show mi 
fortitude than do these simple Christian folk. ** Our people," » 
one writing finom Boss-shire, " are not oTer-ready to complain." 

Norman Macleod has recorded how, in a Tear of terrible destii 
tion in the Highlands, he was present at the first distribution 
meal in a remote district. A party of poor old women approach^ 
their clothes patched and repatched, but Terr clean. They li 
come from a glen far inland to receiTe a dole of meal. Ne^ 
before had they sought alms, and sorely did they shrink frt 
approaching the committee. At last they deputed one woman 
go forward as their representatiTC, and, as she adranced, they 1 
their faces in their tattered plaids. When she drew near, 8 
could not find words in which to tell her tale, but she bared t 
right arm, reduced by starvation to a mere skeleton, and stretchi 
it towards the committee, burst into tears, and her hitler sobs tc 
their own tale of anguish. 

That scene might be enacted again this day in a thousai 
districts in the Highlands and Isles. Heart-breaking is the tes 
mony of the clergy writing from their sereral parishes, and giri] 
pitiful details of the deplorable destitution around them and of t 
sufferings already endured by their people, and which mu 
assuredly intensify but for external aid. 

They say that nothing approaching to the preseni distress Ii 
been experienced in the Isles for thirty years. Nerertheiess th< 
hare had some diflBculty in obtaining accurate statistics, as tl 
people with prorerfoial ^ Highland pride," are Terr rductant ' 
rereal the depths of their poTcrty. On the contrary, they sth^ 
to hide it. 

But these pastors of the flock cannot fiul to pereeiTe the misei 
which lies on erery side of them. They teO of wide districts i 
which for many weeks the families hare subsisted on oae meal 
day, and that consisting only of diseased potatoes. Tliankf 
people who hare been able to secure a load of coaiae taroq 



Oar Own North- West. 23-> 

inleoded for the cattle. Till the Belief Committees were fairly 
ntsblished, letters from the Isles told of homes in which lay aged 
•od iymg persons, vhose sole provision consisted of perhaps a 
Breel-fnII of small diseased potatoes. The clergy have had to 
tisit in houses where worn and wasted mpthers watched hy 
i™g children, but their wails were not for the dead or dying, 
■ho no longer hangered, hut for the living who would be 
heftlihy and strong could they be satisfied with bread only, hut who 
nre actnally starving, for there was abnolutelt/ nothing in the hou»e 
flit can possibly be eaten. Teachers in the schools gave evidence 
tliu many of their children (some of whom have to journey a 
*e*rT distance from their homes every morning), had actually been 
obliged to start without tasting so much as a bit of oat-cake, 
Mcause there was not even a handful of meal in the kisL 

Mr. Macdonald, Free Church Mnnso, Kilmuir, on the 8th of 
Uirch, told the story of his own district : — 

Tkt ciTiI pBriBh tun ■ population of oror 2,500 — 460 families in bIL Of thnt 
aambar 150 funiliei t,ta in oiCrcme dcstitntion now, needing immediate relief. 
Ib^r of ow croIterB, who tricdto rcaarTo soma littlo corn tor need, are now obligod 
U BH tfait Be«d in order to keep their families alive. This will not Ust Iodk, and 
IfKita nprct that in a tew weeks the half of the families in this parish will ba 
vbhnnt food, without an; way o( proonring food, and witliont seod to put into the 
innBl, bbImi IkTgs avpplles shall come to them from irithout. 

From Lewis the report was still worse. Mr. Mackay, the agent 
fcr the endre ialand, so far back as January, published an appeal. 
A local relief committee was started, and Mr. Mackay and a 
buiker from Stomoway had gone as a deputadon to Edinburgh 
■ad Glasgow to ask subscriptions; and it was in consequence of 
thdr lisitB that the relief committees had been formed in Glasgow 
ind Edinfaargh. That gentleman mentioned that the elate of 
BuUen in Lewis even at that time threatened to be worse than it 
WM in 1846. 

In ft letter to the Glasgow Committee, dated 8th March, he 
Mated that there were npwards of 12,000 persons above the pauper 
dan in a state of great deatitution in Lewis, and that in the 
IJimt few months that enormous number was likely to be ang- 
nentsd by nt least 5,000 more. 

A clergyman, the Rev. Angus Maolver, Uig, Stomoway, wrote 
a the 9th March to iho Lord Provost of Glasgow : — 

Mf paritfa is the extreme nentern part of Uw iilaad, ■oma put* of it apwaida 
tf forty mil«a fion StomowsTi wbar* peopk li«Ta bMB aappUtd with mial 

blbertu I gMa lines to aoma tUitMB or fontMn haada of hnHfat Utdj. 

ly d/ tlun, I tth'tva. uw nl (it ttJM /hriay (tanatMH. iSaMi twafpa ^ d^ 
ftd aieaj thirty mHa to Slonmc^ ta g^ fiad/br IkmrJ^adUm. Tk^ kfl m 

mumtMtn wuim^ w«w»< m nun * 



23G Our Own Norlh-West. 

t/ifinseivfs or thtir families, walking in the. struts of Stornoway the most oj Ok finr 
with very little food. There were only two out of the fourteen who had got tay 
supplies before. 

Of course all districts are not equally badly off. Those which 
suffer least are the people within reach of the sea-coast, wliere they 
can gather a wretched diet of dulse* from the rocks, and limpets, 
and small crabs, truly an unsatisfactory meal for hungry men and 
women, when such morsels form its staple^ and not the mere relish. 
The most abundant supply awaits those who dwell near the vide 
fords, where at every low tide the inexhaustible supply of shell-fish 
is daily replenished, and all seekers may be sure of filling their 
creels with something edible. Cockles and mussels are there in 
amazing quantities, gleat clams and whelks, perriwinkles, and the 
long razor fish, commonly called spout-fish, because, by his spouting 
like a miniature whale, he betrays his hiding-place deep beneath 
the sand. Small fishes also ore captured in the little pools; and 
altogether these wide sands form a precious harvest-field for all who 
can glean its treasures. 

These, however, are comparatively few. Even of the Isles, many 
have no shore, only precipitous cliffs, where, during the long 
winter months, not even a white sea-bird nestles. And of course ia 
tlie districts on the mainland, where the destitution is well nigh as 
tonible as in the Hebrides, most of the people live far inland, and 
for them the harvest of the sea is strewn in vain. 

The shrinking of the people from applying for poor-law relief, is 
evident from the reports which have been forwarded to the Relief 
Committee, showing what pinching of poverty multitudes most 
have endured rather than apply to '' the Board.'' But while all are 
very poor, there is much more positive destitution in some parishes 
than in others almost adjoining. Thus, in Ross-sbire, while foor- 
fifilis of the 4;594 inhabitants of Gairloch are living on orediti the 
neighbouring districts of Applccross and Looh Carron (which 
taken together have as large an acreage as Gairloch — about 200,000 
acres and 8,695 inhabitants) reported themselves in spring as not 
yet in extreme want. Lochbroom, with its population of 4^191 
persons to 261,021 acres, and Lochalsh, wiUi 2,050 persona t0 
49,532 acres, did not then complain of unusual poyerty, and only 
stated that they had no seed-corn nor potatoes, nor the meana of 
procuring any. On the other hand, from Ullapool and Gdgallii 
Boss-shire, and from Assynt in Sutherland, came tidily tW 
Ihe people were in great straits. 

Bo, though there are diversities of shade in the general ^OfMii 

* i)u/!ie, a leatheiy, oluwt-eolonred 



Oar Own North-West. 237 

there is no disguising the fact that tho dark presence ofFomino 
DOff oTerahadons the whole north-west of the British Isles; iind 
vhatis true of one district, is in a measure true of a thousand 
others. Of course each differs in detail, but in all, the outline of 
trouble is the same. The people, through no fault of their owu, 
lie left absolutely witout the means of existence. They have no 
patatoiis, no meal, no fish. Those \tho possessed a few hifad of 
uttle or a small flock of sheep have been compelled to sell thorn, 
ud sro Uving on the produce. When thtit is consumed, tliey have 
nothing left to fall back upon. Those who possessed the excellent 
luiury of a cow, have bad to part with her to buy meal, nud tho 
haima^et* in vain for their accustomed milk. 

Id addition to hunger, the bitter cold of winter has been faced 
bnide dreary hearths, for, as we have seen, the peats were lost in 
Oelober, and months elapsed ere there was any possibility of cutting, 
or in my case of drying, fresh supplies. 

it would be easy to multiply individual instances of distress, 
neb one a heart-rending picture of want, but the tale is pninful 
ud tmneceasary. Suffice it to say, that this great multitude of 
">8t innocent sufferers, require continuous aid from the present 
"Bietill a better harvest may once more make them independent. 
But they had to depend on charity for even the means of obtaining 
tb«t harrest; and eeed potatoes, oats and barley for the future, 
nnued a prominent feature in their necessities. 

-Ai a matter of course, this state of matters was no sooner made 
•Qovn in Edinburgh and Glasgow, than subscriptions were set on 
foot, and the Lord Mayor of London likewise invited contribu- 
tioni. These flowed in in satficient abundance to enable Relief 
^■auittees to begin their work well, but the supply has proved 
■y no means eqnal to the emergency of a need that will require 
'^ttady relief fbr months to come. Id the end of March, the 
*^*ti Mayor of London issued a second appeal for funds to relii-ve 
"te widespread distress, the extent of which he fears is by no 
*k««n rsalised by the general public. His lordship has received 
fitters from the Rev. D. Maokinnon, minister of Strath, in Skye, 
I ^d personal assurances from Lord Dunmore as to the terrible 
LvUtms prevailing, iind be urgently appeals for adequate and prompt 
I arert a famine among these distressed and heart-broken 
Mr. Macdonald, the agent of some of the principal laod- 
t the island, and secretary to the Skye DeetitaUon Com- 
^rtree, wrote on Marob 13th ; — 

, I on TDttoh, an Aofnc tbrir tery n 



2a8 Our Own Notih-ii'est. 

■re q-aiM iiuuleqiuit«, uA & grsat part of the ground in Sk;e will b« istt miwil 

A petition for aid was presented to tha House of Commou, 
Bigned by the Lord Provost and Chief Magistrates of Glasgot, 
coQiaioing an authoritative statement of the circumstaaceB which 
have brought ahout the present destitution in the Western Islu. 

A Bill was also introduced into Parliament to enable Goveni- 
ment to advance supplies of seed for the most necessitous distiicti 
in the Isles and Highlands. It was, honever, withdrawn, in cohk- 
quence of the strong feeling that Scotchmen would wish, if possible, 
to avoid soliciting Government aid till the necessities of thewa 
proved altogether beyond the power of individual aid. The prinnpil 
proprietors, such as Lord Macdonald, Macleod of Macleod, FrHS 
of Kilmuir, Lord Middleton, the Duke of Sutherland, SirEennetli 
Mackenzie, &o., accordingly intimated their intentioa of providing 
tlieir tenants with seed com and potatoes for immediate nst, 
either as a free gill or as a loan, as may seem best in difiRBt 
cases. 

But though the proprietors may do their utmost to tide ovo tbi 
present troubles, they cannot hope to meet this emergency witboit 
large and continuous aid from benevolent friends in mors p 
districts. 

So great a crisis would of itself claim speoial t 
GovernmeDt, even were it not for the sore feeling Thioh ha 
recently been aroused in some districts by agitators, only too tmij 
to stir up discord between class and class. Hence the oppointoMd 
of a Hoyal Commission to inquire minutely into the oatiul loadi* 
tion of the people in the Highlands and Isles of ticotland, witht 
Tiew, so far as may be possible, of ameliorating their lot — aM 
however, which, from the very circumstances of the case, moit aia 
he a hard one. 

A distress so wide-spread, and in a greater or lew degr«a ■><" 
recurring, does indeed offer a serious problem for the iiiiiiiiilMHil' 
of all who are interested in the prosperity of the country, h i» ■ 
problem hard to solve, and strangely contradictory are the sDKg«^ 
tions offeied by men, all well rereed in their subject, but Kbo* 
opinions ore in many cases noconsciously tinged by Helf-inieKSk 
«nd who accordingly see the question chiefly Irom their own slaail- 
point. So, while some counsel wholesale emigration, and point v> 
the flonnshing colonies of Highluders who, in previous yean (f 
famine have left onr hoogry shone to moke for themselves n»* 
homes io far ooontriflB, and have succeeded so admirably, oduO . 
contend irith equal iraimth that Britain ought not to be d«jrikJ 



Our Own North- West. 239 

of her strong sons, that this constant bleeding* weakens the 
mother country, and that by granting the people larger farms, and 
training them to systematic cultivation on scientific principles, the 
prodace of the land might be vastly increased without the loss of 
its human sinews. 

The advocates of the latter course point to the days before the 

tide of emigration commenced, when these patriotic clansmen, no 

longer required to do feudal service to their chiefs, supplied the 

British army with many a brave officer and gallant soldier. Dr. 

Norman Macleod, speaking of the tacksmen or leaseholders (who 

in. ihe early part of this century formed so important a class 

'throughout the Highlands, but who were amongst the first to set 

^he example of emigration when rents were raised and the system 

large grazing-farms introduced), says that these were the very 

en whose families had heretofore supplied the Highlands with 

<2l«rgy, physicians, and lawyers, and the army and navy with many 

of their officers. 

He says that in his youth he could look down from one hill-top 
o^ farms which, during our wars with Napoleon, had contributed 
Upwards of sixty officers to the British army and navy. He states 
^ikaHf since the beginning of the last wars of the French Revolution 
"^^e one Island of Skye has sent forth from her wild shores, twenty- 
^^136 lieutenant-generals and major-generals, forty-eight lieutenant- 
colonels, 600 commissioned soldiers, 10,000 soldiers, four governors 
^^^f colonies^ one governor- general, one adjutant- general, one chief 
^^roD of England, and one judge of the Supreme Court of Scot- 
^^Jid. Not a bad oontribution from one Isle to the general brains 
^^^^d sinews of the group. But now, with the tide of emigration 
^Uthis has obanged, and though the Isles still furnish a noble 
"^ctntingent of about 1,600 men to the Naval Reserve, the Highlands 
^i:« far behind old days in their support of the army. For one 
^^ing, military ardour no longer receives such substantial encou- 
5^ement as it did in the early part of the present century, when, 
1808, Lord Macdonald apportioned his crofts among such 
ulies as had sent a son into the army, whereas the men of 
T>«ace who objected to be enlisted were rejected from the favoured 
*i«t. 

Now the military element of the Isles is almost entirely confined 

^ &body of militia, who at present are annually summoned to the 

mainland for drill at Fort Oeorge. It has, however, recently been 

^oggested, that as the Naval Reserve men are found to have 

improTed greatly since they stopped going to drill at Greenock, 

^d had their own h^ad-quarters in tha Isles, so it would probably be 



240 Our Otvn Narth-West. 

greatly to the advantage of the Hebridean militia to have b 
of their own — probably at Stomoway. 

Although comparatively few Hebrideans now enlist in 
Army or Navy, the Mercantile Marine is, largely recruited f 
seaboard parishes of the north-west, and it is a matter 
complaint to the tax-payers of these districts, that whe 
sailors have expended all the best of their lives (periods i 
twenty to forty years) in thus serving their country, they re 
' swell the heavy poor-law burdens in the villages where th< 
bom, but in which they have never worked. The raU 
very justly think that such support should be provided 
national fund.* 

The tacksmen to whom I have alluded were gentlemen i 
often kinsmen of the proprietor from whom they held tl 
much of which they sub-let to small farmers in portions vi 
from £20 to £50 per annum. These men had no lease, a 
much of their rent in kind. Hence there was generally " 
plenty " about the home of the tacksman, whose kitchen-fii 
smouldered, for all comers, rich or poor, were sure of a i 
to the hospitable board. 

Some of these small farmers clubbed together to hold joi: 
farms rented direct from the proprietor, to whom they 
lump sum, while they divided rent and profits among the 
These co-operative bodies worked their arable land on the 
known as run-rig, whereby land was divided into minute 
portions, — high ridges built up, with wide intervening fui 
very wasteful method of cultivation. All these portions 
cally changed hands by lot, among the members of the co-o 
body, who were each responsible for the cultivation of the 
thus assigned to them, a system devised to prevent any m 
being idle. The hill-pasture was held in common, thou 
member of the community paid his proportion according 
number of sheep or cattle he had to graze, and which wen 
by a common herdsman. On each of these farms a certain 
tion of the land was generously set aside as a sort of self- 
tithe to be cultivated for the poor and afflicted, for th* 
orphans and other helpless members of the community ; fc 
handed generosity to all in distress, has ever been a 
characteristic of the people. 

The mass of the population were of course the cottars, 
crofters, the former being in fact " squatters " who, with < 

* It 18 stated on very high anthority that there are districts in the Isl 
where the rates and taxes now amount to 9s. 4d. in the £ 1 1 



Our Own North- West. 241 

out permission, tuok up their quarters on the very small portions 
of land which formed the crofts of their neighbours. I'he word croft, 
or "cropped *' land, was originally applied to the small patches of 
ground which each man reclaimed from the moor, by removing the 
superficial peat and rock boulders ; little draining was ever attempted, 
but the land was so far brought into order that it would yield 
crops of some sort. The men who had thus cleared the ground were 
allowed to hold it rent free for a given number of years, and were 
allowed the right to pasture their cows in the neighbourhood and 
to cut peat from the moss for fuel. Here, then, they built their 
turf huts and established their homes; but, as they could not make 
a living out of their tiny fields, they took to fishing on a more 
systematic principle than had hitherto been done. 

Those living on the sea-coast were also able to increase their 
little store by the manufacture of kelp, a toilsome work of very 
uncertain profit, inasmuch as a heavy shower of rain falling on 
the halt dried sea- weed would effectually destroy the produce of 
many days of labour. However, these patient folk were so used 
to toiling for small and insecure returns, that so long as their kelp 
found any market, they persevered in its manufacture. So when 
(owing to the increased importation of potass and Spanish barilla) 
its price fell so low as no longer to pay for the time and labour 
expended on it, the loss was very severely felt, both by landlords 
and tenants. In some cases the tenants were able to pay their 
whole rent out of the profits of the kelp. The right to collect 
ttt-weed was made a distinct item of rental ; in some cases the 
shore and the rocks were let separately from the land. Of late 
JMiBk however, the manufacture of kelp has been almost entirely 
ahaadoned by the Skye men ; nevertheless, we are told that in 
Mm districts of that Isle an annual payment for sea-weed is 
■^ exacted^ though it is only used as manure for the hungry soil — 
* naniira so necessary, however, that when the foreshore is let 
nptntely, the tenant sometimes has to carry sea*weed for several 
■Oos either by boat or on his own back. 

Other changes crept in. Hitherto, as a general rule, the co- 

^fMtiTe system above referred to, had been found to work well, 

^ illastnted the old story of the well-bound faggots. But 

li'BieBtly the ^gots were unbound, and then weakness crept in 

comparative strength had been before. The club forms 

hnikflii op. and divided amongst the small farmers^ each of 

pnotioally, hereditary lord of his own little scrap of 

though without holding any lease (the advantage of 

lOMDD being oonfliderad dabion% inaomach as it was 

r i-lnL n. 16 




242 Our Own North-West. 

found tlifkt though the diligent mna might thereby be encoiii^ 
to still greater exertion, the idler would rest securely on iiis 
idle DHfs. Small wonder, therefore, thnt every man holding land 
on such a tenure should seek only to extract from the soil the 
ntmost that it can yield, with the smallest possible outlay, eo diat 
the cultivation continues to this dny to be of the most Buperfidil 
character, and no adequnte drainage is attempted. Under the un 
system, hill-pastures were still held in common, but various idTU- 
tages hitherto derived from co-operation were sacrificed. 

Every portion of land thus assigned to on individual ma, 
in the first instance, sufficient for the maintenance of bis ^duIt, 
and in a good year there wns even a margin of profit. Bntvhei, 
in Inter years, it was found that the establishment of great ^cep- 
farms would vastly increase the value of estates, wbolesale cltlf 
ances were effected, in order to leave great tracts of uninhabited 
land ; and innumernble colonies of small farmers were evicted fiom 
their »ma1I holdings, and in lieu thereof received smaller and gen- 
rally very inferior allotments clipped from off the crofts of thtir 
neighbonrs, sometimes a strip of peat-moss, sometimes null 
patches of land scattered among rocks. 

While this artificial crowding together of the people was nitn- 
rolly productive of much distress, their natural increase udd 
proved a further source of difficulty, for, as a new generation git* 
up, without a thought or wish but to live and die in or besids tba 
parent nest, those tiny farms came to be sub-divided, so that lb 
land originally assigned to one family was required to soppot 
several. 

If the proprietor endeavoured to check this aystom by refiuiif 
CO allow more houses to be built, the married sons and daagkun 
all contrived to find shelter in the original home, and sny sttespt 
to induce them to go further, in search of new means of livingi 
created so much real anguish among these very affectionate familit^ 
tliat they were generally left in peace, to find out by dire expenoM 
how impossible it was for so many to extract a liTelihood bW 
such limited ground. Hard, indeed, oftentimes must be lk> 
struggle to contend with such a climate and such poor u^ 
ungenorouB soil, whether the little holding li^s in the dark petf 
swamp, or in the unfertile ridges on the rooky mountain wfe 
Still it is home, sod therefore loved. 

At the same time the several portions of orofcs thus eubdiviw 
were made to pay higher proportions of rent than the whole hn 
done, oonsequently rents ftotnally inoreued under this peniioioos 
process ; of whiob, by the nay, a fairly tTenge & - -" « 



Our Own North-West. 243 

by the mach-talked*of " Glendale Crofters," one of whom states 

tbat whereas in his father's and grandfather's time the township 

was occupied hy only eight crofters, it is now divided amongst 

twenty-one, and the rents have increased from ^54 to £71. The 

spokesman states that his own croft consists of about three acres 

ol arable land ; which has been tilled consecutively for thirty-seven 

years ; that he has eight sheep and three cows, which are fed on 

tbe hill-pasture common to all the crofters. His rent is four 

guineas, and his taxes come to twelve shillings more. There are 

no horses in the township, and all field-work is done by manual 

lalour, of which the women take full share, working with the most 

primitive implements. 

Anyone who has carefully followed the evidence given day by 
day before the Royal Commissioners during the last few weeks, 
^with all the details therein revealed of long-endured hardship and 
B^iJering, must have learnt some strange facts concerning the pos- 
^tilities of life in the British Isles in the nineteenth century. 

It must not be supposed that the proprietors of the land have 
*ooked on, unmoved by the struggles of the people. Many a time 
-^^ve their minds been sorely exercised how to ameliorate their con- 
ation, and various experiments have from time to time been tried 
^^ the hopes of bringing about a better state of things, but the 
^^solts have invariably been discouraging. I may instance the case 
^^ the island of Baasay, near Portree, which, about forty years ago 
^"Hs purchased by Mr, Bainy, who resolved to improve the property 
^^d at the same time help the people, of whom there were about a 
^•>onsand on the isle ; of these 104 were crofters, who paid an 
erage rent of £4 10s. There were also sixty-five families of 
turs, and unfortunately one of the first steps towards improving 
^l^e property lay in clearing fourteen townships to make one sheep- 
^^^m, — ^not a very popular act ! Mr. Bainy and ^his, family lived on 
^He island, taking the greatest interest in the people. He gave 
^^em ample employment in road-making, trenching, draining, and 
Slicing, and at the end of four years found that his expenditure 
^^«8 £1,672 in excess of his revenue from the property, while the 
Condition of the people had not improved] one wit, and he calcu- 
lated that to keep them in moderate comfort he would have to 
<5oiiuime to lay out his money at the same rate. 

He therefore decided on parting with so unremunerative a property, 
^bich accordingly, in 1876, passed into the hands of Mr. E. H. 
Wood, together with the Isles of Bona and Fladda. It appears 
^^ donng the six years that Mr. Wood hasj held the estate, he 
^ expended on it a sum of £82,500 'in excess of any rental 

16 ♦ 



244 Our Own North-West. 

reosived, while various outlays for the benefit of the people (si 
as replacing lost boats, gifts of seed-corn and seed-potatoes^ & 
have amounted to fully £500 more. Happily his position i 
resident landlord, and his keen interest in the welfare of his peo 
has secured a place in their affection, but the property can scare 
be considered a lucrative investment ! 

In like manner, but on a far larger scale, did Sir James Mathe 
attempt wholesale improvements in the isle of Lewis. Vast si 
were expended on the endeavour to convert moor and moss i 
arable land, but the work proved merely a sink of money. £^ 
sort of benevolent scheme was tried to aid the people, who h( 
indeed, well-nigh trebled in numbers, but who (after the expei 
ture of £100,000 on the mere attempt to reclaim peat-moss, i 
as much more on the general improvement of the isle) are noti 
poor as ever ; in fact, the weight of pauperism is overwhelming. 

So, too, on the property of Kilmuir, in Skye, the present p 
prietor, Major Fraser, has expended about £29,000 on road-mak 
and many other improvements, but the returns have borne a ^ 
poor proportion to the outlay. 

On the other hand, it appears that where the people have b 
encouraged to work for themselves on good terms, their condit 
has improved, and in various districts the old system of club fai 
has been restored, with the additional right of pasturing sheep, i 
it is stated that where these club farms exist, there are no paupi 
There are two such farms, at Fassafree and at Stein, on the ^ 
of Captain Macdonald, of Watemish, where the tenants poss< 
about 600 sheep, managed by two trustees chosen by the oo-opei 
tive body. The township of Bemisdale, on the property 
Macdonald of Skeabost is similarly managed. Edinbane, ont 
Grishornish estate is another example ; here the people have abo 
800 sheep. Similar farms are held from Lord Macdonald at Gle 
more and Muggary. There are others on Kilmuir. Most 
these lie inland and are worked by a class of men called '' litt 
drovers,'^ who collect cattle for the markets and sell them to larg 
dealers. 

The Olachan of Achintee in Lochcarron, Boss-shire, has I>6< 
quoted as a fair example of the working of such a club fan 
Uere ten families, each paying a rental of £20 a year, cultivate t 
arable land in common, and likewise share the hiU pasturage whi 
is the chief source of their prosperity. Their mixed stock of she 
cattle, and horses, maintain the pasture in good condition, as ca< 
and horses will feed and flourish on coarse grasses quite unfit 
sheep ; they also prevent the heather from enoroaohing on 



Our Own Narth-West. 246 

fmings, and their heavy tread and manure, encourage grass to 
spn'ng up in new places. 

These fanners work the arable land on a five-couxBC rotation. 
They produce larger agricultural and pastoral results than a single 
tenant could produce from the same space, and they pay to the 
proprietor a larger rent than a single tenant would care to do. 
These tenants give no trouble, are never in arrears, and never 
require assistance from the proprietor. Nearly all have their little 
deposits at the bank, and the majority have well-to-do sons and 
daughters, who have gone forth to make their own way in the 
world, in Britain or her colonies. There is not a pauper in the 
Gommanity. 

The secret of their success lies not only in co-operation, but in 
holding sufiBcient pasture land to fatten their own flocks and herds, 
the Isles and Highlands being of so essentially pastoral a character 
that in these lies the chief source of wealth, as is too well proven 
l}y the miserable failure of such poor crofters as seek to extract a 
liTiog from capricious crops only. 

Here is an instance in which ten families are comfortably 
^pported on land which, if let as a sheep-farm, would probably be 
•Jcftin charge of a single lonely shepherd. 

To return to the condition of the North-West in the earlier half 
of the century. 

There came a time, not in the Isles alone, but throughout the 

Highlands, when proprietors began to realize that large farms were 

^ore advantageous than small ones, and that the new system of 

si^-farming would assuredly bring in far larger returns than any 

liitherto dreamt of. So large tracts of pasture land were converted 

into sheep-runs, and the small farmers were displaced to make room 

ibr fewer but wealthier men. The more energetic among them 

^grated, with heavy hearts but brave purpose, and have founded 

prosperous families beyond the seas. Many of the poor, and weak, 

^d old were compelled to leave their dearly-loved homes among 

^e green hills, and were crowded together into towns or villages, 

tbere to bemoan their hard fate till the hour of their death. But 

^ most cases the families who were thus dispossessed of their 

'Orofts and pastures were, as we have seen, unceremoniously settled 

^ the land already tenanted by other men ; these were compelled 

|o submit to seeing the crofts, which just kept their own families 

^ comfort, sub-divided into infinitesimal allotments, insufiBcient to 

^ow of any profitable farming. Thenceforward began the struggle 

•&r a bare existence, which year by year has become intensified 

*ffl it has reached the present climax. 



246 Our Ovm North-West. 

Then the hatefdl big Soathern sheep came to take the place 
less remunerative though far more attractive Highland b 
attractive to the artist for their beauty, to the spinner f< 
fineness of their wool, to the consumer for the delicacy o 
mutton. Those little Highland sheep were personal friends 
people, and the tending and milking of the ewes formed the 
of many pathetic ballads, as for example, '' Ca' the £^ 
the Fauld, Jamie 's wi' me," or, '" Sae sweet the lassie sang 
Bucht, milking the Ewes," or, " Will ye come to the Ewe-b 
Marion ? " or, most musical of all, — 

Ga* the ewes to the knowes, 
Ga* them where the heather grows, 
Ga* them where the bomie rows, 
My bomiie dearie O I 

Now these sweet old pastoral ballads speak of a dead past. Si 
shepherds tend Lowland sheep on the green hills^ whence one 
the blue smoke from the homes of a generation who, with lao 
tions and bitter mourning, were driven forth to begin life an 
far distant lands. So intimately were those sad, compulsory 
ances associated in the minds of the people with the introdi 
of the strange sheep, that on one occasion a minister in 
having exhausted rhetoric in describing the joys of heaven, cr< 
all by touching a deeply sympathetic cord, when he declared 
'' as no evil thing could enter the blessed kingdom, there 
assuredly be no big sheep there " ! 

It is to the connection of the hated Lowland sheep wi 
unhappy clearances, that allusion is made in the old, sad song 

The flocks of a stranger the long glens are roaming, 

Where a thousand fair homesteads smoked bonnie at gloaming ; 

Oar wee crofts run wild wi' the bracken and heather, 

And our gables stand minoas, bare to the weather I 

It is strange and pitiful to learn that many of these gri 
evictions actually occurred within the last thirty years, anc 
these too true tales of woe were enacted in our own Isles, ^ 
the memory of men now in the prime of life. * On the other 
those who look only to the general prosperity of our countr; 
comfort in the knowledge that throughout the Isles and Higl 
flocks and herds^ such as were never dreamt of in the days < 
ancestors, now fatten peacefully on mountain pastures co' 
millious of acres, which heretofore were of small account, but 
now represent large sources of revenue to their proprietors. 

There are, however, certain districts on the mainland, notal 
Elintail, in which it is afiSrmed that (whereas the cattle whic 
hitherto pastured on the hills had helped to keep the land f< 



Our Own North-West. 247 

the sheep have so utterly exhausted it that it is now deemed advisahle 
to let the ground lie fallow for a term of years. It is said that 
where sheep alone occupy the land, the grazings deteriorate to 
Buch an extent (notwithstanding heather-burning and drainage) 
that farms which, in former years, have supported, say five thousand 
sheep, will now barely yield pasture for four thousand. The 
decrease of half a million, reported in last year's returns of the total 
number of sheep in Britain, is said to be partly due to this cause. 

To allow the land to recover from this exhaustion, is the reason 

now assigned by one proprietor for a considerable extension of his 

deer-forests in part of Ross-shire, though it might well be thought 

that those already occupied their full share of land, inasmuch as the 

twenty-five deer-forests of Ross-shire cover one-third of the whole 

country. It is stated that deer-forests and sheep-runs together 

occupy two-thirds of the Highlands ! Of the former it has been 

recently said : " They extend in an almost unbroken line from the 

Boathem borders of Perthshire to the shores of the Portland Firth, 

wid embrace an area of over two million acres of some of the best 

Pasturage in the Highlands. Within this vast space absolute silence 

'^gns. Sheep and cattle are of course rigidly excluded, and the 

^^y human occupants are a few gillies." The writer might have 

*^<ied that the artist, the poet, and he who would seek new bodily 

*^^ mental strength in those beautiful and health-giving mountain 

'^pons, are alike jealously excluded, lest their human presence 

should disturb the wild deer, and spoil the sport of the few. 

The writer whom I have before quoted goes on to say, speaking 
^^ the twenty-five forests of Ross : ** If we apportion three sports- 
^^"^ to each forest (which is above the average, for the very essence 
^'the sport is its exclusiveness), we have seventy-five persons, who 
Monopolise, for a month or two's recreation in the year, an area of 
^untry that is capable of furnishing happy homes to about three 
"^oasand peasants, afi'ording pasture for an immense stock of sheep, 
cattle, and horses^ while the ancient sport of deer- stalkers would 
'omain as before." He adds the opinion given by the late William 
Mackenzie, of Achindonia, " than whom there was no higher 
•picultural authority in the north," to the eflPect that, were these 
>heep-runs and deer-forests converted into moderate-sized holdings 
®^ the club system (which is in practical, successful working on the 
states of Sir Alexander Matheson), the county of Ross alone would 
Maintain in comfort twice its present population, and result in a 
^^^ increase of agricultural and pastoral good to the nation, while 
^ ''easonable sport would remain as in former times." 
^his is, of course, but one view of the question. The owners 



248 Our Own North-West. 

of the foreBts maintain that they give employment to a numbc 
of keepers, watchers, gillies, and other dependents, who ai 
better off in thus receiving regular wages than they could I 
were they toiling on their own crofts for exceedingly nncertai 
returns. This is doubtless the case, but whether it is necessaz 
that the deer should be allowed undisputed possession of all tb 
pastures is another question, and it may well seem hard to the ma 
who is struggling to rear his young family, as he exists himsel 
chiefly on oatmeal, to know that he can by no means obtain grazin 
for a cow on the green hills which lie around him so invitingly. 

I suppose that one touch of such a privation, afibcting onese 
personally, enables one to realise it far more thoroughly than can t 
done by any mere picture of imagination ; and I have thus realise 
it, in one district, where we were surrounded by pastures ric 
and abundant, but could not procure one drop of milk, because tb 
grass was so wholly devoted to deer that there was none to spare f» 
cows. So the children had to do without, and I scarcely think that^ 
was our fancy which made them appear to us punier and more sickz 
than those which were better provided in this respect. In tru. 
the local doctors bear witness to the amount of suffering due 
this cause, and to their manifold difiBculties in treating infante 
complaints on account of the impossibility of obtaining this natufl 
food. The women, too, suffer sorely from dyspepsia, which 
attributed to the extravagant innovation of drinking tea, whence 
they can (by selling their few eggs) earn the wherewithal to br 
a little ! Truly a grievous extravagance — a little tea without mS 
and often without sugar, to wash down their daily diet of eitfaa 
oatmeal or indifferent potatoes! The men also, to whom porrid;s 
and milk is second nature, have likewise just to eat their porrid^ 
dry ; and if anyone is inclined to think lightly of such a privatiop 
I can only recommend him to try it as his sole diet for one week. 

The only available substitute is whisky, which can always 1 
obtained by those who can afford it, who, however, are by no meal 
the majority ; though, as an instance of how readily supply create 
demand in such matters, I may notice that in the Isle of Sky 
where the whisky distillery at Tallisker annually turns out 45,0€ 
gallons of '* Barley Bree," 20,000 gallons are now consumed in tl 
Isle of Skye itself. 

It may be due to the abundance of this supply that the men of Slr^ 
seem to have so entirely abandoned the illicit business of prepari^ 
whisky of home manufacture, whereas their neighbours in Boss-shi- 
still glory in ^^ ^^^^^ ^ ^^ atariight 

That King's diniui ken 



Our Ovm North- West. 249 

The untaxed, double-distilled draught of true mouDtain-dew, 
which connoisseurs assert to be beyond all question superior to any 
known to the exciseman, the " Ganger " as he is called in the High- 
lands. 

In the silent solitude of many a dark glen in the wilds of Western 

Boss, these unrecognised distillers find their secure hiding-place 

beside some sparkling stream, and work in secret, fully convinced 

^at there can be no harm in transforming their own barley into 

"whisky for their own consumption. Within the last year, however, 

the " gangers" have made so many seizures of these private stills, 

that their number must now be seriously reduced. Last year Sir 

Kenneth Mackenzie of Gairloch brought so much persuasive personal 

influence to bear on his tenants, that they voluntarily surrendered 

their distillery apparatus at the request of their chief. Doubtless, 

however, many more continue in full action, and the revenue oflBcials 

^id a stroke of business eminently satisfactory to themselves last 

February, in the course of which they first tracked and seized a 

skilfully concealed still in Elintail, and then made a raid into the 

well-nigh inaccessible solitudes around Lock Monar in the parish 

of Lochalsh, where they found two large smuggling bothies, one 

for distillery, the other for malting, and both in first-rate order. 

It certainly must be difficult for these sons of the mountain to 
accept a regulation declaring that it is not lawful for them to do 
^bat they will with their own ! 

As regards Skye, the only other factory on the isle is the excellent 
Woollen manufactory at Portree, which gives employment to many 
persons, and supplies good woollen cloth for the comfort of many 
besides the Islanders. It seems a pity that more works of the same 
^rt should not be established in other parts of the Isles, affording 
* home market for the island-grown wool, and regular work for the 
people ; and if the ground in the neighbourhood of such factories 
^nld be apportioned to each family in such lots as to provide grass 
w a cow, and a garden in which they should raise for their own 
^Qsomption the vegetables found to be best suited to the climate, 
^ery such establishment might become a centre of comfort and 
intent. As yet, the idea of growing any vegetable save potatoes 
ttoesnot seem to have entered the insular mind. 

One could almost wish that a few Chinamen could be imported, 
J'Jst to test what can be grown, and whether the land is incapable of 
**^Pporting the inhabitants. In all countries they are the most 
^^ccegjful of vegetable growers, and contrive to live in comparative 
^^fort where other men starve ; but in point of frugality, industry, 
•^a perseverance, the Highlander abroad, where circumstances are 



250 Our Own North-West. 

not all dead against him, is equal to any Chinaman, and though : 
is rather the fashion to speak of him as too easy-going and lackin 
energy, in his own country, he might develop new life were hi 
condition more hopeful. At present he has little to cheer him, t 
year after year he delves the same morsel of wretched land wit 
his crooked spade, and then goes ofiPin search offish that so ofte 
fail him, and returns to watch the crop that will not ripen ; and a 
the time he and those he loves are under-fed, never knowing th 
luxury of one full meal such as we deem necessary at lea; 
thrice a day. How can men be expected to work energetical' 
under such circumstances? Put these same men to work c 
navvies' food of abundant meat, and it will soon be seen thi 
no men in Scotland can work better, and that the many accusatio 
of insular idolence rest chiefly on the simply physical question 
insufficient food. 

Latterly the Hebridean peasant — be he crofter or cottar — \m 
found his means of earning a pittance in any other mann: 
growing smaller and smaller. A few years ago many of t: 
islanders earned fair wages by going to Argyllshire and other pa- 
of the coast to do harvest work, but this is now done by machine: 
It is the age of progress, and they begin to realise that unless tbi 
too progress they will assuredly go to the wall. Why should r: 
they too profit by machinery, — the machinery of the swift steams 
which might carry to southern markets the produce of dairy-fan 
worked by co-operation? If the land is not suitable forcers 
cultivation, is is assuredly fit for pasture, and well-worked dais 
farms and poultry-rearing may, after all, prove to be the b^ 
source of wealth for the isles, as well as that most in keeping wi 
the natural tastes of the people, whose one desire is to be allo^ 
to exist on the ground which gave them birth, and to whom t 
very idea of emigration is utterly abhorrent. 

They know how, in days of old, their chiefs would have gloried 
the increase of their numbers, which meant an increase of fighti 
men, and it is a hard lesson to have to learn that they are n< 
accounted an encumbrance, instead of being " the clan,'* t 
strength of the land, whose interest was one with that of t 
chief. 

No race is more averse to learn the lesson of the bees, and yi 
by year to send forth their swarms to begin honey-making on tb 
own account in fresh pastures. Yet, like the bees, they nndoubtet 
increase and multiply in such a ratio as to render it physic& 
impossible for all to find room in the old hive. And unfortunata 
with all this increase, there is a lamentable neglect of the simple 



Our Ovm North-West. 251 

iaws of prudence in the matter of close intermarriages. First 
consins (whose parents, and prohahly grand-parents, were first- 
cousins) marry, and the process is repeated generation after 
generation. The couples marry very early in life, with no provision 
for the morrow, and often have a hard struggle to earn their daily 
meal of herrings and potatoes. It is almost a matter of course that 
the tone of health must he low, and that the children of such 
marriages must suffer. Consequently, it is only natural that 
scrofula, consumption, and insanity, in greater or less degree, should 
be lamentably prevalent amongst them. That rheumatism should 
abound in such damp surroundings is a matter of course. 

I do not know how far the physical difficulties of supporting lif& 

may account for the gravity which is so marked a characteristic of 

the Islanders. Men and women alike have a solemn look, not 

exactly care-worn, for in truth they are generally ready to accept their 

hardships with amazing philosophy, but a far-away look, as those 

w^hose life-long teachers have been the winds and waves and mists, 

^lemn spiritual influences which have sunk deep into their souls. 

A^s are the physical surroundings, so is the reflex on the character 

^^ « race, strangely sensitive to all that can suggest dreamy visions 

^^ the unseen, a people whose cradle songs have been the wild lay& 

^^ Ossian, sung to eerie Gaelic airs, pathetic and mournful as the 

'"^Bgled sounds in nature which they so faithfully reproduce — the 

loaning of the winds, the wild cry of sea-birds, the deep booming 

^^ the waves, and the thunder echoing amid the mountains. 

^Faithfully do these Nature- taught Islanders live in harmony with 

^^x lessons. As the influences of Nature in calm are ever soothing, 

**^d those of storm are solemnising, so the tendency of the people is 

^ quiet thoughtfulness ; many, indeed, have a depressed, melancholy 

l^ok, as though life were altogether too grave and sad. Yet at a 

pleasant word the whole face brightens with a beaming smile, just 

^ does the face of their native moorland, when glorified by a gleam 

^^ radiant sunlight. But anything of the nature of boisterous 

^inh would seem utterly out of keeping with the character of the^ 

place or people, well-nigh as jarring as a sound of laughter in a 

cathedral. 

Those who know them best, tell us what depths of tenderness, 
^^^ of strong passionate love for kith and kin and country, lie- 
"^^eath the dreamy, seemingly apathetic surface, — what open-handed 
Rcoerosity inclines them to share their poor pittance with poorer 
^'Ddred, and even to show what hospitality they can to the passing 
■^«^ger. 

Strangers sometimes speak pityingly of the wearisome monotony 



Our Own North-West. 



of a life lived ia tlicae isles. I cannot myself think that an; lift so 
encotopassed by the ceaseless varieties of ocean can compare nilh 
the dull, depressing sameness of existence in any agriculturd oi 
mining district on the mainland, where, from one year's end to 
another, all goes on in Tegular mechanical order, each day recalling 
the last, and the ugliness of all around knowing no change. 

Here, even tlio black peat moss (wbioh, when sodden by pro- 
longed rains, is so unutterably dreary) changes as if by magic in 
the clear shining that comes after the rain, revealing a wealth of 
rich colour, of purplo heather and golden lichens, silken-wfted 
grnssee and delicate moorland flowers, dear to the busy bumminK- 
bces, but dearer still to the hnmiLO children who, all unconsciDaily, 
drink in those sweet inSucnces which tend to mould their chanoter 
for life. Ho who knows the deiight of roaming alone in sncbvild 
regions, of watching the tremulous white mists float upward finn 
the dttrk peat bog to enfold and spiritualise the great sleepy hill^ 
can perhaps realise wliy it is that tliese Children of the Mistue 
8u dreamy and unpractical as compared with their Anglo SixoP 
neighbours. 

But of uU influences which combine to produce the Hebrideao tf 
he is, none approaches the ever-present power of the ocean, vbii^ 
as a living inspiration, is for ever and for ever wbiaperiDg ■■ 
messages to man, woman, and child, from their cradle till thoboor 
they are laid beneath the green turf within sound of its oeairiM 
dirges. It claims the right to keep watch over the Islanden, in 
death as in hfe, and steals quietly inland that it may leave siU 
unsought. Even the great Isle of Skye is so strangely indenla' 
by countless sea-lochs, that there is not one comer of the iaW 
which is mors than four miles distant from the coast — few plM* 
are more than two miles from the sea-board. Bo, vbethei n 
calm or in storm, when wild winds carry the salt ma-drift ftr o" 
the hills, or when earth, sea, and sky Us bathed in that QDSttaiw 
peace which is so entrancing a characteristic of these islet ih* 
seen in summer sunlight, Ocean asnerta its sway, and tauh&t ■ 
own lessons in its own fashion. ^^^ 

There is no monotony in its teaching. There are days wb^^H 
« ripple disturbs its glassy Bor&oe, whioh lefleote each dietant IdM 
as in a mirror — a ailvery-blue mirror wbioh blends with die cloud- 
less sky on a bonndlesB horicoo. And perchanoe on the mono* 
the great calm it followed fay a mad ngin; tempest. Tho spiiiu 
•of tha Btoim have awakened ; dark olonds tower above a sullen «*• 
aod wild winds blow so mightily that the very seorbirda are s 
inland. In plaoo of the little ailTer-tongnad l 



Our Own North-West. 253 

terday murmared round the base of the crags, there are to-day 
hoge green billows sweeping shoreward, to dash in wild fury 
against the dark cliffs, throwing up clouds of spray which bathe 
green pastures in salt brine. 

A few days of such boisterous weather seems to chum the whole 
sea. Even the sea-lochs are tempest-tost, but beyond every head- 
land the ocean sweeps with inconceivable force, and the sea for 
miles is all upheaved in range beyond range of crested breakers, 
while the wind off the land sweeps back their spray in snowy drift. 
Very beautiful is that expanse of mingled foam and green water to 
the eyes beholding it from some safe niche in the rock, but awful 
indeed to the vessel whose evil star has brought her within reach 
of dangerous currents, which may at any moment drift her on to 
sunken rocks and reefs, or on to a shore well-nigh as fatal. 

While such are the moods of Ocean round the more exposed 
head-lands, there are some isles where it creeps gently and silently, 
as an anxious mother watching the slumbers of her sick child. 
Sach are the fiords of North Uist, which stretch inland in such 
strange ramifications, that they have been well compared to the 
thousand branchlets of some delicately dried sea-weed. This is 
especially remarkable at Loch Maddy, which actually only covers 
^OQt ten square miles, whereas its coastline exceeds three hun- 
dred miles ! Here no tempestuous waves breathe exhilarating life 
and action — all is still and well-nigh pulseless. These desolate sea- 
lochs, intersecting the low flat land, are as dreary and monotonous 
*B the innumerable and brackish or fresh-water pools which lie 
Mattered over the moorland — shallow pools with sedgy shores. 
Indeed, nothing drearier can well be conceived than such a scene 
on a dull misty day, or after prolonged rains, when the peat-moss 
is so sodden as to become little better than a dismal swamp ; and 
DQiserable indeed must be the lot of those poor creatures whose 
fetched hovels are planted in such districts as these. 

There are some such huts (unworthy the name of homes) to 
^Uch wretched families have been forced to migrate from compa- 
^tively good crofts in healthy situations — miserable peat huts,, 
^hichin wet weather become as thoroughly saturated as the morass 
oii which they stand. They are built without any sort of founda- 
^on to protect them from the perpetual ooze of the boggy soil, and 
^ne soalung rain drips through the thatch of decaying turf, and 
Wis with dull splash on the broken earthen floor, forming muddy 
P^ls even beside the hearth where (if anywhere) a dry comer 
"^^Sht be expected. The ground on which some of these hovels 
^ l)uilt becomes in wet weather merely a quagmire, and the 



254 Ovr Own Xorth-lVeat. 

nretched inmates, wlio si^em to havo uo heart left to repair tlieir 
owD thatch, have nt some period so far roused theiDselves u 
to place bouldei's of rock to act as stepping- stones acruss the 
swamp from house to house. No wonder that the poor little hair- 
naked unkempt children reared in such homes as these arc eickh 
and miaerahle, and that their parents look hopeless and sad. Ho* 
can they he otherwise where even cleanliness is impossible ? Butif 
this is their condition in seasons of average plenty, what mmtit 
be in Bucb a year as the present, when dread Famine hasoTW- 
shadowed all the Isles ? 

Happily the majority of the homes in Skye and Lewis oib o[i 
better type than these. They have thick walls built of rongb 
stones and turf, with the interstices filled in with clay. Bnl 
instead of protecting those walls by an overhanging thatch, tbo 
heavy roof (thatched with bent, broom, heather, bracken, or Bin*, 
as the case may be) rests on the inner edye of this thick viU, 
which accordingly acts as a reservoir for all the rain which poun 
from the roof, saturating the clay and turf of which the wall is bilT 
composed. The net-work of stout straw or heather ropes wuigbiad 
with heavy stones, which covers the roof, tells of the violent gild 
which make such protection needful, and but for which the thiUli 
would assuredly he carried awny. 

If the house is respectably old, its thatch has certainly acquitd 
a canopy of velvety moss, and is perhaps also adorned with so neb 
a crop of grass as is positively valuable to the thrifly gade-wibi 
who, mounting on the roof with her rusty sickle, carefully onta it 
all for her cow. Furthermore, the thatch is so saturated with pMt- 
reck, that it acquires a rich brown hue dear to the ardado eye- 
There is, indeed, a hole somewhere in the roof, by which the smoki 
is intended to escape, and some tidy householders even set up tb> 
old herring- barrel to act as a chimney ; but often the film of Uoe 
peat-reek may bo seen rising from the thatch, almost Ilkeston^ 
and then you may be sure that the whole roof has tttained tbit 
stage of rich oily sootiness when it becomes a valnable paM l* 
manure for the hungry little fields, which otherwise might Ittfi* 
but for an occasional pony-load of sea-ware, which is oanfiiUj iH_. 
in vrith a hand-plough. 

A well-to-do-house probably has a window at the end where the 
family live. It cannot, however, be very efficient in the way "■ 
admitting light, since it is merely a hole from twelve to eigbwn 
inches square, and only partially glazed, about half the spaca beuig 
filled np with turf. A misty gleam, however, struams ibrongkJ^ji 
-opening b; whiofa the smoke onghb to tvoftpo, but the iut^|fH 



Our Own Narth-West. 255 

lefly dependent for light on the ever open doorway. To enable 
f door thus to do double work, it is generally made in two halves, 
t lower half being frequently closed, while the upper half stands 
3n. 

[f you approach such a dwelling, a kindly voice will assuredly 
. you welcome in the Gaelic tongue (for they *' have no English "), 
3, as you stoop to enter the low doorway, you become aware that 
i peat-rock which saturates the thatch likewise fills the interior 

the house with a dense blue eloud, stinging and choking to 
accustomed eyes and lungs. Then you perceive that half of the 
ase is devoted to the cattle — is in fact the byre, and a very dirty 
re to boot. Here stand the cow and her calf, and may be a goat 

two, kept for milking. 
The rough pony is grazing near, with his fore-legs hobbled, to 
svent his straying. The pig, should there be one, likewise takes 
re of itself and roams about outside. It is by no means a wel- 
me inmate, though it does occasionally find its way indoors. 
It this *'gintleman who pays the rint" in the Emerald Isle (or 
ther, who did so in by-gone days) is by no means a common pos- 
s^ioD in these Scottish Isles, where the domestic pig has ever been 
Id in abhorrence well nigh as deep-seated as among the Hebrews. 
Strangely enough, though the wild boar has bequeathed its name 

many a hill and valley throughout the land (such as Beinn-an- 
ire in Cantyre, where Diarmid, Fingal's mightiest hunter, slew 
jTim old tusker which had long ravaged the land ; and the wild 
^^ has Sloch-Muick, the swine's pass, and Sron-na-Muich, and 
'Ci Muich Dhu, and Muckerach, and many another mountain 
ci glen, to say nothing of the green isles of Muck or Mouach 
cl the £ilan-na-Muck), and although such mighty hunters as 
Ugal and his son Ossian feasted on the wild boars they had 
^in in the chase, notably on the celebrated boar Sorymner, — the 
'ottish Celt has ever held the domestic pig in utter detestation, 
^<3 a man of the true old type would sooner have starved than have 
ten pork or pig's flesh in any form. Now the old prejudice is so 
IT modified that a certain number of ^' advanced " Celts tolerate 
le unclean animal as a marketable article ; but they are still in a 
dnority, as may be judged from the fact that in the statistics of 
tie Isle of Lewis we find that amongst four thousand families 
here are only one hundred and fifty pigs. 

Another departure from old tradition is shown by the presence 
of poultry, the use of which for food would have been as repug- 
i^uit to an ancient Celt as would have been that of a goose or a 
lane, though the sacrifice of a red cock in cases of illness (more 



256 Our Own North-West. 

especially of epileptio fits and insanity) wns accounted a sun 
remedy, a propitiatory snorifice to the evil spirits which Christiu 
teachers could by no ineauB induce their converts to forego, ud 
which is known to have been offered in various cases in this pre- 
sent generation. The late Sir James Simpeon has recorded tenai 
instances of this remarkable superstition ns having occurred vitbiii 
his own knowledge. 

Now, however, the " croose tappit hen " is in high favour, ui 
the gude wife's poultry share with the cat and her kitCenn, indtli 
handsome collie-dogs, the privileges and honours of the iniM 
chamber. The motber-hcn and her chickens eeek for ciumbiDf 
oat-cake that may have been dropped by the baims on the eutlia 
floor, while the veneratle cock and tho other members of his iiEiulj 
roost on A well- blackened rafter, rejoicing in the warm smoke. 

So also, apparently, does the smoke-dried but kindly-looking 
old crone in the largo clean white cap, bound round her headwilb 
a rusty black ribbon, who bends over the peat fire, turning tb 
wcII-browned oat-cakes on the flat iron girdle which hangs &on ■ 
heavy chain suspended from the open chimney, down which stnui 
a ray of light which glances on the blue bonnet and silvery hiirrf 
the old grandfather, who sits in the comer qnietly knitting b 
stout blue stockings, and perhaps indulging in s pipe tt the «■* 
time. & tidy woman, dressed like all the family, in thick «■■ 
homespun, is spinning at her wheel — tho most pictareaque ofill 
occupations and the most soothing of sounds. Possibly the bw* 
also owns a loom in which she can weave the yam of her on 
spinning, and so, indeed, clothe berhouBefaold in the work ofk( 
own hands. 

Probably the baby is in a rough wooden cradle at her nd<,A* 
bigger bairns being away at the school ; and wonderful it i< l»» 
the baby intellect survives the terrible shocks of such rooking t> >> 
administered by the maternal foot, working in sympathy wilh tht 
busy hand. Near the fire are a heap of peats, drying for fiitBi' 
use, and perhaps some tarry wool, uid a coil of rope and fiAi^ 
nets; for here farming and fishing are generally oombJDed|fH|l|i 
sions, greatly to the detriment of both. ^ 

In one comer of the dark room, faintly dieoemed thno^ ** 
blue smoke-haze, are a couple of wooden box-beds, atuffr aii<l *^ 
suggestive of the probable presence of nozions insectn; ba(<l'* 
wooden baoke, following the ugle of the roof, proleot fi" 
sleepeia &om the possible rain-drip uid certain dnaght, and i^ 
bedding looks varai and olean. 
A few plates and bowls, spoons, snd 



Our Own North-West. 257 

[he nido dressar — a rickety tablti, a fev stools and buDobes (all 
piobibl; made of worm-eatea driftwood) complete the furoiture, 
■Iwifi excepting the Aisl, or seaman's chest, which contains all 
tba Sunday garments of the family, and perhaps, too, the carefiilly- 
tnuared winding- sheets prepared by the good-wife for herself and 
Imi husband gainst the day when they will surely be required — a 
dif that is often in their thoughts, not as the end of life, but 
nnly as an incident in the journey that will take them safely to 
Ibe only land that is more to be desired than even their own dear 
Wegtern Isles — the only home that could be dearer than this, in 
ibich they have dwelt so lovingly and bo contentedly ever since 
tber can remember, and where most likely their ancestors for many 
gniBratians have lived and died. 

MsDj a joyous family gathering have they seen round their 
Wth in the long winter evenings, when the lads and lasses, who 
km been at work all day, assemble for their simple evening meal, 
nd then, drawing close round the fire, and heaping on dry peats 
till the mddy glow lights up the bouse, tbey settle to work and 
taaliat. Then is the time for langhing and chaffing, for singing 
tf old national snugs, patriotic songs, love songs, songs of the sea, 
■r of th« milking and of the mountain shielings, those summer 
Mm wbere the young folk were wont to camp when herding the 
kft, ind making cheese and butter for winter store, in the good 
dd days, before the bill pastures were turned into sheep-farms. 

Ahhougb those happy days are past, perhaps never to return, 
■dthoagh only scattered heaps of stones mark where the shielings 
(nte oantm of so mnch joyous life) formerly stood, Sandy or 
DouU may adll be sure of a sympathetic audience should ihey 
Nlikaiip inoh an old song as the Gaelic equivalent of — 

OoBM all j» J0II7 ihapherdi tlut whistlB through the gleo. 

Ill tdl joa of s Moret that courtlan diniu ken — 

What Ci tha graatait bliie tli»t the heart of man can trama ? 

Ta WDD a bfnmla laada irhen tha k;e cam' hame. 

bd bQ^t-eyed Mary and bonnie Kirstie will reward the nngera 
^Hpleuant looks aa those bestowed lang-syae by their mother 
* Aa hn of har youth. 
QW i^ too, it the praiae that awaits him who can tell the best 
jV^^^eriispfl a kgtmd of tbe olden times, full of dreamy poetry, 
•dfuntureB of heroes in war or in the chase; or perhaps a story 
the present in some far oonntry, picked up ixom the aobool- 
Wter, or related by some talkative -fellow at tbe fishing — «U is 
(tfly listened to by an attentive and intelligent andienoe, aravtng 
'information on every possible aalyBOt. 



258 Our Own North- West. 

'J'o such men and women as these, home is indeed a locality— nol 
merely the roof whicli, for the time being, shelters the familj.biit 
a place to whicli their hearts are bound by a thousand Unia 
asBOciations — not human ties alone, but love of place — a deep 
passionate devotion to the green hills, the roaring cataract, ll» 
rarely- tj-odden glens, the utter silence of the awful mountiiii 
summits wliere the white mists float so eeriely, the dark cap 
where the eagles and ravens build their nests, and the ses^Iift 
where the beautiful sea-birds with the wild fearless eyes hont 
like falling snow-flakes. 

Perehaoce, us deepest memDries are oft awakened by it 
breath of some long- remembered fiower, the brightest imiga 
may be connected with the scent of "sweet gale," the humbli 
bog-myrtle of the peat-moee; or with the early walks acniH thi 
dewy pastures, when the delicate bee-orchids looked up from itl 
emerald gross, and the fragrant white clover and the blae-bcUi 
and sea-pinks grew so luxuriously on the green headland ai* 
looking the sea; or with the honeysuckle that trailed over th 
grey rocks : these and a thousand kindred details in their nitunl 
surroundings strike deep root in the hearts of these people — iHli 
that abide for ever, even should an irresistible tide of ekagi 
compel them to emigrate to far distant lands. There Unjaf 
prosper, and all material comforts may increase around themtoB 
extent never to be dreamt of in the old country; but rtillAl 
undying love remains unchanged, and the true Celt will •■ 
remember his childhood's home, as a faithful son chsriilM Ai 
memory of his mother. Rightly has VVilson expressed thia Mk 
in his emigrant's song — 

From the dim shleliii|{ on the mitty iaUnd 
HountBiax divide ub, and a vorld ot rau ; 
But still our hearts iire ttne, oar heuta are Highlaiid, 
And we in draama behold Uw Hebrides. 
Donbtlees this poetic love of nature and real 
characteristic of the Celt, is considerably strengthened by tlte|i 
use of the Gaelic language, which, while it cuts off theMjf 
from general communication with the outer world, keeps in ^ 
use a phraseology peculiar to themselves, full of intftgw 
from the world of nature. 

At (he present moment, though bo gnat a moltitnde of S 
sons have emigrated to all parts of the world (there to form 
dolonies in which no other tongue is apoken), tliere Temain il 
four Gounties of Sutherland, Bobs (which includes Crotatfl^ 
InvemeBe, and Argyle, npwardB of oma Mtmdred ami i 
tkoiuaMd permtHM who JkaUtuaify uat tk* OaeHfJ^ 



Our Own NoHk-West. 259 

Out of a total population of 3,7S5,S73, it is found that 231,594 
of oar Scottish people still use the old Coltio tongue. Of these 
161,244 represent ail parts of the Highlands, while the remaining 
60,3S0 abide in the Western Islee, in most of which English is 
KiU an almoat unknown tongue. ThiB in itself explains one great 
Kcrct of the aversion felt by the Islanders to going forth to seek 
nrkonthe mainland, where they are well aware that they will have 
to fight life's battle amongst men who are to them a foreign race, 
ndto whom their toogue is an uncouth incomprehBnsible jargon. 
No more genuine sot of charity was ever devised than that which 
Kcently led a daughter of Dunvegan Castle to make her borne 
br Kveral years in the very unattractive town of Greenock, solely 
■Border to minister to the many Skye folk whom she there found 
Mruded — many in dire poverty, many eick in hospital — to whom 
ba words, spoken in their own dialect of the beloved mother- 
bniffoe, proved indeed the sweetest and most inspiriting of music, 
nmiDg mimy a poor lonely creature from tbe lowest depths of 
Itqiur, and awakening bope once more. 

Itii somewhat remarkable, b y the way, to leam that at five-sixths 
Oftba 200 Board Schools attended by the 20,000 Gaelic -speaking 
(UUfen, there is actually no provision for teaching them to read 
niir awn language, nor does there appear to be any reasonable 
pD^eet of saoh teaching being provided. Even in the remaining 
Mt-iixth, the provision is very inadequate. Under these cironm- 
Itneei, it is difBonlt to understand what advantage the children 
■• to derive from compulsory school attendancOj unless the art 
(■fiwding English like parrots he accounted sufficient. For all 
BHtniotion given in such form as they can understand, they are 
■peodant on the voluntary exertions of the Gaelic School Society. 
Donbdess many Southrons, to whom this Gaelic tongue is 
Bottiog mora than " a oombination of savage gutturals," may think 
4m by ignoring it in school teaching a useful blow may be 
Ifciak It its ezistenoe, and the time hastened when it shall cease 
[ be a distinctive language. Little do such judges know of its 
iuiDg hold on the love of the people, snob a hold that even in 
r Qoiutries to which Gaelio-speaiking Islanders and Highlanders 
ifted two or three generations back, not a word of English is 
oban to this day — indeed, bo carefully have the children been 
Ight their mother- tongue in its pnrity, that the desoendanta of 
tjie men, Harris men, or men of Argyle, can still raoognisa one 
other by the peculiarities of dioleo^ onlj to be deteoted by their 
Q ktvn ears. 
UcBAV a£ at^eaU one sooli lillage in the prarinoe of Aaeklaad 

17 • 



260 Our Own North-West. 

in New Zealand, and am told that many buoU exist ia the Soatfaen 
Isle. Far in all parts of the wilds of BritiBh North America Bucb 
colonioB lire settled. Three tlioueand Gaelic- speaking (Junadiiu 
have named their capital town Stornoway. Canada has no popali- 
tion more intensely loyal than her trne Highlanders, all born od ha 
shores, and who probably have never left them, hut are nooetlig 
less \TljoIc-1ieArled Scotohmeo, keeping up all old cdmodi, 
singing the old Gaelic snngs in the old atyle, and ready to velcoma 
with ecstatic delight the stranger who can accost them in their 
m other- ton };ue, thereby proving it to be liis own, for it ii t 
language that few have been able to acquire save thoss to whoa 
its accents come us u birthright. 

One of the principal colonies of Gaelic-speaking Canadian! ii 
that of Stornoway, a flourisliiDg town, so named in memory of 
tlie green shores of Lewis. Here 8,000 Highlanders, atrrag ii 
ancestral tradition, are ready to welcome fresh oolonists from tin 
old land, for whose behouf large tracts of land have been laid oat 
in lots of a hundred acres, offered for sale at £1 per acre, payiUt 
in the course of ten years. On each of these lots ten uns hm 
already been cleared, and are ready for crops ; the remoiDiDg lunrtf 
acres are still in forest, and fumisii abundant timber fn tbe 
lumberer. 

Perhaps the strangest instance of the sarvival of tbe Qaelio 
tongue and Highland sympathy is to be found in the America 
State of South Carolina, and where we should have sapposed thit 
tbe American nationality, which swallows up oil others, asumili^ 
ing them to itself, would assuredly have likewise absorbed tb> 
Celtic colonists. But here, on the contrary, ao strongly has tkr 
line of demarcation been kept up for upwards of a century, tint to- 
this day there are about fifteen Fresbyteriao churches filled kf 
congregations bom in South Carolina, and who, underst&ndiaf » 
language save Gaelic, are instructed solely by Gaelic pastonboB' 
in the colony. Every circumstence of life has altered; M^P^' 
dence and comparative wealth have taken the pisce of 
which drove their fathers from the loved IslaB or fiiji , _ 
the new country in which tbey have found Uubb UeBsiogs JbttUI 
a secondary place in their love, for they are atill Bigfalanden H 
heart, and they atill speak of the moorlaDd. wliob ifaair oho «!* 
have never seen, aa — Home. 



261 



|nbia mhx Jing ^ako. 

By Majob-Osnebal H. W. H. Goxe. 



Ws had began to hope that a period of rest wa& opening out for 
India, and there were good grounds for entertaining that expecta- 
tion. The excitement connected with the Afghan expedition had 
subsided, and there were no present fears of the question being 
rN)pened. The Egyptian campaign had terminated, bringing 
with it no small amount of satisfaction to the people of India, at 
least to those who were interested in the conduct of our troops ; 
and to them — no insignificant quota of our Indian populations — 
the honour Indian soldiers had won, their association on equal 
tenns with the best troops of the Empress, and the high con- 
sideration with which their representatives were treated in 
England, must have tended in no small degree to soften the 
feelings of race jealousy which affect so seriously the welfare of 
the country. 

There were no burning questions to be dealt with, no new taxes 
to be imposed, no frontier threatenings, no famine impending ; a 
satisfactory, or at all events a not unfavourable, budget was 
«q)ected. All things seemed to promise a social and political 
ealm, such as India has not enjoyed within the experience of a 
generation. 

It has been repeated over and over again by politicians of all 
shades of opinion that India wants rest : — rest for the develop- 
ment of trade, rest for the progress of education, rest for the 
Knidual assimilation of Oriental modes of thought to Western 

^vilisation. 

A prospect of such a caJm was, as I have said, opening upon 
^* At such a moment the Government of India has thought 
fit to folminate, like thunderbolts in a sxunmer sky, three pro- 
i^ts, which, if they had been selected by the bitterest foes of 
'^ib Indians and English alike, could hardly have been better 

^^ to stir up all the class prejudices and race antagonism of the 

^^ peoples. 
■I^e Self-Government Bill, and the proposed alteration in the 



262 India under King Baboo. 

Criminal Code, the latter apparently a corollary of the form< 
contain all the elements of political combustion. 

The Bengal Bent Bill threatens an entire subversion of t 
social fabric in that unhappy province. 

This latter measure is the unfortunate, perhaps necessary, o 
spring of the Permanent Settlement in Bengal. It would 
useless, as well as unsatisfactory, to go over old ground now, ai 
repeat the arguments which have been urged against fixity 
rent in a country like India, liable to so many political convi 
sions, and where the value of money has been subject to so ma 
fluctuations. I only notice the introduction of this BiU 
deprecate the adding of fuel to fire, by bringing the soci 
interests of the Zumindars and Byots of Bengal into dire 
antagonism, at the time that has been selected for intensify! 
the far more formidable race opposition between natives a 
Englishmen. 

The two measures first-named proceed on the assumptio 
first, that the natives are qualified to govern themselves ; a: 
secondly, that they are fit to be entrusted with the Govemme 
of Europeans. 

Now at the introduction of the Self-Govemment BiU, and 
subsequent speeches, the Viceroy has been compelled to adn 
that the measure is a tentative one, and that some degree 
failure may be looked for at its first introduction. 

If so much is granted by the promoters of the scheme, whi 
results may not be anticipated by its opponents ? 

It would have been well, indeed, if the Viceroy had listened t 
the temperate and forcible remonstrance of the Bombay Goyerc 
ment, for then an easy way might have been found for th 
gradual withdrawal of the measure ; but the supreme Groyeri] 
ment, by its dictatorial rejoinder, has committed itself still mor 
deeply to this unpolitic undertaking. 

I venture to think that the adoption of these schemes by tb 
Government has proceeded from an unfortunate misconceptioi 
both of our own position in the country and of the real wisb^ 
of the people of India. 

It has been taken for granted, because a body of clamoro' 
Baboos and aspiring youths of the " Young India " party h* 
sounded the note for self-government, for the increased emplc 
ment of natives in the Civil Service, and for an enhancement 
their powers, that, therefore, the general voice of the conn'' 
responds thereto. But it is no paradox to assert, that '' 
educated portion of the native Indian community does not 



India xuidi^r King Baboo. 263 

*J^y appreciable degree represent the general opinion of the 
people ; and it will be well to remember this in connection with 
the petitions got up in the towns for the extension of Lord 
Kipon's term of Viceroyalty. I believe that if a plebiscite could 
be taken, the mass of the people would pronounce, by an over- 
iwlelming majority, that they would rather see the European 
element in the civil administration increased, than have its ranks 
augmented by native recruits. 

In support of this proposition I may mention the often 
alleged circumstance, that it is a common thing for native suitors 
to apply for the transfer of their cases from a court of native to 
one of English jurisdiction. 

This statement is not made heedlessly. Whether this prefe- 
rence for English over native justice obtains in Bengal and 
within the limits of Baboodom I cannot say ; but I can state 
bom personal experience, that in the Punjab the applications 
for transfers of suits from native to English courts were of not 
infrequent occurrence. I have seen this made the subject of 
remark in English newspapers, as if the practice were general, 
and it is not, therefore, I presume, confined to the Punjab. 

With all our national faults of exclusiveness and standing 
aloof from the people, English judges are uniformly true and 
upright in their decisions. It is impossible to warp their judg- 
ments by any considerations of money or favour ; and I imagihe 
^t the hardiest supporter of the Government scheme will 
scarcely venture to assert the same of all native judges at 
present. 

One of the worst features in the case is, that the natives who 
fremost likely to qualify for the Civil Service, and for the higher 
judicial posts, are the persons of all others who are the least 
fitted, both from general influence and from force of individual 
^luiracter, to govern the people. 

The candidates for employment in this branch of the adminis- 
tration are composed chiefly of Baboos and residents of the 
presidencies and other large towns, whose sole reconmiendation 
is their capacity for mastering the educational tests ; and it 
would be difficult to find in the whole range of the empire a 
<^B more obnoxious to the manlier and more independent 
niembers of the body politic, than these creatures of the 
schools. 

Professor Max Miiller,* no hostile witness, remarks of this 
^: "The native element in such towns (Calcutta, Bombay, 

* Contemporary Review, Nov. 1882. 



264 Lulia under King Baboo. 

and Madras), contains mostly the most unfayonrable specim 
of the Indian population." 

I do not wish to say anything of their possible vena 
and lack of uprightness ; but it is a fact, too well knc 
and acknowledged to require argument, that the great majo 
of Baboos and educated natives of the towns have neither 
courage nor the manliness of character to enable them 
discharge properly the duties of a judge or magistrate, especL 
in trying times, when the possession of those qualities is oi 
more essential than intellectual abihty or a ''judicial mind." 

What kind of support, for instance, could we hope for, i 
crisis like that of 1867, from men of this class, who, whatc 
their judicial attainments may be, are notably deficient in 
qualities which go to make a soldier or a ruler of men ? 

In dealing with the natives of India, and especially with 
manly races of them, respect for the character and moral po 
of their ruler is a far more necessary attribute than the c 
sideration due to legal or departmental knowledge, and 
people themselves would generally have more in common t! 
an Englishman whom they could respect, than with one of tl 
own colour who lacked the qualities they are used to look up 
I am far from wishing to assert that the natives of India 
never be fit for self-government. On the contrary, when y9 
may be called the backbone of the country, the hardier i 
manlier races, have been educated, not intellectually only, 
in a social and political point of view also, up to the pro 
standard, then by all means give them a share in the admL 
tration; for then you may expect something like an hoi 
expression of opinion, and opposition, if opposition there m 
be, of a bold and outspoken character. But do not trust 
absolute existence of our rule in India now, to the hands o 
class who are as feeble in action as they are audacious 
speech. 

The Government has ignored, or, perhaps, has not been a 
to realise, the fact that in India there is no nationality prop( 
so called. The peninsula is divided and sub-divided into 
many races, sects, and classes, that no one sect can speak 
itself and claim that it represents the nation. What sort 
entertainment, for example, would a Baboo patriot be likelj 
encounter at the hands of a Pathan, a Sikh, or a Bajpoot, if 
came to them with the cry, '' Am not I a man and a brothei 
or how would Bengalis and Madrassees appreciate being hao 
over to the tender mercies of a Sikh of Afghan governor ? 



India under King Baboo. 266 

It should never be forgotten that the differences among the 
)eopIe of India are not merely social or political, but they amount 
n effect to difference of race; and their respective aims and 
>bject8 are utterly conflicting and opposed. As Professor Max 
Miiller, in the article already referred to, remarks : ** There is a 
greater difference between an Affghan, a Sikh, a Hindustani, 
El Bengali, or a Dravidian, than between an Englishman, a 
Frenchman, a German, and a Russian." 

There can be, as matters are at present, no sort of unanimity 
between races so widely divergent, and therefore no genuine 
public opinion. If an attempt were made to raise a national 
cry, the Sikhs would shout " Gooroo ji ki futteh '* ; the Maho- 
medans, " Deen Deen " ; the Rajpoots would clamour for the 
restoration of their ancient dynasty ; and each and all would 
l&Qgh to scorn the claims of the Bengali Baboo. 

In England we know what we mean when we speak of the 
good of the country. Opinions may differ, according to our 
Radical or Conservative proclivities, as to how that good may 
''ert be attained, but we all aim at the same object, the welfare 
^fingland; while in India the good of the country, in the 
BiouthB of those who are now clamouring about it, means simply 
he benefit of an individual class.* 

I^be self-government scheme will set all the agricultural 
OPialation at loggerheads, and go far to destroy the influence of 
^08« much-vaunted bodies, the village communities. 
I am not going to decry those institutions in any way, but it 
ill be admitted that they are purely selfish in their scope and 
B^icm. They seek the good of their own community and of that 
'^'Qey and the endeavour to mix them up in a general govem- 
^ Inij will detract from all their individual usefulness. 
I4 may safely be assumed that the attempt to impress upon 
^ "tiUi^ popolation, in their present state of enlightenment, 
^ maxim that "to the public good private respects must 
^^^U," is doomed to failure. Then the election to the Board 
K CSommitiee will form a fertile source of feud and bitterness 
the agrienltnral communities. 

fht AboTs vu written, Aooonnts h%ie been received from India reporting 

of lOflOO natiTei in Galentta to denoonce the GkiTeniment, in eonr 

Ihi aetkni of an ^e"gii«*» judge, who had an idol brought into oonrt, iti 

aaMsaaiy for the deoiaion of a enit then pending. Mr. Norria 

l»lp!Vp Mlod cntirelj on the adviee of Hindoo anthoritieaof high eaateaad 

MdMlon hat been aaiaed by the Babooeto itir np diaaffeetion amoaig 

H ia to be hoped that thia will enlighten the Oovemment aa to 

Hm people tJiegrhaTO to deal with. 





266 India hnier King Baboo. 

In the comparatively simple arrangements that take place 
the periodical settlements, the appointment of the village officii 
causes often a great amount of rancour and ill-feeling, especial 
when the village community is composed of representatives o 

different creeds or castes, and these feelings will be greatly L. n 
tensified when it is understood that the powers of the villa-^ gr^ 
notables will not be confined to the collection of the revenue as 
heretofore, but that they will be endowed with greatly enhance. -«d 
means of patronising their friends and injuring their enemL ^s. 
When it is found that the successful candidate cannot give fc^lie 
promised parts of village barber, washerman, or watchman, or 
whatever their equivalents may be under the new regime, to ckU 
his expectant followers, wrath and opposition will encoun.'fc^r 
him on all hands, and I suppose that even the framers a^xxd 
promoters of the self-government scheme are hardly sangiuxxe 
enough to believe that the elections will be carried on on ptxx"e 
and enlightened principles. 

Some fears of thie result are already apparent in the schexacxe 
of self-government introduced for Bengal, where provision Ix^m 
been made for a court of appeal, to consist of one Engli^k 
officer and two native subordinates. According to this schexix*, 
the native committee and local boards are to manage their o^^^^ 
pounds, schools, and roads, and to be responsible for fheir o"^^^ 
sanitation. 

All this sounds plausible and reasonable enough in EnglipJ^ 
ears, but to those who have lived among the natives of Indi^ 
and know their powers of passive resistance, and their ntt^ 
apathy regarding education or sanitation, so long at least as ^^ 
depends on their own exertions, the whole scheme verges on tti^ 
ridiculous. 

It would be a searching test to apply to the working of ib'-^ 
measure, if the Government would leave it optional with tb® 
people to pay the cesses from which the funds for educatioI^^ 
road-making, &c. are derived, and which are now collected ^*^ 
the revenue by Government officers. The Government has n<^*f 
however, ventured on this hazardous experiment, knowing tb^ 
the result would be a beggarly account of empty boxes; and tl^'*^ 
the inevitable conclusion is arrived at, that though the peoJ>^® 
are capable of governing themselves, they are not fit to *^^ 
trusted with their own money, — surely a reductio ad absurduff^ • 

The thought has doubtless suggested itself to the authoriti-^jl 
that if the people were trusted to manage their own finau^^^^^ 
affairs, the income tax would fare but badly, and untaxed ~ ^ 



India under King Baboo. 267 

oliester goods would no longer be suflfered to drive native manu- 
Cactnres out of the market. 

I have noticed above that the Bengal Government has shown 
8.pprehensions of the working of its new scheme, by the appoint- 
ment of an English officer as Chairman of the Central Board ; 
8.nd the irony of the elective process is still more apparent in 
tiie appointment of the village committees. 

'' In some few cases it might be necessary to nominate these 
members/' and, in the constitution of the local boards supposed 
to be elected by the village committees, " one of the members 
'^rould be elected by the Government," and " it would be neces- 
sary to retain the power of nominating a certain proportion of 
members so as to insure the representation of minorities." The 
passages between marks of quotation are taken from the resume 
of Mr. Macaulay's speech introducing the Bengal Local Self- 
Government Bill. 

From all this it is evident that the elective process is a delu- 
sion. It shows also that the Government looks askance at its 
own bantling ; and while more than enough is done to unsettle 
tile comm'unity, the ruling Power's attempts to hedge against 
^e consequences of its own temerity demonstrates clearly 
enough its conviction that the Indian people are not yet ripe 
for self-government in the true acceptation of that term. ^ If, as I 
have endeavoured to show, the natives of India are not yet fitted 
'o govern themselves, what is to be said of the assumption that 
tiiey are worthy to be entrusted with the interests of English- 

When the general subject of conferring enhanced powers ob 
stives was under consideration some years ago, the Duke of 
-^gyll made this very forcible remark : " There should be no- 
hesitation in laying down the principle that it is one of our first 
^^ties towards the people of India, to guard the safety of our 
dominion." The italics are mine. 

If the present rulers of India, representing or supposed to 
Represent the same political views as the Duke of Argyll, had 
^^ly kept this principle in view, it can hardly be credited that 
*hey would have ventured on a scheme which, of all others, would 
^ most likely to jeopardise the security of our position in India. 

The only plea for the present Government's transgression of 

*hiB principle, and it is not a complimentary one, is that its 

^^presentatives are unconscious of the real state of opinion in 

"^^iia, both in its native and its English bearing. This has 

afforded grounds for much hostile comment, which I do not wish. 



268 India under King Bahoo. 

to repeat; but it is a self-evident proposition, that whatever kno 
ledge the Viceroy and Mr. Ilbert may have on the subject, mi 
have come to them at second-hand. 

Sir Ashley Eden is credited with being the author of this i 
happy measure, at least that his recommendations formed i 
ground of Mr. Ilbert's Bill. If this be so, it would have be 
well that Sir Ashley should have stated his ** objects a 
reasons," according to the approved formula, as his views, if 1 
they be, have been directly traversed by his successor in 1 
Lieutenantcy of Bengal, who denounces the BiU as unnecessf 
and unpatriotic. 

Much stress has been laid upon the support given to the I 
by Lieutenant-Governors and others of high official position, 
must be remembered, however, that many, perhaps most 
these officials, have earned their promotion by a long service 
the Secretariat Department. I am very far from wishing 
assert that any of these gentlemen would record opinions contrs 
to their judgment, and their sense of what was right ; but i 
wishes of the Government would naturally commend themseli 
to men who had so long promulgated, in many instances p: 
bably originated, its policy. At any rate it will hardly 
denied that a long tenure of office in immediate connecti 
with the Supreme Government, is not the best training for 1 
proper appreciation of social questions such as those un( 
consideration, and that the real exponents of native views 
the subject would rather be sought for in officials of lev 
position, especially the district officers, who are in constant a 
intimate communication with the people. 

On this part of the subject important light has been throv 
as showing the opinions of officials of all grades. When i 
proposed amendments to the Criminal Procedure C!ode w< 
under consideration before the Legislature, the opinions i 
only of governors of provinces, but of other officers concern 
in the administration of the criminal law, were sought for. M( 
than 150 reports, several from native officials, were received 
reply. '* Among these," I quote from an article in the Hot! 
ward Mail of 24th April 1883, " were fifteen reports from Hi 
Court Judges, thirty- two from sessions and assistant sessic 
judges, ffity-seven from district magistrates, four from pre 
dency magistrates, thirty-two from commissioners of divisic 
seven from judicial commissioners, six from chief commissione 
five from inspectors-general of police, . besides others. Oi 
«ne of these reports, that of a native not belonging to 1 



India under King Baboo. 269 

Covenanted Civil Service, who was then acting aa Chief Magis- 
trate of Calcutta, advocated the aboIiti(Hi of the existing rights 
ofEmtipean British subjects." 

Tbis almost unanimous verdict by the persona beat qualified 
to judge should have settled the question, so far as Mr. Ilbert's 
Bill was concerned. We observe with regret that it has not 
done Eo, and that this festering sore is to be allowed to rankle 
on and gather fresh humours for the neit aix months. 

It has been stated that Mr. Ilbert's Bill has been suffered to 
incubate from the date of its fij-st reading till November next, 
HI the hope that the European non-official community will 
become used to it, on the old post-horsu principle, 1 suppose ; 
ud that, by the time the second reading of the Bill comes on, 
(heir withers will have become accustomed to the yoke. If aueh 
u idea has been entertained, it may be promptly dismissed ; for 
wen supposing such an impossibility as that Englishmen would 
uncomplainingly acquiesce in native domination, the Baboos of 
the native press will be sure to keep the " raw " open by their 
Niutant reference to the subject, and by their insisting, as they 
"'•^ already done, that the measure does not go far enough. 

I snppoae that there can be no difference of opinion as to how 
"W ptopoeal is entertained by non-official Englishmen in India. 
Hie universal outburst of indignant remonstrance when Mr. 
Hhett'B Bill was announced shows clearly what their sentiments 
*n ; and it remains to be seen if the Government will pay 
V^fet heed to this unanimous denunciation of their policy, ao 
w u their own countrymen are concerned. And that this 
■Woonstration is no transient display of feeling may be gathered 
^^^nn ttie remarks of the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, in his 
^Bech q^xwing the Bill : "I feel that in my whole experience 
'^ India this is unmistakably the strongest and most united and 
^VaimoDB expression of public discontent that I have ever 
[*H>ini. I believe that the last stage will be worse than the 
*^Vt; and if there is any thought that this is a transient 
UqilGtioii of feeling, I believe that view will in the end be proved 

isible complications which may ensue on the carrying 

of Mr. Ilbert's Bill have been forcibly depleted in the 
ewspapers. The withdrawal of English oapital and enter- 
tise from India, and the deadly opposition of non-official 
loglishmen to native authority, vhiofa may find vent in 
^erouB outbreaks, aire of themselves eerioas enough to 
■f^itom anforfling anviie and unnaceflaary legislation; 



■270 India under King Baboo. 

but there is a more serious element still, and that iv tli« 
hostile feeling to our own GoTcmmcnt which this legislation 
will engender, and this will hardly be confined to the non- 
official class. The commander-in-chief and the military mem- 
ber of Council have done well in protesting against the armj 
being mixed up in this question while it is under discussion ; bat 
if this Bill becomes law, it is impossible but that the feelings of 
English soldiers will be excited b; seeing their own cornitiymen 
subjected to native intrigue and native domination. 

The consequences of that excitement ma; well be regarded 
seriously ; and of all dangers to our rule in India, that of 
disnnion among the governing class is most to be apprehended. 
What was it that, under Providence, carried us safely thiougb. 
the terrible crisis of 1857 but the united front presented by 
every body of Englishmen in India ? The bundle of fagots w»b 
hound together firmly then, and all the vast forces bron^^ 
together against it failed to loosen the well-compacted bond z 
but if these conditions should be reversed, and discord take tb^ 
place of union, what then ? 

Let Mr. Ilbert and his supporters furnish the answer. 

I have said above that the natives who are most likelf t0 
qualify as judges over Englishmen, under Mr. Ilbert's propoeal*'* 
are quite unfitted for bo grave a responsibility. I will go 
further, and say that, from a pernsal of the sentiments expiueuMi 
hy their representatives in the native press, there is a tanfftx:^ 
determination to take up a hostile position — a manifest bin t^ 
make judicial power a means of injuring Englishmen. 

Take a few choice extracts from the native journals : — 

The Rate miA Rayat describes the English citizens of CaJeotto 
who met to protest against Mr. Ilbert's Bill as "a needy ui^ 
greedy lot of adventurers " ; and adds, " It is all over now with 
the last pretence of peace — the possibility or hope of an mtfflW 
cordiale between native and European." 

Another native paper, the Amrita Bazaar I'atrika, has n lonj 
article entitled " The Empress v. the Privileges of Cowards"— 
the cowards, of course, being the members of the European 
'Oommmiity. This same paper, reportuig aa occurrence at tbe 
Indian Club in Calcutta, which was institatad with the specii! 
•object of encouraging social interooorae betffeea natin>!i t^ 
En^ishmen, speEika of the treatment cnpeEcieooAd tharu by Bij> 
Shiva Pershad, one of the members of ConnoO, and one of tbc 
few native gentlemen who had the senBe to sM the dangers 
Mr. Ilbert's Bill, and the courage to proteat against it. 



India under King Baboo. 271 

iirg this gentleman the Amrita writes : '' Some looked upon him 
^"ith contempt ; others shunned him as if he had been something 
loathsome, untouchable ; others in very loud language called 
friTn a traitor ; while some hot-blooded young men were, we are 
&8sured, determined to assault him." 

The same gentleman is called by another native paper '* a 
traitor '* ; his speech against the Bill is termed '' a screaming 
fajrago " and '' a blasphemous adoration of injustice " ; and the 
ILiieutenant-Govemor of Bengal and Mr. Evans are treated with 
Sillingsgate of the same description. 

It would be easy to multiply instances of silly vituperation 
^Lnd scurrility like the above a thousand-fold. Anyone who 
caJ^B to read the reports of the Times correspondent from 
Calcutta, or the columns of the Anglo-Indian newspapers, can 
satisfy himself that the above quotations are, by comparison, 
rather favourable specimens of Baboo journalism ; but we may 
well pause to ask if it is in favour of a class like this that it is 
deemed desirable to incur the risk of a revolution. 

Is the Government prepared to hand over not only the welfare, 
the very existence of Englishmen in India, but the interests also 
of vast numbers of natives well affected to our rule, to a body of 
siUy scolds like these ? Are we suddenly to forget that we hold 
India under a mighty responsibility before God and man, and 
that when, if ever, we do abdicate our functions in that country 
^e are bound to do so in favour of a people represented by 
upright and independent principles of government, by power of 
<^aracter as well as by physical force ? Will anyone dare to 
^y that these conditions are fulfilled by those in whose favour 
^e are now asked to concede so much ? 

But besides and beyond exciting class against class and race 

^inst race, Mr. Ilbert's Bill will exercise a most injurious 

^6ct upon missionary work in India. I am among those who 

^hin]^ that our duty in India goes far beyond the developing the 

'"esources of the country, and giving good government to the 

People ; and that we are very nearly concerned in endeavouring, 

^y all lawful and peaceable means, to spread the knowledge of 

"^^ own blessed religion among the people of India. 

_ Of course we cannot effect this by the «ic volo sic jvbeo of 

Government authority, and offer The Book or the Blade, like 

^ Mahomedan predecessors ; but we are bound, at least if we 

1 ^^gnise our responsibilities, to avoid throwing any let or 

^^^drance in the path of those who are doing their best to 

^^Pagate the truth independently. The passing of Mr. Ilbert's 



272 India under King Baboo. 

Bill means the lowering of English influence throaghont bdiir 
and whatever legitimate help the misBionaries might have derind 
from that source, and it probably was considerable, will be loat 
to them. 

I shall hardly be misonderstood as implying that the nuason- 
aries ever derived any support or encouragement from tlu 
Government of India. On the contrary, from the time tbt 
Marquis Wellesley drove one of the earliest missionarieB from 
Calcutta to take refuge in Burmah, and exiled Carey and Manb- 
man to Serampore, mission work has been persiBtentlr 
discoimtenanced, to use the mildest term, by oar mlers, and n 
have presented the singular spectacle to the world of a Btrmg 
Government being ashamed of its own religion. 

It is the fashion of many people in India, and elsewbeis, t» 
depreciate the work which has been done by the misaionarybodf, 
and to minimise the result of their labours. Because lutin 
Christians are not often met with in daily life, err in ordimif 
society, therefore, so apparently proceeds the argnment, the woA 
of missionaries is a failure, and no perceptible influence hu been 
created by them. Of course those who hold these opinion* m 
content with negative evidence, and they do not tronble them- 
selves to ascertain if there is any movement outside the cirekof 
their own experiences. But even writers holding these opisiaw 
as regards the religious aspect of mission effort, have been em- 
pelled to admit that a great work in the caose of edao&tion htf 
been effected by missionaries in India. 

On this question, I quote the following from the Ptotwer, IB 
influential paper in the Morth-West Provinces, and eertainlf not* 
fiivourer of missions : 

As odneators, Probutant miisionuiei hdre ia IhdlB attaiiwd radoMrt NMM 
To compare their schooli irith tbaso under State anperniiaii wanld not b* • Iiir li' 
of what they haro accompliabed. Wa h>TB to look ba«k thnragh the lart tbMf 
j^ara, and trace ths conrao of the edncational moTHnent which hwiprMlxV 
India. We shall find that the leaders o( the moTemsnt hars baen eltW afarfv 
ariea, or those who have been their wamieat sopportara. In tUt indiiHt nvt'* 
•nlitfhtennient and oiTilisktion of India maj be aud to IwIaigeljoiriiigtomUHHy 
labonra. 

To this I may odd an extract &om Professor Monier WiUianiB'B 
book on India. Treating of the work of edooadon effected by &^ 
niissianaries, he remarks that " he has beenimpressed meretb&n 
ever with the beneflts which India derives from the active efforts 
of the missionaries of all denominatiojiB," and ho con&idem ttutt 
" the Enropeim missionary is daily beooming a more uspprtaB^ 
link between the QoTemment and ^e peopl 



India under King Baboo. 2 73 

This is not the occasion to enter upon a discussion as to the 
results, in a religious point of view, of missionary labours in 
3bidia. To those who expect the instantaneous conversion of so 
many millions, the returns will doubtless be disappointing ; but 
to those who are content to wait God's time, only being assured 
that the seed is growing, the statistics furnished by the various 
xnissionary bodies will afford strong hope and encouragement. I 
lia^e only one recent report to refer to, that of the Church 
Missionary Society, tuid from these I find that the number of 
their converts has been just doubled during the last twenty years^ 
and that it now reaches 100,000. 

Be it remembered that these are not men of straw. They are 
not like the slipshod individuals who take service with English- 
men, and from whom, I fear, many of our countrymen derive their 
views of native converts, who call themselves Christians on the 
ground that they " drink beer, same as master." 

The Missionary Societies to not readily admit native converta 
to baptism. They organise a long initiative process : the testi- 
mony of a virtuous life ; a thorough conviction on the part of the 
convert that the doctrine he has been taught is the true source 
of life; the abandonment, if necessary, of all natural ties — a con- 
sequence, be it added, very frequently entailed on native converts. 
When men comply with requirements like these, there should 
remain little doubt of their sincerity. 

I have just quoted the number of converts in the Church 
iCissionary Society's communion. Besides, there are vast 
^Umbers of native Christians in Southern India — Tinnevelly 
^^d Travancore have become a wonder. In Bengal the 
People of Chota Nagpore, a small nationality, have in great 
^tunbers adopted the Christian faith. In Burmah the Karen 
^^liristians number some 80,000. It is not well to exaggerate in 
^is matter, but, with these facts before us, we can hardly deny 
^hat mission work in India is steadily progressing, and we may 
'^^irly assume that the number of native Christians does not fall 
^e^y far short of a million souls. Is it well, we must ask once 
^ore, to incur the risk of destroying this great influence for 
Sood by race legislation ? 

To sum up. These measures are unnecessary. As regards 
^e Self-Govemment scheme, the village community system, 
^hich it would displace, has been working as well as any method 
^f local administration could in the present state of development 
^' the native races, and, conjoined with the Municipal Corpora- 
^ong, it meets sufficiently the wants of the people. 

YOL. VI. 18 



274 India under King Baboo. 

As regards the alteration of criminal procedure, I do not 
remember that any of its advocates have pleaded its necem% 
and the plea of '^ administrative convenience " appears to ha^ 
been dropped as untenable. 

Further, both schemes are uncalled for. It has not been aei 
forth, so far as I am aware, in favour of local self-government, 
that the people themselves have asked for the introduction of the 
new system. By the people I mean the real representatives d 
the different races, for we decline to accept the ** dicta " of the 
Baboos as representing in any degree the real wishes of flu 
people of India. As regards Mr. Ubert's Bill, assuredly itu 
opinions and wishes of those most nearly concerned, namely 
non-official Englishmen, have neither been consulted nor heeded 
Finally, as has been abundantly demonstrated by what hii 
transpired since the introduction of the last-named measure, i 
will renew and intensify all the bitterness of race antagonuoL 
which the glimpse of better times, alluded to above, might ixn 
induced us to hope was dying out. 

These remarks have not been penned in any spirit of partinB' 
ship. In India we have, or ought to have, no party ; butthetiBM 
appears to have arrived when Englishmen who have hi^ lon| 
personal experience of native habits and native feelings, and vb 
have brought away with them a sincere regard for the people, tb 
real people of India, and an earnest desire for their welffire, shouU 
in the presence of such dangerous innovations, make Oni 
opinions known ; and I trust that better and abler hands tim 
mine may be drawn to the work of impressing upon the pieM 
rulers of India, that '' it is our first duty to the people to gntf 
the safety of oiu: dominion." 

Since the above was written, I have seen two articles in A 
Beviews for June, one by Mr. H. G. Keene, of the Bengal (Sfi 
Service, on the subject of ** Local Self-Goverxunent in Ia&' 
the other by Sir Arthur Hobhouse, in support of Mr. IDNrti 
Bill. 

The former, as I gather from a ciursory perosal, Bnpporiitt 
view that the natives of India, at least as regards tiie rural Ml 
munities, are not yet ripe for local self-govenmient^ jimM 
simple, and that the constitnencieB would probably dsfil tfi 
own English district officers as Superintendents of the Bolrf 
a course which would directly traverse the OovemmflBkiAili 
at first pronounced. 

Sir Arthur Hobhouse, of course, supports the f l n M ii mm riillj 
of Mr. Obert's Bill, and speaks sligbtdngly of (lift ul^ MjWM 



India under King Baboo. 275 

^e principal non-official opposer, one Mr. £ranson, as Sir A. 
Hobhonse calls him. 

But we may generally conclude that a cause is weak when its 
^advocates resort to long extracts from ancient authorities to 
support their views. Sir Arthur Hobhouse has quoted Sir 
Thomas Munro, Mount- Stuart Elphinstone, Macaulay, and 
•others, to show that it is desirable to give increased power to the 
natiyes of India, and to allow them equal jurisdiction with Eng- 
lish judges over our countrymen. 

Allowing the weight with which Sir A. Hobhouse's authorities 
xziay be* supposed to speak, that gentleman has overlooked one 
important factor in the question, and that is, that between their 
4ime8 and our own the mutiny has intervened. That disastrous 
*eTent caused for a time an entire disruption of our relations 
^ih the people of India, and the amalgamation of the scattered 
fragments is not to be compassed within the term of a decade 
or two. Attending and following the mutiny, have come a new 
i^gime and the adoption of many western innovations, including 
-among them new laws and new systems of taxation. 

It is a moot question whether the people of India are gainers 
^7 being governed from Whitehall or firom Leadenhall Street, 
but there can be no doubt that the introduction of English laws 
-^d English systems of taxation has resulted in grief and trouble 
*o the country. 

The time and attention of the Government, I venture to say, 
^ould be more profitably employed, so far as the people are 
<^ncemed, in modifying or removing, if it may be so, the pressure 
'^i legal or financial measinres which are unpalatable to the 
^tives of India, than in adding to the trouble by the introduc- 
^n of fresh elements of discord. 

Sir Arthin: Hobhouse winds up his article by remarking that 
" We may feel confident that we are acting most wisely, when 
^6 advance towards the ideal by the most cautious and well- 
^iXfiidered steps." 

Carried nem. con. — and it is just because the great majority of 
^i^lishmen connected with India are,of opinion that the present 
^ps are '' incautious and ill-considered/' that they enter their 
latest against them. 



18 



276 



i^e lab (Estimates for 1883-84. 

By Mark Fytton. 



The discussion of the Navy Estimates for 1883-84 has r" 
suflfered from the circumstances to which we drew attention If 
year. The subject has been brought before Parliament at- 
period when the minds of Members were not worn out by t- 
effects of a heated and exhausting session. This is more as 
should be, for, as has been repeatedly pointed out in the 
pages, no estimates sanctioned by Parliament are of such vi"i 
importance to the country as those which aflfect the Navy. Lc3 
Henry Lennox, who last year did good service by keeping ti 
unsatisfactory condition of the materiel of the fleet well befc: 
the eyes of the country both in pamphlets and speeches, show 
that his interest in the subject had in no way abated, as 
the recent debate he subjected the Government ship-buildi: 
policy to a most searching criticism, which placed our sho:: 
comings in a very unpleasant light. He commenced vs 
properly by showing that while our maritime interests, v^ 
colonies, carrying trade and commerce, had enormously increa^ 
of late years, our naval strength on the other hand had rz 
only failed to grow in proportion to the interests it had 
defend, but had not maintained its position relatively to that 
other powers, such as France, Italy, and Germany. Thus 
the year 1881 the gross tonnage of the commercial marines 
the whole world was about 6,700,000 tons, of which 4,200,OC 
or nearly 65 per cent., belonged to this country, while the pX 
portion belonging to France was only 420,000 tons, or j«: 
one-tenth of our own. Thus our floating interests at sea ^ 
ten times as great as those of our neighbour, and nearly tw^ 
as great as those of all the rest of the world put togetlB. 
These figures are striking in their way, but they do not tell 1». 
the tale. We have also to take into account the enorm^ 
relative size of our colonies and foreign possessions, and ^ 
large proportion of our daily food which comes to us by ^ 



The Navy Estimates. 277 

Wlien all this is considered, no candid person will be found to 
•den J that the fleet of this country should be maintained in a 
oondition of strength superior to that of the two most powerful 
European navies put together. But what are the facts ? How 
is the Government showing that it is aUve to the situation, and 
^what steps is it taking to maintain our supremacy at sea ? It 
has been already shown in the pages of this magazine * what 
^as the relative state of the navies of France and England last 
year. Full particulars were given of the names of the ships 
built or building for the two countries, and of their size, 
•armour, armament, power, and speed. It was shown that while 
we possessed thirty-nine non-obsolete sea-going and coast- 
defence ironclads, either built or building, the French owned 
thirty-eight ; while the largest of the French ships were superior 
in &11 fighting qualities to our own. This was of itself suffi- 
ciently alarming ; but, as events have shown us, it has proved 
q^aite insufficient to stimulate the Government to action. 

In the meantime matters have become much worse, for to the 
twenty vessels building by France last year they have now 
^ded two more first- class ironclads, the Brennus and the 
Ck,Tle9 MarteUy which are each to be armed with four 64-ton 
^^ins, together with eight armoured gtm-vessels of great 
speed ; while we in this country have not yet made a serious 
)>eginning with the two new ironclads of the British Admiral 
^lass, viz. the Camper down and the Anson y which were promised 
^ the Estimates for 1882-83. Nothing was done to the 
latter vessel, and only 237 tons built into the former during 
tte last financial year ; while no new ironclads, properly so 
called, are promised for the current year, but only two pro- 
tected vessels, modifications of the Polyphemm, one of which 
^ not even carry guns. 

Last year the French laid down four new ironclads, viz. the 

^cyenta^ the Neptune, the Hoche, and the Marceau, which were 

fe) be advanced to the following extents : — Magenta, 14'5 per 

^Dt.; Neptune, 16i per cent.; Hoche, 17i per cent.; and 

^arceau, 30 per cent. These vessels are of the same size as 

*^^ later vessels of the British Admiral type, viz. about 9,864 

•ons ; the armour round the guns is about fourteen and a half 

^^hcB, and the armament consists of three 48-ton and fifteen 

^i*ton guns. The same year our own Admiralty proposed to 

^ouamence four ironclads of the British Admiral class, viz. the 

"^owe, Benbow, Anson, and Camperdown, which were to be 

• Vol iv., pp. 460 and 566. 



278 The Navy Estimates. 

advanced as follows : — Howe, 13 per cent. ; Benbaw, 7 per cei 
Camperdoum, 3^ per cent.; and AnsoUf 'OOS per cent, 
before stated, the Afison was not even commenced, and 
work done on the other three fell considerably below the E 
mates. From these figures we may deduce that the numbe 
tons of new ironclads built by the two countries in the 
financial year bore to each other the following ratio : — Fre 
19*6 to English 6, i.e. our neighbours were advancing their i 
work more than three times as fast as we were. These figr 
take no account of the work done by either side on ships wl 
had been commenced prior to last year. During the cun 
financial year the French are going to add 17,200 tons to tl 
armoured fleet, while we have estimated for only 12,300 t( 
It is known that neither Government adheres strictly to 
programme, but in estimating which will most approxima 
carry out its intentions we must remember that the Fre 
have got 23,000 hands in their dockyards, and are in addil 
building three ironclads by contract, while we have only 18, 
hands m the yards, and are building but one ship by contra 
added to which is the known fact that the British Admin 
invariably falls very much short of its intentions, the deficie 
in the ten years from 1872-73 to 1882-83 having been no 
than 21,665 tons out of a total of 88,471 which was estim^ 
for. 

To sum up, we may assert that when the present builci 
programmes of the two countries are completed, each f 
will contain the same number of non-obsolete ironclads, w 
the largest French ships will be superior to the largest Eng 
in both size, speed, armament, and armour ; and at the ] 
sent moment our neighbours are adding to their armor 
fleet annually half as much tonnage again as we are. 1 
is anything but an agreeable prospect. It means that ^ 
shortly France will share with us on equal terms the domii 
of the seas, and that a combination of France with. Ii 
will be able to overwhelm us. It must never be lost si 
of that such a combination is not only a possibility bu 
exceedingly probable. Italy is known to have ambitions 
the Mediterranean, which France could afford to allow he 
satisfy at England's expense; and the Italian fleet, tho 
not a very large one, is invaluable for purposes of co-op 
tion, because it possesses the most powerful war-ships 
existence. The Italia and Lepg^nto, in conjunction with 
two French ironclads the Amiral Bauiin and the Farmidc 



The Navy Estimales. 279 

will, when completed, be able to sweep the Mediterranean clean 
of any other ships in the world which might be brought against 
them, while their immense speed will make it impossible for 
any merchant vessels, no matter how strongly convoyed to enter 
the same sea. One of the most alarming featm-es of the present 
state of our own navy is the complete absence of really first- 
class ironclads. With the single exception of the Inflexible we 
do not possess a vessel which approximates to the first class, 
and even she must, on account of her comparatively low speed 
and lighter guns, be put in a distinctly lower category than the 
four vessels named above. Even if the Admiralty wake up at 
last to the dangers of the situation — and at present they show 
no signs of doing so — it will take many years to make up for 
lost time, and to overtake the start which the French and 
Italians have already got of us. 

It will be interesting now to glance at the official view of the 
situation. Sir Thomas Brassey, the Civil Lord of the Admiralty, 
vas the first speaker on the Government side of the House to 
'cply to Lord Henry Lennox. Sir Thomas Brassey is known to 
jw an advocate of vessels of restricted size. His favourite hobby 
M the too many eggs in one basket theory. Li other words, he 
'fluJcB it to be prudent to build vessels which must, from their 
**niall size and consequent deficiency in every fighting quality. 
laU an easy prey to first-class u-onclads. Looked at in another 
l^ay, he adyocates that the eggs (i.e. sovereigns) be distributed 
n a number of frail baskets, in which, under certain circum- 
ttances, they are perfectly certain to be broken, rather than 
hat they be grouped in larger quantities in receptacles which 
re tolerably certain to carry them safely under all contingencies. 
Fe leave our readers to form their own conclusions as to the 
ifldom of this policy. It is the natural outcome of another 
kTonrite delusion, viz. that the proper object which the 
dmindty ought to keep in view is, how with most advantage to 
Mnd a given smn of money. Now we protest earnestly against 
le adoption of this view of the situation. The proper object 
bifih the Admiralty should keep in view should be how best 
I eecure the efficienoy of the navy and the safety of the country, 
be given-Biim-of-money element should not exist. If the navy 
mnot be made efficient, and fit to cope with all comers, for one 
Dtt of momejt then another sum must be asked for and 
^H&ied. It irill be given, and with no gmdging hand by the 
ili^i^f.BO matter what the Treaanry may say or affect to 




280 The Navy Estimates. 

The above being Sir Thomas Braaaey'a views, it will not 
flurprise our readers to learn that he takes a very rosy Tin 
of the situation. Official views on snch questions Bomebof 
always are sanguine. What will surprise our readers to lem 
is, that in order to make the official view acceptable sol 
palatable, the speaker, if he was correctly reported, did not 
hesitate to strain even official veracity to its utmost limitBii 
order to prove his case and score off an adversary. With tta 
accurate descriptions of every ship built or building for tin 
two navies, which have been recently published in the pag* 
of this magazine, before thera, our readers will have no difficult 
in making up their minds as to the truthfulness of what foUon. 
Sir Thomas Brassey groups in the first class ships with annooi 
of not less than nine inches and a displacement exc«din( 
8,500 tons, and tells us that we had in 1862 ten ships reidj 
for sea, with an aggregate displacement of 96,000 tons, whiW 
the French had three ships with a displacement of 22,000 tou. 
Now, we have never denied that our fleet is at the presMi 
moment much the stronger of the two, nor did Lord HeniJ 
Lennox, or any of the other critics on the Opposition side of tin 
House, ever deny it ; therefore Sir Thomas Braasey might hxn 
saved himself the trouble of giving these hgures. NevertbelaHi 
as he has given them, they are fair game for analysis, and will 
serve as an example of the style of official explanation as pne- 
tised by the present Government. Sir Thomaa Braasey bA 
upon the limit 8,500 tons and nine inches of armour becioM 
by so doing he was able to exclude four French ships ^isA 
just fell the merest trifle abort of one or other of tlaii 
(jualifications, though they posaeaB other quaUtiea which tt^ 
entitle them to rank with some of the English veaaek whiA 
be has included in his list. The names of these vawb 
are the Fricillund and Rkhelieu, of 8,661 tons and B) indM 
of armour, which fall short of tiie standard by only oiullW 
of an inch of armour, a microscopic quantity, and the Cottffl 
and TrUient, the tonnage of which is, ac«ordiug to MO* 
authoritiea, slightly above, and to others slightly below ^ 
limit, and the armour is 8'5 inches, or half au inch le.'ie ibtf 
the standard at the thickest part, but these vesi^ols pos^e" 
higher average thickness of armoor than two of our own irW- 
clada which he incladea. On the other band, he included lO 
the English list, as then ready for sea, the Thundfrer. vi^ 
was Dndergoing repair, and leaves out the Moiutrdi f^^^^^ 
tons and 10-inch armoor on tnixetB. With tbH«}<l 



The Navy Estimates. 2?1 

bis statement abould have run as followB : — We had in 1882 
ten Urat-claBB ironcladB ready for sea, with an aggregate dis- 
placement of 94,140 tons ; and the French eight vesBels, 'with 
1 displacement of about 72,180 tons — whivh reads slightly 
differently. 

Neit as to the future. Sir Thomas tellB ub that in 1666 we 
thai] have fifteen ships (tirst-claus ironclads) of 140,000 tons, 
Bgaiust the French six ships with t;i,000 tons. The ahsurdity 
of this statement lies on the Hurfacc, as the French have 
already, as shown above, seven ships of G2,700 tons ; but let ns 
examine its accuracy a little more closely. The division of 
■hips into first ami second class according to their mere dia- 
placement and thickness of armour is purely ridiculous, and 
would oblige Sir Thomas to exclude from the British list the 
Conqaeror, which is the most powerful ship of her size in the 
world, carrying two 43 ton and two G-ineh B. L. guns, and pro- 
rided with twelve inches of steel-faced axmour round the guns ; 
while he includes the comparatively antiquated II<:rcule8 and 
Sailan, which could botli be destroyed by the Comiiu-rur single- 
■onded. He would also have to exclude the Ajax and Aga- 
■Kniioii, because they do nut quite come up to his limits of 
tonnage. Let us, however, include these vessels, and add them, 
together with the Thundnrer, the Edinhurgh, and the ColosBus, 
to thoM now ready, and we shall have, by 1885, sixteen first- 
»>■■ itooclada ready for sea, having an aggregate displacement 
W 144,9SO tons. No other ironclad now building will be ready 
I*! the end of 1885, nor yet by the end of 188t), unless excep- 
txutl ptogresB is made with the Colluuiicood. By the end of 
^°8S tiie French will have added six new ironclads to their fleet, 
*> which foor, viz. the Caiman, Itidomptabln, Rcquiii, and 
^trriiU, are included in the first class for the same reasons* 
•Ut Bodied to the Conqueror. They ore vessels having each a 
^mheanent of 7,200 tons, 18-inch steel armour, and two 
hodl gmiH. Perhaps, however, Sir Thomas Brassey would 
Kio put them in a class below the Herculen, Stiltan, Alexandra, 
*Pfr\i\ though probably on mature deliberation, and when 
'^ from the necessity of lulling the suspicions of the House 
[Commons to sleep, he will change his opinion. The aggregate 
placement of the fourteen French vesBels by the end of 1886 
SU be 123,300 tons. 

By the end of 1886 the numheT of English first-ratea will be 
Vmteco, and their t(»magB 164,100. At the same period the 
' ^ill iuLii;e,ad4^ foor more powerful vesBels to theii fleet* 



282 The Navy Estimates. 

viz. the Magenta, Hoche, Marceau, and Neptune, so that 1 
total will be eighteen, having a displacement of 162,000 ton 
about 8,000 tons in excess of ours. 

The above figures amply justify Lord Henry Lennox's acl 
but what can be thought of the assurances of the Govemi 
when one of the members of the Board of Admiralty condesc 
to the shabby trick of dividing the two navies into classes b 
arbitrary line, chosen with such cunning as just to exclu 
number of French ships, and just to include a numlx 
English vessels, all of which, as he knows perfectly well 
practically on a par with one another. Had any other 
representative of the Admiralty thus spoken we could '. 
found an excuse for him ; we should charitably have supp 
that he had been primed with facts of which he was hir 
ignorant, by some over-zealous oflGicial of the department, 
for Sir Thomas Brassey there is no such excuse ; he know 
too well what he is talking about. He has lately compi] 
work which gives an accurate account of all the navies in 
world, and out of this work he can, whenever he feels disp( 
confute his own statements. These statements may deceivt 
bulk of Members of the House of Commons, they ma 
received with feelings of satisfaction in the country, where 
will engender a sense of false security, but they will not de 
the rivals of England. 

The condition of the sea-going fleet is not the only groun 
have for complaint of the Admiralty. To whatever depart] 
we turn, we find the same want of preparation, the sam 
ability or unwillingness to grapple with the facts of the situa 
Our coast-defence ironclads are, as has been pointed out bj 
John Hay, greatly inferior to those of the French. The 
is still armed almost throughout with the old-fashi 
Woolwich gun, which became obsolete four years ago. ] 
the limited amount of re-arming which was promised two i 
since has not been carried out. We are without an authorit 
statement as to whether the new heavy breechloaders a 
success or not. The 63-ton breechloaders for the Bi 
Admiral class have not even been commenced, and meas 
other Powers have actually got 100-ton guns afloat. Tor 
vessels, we are told on Sir Thomas Brassey's own authority 
being largely built for all the principal ^avies of Europe, y 
he admits that the provision in the present estimates 
vessels of this class is confined within somewhat narrow lii 
but postpones till next year the remedy for this stat* 



The Navy Estimates. 283^ 

things. Now the position which first-class torpedo-boats will 
take up in future wars is every day engaging more fully the 
attention of naval of&cers. Some of these vessels, having dis- 
placements of from fifty to 100 tons, are capable of steaming 
1,000 miles at speeds of from ten to twelve knots, and can also 
stand exceedingly rough weather. They will imdoubtedly prove 
dangerous antagonists to ironclads under certain circumstances 
in closed seas like the Channel, the Baltic, or the Black Sea. 
Their attacks can only be successfully warded oif by the use of 
similar torpedo-boats accompanying the ironclad fleet. Never- 
theless, though these opinions meet with general recognition, 
and though the Civil Lord of the Admiralty confesses that 
foreign Governments are rapidly supplying themselves with this 
type of boat, and that our own navy is deficient in them, no 
effort is to be made till next year to put things right, and when 
next year comes we may have new representatives of the 
Admiralty in the House, who will not consider themselves 
bound by, or who will have forgotten the flimsy promises of,. 
Aeir predecessors. 

We have thus far only compared our own navy with that 
of France. If we compare it with that of Franco and Italy 
combined, we should have grounds for feeling not merely 
^'^nn, but almost despair. Two of the Italian first-rates, the 
-DhiKo and Dandolo, though a little smaller than the Inflexible^ 
^^ superior to the latter ship in armour, armament, and 
■P®od, while the other two, the Italia and Lepanto, which arc 
®^?ected to be ready for sea by the end of 1886, will be as 
•'^^erior to the Inflexible as the latter ship is to the Devastatvni 
^ Thunderer, It is no exaggeration to say that a fleet eoiii- 
P^^Bed of these four Italian vessels, and the three French 
"'rt-rates, viz. the Amiral Duperre, the Amiral Bavdin, and the 
^ornidaUtf, could not be confronted by any other fleet in the 

In order to make the relative future positions of the two 
leBb of Great Britain and France apparent at a glance, the 
ndgoined table is placed before the readers of this magazine. 
flie ahipB are divided into numerous classes, and not merely 
ilto two great diviBions — as was done by Sir Thomas Brassey — 
ndl division including vessels of widely different power. The 
pMlMt ^ypee of vesBelB included in the list are those of the 
SblMfat dMB fiir England, and of the Colbert class for France. 
itejilijjyi an indnded except such as will be ready at the end 
il^MII*' Xba first class comprises only vessels of over lOiOOO* 



284 Tlie Navy Estimates. 

tous displacement, having guns neighing more than eighty 
tons, and armour of not lesH than fifteen inches. The second 
class includes veRSels of not less than 7,200 tons displacement, 
and this only when the armonr and armament is exccptionall; 
powerful. In this list are included the English turret-ahips 
which rank after the IxJlexihU: ; the powerful French " barbette" 
ships of the Hoche type; their very formidable turret-Ehipa 
intended for cruising in the Channel SJid Mediterranean, uid 
for coast defence, of the Terrible class ; and their ceutnl 
battery ships of the Devastation type, which it will be noted 
are more powerfully armed than our large turret-ships. Tbe 
third class includes all vessels which are not powerful enOD^ 
to enter the second class, but which do not fall below the limit 
fixed by Sir Thomas Brassey and modified by onrselves. The 
only vessel put down in this class, whose rightful position a at 
all doubtful is the Conqueror, of 6,200 tons, 12-inch ateel-fued 
armour, and two 43-ton brecchloading gims. Though distinctlj 
inferior to the vessels included in the second class, this eliip 
will, on account of her powerful armament and excellent ormonii 
he vastly superior to any other vessel included in the thiri 
class. 

The following short table gives a summary ot the pontion, 
and also takes into account tbe effect of an alliance between 
France and Italy agsinst this country : — 

C1HK4 of ^hijin. Fruico. Itnlj. FrsDM md Itolj. Eogbai 

First .24 6 1 

Second . 11 — 11 9 

Thinl . 5 — 5 7 

Total .18 4 22 17 

This table shows that the serious want of our navy istb* 
more powerful type of line-of-battle ship. In both first ani 
second-class ships we are inferior to France alone, and vutl; 
inferior to her and Italy combined. It is not till we get to tiu 
third and lower classes of veasela that we are superior in 
numbers. 

We trust that tbe table given below, oontaining, as it Ana, 
iuformation drawn from the best sources, may have the ufleet 
of dissipating the uncertainty on this subject which haa beeo 
produced by the official generalities of the Cfvil Lord of the 
Admiralty, and thai it may have waaa effisot in awal^eiui^ 
the country to a eeiiBe of the dangerous poaitipn which, it i 



Thf Navy EstimaUs. 



III! I i 

ii mm ii III 



liii |ii 



I nil 



i 'ft' 



I I ■"! = B 



I III! 

! iiir 



-liiiiii 



i 



liliill 

SS3" 3=5 = 

aaasa 'a = 

IISIi'"l 
Plllill 

liiL 




III I III 

III I JSI" 

■liiiiji 



I 



2B6 



% Ulobtrn (gclopt, 



Faib in the Porh when Spring's light Tul is dxtrn 
Over greeQ tbicketB set in velvet lawn, 
WHere on their shining palfreys galloping go 
The tight-braced Amazons of Rotten Eow ; 
"Where, rom the Gardens up to Grosvenor Gate, 
In low-hang landaus Beauty sails in state ; 
Where bronze Achilles in his corner sprawls 
To where, beyond the red Prtetorian walls, 
Albert the Gilt confronts hia marble balls 
(There Art and Science hold united sway 
Over the ancient realm of bright D'Orsay) ; 
Or where, revealed in all ita graceless line. 
Unskilful oarsmen plough the Serpentine ; 
Town 's country, sedentary labour 's cure. 
Home of the homeless, pleasance of the poor ! 

Here, as Alphonse and I, up Back-hill-waUi 
Strolled, idly met, we drifted into talk ; — 
Alphonse, with whom (before the century gained 
Half its third quarter, and Badinguet reigned) 
I lounged the Boulevard, shared the Bois' deUghtSi 
Saw the Elysian fields alive with lights ; 
Then at tbe Vari^t^s, in gorgeous dress, 
Applauded Schneider as the Grande Dnchesse; 
Or, in a still more thooghtless long-ago, 
Ate bisque with Cora at tbe FroveuQaux — 
Now we met here, eaob powdered with Tinu'i koA 
To ask what Life bad gained, what Life lyillMfc. 

"All things ore for the worse," my friand' 
'" First womiui, doubtless, but then, also, man 
Behold, I pray, those pale, sad- 
With Florenoe fringe and mediant 



A Modern Eclogue. 287 

Penance and peccadillo all combined ! 
Ma foil no wonder Love is painted blind. 
And see the men that raise fantastic hats, 
Their razor-collars and their white cravats ! 
I swear I never saw — but no ! ahem ! 
I only mean they are good enough for them,** 

" Betise, man chcr / " I hastened to reply 
(And if the word was hurried, so was I ; 
For six o'clock was striking, and I knew 
I was engaged to Shentpershent, the Jew), 
" That golden age of which the poets tell 
Is each man's youth, and Time abates the spell : 
Keen memory, baffled hope, bring us ennui ; 
But ask the careless youngsters that you see, 
Ask if the life we led they 'd care to live, 
And let me know the answer that they give." 

Alphonse was mute. But do not think to stay 
A Frenchman's eloquence by aught you say ; 
As soon control the " Flying Dutchman's " pace 
By smiling in the engine-driver's face ; 
As soon arrest the Hansom*s furious course 
By holding out a biscuit to the horse ; 
As soon — for similes why need I fret ? 
Alphonse but paused to light a cigarette ! 

So I went on, more calmly, '^ You and I 
Are fogies, fools of Anno Domini ; 
Bemember Balzac's often pilfered tale, 
* Critics are only those who try — and fail.' 
*That pair who passed, he on the chesnut cob, 
With golden trinkets jingling at his fob. 
She in the cuffs and collars epicene. 
With black pot-hat, and habit all of green. 
His £ather made a million by his toil, 
Hen in America has a mine of oil ; 
Would you deny all merit to a time 
When humble birth has ceased to seem a crime. 
When patient Merit, rising from the dust, 
-Can hnntify the Planet's npper cmst. 
And oQmes your Emperor's adage to fiilfil, 
^Ihe qnany opened to the labourer's skill ' ?" 

<* Qnoe rank was rank," he answered, " each man 
knew 
^IKhii io anotheri to himael^ wae doe; 



2ti6 



% gtobtni dttlopt. 



Fair is the Park when Spring's light veil is ^^ 
Over green thickets set in velvet lavn, 
Where on their shining palfreys galloping go 
The tight-braced AmazonB of Rotten Row ; 
"Where, rom the Gardens up to GrOBvenor Gate, 
In low-hung landaus Beaut; sails in state ; 
Where bronze Achilles in bis comer sprawls 
To where, beyond the red Freetorian walls, 
Albert the GUt con&ontB his marble halls 
(There Art and Science hold united sway 
Over the ancient realm of bright D'Orsay) ; 
Or where, revealed in all its graceless line, 
Unskilful oarsmen plough the Serpentine ; 
Town 's country, sedentary labour 's onre, 
Home of the homeless, pleasance of the poor I 

Here, as Alphonse and I, up Buck-hiU-WBlk 
Strolled, idly met, we drifted into talk ; — 
Alphonse, with whom (before the centnry gained 
Half its third quarter, and Badingnet reigned) 
I lounged the Boulevard, shared the Bois' dnlight*' 
Saw the Elysian fields alive with lights ; 
Then at the Variet^s, in gorgeous dresB, 
Applauded Schneider as the Grande DneheMS; 
Or, in a still more thoughtless long-a^, 
Ate bisque with Cora at the Proven^aoz — 
Now we met here, each powdered with Time's btyetw 
To ask what Life had gained, what Life had lost. 

" All things are (or the worse," my friend begWi 
-" First womjui, donbtless, but then, alao, man ; 
Behold, I pray, those pale, Bsid-vi&iLged girls, 
"Witli FloEeiUM fringe and mediteval curls, ^m 



A Modem Eclogue. 287 

Penance and peccadillo all combined ! 
Ma foi f no wonder Love is painted blind. 
And see the men that raise fantastic hats, 
Their razor-collars and their white cravats ! 
I swear I never saw — but no ! ahem ! 
I only mean they are good enough for tJieni.'* 

** Betise, mon cher / " I hastened to reply 
(And if the word was hurried, so was I ; 
For six o'clock was striking, and I knew 
I was engaged to Shentpershent, the Jew), 
" That golden age of which the poets tell 
Is each man's youth, and Time abates the spell : 
Keen memory, baffled hope, bring us ennui ; 
But ask the careless youngsters that you see. 
Ask if the life we led they 'd care to live. 
And let me know the answer that they give." 

Alphonse was mute. But do not think to stay 
A Frenchman's eloquence by aught you say ; 
As soon control the ** Flying Dutchman's " pace 
By smiling in the engine-driver's face ; 
As soon arrest the Hansom's furious course 
By holding out a biscuit to the horse ; 
As Boon — for similes why need I fret ? 
Alphonse but paused to light a cigarette ! 

So I went on, more calmly, " You and I 
Are fogies, fools of Anno Domini ; 
Bemember Balzac's often pilfered tale, 
'* Critics are only those who try — and fail.' 
'That pair who passed, he on the chesnut cob, 
With golden trinkets jingling at his fob, 
She in the cuffs and collars epicene, 
With black pot-hat, and habit all of green, 
Hi$ £ather made a million by his toil, 
Hen in America has a mine of oil ; 
Would yon deny all merit to a time 
When humble birth has ceased to seem a crime, 
When patient Merit, rising from the dust, 
<!Bn beautify the Planet's upper cnut. 
And eomes your Emperor's adage to ftdfil, 
^Ihe qnany opened to the labourer's skill ' ?*' 

" Once rank was rank/' he answered, " each man 
knew 
ip another, to himself , was doe; 




*-.-:» sT 



A Modern Eclogue.. 

Then, for the elang and liberty of Now, 
Yoa had the compliment and courteous bow; 
Then, impudence by looks was soon repressed, 
Or, if they failed, the pistol did the rest ; 
Then lords were lords ; and then the sons of earth 
Obeyed the laws decreed by men of birth. 
What have yoa now? Be fond en comble tossed. 
All grades confounded, and all order lost ; 
Chaos is come, and Bassia soon will be 
The only place for men like you and me." 

But, while we argued, Fashion left the Park, 
And lengthening shadows made the hollows dark. 
Alphonse went home, to dress and see a play 
Where young patricians act — as best they may; 
I, to apologise to Shcntpershent, 
Whose house I hire, but cannot pay the rent. 

H.G.I. 




289 



lltfriefos anb |totes^ 



Memoir of John A. Dahloreen, Bear-Admiral United States 
Navy. By hie Widow, Madeleine Vinton Dahlgreen. With 
Por^ait and Illustrations. Boston : James B. Osgood &, Co. ; 
London : Triibner 4; Co. 

^ONosT the many distinguished sailors produced by the great 

^public across the Atlantic John Dahlgreen will always occupy 

^ conspicuous place. A man of a singularly inventive genius, 

it may be said that he created the ordnance which proved so 

^fifective in the civil war ; that he not only built up but put in 

^tion a system which superseded that which had previously 

Prevailed. It is not always that the practical finds a place 

^ide the theoretical in the brain of the same man ; but it is 

^^e of Dahlgreen's great merits that, with all his inventive 

S^^us, he was essentially a practical man, and that he was 

J^^ver satisfied with any of the ideas which crowded into his 

'^^ain, until he had submitted them to the roughest tests. We 

^^e bound to add that in America he had an executive which is 

^^ more tolerant of inventors than is that of Great Britain, and 

^tich is free— "to an extent far greater than in these islands — 

^om the shackles of cliques. Dahlgreen had then a fair chance, 

^^<i he used it to the best advantage of his country. 

The memoir before us is one of the most fascinating books 
^e have ever read. It introduces the young Dahlgreen trained 
^ the habits to closely investigate cause and effect. It is well 
^h«t we should state here that he was lineally descended, on the 
^other's side, from the once influential Mortimers of the north 
^^ Ireland — a family which claimed collateral lineage with the 
*^ Bohans of Brittany ; that his mother was a lady specially 
^^dowed with great natural gifts, especially in the way of 
designing ; and that his father was of a distinguished Swedish 
VOL. VI. 19 



290 Reviews and Notes. 

family, and a man of great learning and talent. The subject of 
this memoir early entered the navy of the United States, in 
1826. Here he specially distinguished himself by his quickneaa, 
his aptitude, and his genius for scientific discovery. Transfened 
in 1847 to the ordnance department at Washington, he spent here 
the sixteen years that followed, rose gradually to be its head, 
and during that period devoted all his energies to the de- 
velopment of discoveries which revolutionised the science of 
gunnery. 

We have not space here to enter into the details of the process 
by which Dahlgreen arrived at certain conclusions, or of the 
mode in which he applied his theories. The story 'is told with 
wonderful minuteness, often in Dahlgreen's own words, in the 
book before us. We have in fact the diary of a man of singu- 
larly inventive genius. We trace the several phases of his minii 
as conclusions, coming one after the other, prompted him to 
further investigation. We have never read a book which give* 
a greater insight into the mind of a man. It is this whicli 
constitutes its fascination. We defy anyone of ordinary intel- 
ligence to read it without being carried away. Prominently thftjr* 
stands out the earnestness, the energy, the application, an.^ 
superintending these qualities, the divine gift of the invento: 
gift, however, which would have been of no avail unless it 
been accompanied by the other qualities. 

After sixteen or seventeen years of abstruse study, the 
arrived again for action. When the civil war broke out Dal»^3 
green was placed in command of the Washington navy yard, aa^ 
in 1863, appointed Bear-Admiral. He then succeeded Admir^^ 
Dupont in command of the South Atlantic blockading squadros^ 
In this post, of the occurrences in which a complete and m(p^ 
interesting record is given, he proved that the genius of tl*^ 
closet can, when occasion demands, develop into the daring ari^^ 
prudent man of action. In 1866 he was nominated to il'^^ 
command of the South Pacific squadron. He died in July 19f^ 
in his sixty-first year, from the effects of a cold caught fro^^ 
riding in his wet clothes when saturated by a thunder-storm. 

Barely have we laid down a book with greater regret, 
appeals to all the truest feelings of our nature, alike to l^ 
intellectual and to its sympathetic side. It is a record of the li^^ 
of a man who was as good as he was great. A descendant of tt'^ 
Vikings, who were the forerunners of the race which domioife'^ 
the world on both sides of the Atlantic, John Dahlgreen left ^ 
le which must ever be dear to both branches of the 




Reviews and Notes. 291 

ilj, a reputation clear and bright as the sunny sky of an 
3 astern summer, an example and a memory to all. This 
n.onnment to him, admirably raised by the hands of his widow, 
loxnned though it be of paper and ink alone, will, we predict, be 
mortal ! 



COLLECTIONS OF THE EaBUL CAMPAIGN, 1879-1880. By JoSHUA 

Duke, Bengal Medical Service, F.R.A.S. London : W. H. 
Allen & Co. 1883. 

[7di8 book modestly professes to contain only a brief description 

>C places and facts which have come under the notice of the 

«rriter while serving with three branches of the native army in 

Ln.^, and for a short time on Sir P. Roberts's staff, during the 

Afghan campaign of 1879-80. We do not hesitate, however, to 

pronounce it to be the historical work of that campaign. The 

Btory is well told ; the scenes are impressively described ; and the 

greater part of the proofs were read by Sir P. Roberts before 

being submitted to the public. They thus bear to a great extent 

the oflBcial stamp of accuracy. The letter from Sir P. Roberts, 

which is published in the preface, is very explicit on the subject 

of the point up to which a subordinate officer writing the 

history of a war can hope to dive into the mind of the 

commander, and the point beyond which he cannot go. 

The years 1879-80 were the most interesting years of the 
second Afghan war, and the main interest attaches to General 
Roberts. Dr. Duke gives us an account of that distinguished 
officer's campaign ; of the preliminary events of the war ; of the 
brilliant march over the Shutargardan ; the occupation of Kabul 
^d the deposition of Yakub Khan ; of the rising of the clans ; 
^f the manner in which General Roberts saved the position; of 
tte concentration within Sherpur ; of the second fight at Chara- 
^b ; of the brilliant march from Kabul to Kandahar ; and of 
. tte decisive battle fought near that town. We have called it a 
^^scription : it is really a history ; for not only is it full of 
wie most interesting details, but the narrative never neglects 
^6 leading facts which should guide the pen of a historical 
^ter. 

We cannot too strongly recommend this work to the general 
'^er. It combines the interest of the romance with the 
•ccnracy of history; it pictures in glowing words scenes of 
^hich every Englishman is glad to have a record ; and, above 

\ it brings before the public, in a most striking manner, the 



292 Beviews and Notes. 

character of the most modeBt, moat unpretending, yet most 
brilliant and daring soldier of our period. 

We may add that the work is well illustrated with exoellent 
maps, plans, and eketcheB. The portrait of Sir F. Roberts, 
which faces the title-page, is good as far as the likeness is 
concerned; yet, looking at the enormous length of the acahbard, 
a hypercritical observer might be tempted to inquire whether it 
is Sir F. Koborte who is carrying the sword, or the sword which is 
carrying Sir F. Boberts. 



A TsEATiBE ON Scales. By Major F. H. Dyke. London: 
Messrs. Allen & Ck)., 13 Waterloo Place, 8.W. ; Colchester: 
N. B. Mattacks, Head Street. 

This little work is designed by its atitbor to supply a want 
long felt by officers and others who are forced by circumstances 
to acquire a knowledge of map-drawing and surveying, and who 
have no previous knowledge of the use of scales. Being of 
moderate Mize and price, and devoted exclusively to the subject 
uidicatcd by the title, it will, no doubt, command an eitensive 
cii'culation, If the descriptions of scales given by the antfaor 
arc somewhat restricted by the necessities of space, this sli^t 
defect is amply compensated for by the abundance of examples 
which the book contains, and which are all worked out. A sindy 
of these alone should enable anyouE gifted Tk^th the most 
moderate intelligcnee to acquire a complete knowledge of th« 
subject in a very few days of work. 



TO C0EEBSP0NDENT8. 



All USS. intended for inaertion miut bs diraoted to the Editon, Anpyaij 
NftTy Hftffuine, 18, W&terloo Plaoe, London, S.W., and most oontain ni 
ftddnMOT the writer. Name andoddresaon lelttm ia iuBafSoient. 

A It rtguaUd that rvled paper be lued, tlu pat" lumhtTed, JaiUiud U 
and a $maU margin left. 

Emry nan will be tatien ; bat neither the Editors nor the Publiahtc* ff ■■* 
napoauuble lor the lose of MBS. through the post or otberwise. Wba nlW— I 
denied to be tetamed, rtampB moat b« enolooed. ' '^^^^^^ 

BevieWB of Books and Notoa on lalient mattenooimeotedll 
XTavy will be oontinoed aadh nunth, 

LmSoh : FitBM faj W. S. Alka * (to., la Wetalaa XtoM^ IM » 



THE ARMY AND NAVY 
MAGAZINE. 



AUGUST 1888. 



C^f i^atflc-fitliis of §tmuji. 

Bt Colokel Q. B. Mallbsoh, C.S.I. 



I. — Bbeitenteld . 
hn eify of Leipzig lies on a broad and fertile plain vatered by 
hm rivers, the Pleisse, the Elster, and the Parthe, which 
tnite in ita vicinity. The waters of these rivers and of their many 
mns have made the broad plain so rich and fertile, that, within 
k ndias of six or seven miles, many flourishing villages have 
riwn to house the cnltivatoi'S of the helds, the meadows, and 
flu orchards which cover its surface. To the north-west, for 
iutenoe, ^ong or near the line of the Uagdeburg road, are the 
■ of Mookem, Wahren, Lindenthal, Podelwitz, Soehausen, 
reitenfeld — the last some five milea from the city. To the 
I north lie Entritsch, and, aome two miles further, Wiede- 
tach. To the north-east are Schonfeld, Mockau, Neutsch, 
jeen, Clenden, Portilz, Plaussig, and Seegeritz. A little more 
J the east, bat in an almost parallel line, a direct road traverses 
Uie plain by Volkmanadorf and Hciterer Blick to the conaider- 
able village of Taucba, six miles from Leipzig. To the east, 
•OQth-ea»t, and south, are many more villages, the best known 
U which to students of hiatory are Thonberg, Probetheida, 
Bfeosdorf, and Wachau ; to the direct west, Plagwitz, Lindeuau, 
bd LeutzBCh. The extent of the plain, the fact that on it baa 
■WD one of the richest cities of Germany, that it is the centre 
■Qial of many converging routes, that its surface is generally 



294 The Batde-fields of Germany. 

kivel, that the banks of the streams which intersect and t 
villages which cover it, might be utilised for warlike opei 
tions, have attracted to it during the many wars which he 
desolated Germany, the commanders of armies. On t 
memorable occasions it served as the battle-field on which w< 
decided the most important questions agitating the minds 
mankind. In 1631 Gustavus Adolphus fought there to seci 
to his fellow-men freedom of conscience in matters of religi( 
In 1813 Austria, Prussia, Bussia, and Sweden, combined 
rescue the sovereigns and peoples of Europe from the thrald( 
of Napoleon. The first battle, fought near the village a 
manor of Breitenfeld, was followed, eleven years later, bj 
second, fought on the same spot, by the representatives of t 
same cause, to assert the same principles. Both these batti 
though sometimes called after the city on the plain, bear 
Germany the name of Breitenfeld. I propose, in this paper, 
examine the causes which led to them, and to narrate, 
concisely as may be consistent with clearness, the events wh. 
preceded and illustrated the first. 

The Beformation, in Germany, received the first authoritai 
acknowledgment of its political existence only when the electa 
princes, and nobles of the Empire, assembled by Ferdinand 
at Fassau, signed, the 31st July 1552, the Feace of Beligi 
Three years later, the 26th September 1555, the main c 
ditions of this agreement were detailed and confirmed by 
Imperial diet assembled at Augsburg. But this peace, v2 
able to the Frotestants as a recognition of their rights, 
no means concluded the strife between the professors of 
two religions. On the one side the Catholics complained 
the secularisation and suppression of foundations belonging 
their church. On the other, Frotestants raised their voi 
against the arbitrary enforcement of claims which, in spite 
the Feace of Eeligion, Catholic princes allowed to be enfor 
against them. Everywhere the Jesuits bestirred themselves 
induce those princes to carry out with zeal and vigour 
policy of forcible conversion. It thus came about that at 
close of the sixteenth century the entire public life of G 
many was completely dominated by religious machinatio 
and these machinations led to serious tumults and even» 
certain instances, to war. To the feelings thus aroused 
occurrence in the town of Donauworth, 1606-7, gave consid 
able impulse. In consequence of the forcible prevention by 
Protestant population of a procession headed by the Abbot be 



The Battle-Jields of Germany. 295 

the monastery of the Holy Cross, the Emperor Rudolph placed 
the town tinder a ban (3rd August 1607), and committed to 
Itf aximilian of Bavaria the execution of the sentence. Maximilian 
in consequence occupied Donauworth with his troops the 17th 
December following, and, condemning the inhabitants to pay the 
entire expenses of the occupation, used all the means in his power 
to force them to return to the old religion. This act of tyranny 
roused the Protestant princes. Many of them — the Elector 
Palatine, Frederic V., at their head — met together, 4th May 1608, 
at the monastery of Ahausen (in the Bavarian district of 
Schwaben-Neuburg), and there formed the Protestant Union. 
To this, besides the Elector Palatine, eight princes and fifteen 
imperial cities of Germany gave their adherence. The Catholics 
replied by constituting at Munich, 10th July 1609, a holy league, 
of whose decrees Maximilian of Bavaria was to be the executor. 
Meanwhile the Bohemians, two-thirds at least of whom had 
embraced the reformed religion, had taken advantage of the 
division* in the Imperial family between Rudolph II. and 
Matthias, to wring from the former, by letters patent dated 
llth July 1609, conditions of almost unlimited religious freedom. 
■These conditions, Matthias, on his accession to the Government 
^ 1611, had confirmed. One of these granted to the cities and 
^ the order of nobility the privilege of erecting Protestant 
churches and schools. But when, in opposition to the wish and 
^^ders of their landlords the Archbishop of Prague and the 
^bbot of Braunau, the inhabitants of Klostergrab and Braunau 
Ventured to build churches, the archbishop did not hesitate, 
^th the support of the Imperial authority, to have the church 
*t Klostergrab pulled to the ground, whilst the abbot, with the 
^^xne support, closed that at Braunau. In vain did the 
^Sgrieved inhabitants petition the Emperor. But the reply they 
Received was couched in terms so harsh that, acquitting- their 
imperial master, they drew the conclusion that it had been 
^i<5tated, without his knowledge, by his councillors. When, then, 
^^e Estates of the kingdom met in the Hradschin on the 
^^rd May 1618, the Protestant nobles, headed by Count Thum, 
^^nie thither armed, and demanded from the Imperial councillors 
^ account of their high-handed proceedings. Violent words 
^JiSTied, complaint was answered with defiance, till at last, unable 

OtTised mainly by the preference shown by Radolph for his cousin Ferdinand, 
T^i^ards known as Ferdinand ot (h'atz, whom he not only summoned to his 
"^e to aid him in the government of the country, but designated, to the prejudice 
^ brother Matthias, as his successor in the Austrian dominions. 

20 • 



296 The BattU-Jields of Gemavy. 

farther to restrain tbemaelves, the Protestant deputies seized ttK 
obstructive councillors, Mnrtinitz and Slavata., and their 8ecr«- 
tary, Faliricius Platter, and hurled them from the window in.*® 
the dry ditch, some fifty feet immediately below it ! This act pre- 
cipitated 11 war which had been lonj^ pending, and coulii ii':>t. 
under any circumstances, have been much further delayed- 
Whcn the minds of all parties ari' embittered a slight incident 
will always suffice to brinp about reaolute action. In 1618 blie 
minds of kings and nobles, of traders and peasants, were in a 
state of irritation scarcely to be controlled. The incident at 
Prague removed the barrier which had till then restrained tlio 
forcible expression of their indignation. 

For the moment Bohemia nas virtually independent of the 
House of Austria. The Estates administered the internal affiiirs 
of the kiugdom and invested Count .Thurn with the com- 
mand of the army. The Protestant princes of the Union and the 
nobles of Moravia and Silesia supported them. The Emperor 
Matthias, a tolerant and well-meaning man, endeavoured, by 
smooth words and promises of pardon on repentance, to conjure 
the storm. His action only encouraged the revolters to mike 
further encroachments on the imperial authority. When at 
last he resorted to force and ordered an army into Bohemia, the 
Protestants replied by secretly offering the crown of that conntej 
to the Elector Palatine, Frederic V. ; by inviting the republiciof 
Venice and Savoy to declare war against Austria : and by enter- 
ing into a stricter alliance with their brethren in the neighbour- 
ing provinces. 

The death of Matthias (20tb March IBlfli brought maUcra be- 
tween the two parties to a still more direct issue. His auee«iMor, 
Ferdinand 11. , then in his forty-first year, was one of thi* ukw^ 
bigoted of Catholics and the most resolute of men. Whtn stiil u) 
his early manhood he had made a pilgrimage to Loretto, fUid< 
prostmte before the altar of the Virgin, hatl solemnly vowed t^ 
re-establish Catholicism throughout his dominions. The period 
between the death of Matthias and his election aa EmpertT 
(2Sth Aupiust 1619) was spent by both parties in the pr^liminUl 
strife. The Protestants of Bohemia despatched an atmy in'" 
Moravia, formally set aside FerdinEUid, and nominated (b^ 
Elector Palatine as their King. Their efforts, however, vren 
shattered by the dogged resolution of Ferdinand. On. the lOtb 
June a mercenary army favoaring the Union, led by Mattsffldt. 
-was completely defeated by the Imperial Oaawftl Bae^MirL*t' 
Zablftti, near BadweiB. Nine dajB lal 



The Battle-Jields of Germany. 297 

inarching through Moravia and Upper Austria, laid siege to 

Vienna. Had he been a great general the subsequent fate 

of Austria had been changed. Whilst his army, marching to the 

cry of ** Equal rights for all Christian churches," had been greatly 

strengthened in its progress through the hereditary dominions, 

not a finger had been raised for Ferdinand. The latter had at 

his beck but a handful of soldiers, far too few, even could they 

have been trusted, to resist an attack. The population were 

shouting all around him for Protestantism. That Ferdinand 

was aware of the danger was proved by the despatch of his 

children to a place of security in Tirol. But, recognising 

that for himself flight would be the renunciation of his claims 

to the empire — abdication of his rights over Bohemia — he 

refused to stir. Never did the dogged resolution of a man 

assert itself to greater purpose. Almost alone in his capital, 

exposed to the bullets of the besieging soldiers, virtually a 

prife on er in the Hofburg, he yet bade to his enemies a haughty 

defiance. Had Thum only pushed into the city and seized his 

person, it had been all over with him and his pretensions. But 

Thurn, delaying to take the decisive step, preferred to incite sixteen 

^Q^strian barons, with Andreas Thonradl at their head, to compel 

f'erdinand to sign the conditions on which the Union had agreed. 

Forcing themselves into his private chamber, the parchment in 

^^ hands of their leader, the barons surrounded Ferdinand, and 

pressed him to aflSx to it his signature. As he still refused, one 

^f them, bolder than the rest, seized him by the button of his 

^^ublet, exclaiming, ** Sign, Nandy, sign." Ferdinand was still 

P^^eisting in his refusal when suddenly a cavalry trumpet 

^^VUided on the Place below. In another moment the news 

spi^ead that five hundred cuirassiers, led by Henry Du Val, Count 

^ l^ampierre, had arrived, the vanguard of a relieving army. 

^e by one the rebellious barons sneaked away. Ferdinand'^ 

^^tititLcy had preserved his position for himself, had regained 

^^tholicism for the hereditary states — and for Bohemia ! 

t'hurn hastily retreated from Vienna. Thenceforth the game 
^'^ in Ferdinand's hands. Though Bohemia, still in revolt, 
*^solved itself from allegiance to Ferdinand on the 17th August, 
ij^^ chose the Elector-Palatine as its King on the 27th, 
'^^i'dinand was, the day following, elected Emperor of Germany 
Frankfurt. No soon had he assumed this high position than 
^^ ^inited himself by the strictest alliance with Maximilian of 
^^"^ajia to crush Protestantism throughout Germany. In their 
'ffoi^ to thifl end the two sovereigns were greatly ^^ssisted by 



298 The iiattle-Hehls of Germanii. 

the imprudence of tlieir eucmicH. A Calviniftt and a foreigner, 
deficient in judgment and posseRning uo coanterbalancing 
ability, Frederic V. conciliated but little support in IJohtmia. 
It IB true that the Bohemians, in concert with Bethlen Gabor, 
who had proclaimed liimHclf Kiii):; of Hungary, again (October- 
November 1(J19) besieged Vienna. They were compelled, boir- 
ever, by want of Buppliea iind stress of weather, to retreat— and 
at that Beasou retreat meant demoralisation. The Protestant 
Union, moreover, was rent by internal dinsensions. 

In June of the following year the superior orgauisation of Uw 
Catholics had, without striking a blow, materially altered tin 
condition of affairs. The Elector Palatine, foiled in hia bopei- 
of foreign aid, but very faintly supportfd by the other prince* 
of the Protestant Union, — who, either from fear of the 
Emperor, or from a selfish regard to their own persouil 
interests, affected to dissever the cause of Bohemia from that 
of their confederacy generally — was doubting whether he had 
acted wisely in accepting responBibilities which might involn 
the loss even of his hereditary domains. Saxony and HesM* 
Darmstadt had been won over by Ferdinand. Lower Anatnii 
once the focus of Protestant feeling, had submitted. A troee 
had been concluded with Bethlen Gabor. Denmark had been 
cajoled, and Sweden had been entangled into a war with the 
Poles. Venice, Savoy, and England remained inactive. Oi» 
after another the hopes of the Protestant Party had disappearsdl 
But the Protestant Party had still an army — a powerful annj"^ 
assembled at Ulm, under the command of the Margrave of 
Ansbach. Opposed to it was the army of the League, colleetea 
at Donauworth. under the orders of Maiimilian. A battle 
between the two seemed impending. Every eonaideratiiB* 
impelled the Protestant princes to seek one. Eveiy OdO' 
sideration prompted Maximilian to mdoce his eoemies t"' 
disband without daring a fortune which might prove adverM ^ 
him. Gould he but bring about snch a result he oonld iff*' 
upon Bohemia, drive thence the usurper, and re-Mtebliiib u^ 
Catholic faith. Again did the Protestant princes play into h|* 
bands. Influenced partly by the interested advice of Ca^ioii'' 
France, partly by the fear of seeing anofher imperial aro^ ' 
called up from the Low Countries, on their huids, they of^'^ | 
(8rd July) with the Emperor a peace, in the most importAH* ^ 
artiele of which they agreed to renounce all interference in u*^ 
mfioirs of Bohemia, and not to afford any aid to gtedtw ''^ 
beyond the borders of the Palatinate. 




The BaiiU-jields of Germany. 299 

rrhis fatal treaty was at once utilised by Maximilian. He 
xiediately summoned Frederic Y. to renounce his pretensions 
the crown of Bohemia, and, when Frederic refused, he, after 
skking doubly sure of Lower Austria, and arranging for the 
ultaneous action of a Saxon army in the Lausitz and a 
army in the Palatinate, entered that kingdom at the 
d of 80,000 men. As far as Prague his march was a 
xxocession of triumphs ; but on the White Hill, three quarters 
a mile west of that city, he found Frederic's army in- 
esjached and ready to give him battle. Guided by one 
£ the most skilled and successful generals of the age, the 
ous Count Tilly, he at once attacked it (8th November 
^620), and, in less than an hour, not only drove it from its 
I>osition, but so completely defeated it that it was never able 
"to jrally. 

TPhis battle put an end to the short reign of Frederic* 
-A-xxother immediate consequence was the complete submission of 
^olemia, Moravia, and Silesia to the Emperor. The religious 
freedom granted by Matthias was abolished ; many of the 
Promoters of the rebellion were punished in life and property. 
e year following (1621) all members of the sect of Protestants 
own as the Reformers — a sect analogous to the Calvinists — 
forced to quit the country. A similar edict drove out the 
■Lixtherans in 1622. In that year likewise the Jesuits were 
^eoalled ; and in 1627 the exercise of all religious forms, except 
*liose of the Catholic Church, were forbidden. It was calculated 
^*^«t these severe measures drove into exile thirty thousand of 
*l^e wealthiest of the industrial, and two hundred of the noblest, 
i^xnilies of the kingdom. The confiscations alone amounted to 
^^^tween five and six millions sterling. A similar policy was 
Ptxxsued in the Austrian hereditary lands, especially in Upper 
-^viBtria, where the shedding of much blood was required before 
the old religion could be firmly re-established. 

After the conquest of Bohemia the interest of the war was 
t^i^^uisferred to the Palatinate. On the side of the Protestants 
appeared the partisan leader, Ernest of Mansfeldt, Duke 
Christian of Brunswick, and Margrave George Frederic of 
Baden-Durlach. Frederic V. returned to his hereditary lands 
Mid defeated a detachment of the League army at Wiesloch 
(27th April 1622). The defeat, however, was more than 
«»veiiged nine days later when Tilly smote the Margrave 

* Frederic fled with his children to Silesia, thence to Holland. 



800 The Battle-fields of Gemamj, 

Geoi^e Frederic at Wimpfen ; and again, when, on the 
20th June following, after having forced the Duke Christiu 
to abandon the Palatinate, he overthrew liim at Huchit. 
The Protestant cause, however, would not have been lost in 
the Palatinate had Frederic V. displayed ordinary vigou 
and energy. But this prince, weak by natnre, was induced li; 
hill father-in-law, James I. of England, to abandon the codM 
and truBt to the tender mercies of Ferdinand. On the ISih 
July following he diamisRed his army, and quitted the connttj. 
Thenceforward Tilly could plunder and pillage unmoleited. 
The Palatinate was speedily reduced to the same condition h 
Bohemia ; and at the Diet held at Ratisbon, the 6th May 1688, 
the electorate was conferred, despite the protests of Brungwiek 
and Saxony, upon Maximilian of Bavaria ! Had the Empenv 
been as wise as he was resolute, it ia probable that, victorioiu in 
every direction, lio might have been able to conclude a pe> 
mauent peace with tlie Protestant Party. But the bigotij 
which was a very part of his nature was spurred on by bii 
easy tiiumphs to refuse to sheathe the sword until heresy bad 
been rooted out from the land. In vain did the Protntaal 
princes, who had maiutained a selfish and foolish neutrt%i 
remonstrate against the continuance of hostilities afta 1^ 
avowed object for which those liostilities were undertaken iii 
been gained. In the opinion of Ferdinand II. the real olgM' 
still remained to be accomplished. 

Under these critical circumstances the emigrants, now gnwB 
nimicrons, and the awakened Protestant princes, eanuiflT 
besought the aid of a foreign power. It was their teg^ 
sentatious which at length induced three nationa of A* 
reformed faith — England, Holland, and Denmark — to ^ 
themselves to assist their oppressed brethren. England tfflfi 
to send subsidies, Holland to supply troops. The commind ■ 
the delivering army was confided to Cbrifitian IV„ King ■ 
Denmark (1625). He was to be supported in Germany lij th« 
partisan Mansfeldt, by Prince Christian of Bruuenick, and )? 
the Protestants of Lower Saxony, who had armed themsdvtf 
to resist the exactions of the Emperor. 

Ferdinand II., after vainly endeavouring to ward off boBtil^ 
by negotiations, despatched Tilly to the Weser to meet tii* 
enemy. Tilly followt^ the conrseof that river as far as MioM 
eatuing to be occupied, as he marched, the places which fO"'^' 
manded its passage. Porsoing his oQUBe uorthwardB, hee reM** , 
the mtx at Nenbtiig (midv^ between Minden and Bi^^H 



The Battle-fields of Germany. 301 

and occupied the principality of Kalenberg.* The King of 
r>enniark was near at hand, in the duchy of Brunswick, 
^^ixxious, for the moment, to avoid a battle. Tilly, superior to 
b.ixii in numbers, was as anxious to fight one. 

-As if the position of the King of Denmark were not already 

sxrfficiently embarrassing, the Emperor proceeded at this period 

to make it almost unendurable by launching upon him likewise 

*ix imperial army. Whatever minor reasons might have com- 

l>ixied to induce Ferdinand II. to such a course, there was one 

over-riding them all. Up to the period of the complete over- 

tturow and expulsion from the Palatinate of Frederic V., ex-King 

of Bohemia, Ferdinand had been indebted for all his successes 

^ Maximilian of Bavaria. It was Maximilian who, as head of 

tla^ Holy League, had reconquered Bohemia for the Emperor : 

it was Maximilian's general, Tilly, who had driven the Protestant 

«tr"inies from the Palatinate ; and it was the same general who 

^as now opposing the Protestants of the north in the lands 

Mratered by the Weser. Maximilian had been rewarded by the 

oession to him of the Palatinate, but it was not advisable that 

near a neighbour of Austria should be made too strong. It 

as this feeling, this jealousy of Maximilian, which now 

I>irompted Ferdinand to raise, for the first time in this war, 

imperial army, and to send it to the north. 

This army was raised by and at the expense of Albert Wenzel 

usebius of Waldstein, known in history as Wallenstein. 

Czech by nationality, born in 1583 of noble parents, who 

*>eIonged to one of the most advanced sects of the reformers 

^^t who died whilst their son was yet young, Wallenstein had, 

'^ien yet a child, been committed to the care of his uncle, 

-^fjert Slavata, an adherent of the Jesuits, and by him educated 

*^ Olmiitz in the strictest Catholic faith. When he had finished 

^^ course of studies at Olmiitz, Wallenstein spent some time 

** the University of Altdorf, and then frequented in turn the 

^hools of Bologna and of Padua. His next step was to travel 

•hrough Italy, Germany, France, Spain, England, and the 

j^^therlands, carefully observing the military condition and 

•^tics of each countiy. Almost immediately after his ^return 

?^ Bohemia he took service under the Emperor Rudolph, and 

^^ed the army commanded by General Basta in Hungary. 

^^n advanced to the rank of captain, he distinguished himself 

^^tly at the siege of Gran. 

^jilenberg has long ceased to exist as a principality. Since 1705 it has formed 
^Wtrict of Hanover. 



302 Tb^ Baltle-fields of Gemani/. 

On the conclusion of peace in 1600, Wallcnstein returned to 
Bohemia and married there a widow, well stricken in vew, 
Lncretia NikesHin of Laiideck, the owner of large properties in 
Moravia, all of which, upon her death in 1C14, devolved upon bim. 
Two yearB later he raised, at his own cost, two hundred dragoons, 
to support the heir presumptive to the empire, Ferdinand of Grati, 
in his war against the Venetiann. It was owing mainly to hit 
skill and exertions that the helca^ered fortress of Oon. 
(Gori^iia) was saved from their hands. For this and foroths 
services, scarcely less signal, he was promoted to be a coloneL 
His generosity, his daring, his quick insight, had made him tht 
idol aUke of oQicersandmen. On the conclusion of tbewarhecon- 
tracted a second marriage, this time also with an heiress, the brid» 
being Isabella Katberina, daughter of Count Horrach, a bvooiiti 
of tbe Emperor Matthias. This union not only gnatlj 
augmented his influence, but it procurr:d for bim tbe title of 
Count. On the breaking out of tbe religious disturbances in 
1618, Wallcnsteiu adhered to the cause of tbe Emperor, emi 
for bis master, and carried to Vienna, df spite tbe ^ortsoftbi 
Protestant nobles, tbe contents of the State Treasury, raiud ■ 
regiment of cuirasBicrB, and fought at its bead with success ogainrt 
Thurn and Bethlcu Gabor. In 1620 be was appointed QoBrta- 
master-General of the army led by Maximilian and Tilly •gvnt 
Fredeiic V. ; and although, for personal reasons, be took at 
share in the battleof the White Hill, yet, on its favoorable ren^ 
he marched at the bead of an independent force into Morni^ 
and completely re-established there the imperial authority. Inthl 
following year he purchased from the Cmperor Ferdinand, ff 
the sum of 7,290,228 florins, sixty properties, great and bdmH 
which that prince bad confiscated from patriots whom he bli 
either executed or banished. 

For his faithful services, Ferdinand in 1628 
Wallenstein to be Prince, a title changed, tbe year 
into that of Duke, of Friedlaud. At this time tbe jeuly 
he derived from bis various estates, all carefully and 
managed, was calculated to be thirty millions of 
little short of three millions sterling. When, in iG&^' 
invasion of Christian IV. of Denmark threatened to dera&getin 
plans of the Emperor, that prinos, anxious to find a coaaUt' 
poise to the influence of Maximilian, turned hie thou|;hb te 
Wallenstein. Bat the Duke of Friedland bad anticipatolbii 
lOTereign. It was he, who, dinning his master's thoughts, u^ 
uumated perhaps by ambition, offered to raise and 




The Battle-fields of Germany. 808 

liis own cost, an army of 50,000 men, and to lead it against the 
jnemy. Ferdinand, joyfully and without any mental reserve, 
iccepted the offer. Named Generalissimo and Field Marshal in 
Foly of the same year, Wallenstein marched at the head of 
H),00O men, a number which increased almost daily, first to the 
ifeser, thence, after noticing the positions of Tilly and of King 
Christian, to the banks of the Elbe, where he wintered. 
Of the campaign which followed in the spring, it is necessary 

give but the briefest outline. It will suffice to say that 
iansfeldt, with the view to prevent a junction between Tilly 
ud Wallenstein, marched against the latter, and, though his 
roops were fewer in number, took up a position at Dessau in 
ill view of the imperial camp, and there intrenched himself. 
[ere Wallenstein attacked (25 April 1626) and completely 
^feated him. Not discouraged by this overthrow, and still 
taring in mind the main object of the campaign, Mansfeldt 
U back into Brandenburg, recruited there his army, called 

himself the Duke of Saxe-Weimar, and then suddenly 
ished, by forced marches, towards Silesia and Moravia, 
th the intention of reaching Hungary, where Bethlen Gabor 
•d promised to meet him. In spite of his desire to finish 
B war in the north, Wallenstein recognised the necessity of 
lowing the daring adventurer, as the only means of prevent- 
[ him from carrying the war into the very heart of the 
perial dominions. He marched, then, with all possible speed, 

1 pressed him so hard, that, though Mansfeldt did effect a 
ction with Bethlen Gabor, it was with but the skeleton of his 
ay. Despairing of success against numbers vastly superior,. 
;hlen Gabor withdrew from his new colleague, and Mansfeldt^ 
uced to despair, disbanded his remaining soldiers, and sold 

camp-equipage to supply himself with the means of flight 
ptember). He died soon after (30th November). His com- 
lion, the Duke of Saxe Weimar, followed him to the grave 

the 4th of the month following. Wallenstein then retraced 

steps to the North. 

Meanwhile Tilly, left to deal with Christian IV., had followed 
kt prince into Lower Saxony, had caught, attacked, and com- 
tely defeated him at Lutter (am Barenberge), the 27th July 
26. This victory gave him complete possession of that dis- 
scted province, and, despite a vigorous attempt made by the 
•rgrave George Frederic of Baden to wrest it from him, he 
d it till the return of Wallenstein from the pursuit of Mans- 
It. As two stars of so great a magnitude could not shine in 



y04 The Baltle-fidds of Oermantj. 

the Bamo heminphcre, it was then decided that Tilly lihonld can] 
the war into Holland, whilst to 'Wallenetoiii should be left tU 
honour of dealing with tlie King of Denmark and the Protestant 
princes of the north, Walleustein carried ont his task lift 
great thoroughness. During the two years that followed. It 
drove the rcmnantn of the enemy from Silesia, took tnilHuj 
occu[]ation of Brandenburg and Mecklenburg, then advanced inta 
Pninerania and laid siege to Stralsnnd. Here, however, be nut 
witli hin first cLeck. In the Rpk'ndid resistancf which iheymiii 
the Stralsunders were aided by the genius and the eneigjd 
Gustavus Adolplms, the young King of Sweden. Mainly il 
consequence of this aid, Wallenstein, after a siege of apwaidirf 
three months— May to July 16*29— was forced to renonnctla 
efforts. A year later he concluded with King Christian at Liibid 
a peace, by which the latter bound himself to interfere nomona 
the affairs of Germany. For his services in the war Wallemhii 
received in fee the Duchy of Mecklenburg. 

Germany lay apparently at the feet of the Emperor. Fwi 
alike from I'lutcstant opposition and from the yoke of TiMit 
milian, Ferdinand began now, in consultation with the JesoH 
to put in action the policy dictated by the EEinaticimi *W4 
swayed his narrow mind. Before even the peace of Liibeciw 
been signed he had issued (tith March 1629), an edict, htowBH 
the Restitution Edict, in virtue of which the Frotestanta «n 
required to restore to the Catholics all the monaBteriM ■■ 
church lands of which, since the peace of Passan, they had «■< 
possessed ; it further directed that, in the States immediiM) 
subject to the Emperor, the Catholic services alone shonU h 
performed in all churches, tliat the Geformera should be eidnW 
from the operation of the Peace of BeJigion, and thil •( 
Catholic princes of the empire slionld be permitted to constiU 
their subjects to conform to their faith. This decree was p 
in force, under the pressure of the sword, in ail the Iiopfl*' 
cities: in Angsburg, in Ulm, in Katisbon, in Kaufbenien, 
in others, and it was plainly intimated to the Protestant pwW 
that they would be required equally to i;arry it out. 

It was not to he supposed that an edict of this tremoD^ 
character would be submitted to without opposition. Alrw 
the preponderance obtained by the Emperor in Germany by ■ 
Tictoriefl of Wolienstein had given umbrage tu the more inA 
pendent of the Catholic princes. Maximilian of Bavaria esp(cial|| 
who had really given Ferdinand his throne, was r(i&ohr«dj9J 
wnse to become that prinoe's vassal. 



The BatUe-fields of Germany. 805 

rapported by those of the French court, represented by the 
illiistrioas Bichelieu, found expression at the Diet held at 
Eatisbon in 1630. The opposition which developed itself on this 
occasion forced the Emperor to consent to diminish his army, 
and to withdraw from Wallenstein the patent of Generalissimo. 
On the Both September following, then, Wallenstein's army was 
disbanded, and Wallenstein himself withdrew to private life 
in his princely residence at Gitschin. 

Before even this step had been taken a new difficulty had 
confronted the Emperor. Neither the Electors of Brandenburg 
and Saxony nor the representatives of the Hanse towns had 
attended the diet at Batisbon. Almost the sole representatives 
of the Protestant feeling in Germany able to raise their voice 
against the new persecution, these champions of the Beformation 
had secretly urged upon the prince who had saved Stralsund to 
aid them in devising means to conjure the danger which 
threatened them all alike. These solicitations, supported by 
Denmark and by Prance, fell on no unwilling ear. The very 
month which witnessed the re- formation of a Catholic League 
at Ratisbon, witnessed likewise the declaration of Gustavus 
Adolphus at Stockholm to espouse the cause of the oppressed 
Protestants of Germany. 

The son of Charles IX. of Sweden and of Christine of Schleswig 
Holstein, born the 9th December 1594, Gustavus Adolphus had 
succeeded to the throne of Sweden at the early age of seventeeiv 
Nature had endowed him with beauty of form, with the strength 
that defies fatigue. She had bestowed upon him likewise 
the still more precious gift of a mind full of intelligence, of noble 
sentiments, and of courage. These qualities had been developed 
by a most judicious course of education. At the age of sixteen 
Gustavus Adolphus was well versed in the science of arms, he 
bew almost' all the languages of Europe, he assisted his father 
alike at the head of his armies, and in the Council chamber* 
Called to the throne (8th November 1611) before he had attained 
the age of seventeen, at a time when his country was engaged 
iu war against Bussia, Denmark, and Poland, he displayed a 
rare prudence. With the advice of his friend. Axel Oxenstiema, 
whom, his senior by eleven years, he had made minister, 
fiustavus proceeded in the first instance to strengthen the bases 
of his own authority. He effected this important object by 
niaking concessions to his nobility, by restoring to them the 
privileges of which he believed they had been unjustly deprived. 
•Che good policy of this reform soon made itself practically felt.. 



the same hemisphere, it was then decided that Tilly at 
the war into Holland, whilst to Wallenstein sbonld 
honour of dealing with the King of Denmark and the 
princes of the north. Wallenstein carried oat hie 
great thoroughness. During the two years that foi 
drove the remnants of the enemy from Silesia, too 
occupation of Brandenburg and Mechlenburg, then adv 
Pomerania and laid siege to Stralsund. Here, lioweY 
with bis first check. In the splendid resistance which 
the Stralsunders were aided by the genius and the 
Guetavus Adolphus, the young King of Sweden, 
consequence of this aid, Wallenstein, after a siege of i 
three months— May to July 1629 — was forced to rei 
efforts. A year later he concluded with King Christian 
a peace, by which the latter bound himself to interfere i 
the affairs of Germany. For his services ill the war V 
received in fee the Duchy of Mecklenburg. 

Germany lay apparently at the feet of the Empen 
alike from Protestant opposition and from the yoke 
milian, Ferdinand began now, in consultation with t 
to put in action the policy dictated by the fanatic 
swayed his narrow mind. Before even the peace of L 
been signed he had issued (tith March 1629), an edict, 
the Restitution Edict, in virtue of which the Proteff 
required to restore to the Catholics all the monai 
church lands of which, since the peace of Fassau, ther 
possessed ; it further directed that, in the States i 
subject to the Emperor, the Catholic services alotn 
performed in all churches, that the Reformers should 
from the operation of the Peace of Kfligion, a 
Catholic princew of the empirt should be permitted 
their subjects to conform to their faith. This d( 
in force, under the preasure (rf &e Bword, in iT 
eities : in Augsburg, in Ul^AMffiMKriKm, in Km 
in others, and it was f^tjjt^^^KhA to Hie Pra 
tlioy wouldbflJMflj^^^^^^csrry it ov 




306 The BatOe-Jields of Germany. 

Before the close of the year following his accession his po] 
had obtained for him all the assistance in men and 
necessary to carry on the war. Deeming himself, howe^ 
yet strong enough to combat three enemies at the same t 
took an early opportimity to conclude peace with Denmar 
January 1613). He found it comparatively an easy tasl 
to drive the Russian fleets from the Baltic, and to conqu 
the Czar, Michael Romanoflf, the provinces of Ingr 
Carelia, and a part of Livonia. A less well-balanced mii 
his own might possibly, at his age, have yielded to 
advice pressed upon him by one of his oldest generals, « 
•de la Gardie,* to expel the Romanoffs, and to gain the i] 
throne of Russia for himself. Gustavus contented hims( 
the more safe and solid project of expelling Russia fr 
shores of the Baltic, and of annexing Finland. He secun 
these objects by a treaty which he concluded with th 
in 1617. 

The war against Sigismund HI., King of Poland, kn 
Polish history as the sixty years' war, still, however, cod 
So fiercely did Gustavus press it, that by the end of 1626 
conquered the whole of Polish Livonia, and of west Russij 
as Thorn. Before Dantzig, which he proceeded then to 1 
he was wounded, and his troops were repulsed. Gr 
however, took his revenge by inflicting several defeats 
enemy, and, although twice wounded, he had drivei 
almost to extremity when Wallenstein, after having expel 
Danes from North Germany, entered Pomerania and lai 
to Stralsund. How the action of Gustavus, aiding the vj 
the defenders, forced him to raise the siege and to retn 
been already related. Gustavus pursued his advantage, cj 
Neuburg, Marienwerder, Graudenz, and other places, w 
the intervention of the Elector of Brandenburg, he agre 
twelve weeks' suspension of hostilities (8th March to li 
1629). On the expiration of this term hostilities were r( 
but the diplomatic action of France induced the con 
parties to come to terms, and on the 1st September fo 
u truce for six years, very advantageous for Sweden, was 
/at Altenmarkt. 

The proceedings at the Diet of Ratisbon the followin 

* Second son of the renowned Pontns de la Gardie, Baron of Eckholm. 
is described as having been a type of those illustrious men who distingoi 
selres no less by their great military serrices than by the protection they 
letters and art 



Tlie Battle-fields of Germany. 307 

,he renewal of the league against the Beformers, the solicita- 
ions of many leading Protestant nobles, and the promised sup- 
wrt of France, determined the young Swedish monarch to take 
he bold step of declaring war against the Emperor. He felt, 
IS he explained to his Estates, that the step was in reality 
purely defensive ; that he had cahnly to look on whilst north 
Tn'riuany was being swallowed up, certain that his turn would 
-'ume next, or to interfere ; that of the two courses interference 
sras the nobler and the more humane. On the 19th May 1630, 
clionjie presented his only child, Christina, then six years old, 
to the Estates assembled at Stockholm ; confided her to their 
care and to their fidelity as the heiress to the throne, and 
addressed them in the most touching language. Galling God to 
witness that he was making this war solely in order to make 
common cause with the oppressed reformers of Germany in 
lesisting the tyranny of their Catholic persecutors, he added : 
*'I hope to ensure the triumph of the cause of the oppressed ; 
Irat as it sometimes happens that the pitcher is broken whilst 
being carried to the water, it is possible that I may not succeed. 
I, who have exposed my life to so many dangers, who have 
«hed my blood so often for my country, without receiving, thanks 
be to God, a mortal wound — I feel that, at last, I shall have 
to pay the sacrifice. That is why I make now my adieux to you 
«I1, and express my hope that we shall meet in a better world." 
Eleven days later he embarked at Elfsnabben. 

The fleet collected at that port to convey the army to the 
shores of Germany consisted of twenty-eight ships of war of 
^008 sizes and a large number of transports. Considering 
the end iu view, the might of the enemy, the extent of the 
eonntry to be traversed, the army itself was ridiculously small 
in nombers. The three arms which composed it fell some- 
^uit short of twenty thousand. Of these, in round numbers, 
ifteen thousand were infantry, two thousand cavalry, and 
ilie reinainder artillery. But the army led by Gustavus was 
Bot to be judged by numbers alone. The men, trained to 
'ftft perfection of discipline by the long wars with Russia and 
^'ohiid, occupied the first rank in the esteem of military 
Kttope. They were led by officers tried and proved in several 
jM^|iiiflnu, and the reputation of many of whom was to 
an immortal heritage to the generations that were 
Amongst them may be named Gustavus Horn, a 
HiMl had "made his proofs" under Prince Maurice 
^ _ fg' Banner or Baner, also a Swede, who avenged 




308 The Baltle-Jields of (iptmanij, 

himself for the expcutiou of his father by CharloE IX. hy 
rendering t\\v most Kpleiidid service to tlie uon of that monsrch: 
Banilisiiin. a reprewcntativi' of tlie Lusatian family of Luppau; 
Falkenherg, Mutsenfalil, Ortenburg, Knipbauaen, Teufi^l, utd 
Tott, all men of great ability ; Henry Matthias, Count of Thtm, 
the liamc who had lluiig the councillors and tlieir secrf tary frtn 
the wiudow at Prague ; the Ithiuegravo Utto Ludwig. The lilt 
could hci lengthunod, for there was scarcely a man in that amj 
who was not a liero. 

J^etained by eontmry winds, the fleet cast anchor off the littii 
itiland of Kiigcu, separated only from the Pomeranian mainluJ 
by the Strula Sound, on the '24th June. Gu-starus wu Ur 
£rKt to leap upon the land. Kneeling, in the presence of In 
following, he thanked the Almighty for having brought his tasj 
and bis Heet in safety to German ground. With theatntnt 
expedition, and in spite of a violent storm, be landed bis tm^ 
marched upon and o(;cui>Led Stettin, Damm, Stargard, Ctininiii, 
and Walgart, almost without the semblance of oppositiiiL 
Before the end of July ho had become virtnally uiutei i 
Pomiirania. 

For the moment the Emperor had no army to oppoee bin. 
Wallensteiii had been dismissed, and the army which WallcnsldB 
commanded bad vanished with their leader. A few troopa hil 
indeed garrisoned the towns of Pomejania, but these, dim 
together hy the Imperial commander in those partSj Tufodl 
Cnnti, were in no coniUtiou to make head against the inndK 
Conti, whose cruelty was surpassed only by his avarice, IW 
tbou unhesitatingly the only means at his dispoaa! to cheek tk 
prosrcHH of the Swedes. He ordered the laying waste of th 
country on l)oth sides of his line of retreat, the burning * 
the more opuhmt villages ; then, to rend er the ] 
Stettin useless to Gustavus, ho intrend: 
south of that place, on the left bank of the { 

means to sever the communications between 'ffiec. ~ 

the rest of Germany. Further, when he saw that Gustavnabv 
no intention of attacking him, but, leaving bim intrcndu^ ^ 
Garz, had proceeded to complete the conquest of the proviixe 
Conti suddenly quitted his position and made a dash at Stettit 
Bcpulsed with loss, and seeiag the imposaibility of coiryiitg ^ 
the campaign succesBfully, he sent a messenger to UusUTQitt 
propose a truce during the autumn and winter montliii, onv'' 
ground that it would be too cold to fight. "The Swodu ^ 
fight in winter as well as in i 



The Battle-fields of Germany. 309 

Swedish king. It was siifficient for Conti, who resigned his 
command and left his troops, under the Count of Schaumburg, 
to make the best of their way into Brandenburg. This march 
flutter they only accomplished with great loss of men, of guns, 
&nd of baggage. 

The circumstances of the emph-e, the absence of an imperial 

Army, the knowledge that more than one-half of the people of 

Germany gave him then- sympathies and then- prayers, and 

were prepared, as soon as he should have developed his capacity 

by beating the armies of the League, to render him their active 

*id, would have justified Gustavus, being the man he was, to 

march through Germany and finish the war in Vienna. The 

idea was considered by his generals and himself. Gustavus 

i^j^ted it, not because he considered the plan impracticable, 

^m because, were he to act upon it, he would appear to some, 

and he would be represented to all, as a foreign sovereign whose 

selfish aim was to expel Ferdinand only to assume his place ; 

whereas, by confining himself to driving the Imperialists from 

the north and the west of Germany, where they were harassing 

Mid oppressing the people, he would occupy the position which 

he coveted above all others, that of a deliverer. He resolved 

lather, then, to make himself master, in the first instance, of 

the strong places in the northern and western portions of the 

country, to rouse to co-operation with him the princes and 

people of those portions, to close the Baltic to the Imperialists, 

to deprive the Emperor of all his allies in the country, and, 

when this had been accomplished, to deal the House of Austria 

• blow which should force it, under the penalty of destruction, 

to abandon the policy of persecution — to respect the rights and 

fee consciences of others. 

The resignation of his command by Torquato Conti, and 
tbe disorderly retreat of the troops he had commanded, were 
^ents which played the game of Gustavus. He took Greifen- 
'^en — a considerable town on the Oder, between Stettin and 
^— by storm, occupied the latter place, abandoned by the 
^perialists; then, marching nearly directly eastward, seized 
vritz. Before the end of the year the only places in Pomerania 
^ch still held out for the Emperor were Greisswalde, Demmin, 
^d Eolberg, and Gustavus was making energetic preparations 
** besieging these. 

If the Imperial generals were, on the plains in the north of 
^^^Dany, pla}ing the game of Gustavus, not the less so was 
'wdinand U. in his Cabinet of Vienna. It has been already 

VOL. VI. 21 



810 The BattU-fields of Germany. 

Btated bow WallenBtein bad OTer-nm Mecklenbnrp;, and bov the 
Emperor, to reward bis BerviceB, bad pronounced tbat dach; to 
be forfeited, and had bestowed it upon hia victorious general, 
But tbe expelled dukes of Mecklenburg still posseased power ind 
influence in their bereditary domains. Gustavus, conqneroi d( 
nearly all Pomerania, stood on the borders of Mecklenburg 
prepared, there could be no doubt, to restore the ducby io iti 
rightful lords. Tbe expelled dukes, however, endeaTOond 
rather to win from their master the boon wbicb the foreigoei 
would have placed in their bands. Through tbe princes of tht 
Diet, still assembled at Batisbon, tbey expressed theii detei- 
mination not only to give no aid, but to offer tbe strongot 
opposition to tbe foreign invader, provided tbe Emperor vddU 
restore to them their rights. But obstinacy was a gnat 
characteristic of Ferdinand. Though be knew what a refuol 
would cost him, he refused. One consequence was that Ifeckla- 
burg, the province adjoining Pomerania, was gained for GaBttm 
and Prince Charles of Sachsen-Lauenburg proceeded to tiin 
troops for him in the province. 

In other respectu tbe affairs of Gustavus prospered. On thi 
IStb January 1681, he concluded, at Barwald, a treaty for K 
years with France, in virtue of which he was to recon > 
hundred and sixty thousand tbalers on tbe spot, and an amiiid 
subsidy of four hundred thousand on condition of maiTitt'"'''^ 
in tbe field an army of thirty thousand infantry and six t^lft"**"^ 
cavalry, and of assuring to tbe princes and people whOM 
territory be might occupy the free exercise of tiieir religion- 
He opened the campaign in the March following, took GritM- 
walde, Neubrandenburg, Loitz, Malchin, Demmin, and Solbaq^ 
During tbe siege of tbe two last-named places, ha took sp i 
covering position in the intrenched camp of Schvedt, on tks 
Oder. He was still in that position when he received infonft- 
tion that an Imperialist army under Count Tilly was nfiOl 
approaching to relieve the beleaguered towns. 

A short, lean man, with hollow cheeks, a long nose, a brot^ 
wrinkled forehead, heavy moustachios, and a pointed chin, Tilly 
had the reputation of being the most sncceasful soldier of Uie 
age. A Netherlander by birth, he bad learned the art of vtx 
nnder Alba and, especially, under Alexander Farnese. In tlie 
school of that great captain he had learned alike how to obt; 
and how to enforce obedienoe, to shrink from no m&uoMt 
however opposed theiy might be to the dictates of bomtiutTi 
which were neeeawiy to obtain his ( ' ~ 



The BaUU-fiMs of Germany. 311 

Catholic, and thought all meaoB lawful for the extirpation of 
heresy. He had made his first military Btudies in the Nether- 
lands againat the Protestants : he had then served in Hangary 
igainst the rebels of that country and the Turks ; then again in 
Havana, in Bohemia, and in the Palatinate against the Pro- 
testants. He had never been beaten. Though not, in the strict 
sense of the word, a great general, he was yet a man to be 
Feared ; for he combined quickness of movement with daring, 
possessed a very clear military vision, never shrank from striking 
nhen he thought a blow might be effective, and his execution 
was always " thorough." 

Such was the man who, at the head of twenty thousand men, 
hastily collected from the different parts of Catholic Germany, 
vas hastenii^, in the middle of the winter of 1630-31, by forced 
marches, to relieve the beleaguered towns of Demmin and 
Kolberg. At Frankfurt-on-the-Oder be met the shattered 
remnants of the small army which, under Conti, had endeavoured 
to Btay the progress of the invader, and subsequently, under 
Behaumburg, had roused against itself, by its terrible excesses and 
nnsparing exactions, the indignation of the people of the pro- 
vinces through which it had retreated. Leaving Schaumburg 
with a sufficient garrison in Frankfurt, Tilly pressed forward to 
Pomerania. But before he could quit Brandenburg he heard 
at the surrender of the two places he had been so anxious to 
nve. The first objeot of his march, then, had vanished. There 
Gonld be no question of attacking, with his comparatively small 
tone, the intrenched camp of Gustavus at Schwedt. But he 
eoold still strike a blow under which Protestantism would reel. 
The very considerable city of Magdeburg, known for its zeal for 
Qie reCormed religion, had re-elected, as its administrator, 
Ghriatiiua William of Brandenburg, a prince who had been 
plaoed at the ban of the Empire, had received a Swedish 
ganaral, Dietrich of Falkenburg, and with him a small Swedish 
garrison. He resolved, then, that Magdeburg should feel the 
bat vengeanoe of the Catholic League. Renouncing, then, bia 
■anih to Pomerania, Tilly struck westwards towards Magdeburg. 
I Ko sooner had Qnstavus become aware that the directiuu of 
ully's march bod been changed, than, as anxious as bis 
toponcnt to deliver a blow which should be felt, he quitted bis 
btrenched camp and marched on Frankfnrt-on-the-Oder. His 
Koops were on their march inflamed to fury by th« tidings 
ihidi reached them, that Tilly, on hie march westward, had 
■ffnart-tha town of Neabrandeidnirg, reeently taken b^ them. 



312 The Battle-Jields of Germany. 

and had put to the sword evpry mau of the Swedish (EarriwD' 
which had defended it. They arrived before Frankfurt deter- 
mined to enforce a heavy retribution ; attacked the city with 
vigour and resolution ; and Rtorroed it the third day 13rd April 
1531). They captured all the enemy's gune and meted out to 
the Boliliers who demanded mercy the Euime quarter which thrij' 
own countrymen had received at Noubrandenburj;. 

Meanwhile, in view of the invasion of Germany, of tbe 
declared intention of the Kmperor Ferdinand to enforce with 
the utmost strictness the resolutions of the Diet against beTesy, 
many of the Protestant princes had, on the invitation of John 
George, Elector of Saxony, met in consultation at Leipiif; 
(6th February 1681). Neither John George nor George Williun, 
Elector of Brandenburg — though the latter had been one of 
those who had invited the intervention of the Swedes, had, ap- 
to this time, displayed the smallest desire to aid GuBtavuiin 
his enterprise. Both weak men, they were alike govemoi by 
their ministers — the Elector of Saxony by Field Marshal Von 
Arnheim, a devoted friend of Wallenstein ; George Williart 
by Count Adam of Schwarzenherg, a Catholic and an Imperialiat. 
But the determination of Ferdinand to push to the utmost 
the Catholic cnisade had alarmed them ; and whilst the tot 
summoned, the other was foremost in attending, tha congresi it 
Ltii\y£ig. Besides the Elector of Brandenburg there were iffeMrt 
also on the same occasion the Elector of Hesse-Caflsel, udllt 
the more important adlierents of princely and noble rankoftiM 
Beformed connection. In spite of tbe intrigues of Ferdinuili 
the assembled notables declared their lixed resolution to TniJntl''' 
their rights ; and to summon the Emperor to abrogate the edM 
known as the Bestitution Edict, to withdraw his troops bcM 
their towns and fortresses, to suspend his arbitrary exeoidim 
and to redress the grievances of which they complained : — dMBH 
he refuse, to raise au army of forty thousand men to assert thir 
claims. 

The alliance which Gnatavua had made with Franco, sol 
more particularly the conditions <tf that aUianoe, had eootnbuted 
more than anytiiing else to the solidarity of the confeder&^on 
af the princes and nobles of northern Germany. The importaot 
oondition that the Catholic religion should be respected ia *1I 
the places which might sulHoit to or be conquered by GostaviA 
that religitm should be ererTwhere free, did as much to bini 
northera Oermany to his cause sa the reputatiou of his aolUa* 
and biBownbmeaBamizin. Evan the less bigoted Catfadici 



The Battle-fields of Germany. 318 

lao regarded with apprehension the increasing power of the 
;^Sxxiperor, were ready to fight for a programme which, whilst it 
iromised them protection against arbitrary power, ensured te 
em the exercise of their conscientious beliefs. 
If eanwhile Tilly was marching against Magdeburg. Gom- 
xixsuiding a separate army, acting in conjunction with rather 
^Viftn in subordination to the Imperial commander, was Godfrey 
Henry, Count of Pappenheim. Tilly was the general of the 
CSa.tholic League. Pappenheim, subsequently to 1630, represented 
-fclie Empire. One of the best cavalry oflBcers of the age, Pappen- 
heim had distinguished himself on many a well-fought field* 
X-t was when returning from the pursuit of the Duke of Saxe- 
I^OpUenburg that Pappenheim received from Tilly notice of his 
itxovement against Magdeburg. Instantly he changed his course 
ii^ that direction, drove in the troops with whom Falkensteiu 
ttad occupied the outlying points, and had already invested the 
place when Tilly arrived. The regular siege began on the 30th 
March. 

Gustavus, we have seen, had stormed Frankfurt-on-the-Oder 

on the 3rd April. Little apprehensive, probably even ignorant 

of Tilly's designs against Magdeburg, he had marched from 

Frankfurt against Landsberg, an important town on the Warthe. 

He captured this place on' the 16th April. The same day he 

learned that Tilly and Pappenheim were pressing Magdeburg 

^^^d. A glance at the map will show that to reach Magdeburg 

from Landsberg, Gustavus would have to march by Kiistrin, 

^^riin, and Spandau, all belonging to the Elector of Branden- 

"^^g. Now, not only were Kiistrin and Spandau strongly 

fortified, but the Electpr of Bavaria, influenced by his minister, 

^^, some time before, opened the gates of the former to the 

**eeing Imperialists, and had shut them to the pursuing Swedes. 

^^ Was impossible, then, that Gustavus should pass these two 

places to attack Tilly at Magdeburg, imless he were assured of 

*^^ dispositions of their garrisons. Marching beyond them 

?^tliout such assurance, he would place himself between two 

^^a. He had claims on the Elector of Brandenburg — not 

^itns based merely on common religious convictions, but claims 

. ^^ting on the fact that he had freed his ancestral province from 

j^^ presence of the enemy, and on the knowledge that he 

^*^e stood between the Elector and the Emperor. He sent to 

, then, as soon as he had learned the peril of Magdeburg, 

^^oposition whereby he engaged to march at once to relieve 

^ city, provided only that the strong places of Kiistrin and 





314 The Battle-fields of Uermanij. 

Spandau were placed in his handn. The Elector, Qeo^ 
Williani, who was then at Berlin, heRitnted long before he 
gave a favonrable reply. He was dominated by his fears and 
by his minister. If he should comply, and if then GustBToa 
were to be beaten, what would become of himself ? How could 
he hope to escape the wrath of the narrow-minded but bigoted 
and determined Emperor ? He was etill hesitating, still pairy- 
ing the requests of Gustavus with cvnsive answers, when the 
Swedish hero reached Berlin. At the interview which folloired, 
GustaviiB scarcely attempted to control himself. He plainfy 
told tilt! Elector that the relief of Magdeburg was a mstta 
which concerned not himself personally, but the cause of the 
reformed religion ; that if the reformed princes of Germany 
declined to help him, be would return to Htockholm. make 
peace with the Emperor, and then, hi' added, " in what ■ 
position would you find yourself? " These arguments, to 
which the presence of the highly-diiiciplined and well-oidend 
Swedish army gave weight, decided at last George Williani, uid 
he gave orders for the surrender to his ally of Kiistrin and 
Spandau. 

But all the difficulties were not yet surmounted. Fnna 
Berlin to Magdeburg were two roads ; the shorter to the west, 
through a country eaten up and occupied by the enemy, who 
would be able to diiipute the passage of the Elbe; the longei, 
aouthwanl, by Dessau or Wittingen, through a land, easy and 
unexhausted, and belonging to a professing ally, John Georgs 
of Saxouy. But like George William of Brandenburg, John 
George, timid by nature and influenced by his minister, refused 
a free passage to the Swedish troops ; and whilst UnstaW 
was negotiating to induce him to withdraw hih objections 
Magdeburg fell. 

Magdeburg was stormed by the troops of Fappenhdm vA 
Tilly on the 10th May. For three days the city was a aoenco' 
blood for which, to use the words of Schiller, " history baa ■> 
description." It was the most barbarous act of, in ataitita? 
sense, a barbaric age. It is computed that thirty thouW" 
persons, in total disregard of sex, or age, or condition, w^ 
mthlessly massacred. It was not nntil the 14th. the fifth da? 
after the storm, that Tilly himself ventured into the city. Tb« 
evil had then been consammated. A deed bfid been doiw wlii"'^ 
rendered reconciliation impossible, which marked in broad niA 
bloody lines the demarcation between Catholic and ReformeA l— 

This BaDgninary stroke produced, for the moment, ^^^| 



The BatUe-Jields of Germany. 315 

[biy favonrable to the Imperial canse. With the panic which 
"ead thronghout Frotestant Germany flew also the feeling 
ii the disaster might have been prevented, that the lingering 
Gnstavns at Berlin had assured the triumph of Tilly. For 
3 moment men did not stop to enquire whether the Electors 
Saxony and Brandenburg were free from blame. The latter 
ince, far from regarding the matter from the standpoint of 
ligion, seemed in the first instance most anxious only to clear 
mself from all connection with the Swede. He had made 
er Spandau to Gustavus that Gustavus might march to relieve 
agdeburg. Now that Magdeburg had fallen, he demanded in 
iperative terms the restitution of Spandau. But Gustavus, who 
A quitted Berlin, was equal to the occasion. He announced 
B intention to comply with the demand of the Elector, but to 
sat that prince as an enemy. Sending, then, instructions to 
e commandant of Spandau to evacuate that place, he marched 
[ainst BerUn. Before the gates of that city he declared his 
timatum. He desired, he said, to be treated not worse than 
e Imperial generals ; to be allowed to ensure the safety of his 
my by the occupation of the places necessary for that purpose, 
be furnished with a moderate sum of money and bread for 
3 troops. Were these conditions complied with, he would be 
e true friend of the Elector, and would engage to protect him 
ainst all his foes ; were they refused, he would become his 
emy. This message, which conveyed likewise to its recipient 
3 conviction that it would be followed by action, decided the 
ector, and he subscribed to the terms dictated by Gustavus. 
Circumstances soon brought about a similar result in the 
moils of the Elector of Saxony. 

rhe capture of Magdeburg had left Tilly free to direct his 
ns against the two most formidable of the reformed princes 
that part of Germany, the Elector of Saxony and the Land- 
ive of Hesse. So long as these should maintain the power 
independent action, the triumph of the Catholic cause was 
11 uncertain. Tilly selected the Landgrave as the first object 
imperial vengeance. From the ruins of Magdeburg he 
mhed into Thiiringen and desolated that beautiful country 
th fire and the sword. Frankenhausen, the capital of the 
incipality of Schwarzburg-Eudolfstadt, was plundered and 
duced to ashes under the very eyes of the imperial general, 
rfurt purchased its exemption from a similar fate by a plentiful 
ipply of money and provisions. Having exhausted the Saxe- 
niestine and Schwarzburg principalities, Tilly turned to thi 



^ 



816 The BatOe-fields of Germany. 

Landgrave of Eassel, and threatened bis lands with the 
fate unless he would immediately disband his troops, ren 
the Leipzig contract, receive imperial troops in his cc 
and fortresses, pay up the contributions demanded, and d 
himself a friend. But the Landgrave of Eassel was mi 
firmer stuff than many of his colleagues in the princely fa 
of Germany. " I will not," he answered, " admit f< 
soldiers into my cities and fortresses; my troops I r< 
for myself; if I am attacked, I shall know how to c 
myself ; if Count Tilly requires monev and provisions, h 
better get them from Munich." More than that, he re] 
two detachments which Tilly, on receiving this answer 
into his lands, and prepared to defend himself to the 
when the movements of Gustavus forced Tilly to renouni 
intentions. 

Gustavus, in fact, having concluded his arrangements 
the Elector of Brandenburg, prepared to move forward. G 
walde, the last place in Fomerania which had held 01 
the Emperor, had fallen; a reinforcement of 8,00C 
&om Sweden, and a corps of 6,000 Scotchmen, led I 
Marquis of Hamilton,* had arrived. Thus strengtl 
Gustavus marched against Fappenheim, who still hel 
coimtry about Magdeburg. It was Pappenheim's call f 
which saved the daring Landgrave of Eassel from a c 
with Tilly. The latter, hastenmg back to Magdebu 
forced marches, effected a junction with Pappenhein 
took up a position at Wolmirstadt on the Elbe, betwee 
and ten miles north of Magdebm*g, and not much i 
from that occupied by Gustavus on the same side < 
river at Werben, near the jimction with it of the 
Li the skirmishes which followed, the Swedes invariab 
the advantage. At last Tilly issued from his positio 
marching to within cannon-shot of that occupied by Gui 
offered him battle. But, with an army inferior in numb 
one-half to that of the enemy, the Swedish king was too p 
to accept the invitation. Knowing his position to be 
enough to resist attack, he remained behiud his intrench 
After a fruitless cannonade and some skirmishes, whicl 
again favourable to the Swedes, Tilly then returned to his 
losing in his retrograde movement many men by desertion 
Whilst Gustavus was thus watching the main imperial 
his lieutenants. General Tott and Duke Adolphus Frederi 

* Afterwards, 1643, the first Duke of Hamilton. 



The Batde-fidds of Germany. 81 7 

Jjfecklsiibiirg-Schwerm, hud re-cooqnered almost the whole of 
UuckJenburg, and AdolphuB Frederic had resumed the govern- 
ment of the Schwerin diTisioii of the dukedom. Just then 
Tilly fell back in the moment already related, and GuBtavne 
thought the moment opportune personally to re-instate the 
other doke, John Albert, in the Giistrow portion. He rode 
for that purpoae to Giistrow, and, surrounded by a retinue of 
ptioces and nobles, amid the heart-felt rejoicings of the people, 
replaced the dispossessed prince upon his ducal throne. On 
Ilia return to hia camp of Werben, he welcomed with great joy 
liwdgrave William of Hesse Kassel, the firnt of the princes of 
Gennauy who had offered, of his own free will, to make an 
oCFeuaive and defensive alliance with the invader. The alliance 
was ceocluded then and there. 

Thia action on the part of Landgrave William produced in 
the mind of Tilly the fear lest it should become contagious. 
If Saxony, for instance, were to declare for Gustavus, his own 
position at Wolmerstadt would become dangerous in the 
"twme. He resolved to conjure this peril by making demands 
npDD the Elector Jobn George, the answer to which would be 
■Miave. He required him, thorefore, to admit the imperial 
"^y into Saxony, and either to disband the Saxon army or to 
mute it to bis own. John George, knowing from experience 
"Wt the tender mercies of tlie Emperor were cruel, embittered 
•9 the treatment dealt out to Magileburg, and encouraged by 
"» proximity of Gustavus, rofuHed point blank. Upon this, 
■™lj broke up his camp at Wolmeistiidt, and prciised on to 
H'lle, devastating the country aa he marched. Tbenco he 
^"patched another and more threatening message to the 
^iHtor. Its effect was directly the contrary of that which he 
*d intended. It forced John George — who till then had re- 
ptded OustavuB with jealousy, distrust, even aversion, and who 
"■d preferred the sacrifice of Magdeburg to union with him — 
H throw himself into the arms of the King of Sweden. He had, 
•W jfae receipt o f the &rBt message, despatched Aruheim to treat 
~ie second message made bim still more 
tnco, and he concluded one on terms dictated by 
September L631). The King then crossed the 
'-, and elTectod the day following, at Torgau, a junction with 

Lon army. 

, far from endeuvuuring to prevent this junetion, had 

d on to the important city of Leipeig, and had soniinoned 

Am thu uommaodont hesitated, Tilly reduced 



818 The Batlk-JUlds of Germany. 

the suburb, called the snborb of Halle, to asbes. This aentt 
measure, the recollection of the fate of Magdeburg, and the bad 
condition of the fortifications, combined to influence the com- 
mandant to yield. On the second day, Leipzig opened hn 
gates. The city and inhabitants were mercifully treated by the 
conqueror. 

Tlie news of the occupation of Leipzig reached Gustavus and 
his allies at Torgau. Tliey held at once a council of war, and 
resolved, at the pressiiit; inatanee of John George of Saxonj, 
to set the fate of Protestant Germany on the issue of a sin^ 
battle. The order to march was then given, and early on tbi 
morning of the 7th September the Swedish-Saxon army come it 
sight of Leipzig. 

Tilly, who was daily expecting the arrival from Italy of 
Aldringer and Tiefenbach, at the head of 12,000 veterans, wu 
very anxious to avoid a battle until those reinforcements should 
reach him. He had therefore originally token up a position doie 
to and resting upon the city of Leipzig. The earnest reprsBBn- 
tations of Pappenheim, backed by Fiirstenberg and the yonngv 
generals, induced him, against his better judgment, to quit thil- 
unassailable post, and to move forward to the fair champiiffi 
plains of Brcitcnfeld. The ground which he selected for hii new 
encampment is diversified here and there vrith small elevaticDi 
and declivities. In front of two of these elevations, soutb-weflt of 
the village of Podelwitz, Tilly now ranged his army. He plaead 
his guuB, consiHting of forty pieces, on the heights, iDBodl' 
manner that their fire ^s'ould pass over the heads of his ri^ 
commanded by Fiirstenberg, and of his centre, commanded bf 
himself. Behind the heights, in rear of his right centre, waslikt- 
wiiie a very thick wood. His left, commanded by Pappenheiiiit 
and consisting of cavalry, was free in front and in rear. lf<A> 
withstanding that he had relinquished his advantageoospositua' I 
near Leipzig to post himself in the open plain, Tilly was eeoiwf J 
resolved to avoid a general action till his reinforcements ehooU , 
arrive. But the rashness of Pappenheim disconcerted his pUiM> 
To take up the position marked out by Gustavns. the SvecQili* 
Saxon army had to cross a little rivulet called the Iioder, nur 
Podelwitz, to the north-east of the imperial army Thft op^- 
tonity to horasa the enemy whilst they should be cogn^ in I 
this operation was so tempting that Pappt^nheim proposed <i> 
Tilly to attack them. Tilly gave a most unwilling conMQt, 
and only on the condition that Fappenlieim should ( 
no more Uian 2,000 coiraasierB, and should not luiog^gj 



The Battle-fields of Germany. Sid* 

Pappenheim so far conformed that he charged the 
, advancing obliquely across his front, with only the 

of men specified. But he made no impression on 
3rried ranks. Gustavus had noted the possibilities, 
istened to the point of danger, and, present there 
appenheim swooped down, had first broken his attack, 
Uly forced him to retire badly smitten. Pappenheim, in 
eat, had set fire to the village of Podelwitz to check the- 
' advance. It did not check it, however. The gallant 
of Gustavus traversed the burning village, and reached a 
L which enabled them to form up fronting the enemy's line, 
rning to the main body after his repulse, Pappenheim 

his entire cavalry to form, with the intention of falling 
rce upon the enemy whilst they should be still in motion.. 
I allies had too well employed the interval to grant him 
d chance. Their whole army had, under the fire of the 
.1 guns, cleared the dangerous point, and had taken their 
I opposite to the imperialists : the Saxons, numbering 

of whom one-fourth were cavalry, were in two lines 
B Fiirstenburg ; the Swedes, counting nearly 20,000, in 
nes, including the reserves, opposed to Tilly and Pappen- 
Of the front line, Gustavus Horn commanded the left, 
Teufel the centre, and Gustavus the right. The cavalry 
)t massed in one compact body, as with the imperialists, 
nes between each regiment, sometimes between every two- 
5 regiments, was posted a regiment of musketeers, trained 
with the horsemen. The centre was composed of four 
s of pikemen. The guns were ranged immediately in 
if the first line. The second line consisted of five 
its of cavalry, immediately behind and supporting 
J brigades of pikemen. On their right, behind the 
^mmanded by Gustavus, were three regiments of horse- 
Banner. The centre of the third line, or reserve, was 
ed of three brigades ; two of which were British, under 
n. It was flanked on the right by four regiments of 
mder Baudissin ; on the left by three regiments under 
and supported in the rear by two more at Hepburn's 
1. It may here be stated that there was no great dis- 
between the numbers on both sides. The imperialists 
I but few more than 85,000. 

more compact formation of the allied army gave the 

.lists an apparent advantage, for it enabled their longer 

outflank that of their enemy. Tilly was so impressed 



820 The Battle-fields of Germany, 

with this, that tie was anxious to await their more fomid 
movement. But f appenbeim and Eiirstenburg forced Lis hand. 
Smarting under his repulse from Podeiwitz, Pappenheim iai, 
as I have said, returned to his camp, and ordered oatallhii 
horsemen, with the view to renew hiu attack in full font 
Fiirstenhurg likewise uo soouer viewed the Saxons farmed up i 
front of him than he charged upon them with eeven regiimk 
of cavalry. The^e two attacks were made almost simultanwmitf, 
Pappenheim on the King's troops, Fursteuburg on the Sain^ 
thii latter having perhapH a blight, but very slight advance. 

By a special arrangement made by Gustavus, who had 
no experi(uict) of, and who therefore was inclined to doubt Ik) 
discipline ami Httadfastnese of his allies and the eapaei^ o( 
their general, iv considerable space separated the 
the Swedish army. This isolation was not, perhaps, 
iuurcase the confidence of young troops having in front of 
a serried line of infantry, on their left flank strong bsifiii 
cavalry, and whose eyes were blinded by dust and 
the wind blew strongly from the south. The roBolt 
that which mi^ht have been anticipated. Attacked with 
fury on thtiir left tiauk, the Saxons made but a feeble 
Their Elector, John George, was the first to give 
the practice of war often diffei-s vastly from its theory. He! 
with ail speed in the direction of Torgau, and first drew: 
at Eilenburg, about midway between that place and 
In the space of twuuty minutes the Saxon half of the 
army bad (lisapi)eared ; the Croats were engaging in 
their ciimp, and couriers were on their way to Mimioh 
Vienna to announce a great victory. 

For, at that supreme moment, Tilly never doabted tmt 
victory was witliiu his grasp. The only enemy Btill 
on the field was inferior to him in numbers by nearly 
Pappenheim was engaging tbem on their right. He 
to push forward his numerau£ infantry, and assail Uramoa 
front and their now exposed left, to crush in Gemuoy, 
long time to come, the cause of freedom of 

But the Tilly of that day was not the Tilly who! 
on many a well-fought field, who had never 
"The determination," writes Schiller, "which 
Tilly before, i'ailed him on this day." Certun 
allowed a grand opportonity to slip from his bands. 

Another moment, and it was too late. Pappenheim, ti\ 
the front of danger, had launched, ae alreiuly 



The Battle-fields of Germany. 821 

ivalry against the Swedish centre. Here, we have seen, the 
LDg commanded in person. Under him was an officer worthy 
serve under such a chief, the cool-headed and daring Banner, 
le Swedes met the charge with so much steadiness that Pap- 
inheim, unable to make any impression upon them, fell back 
iffled. Seven times, however, did he renew the charge, but 
?en times was he driven back. It was on the occasion of the 
3t of these charges that Gustavus, noting the rout of the 
kxons, and feeling certain that in a few minutes he would have 
lly on his hands, turned the repulse into a complete defeat by 
(inching his own cavalry from his right wing and forcing 
ippenheim to quit the field. 

This, then, was the situation after a hand-to-hand engage- 
ent which had lasted about half an hour : Tilly had disposed 
the Saxons, and Gustavus had driven Pappenheim from the 
M. If the left flank of the King was uncovered, his front was 
ear, and the traversing by the enemy of the space which he 
li designedly left between him and the Saxons would give him 
me, with his troops well-trained for movements of celerity, to 
fer a new front to the enemy. 

Before even the Saxons had been completely driven from their 
K>imd, and before Pappenheim's repulse had been changed into 
decisive rout, Gustavus, noticing the disorder of his allies, 
id strengthened his left flank, where Horn commanded, by 
Btaching to it, from the centre, three of his best infantry 
igiments. On receiving this welcome reinforcement, Horn had 
istributed the pikemen, of which it was composed, in com- 
plies or sections between each squadron of cavalry, the pike- 
ien slightly in advance. He had but just made this disposition 
'hen the imperial cuirassiers, their swords dripping with Saxon 
lood, dashed upon him. The Swedish pikemen received the 
lu)ck, however, with the same firmness and resolution with 
^h, but a few minutes before, they and their comrades had 
^ the charge of Pappenheim. The cuirassiers were drawing 
BMsk, baffled, with the intention of renewing the attack, when 
Qstavus appeared on the scene, and, launching his own horse- 
ten against the retreating imperialists, completed their discom- 
^. They fled from the field, not again, that day, to 
'appear. 

Having thus disposed of the enemy's horsemen, Gustavus, 
beeling his troops and making a long sweep to the left, 
barged the extreme and now uncovered right front of the 
^«my, immediately below the high ground in front of which 




:322 The BatOe-fidds of Germany. 

Tilly's army had been posted. To hew down and dis] 
infantry, to charge the high ground and to drive th 
gunners, to capture the guns, to turn them against i 
-of imperial infantry, now hesitating between two fi 
the work of a few minutes. A moment later and Horn's 
advanced from the front to deal the finishing bio 
imperialist infantry, assailed now on three sides, had 
left to continue the battle. Four famous regiments < 
they broke and fled. The four regiments alluded 
belonged to the force which Furstenberg had broug 
Flanders, where they had " grown grey with victory," i 
way fighting to the wood of which I have spoken, ii 
their right centre, and eventually, after losing more tl 
their numbers, succeeded in effecting their retrea 
rest of the imperialist army fled, I have said, in 
They were, on the order of Gustavus, hotly pursuec 
Swedish cavalry till night-fall. Their losses, when the 
ceased, had been enormous. Of the thirty-five thousand 
marched out of their camp that morning, one-fifth lay 
the field ; one-seventh were either wounded or prisoi 
complete was the defeat, that Tilly, who was badly woun 
who had narrowly escaped capture, could not muster m 
six hundred men to accompany him in his retreat to H 
Halberstadt; whilst even Pappenheim only rallied 
hundred horsemen. The Swedes lost only seven hundi 
the Saxons about two thousand. 

On his knees, amidst the dying and the dead, i 
returned thanks to God for his great victory. He then 
from the field, took possession of and occupied the still 
camp of the imperialists, near to and resting on Leipzi 
same evening, the Elector of Saxony reappeared to con 
the conqueror. Gustavus received him with the 
courtesy, thanked him for having so earnestly utj 
to fight, and entrusted to him the task of re-( 
Leipzig. The next day he himself marched to Mersel 
Halle, defeating on his way thither a body of five 
imperialists. At Halle he was rejoined by the Elec 
had recovered Leipzig without striking a blow. 

Such was the first great encounter on the field of Br 
If the greater battle which was to follow it, at an 
of a hundred and eighty-two years, may be truly ei 
" Volkerschlacht " — the battle which delivered peep 
tyranny — this, its forerunner, may as truly and as 



The Batile-fields of Germany. 323 

-designated a battle which freed Germany from the thraldom 
•of religions intolerance. It was necessary, certainly, in both 
cases to follow up the victory, to supplement the first great 
initiative battle by others. Breitenfeld was, in fact, the first of 
a series of battles which brought about the great result of 
allowing Catholics and Protestants to live together in har- 
mony, of ensuring to every man freedom of conscience, of 
rooting out and destroying the principle which gave one man 
the right to say that because he himself believed certain dogmas 
therefore all the German people should be compelled to believe 
them. This was the principle which Ferdinand II. had introduced 
into Germany. This was the principle which Gustavus Adolphus 
invaded Germany to destroy. These two men were the embodi- 
ments of those opposite ideas. The one, trained up from his 
earliest childhood to hate the Reformers with the most bitter 
hatred, viewed all the affairs of State through spectacles of 
■extreme Catholic prejudice. To force other men to believe as 
he believed was the aim of his life. To effect this aim no 
instrument was too vile. Persecution, confiscation of property, 
banishment, sentence of death, torture, were all legitimate 
Weapons. From Ferdinand there issued no rebuke for the 
sianghter of thirty thousand unarmed people at Magdeburg. 
He read, on the contrary, with sympathy, the report of Tilly 
that " since the taking of Troy and of Jerusalem no such 
triumph had been achieved." The embodiment of the very 
'^orst features of the worst form of Boman Catholicism, he 
^^8 unfortunately in a position, and he possessed, unfortunately, 
^e iron resolution, to give effect to his convictions — and he gave 
effect to them with a vengeance. 

Kever, in the history of the world, has the influence of one 
lA^n been greater upon a people than was the influence of 
Ferdinand II. on the hereditary states and kingdoms of the 
House of Hapsburg. At the time of the death of his predecessor, 
the Emperor Matthias, the reformed religion preponderated, 
liot only in by far the greater part of Bohemia, but in the 
*^o Austrias and in Moravia. It was a living force in 
^Ungary, in Carniola, in Carinthia, even to a certain extent 
^ Styria. By persecution, by banishment, by the harrowing 
"^^ armies, this one man did succeed in rooting out, almost 
•cotiapletely, the new faith from those provinces. He tried to 
Produce the same result all over Germany. 

*Ihe living embodiment of the other principle, the principle of 
^leration, was a far nobler character. If Ferdinand would have 



824 



The BattU-felds of Germany. 



enelaved men's conBciencea, GastavuB would have freed Ihm. 
Firm in hio own conyictione, he did not, like Ferdinand, force 
those convictions down the throats of other men. He was villinf; 
to grant to the various peoples of Germany the same freedom of 
thought on questions of religion which he claimed for himselL 
He loudly declared himself, when he entered Pomerania, the 
protector of all established reUgions, even of the Catholic. 
From that declaration he never swerved. 

An age whicli has recognised toleration as a cardinal prindpk 
cannot be indifferent to an event which first breathed life into 
the scattered materials on which that principle has been bnilt 
np, which gave to it a power of cohesion, and welded it into 
a material shape. The battle of Breitenfeld, or, as it ii 
sometimes styled in this country, of Leipeig, waa tlu 
first effective blow struck in the Germany of the Beroh 
teenth century for freedom of conscience. As such it deaenn 
a permanent resting-place in the thoaghts and memorieB of tin 
descendants of those who so nobly fought to bee thenuelni 
and their children from a yoke which tbey had foBod in- 
tolerable. 



J 



826 



£xm\ Colonial Aggressions 

By Oeobge C. Y. Holmes. 



A ORSAT deal of intersst has been excited in this country, during 

the last three or four years, by the energy which the French have 

displayed in pushing their colonial interests and in making fresh 

annexations in various parts of the world. The daily papers and 

magazines have been replete with news and with articles on the 

Bubjeot, and the general spirit of what has been written shows that* 

this new development of the aggressive spirit of our neighbours is 

▼iewed on our side of the Channel with feelings of considerable 

jealousy, irritation, and mistrust. For the cause of these feelings 

we need not seek very far. A great deal may be set down to the 

peculiar nervous uneasiness which Englishmen always exhibit 

whenever a foreign Power is making an advance, no matter in what 

^i^ction, and which is, no doubt, engendered by the large extent 

^i scattered nature of our own empire, these causing an uneasy 

ispioion, if nothing more, that our interests may somehow or 

lier he endangered or interfered with. Not only is the empire 

*elf large and scattered, thus exposing innumerable frontiers to 

"^ign attack ; but the high-roads between our various colonies and 

^sessions are, to all intents and purposes, more vulnerable than 

frontiers themselves ; and as some of these high-roads lie all 

ig the sea-boards of many of the most important nations in the 

Idy we naturally look with extreme suspicion upon the aggressive 

ements of foreign Powers. 

^ough this state of things may account for a great deal of our 

\gs towards France, much more, however, must be set down to 

thing far more defined than a mere nervous suspicion. Many 

steps which France has lately taken, have produced in us not 

;s of doubt and misgiving, but the absolute certainty that our 

fital interests will, under certain circumstances, be actually 

^red by them. There are two other elements of the ques- 

hich materially affect our views. One of these is the 

al aspect of the case. We cannot forget that but little 

)L. VI. 11 



326 French Colonial Aggression. 

more than a century ago France was our rival in every p 
of the world for colonial dominion and maritime supremacy, 
was found necessary then to engage with her in a struggle for li 
or rather a series of such struggles, which commenced in 17 
and continued with but short intermissions till the final ov^r* 
throw of Napoleon in 1815. The earlier of these wars ir^Te 
waged mainly for colonial dominion and the empire of the seas, &zid 
they resulted, as is well known, in the stripping of France of neaorly 
all her foreign possessions. The names of Olive in India, of Wolfe 
in North America, of Anson, Hawke, Rodney, and Howe, w^ho 
carried their country's flag wherever there was water enough to 
float a man of war, will not allow us to forget how bitter and how 
hard- fought were the struggles which, about the time of the Seven 
Years' War, we waged with our neighbours for colonial supremacy* 
We are still paying, in the shape of a large proportion of the interest 
of our national debt, for the cost of those enterprises ; how, then, 
^ can it be expected that we should look otherwise than with 
feelings of traditional jealousy upon this new departure in French 
politics ? We naturally feel that what has happened before may 
occur again, and that if France reasserts herself successfully as a 
colonial power, the history of the last century may be repeated ia 
the near future. 

All the above-mentioned causes, which account for the present 
state of the national instinct towards France, are, of course, more 
or less due to our feelings of self-interest and self-preservation; bat 
there is one other element in the question of a quite unselfiab 
character, which accounts for a great deal of the bitter character of 
much that has been written. This last is the wantonly aggres' 
sive and unjustifiable nature of the recent French attacks 
upon contented and inoffensive nationalities. Whenever ii^ 
their foreign expeditions they have kept clear of our immediate 
interests, and have given us no cause to fear for ourselves, tbef 
have managed to estrange from themselves all our good feelinff* 
and to enlist it on the side of those whom they have so wantonly 
and with such frivolous pretext attacked. 

The general motive under-lying all this French aggression is so 
thoroughly unworthy of a great people, so mean, pitiable, and evs<^ 
frivolous in its nature, that we can hardly avoid feeling as mool^ 
compassion for the nation that has fallen so low as to act on sncb 
motives, as for the helpless victims of its misguided ambition. ^^ 
are told that France seeks to compensate herself elsewhere for th^ 
loss of prestige and territory which she has sustained in £arope» ^ 
if the filching of Tamatave were a compensation for the loss of 



French Colonial Aggression. 827 

ysace, or as though the slaughtering of helpless and half-naked 
Ijrahs at Sfax would redeem the honour lost at Sedan, or the 
lisgrace of the thousands who capitulated at Metz. The nation 
Jiat can seek consolation in such petty triumphs for the loss of 
«rritory, political position, and even honour, is easily consoled, 
md must be bereft of the first elements of greatness, viz. the 
rell-defined knowledge of its own interests. 

We cannot avoid here contrasting the way in which our own 
Colonial Empire has grown, with the method adopted by the 
French to create dependencies, as it were, ready made. Our own 
record is not as clean as it might be ; there are many pages in the 
history of our dealings with races now subject to us which we may 
well wish were unwritten ; but never, we may safely assert, have 
^e gone about annexing independent communities for the mere 
gratification of national vanity, or in order to wipe out the disgrace 
of defeats inflicted on us by nations of our own size. That we 
We not done so is perhaps less a proof of the possession of 
'<aperior virtue than of sounder common sense ; for we know well, 
^bat the French will probably soon learn to their cost, that the 
'^uisition by force of territories not necessary to our national 
^stence, and peopled by hostile races, is a source, not of 
^rength, but of weakness. Thus the nation that was injured by 
^e loss, in fair fight, of Alsace and Lorraine, will probably be 
Weakened still further by the acquisition of Tunis, Madagascar, 
^d Tonquin. 

In our own case, our possessions have, as a rule, grown imper- 
^ptibly from small commercial beginnings, often against our will, 
>^d by force of circumstances. That this was so in India is a thrice- 
^Id tale. We might even now be occupying in that country the 
Ooition of simple traders, had it not been for the intrigues against 
Ur commerce and our influence, and also against the native rulers 
hich were first set on foot by Frenchmen. Certainly it was no 
^d-hunger which led us to increase the cares, the responsibilities, 
^d the expense of Empire, as we have done in that country. 
^ other cases, we have settled on tracts of territory, sparsely 
H>pled by tribes of savages^ and in some we have wrested their 
^Icnies by force of arms from European nations with which 
<d were at war ; but never have we wantonly attacked civilised 
^d contented communities, who in no way interfered with our 
Purity, merely for the sake of adding to our national great- 
^8. The French^ on the other hand, make annexations — for 
clonics in the true sense of the word they do not possess — 
^^tAj for the sake of increasing the area of their dominiona* 



^828 Frendh Colonial Aggression. 

Having no just pretexts for attack, the preliminaries to tt^ 
aggressions are necessarily of a character to disgust all f^ 
ininded men, and involuntarily recall to mind the old story 
the wolf and the lamb. We need only mention, in support ( 
this assertion, the trumped-up quarrel with the Eroumirs, n 
well described by Mr. Broadley in his recent work Tunis Pan 
and Present, and which served as pretext for the occupa- 
tion of Tunis. If we search the whole of history we shall 
find hut one parallel to the treachery and enormity of this poli- 
tical burglary. Only in the records of their own country— ia 
the story of the robbery of Alsace and Lorraine during a period 
of profound peace — have the French been able to find a precedent 
for the immorality of their action towards Tunis. Another 
instance in point is the absurd piece of thimble-rigging by which 
the adventurer De Brazza induced a Central African savage to sign 
a treaty with France, the contents of which he could not read, and 
the significance of which was not explained to him. This latter 
transaction, had it been carried out in a civilised country, and 
between private individuals, would have rendered the deceiter 
liable to a term of penal servitude; but we do not find that 
France, which boasts of the perfection of her civilisation, disowned 
the petty swindling of her subordinate ; on the contrary, by her 
acceptance of the treaty acquired by fraud, she put herself on the 
level of the receiver of stolen goods. 

Irritating as are these incidents in French aggression abroad^ 
and aggravated as they have been by such circumstances as tho^^ 
which recently befell our own Consul after the recent bombardment 
of Tamatave, it nevertheless behoves the people of this country 
to lay aside all feeling of anger and outraged sentiment, and tC3 
view the proceedings of our neighbours strictly and exclusively 
from the standpoint of self-interest. If the French think tha^ 
their interests are served, or their national vanity soothed, hy 
continuing on the line of policy to which they seem committei:s 
that is their afi*air, so long as they do not interfere with us. W^ 
may pity them, and commiserate those whom they have injni^ 
but we have no right to thwart them so long as they do not baro^ 
Us, If, however, the latter contingency should arise, we mu*-^ 
act, and act vigorously, and we cannot act too soon. It ma^ 
therefore, be worth while to examine a little more closely into whM 
France has recently been doing in various parts of the world, wb*^ 
military and naval measures she has been adopting at homo to 
cure and maintain her influence abroad, and how far, if a< ^ 
actions have jeopardised our interests. 

i 




French Colonial Aggression. 829 

Let us first consider her position in the Mediterrnnenn, which, 
for many reasons, affects the people of this country more vitally 
than could the extension of her influence in any other part of the 
globe. The Mediterranean is one of our chief ocean highways. 
Through it passes an immense proportion of our steam trade with 
India, China, and our vast Australasian colonies, not to mention 
the local trade which we carry on with all the principal countries 
of Southern Europe. Its value to us from the military is not less 
important than from the commercial point of view, as it is the only 
convenient means of transit for troops and munitions of war 
between this country and our Eastern Empire. On the other 
hand, it is the one spot in the globe where France, by reason of 
her natural proximity to the sea, is most capable of acting in 
force. 

It is not generally recognised in this country how widespread till 
^uite lately was French influence, and how far-reaching French 
ambition in the Mediterranean. That they have recently suffered a 
dieck is, perhaps, due to the peculiar temper of tlie French 
Chambers, at the period preceding the despatch of the expedition 
^Q8t Arabi, rather than to any superior wisdom or diplomatic 
>U1I on thu part of our own Government. Before that expe- 
^tion took place French influence was paramount over a large 
portion of the coast of Northern Africa and the Levant. Algiers 
W been for years a French province ; Tunis had just been con- 
^oered; in Egypt the Suez Canal, that jugular vein of British 
<ioinmerce, was virtually under French domination, and the agents 
of the Republic shared with us, on nominally equal terms, the control 
^luch the Western Powers had imposed on the Khedive Ismail ; 
bat in reality their share in the administration of the country was 
fa greater than ours. French o£5cials swarmed in every branch of 
Ae Egyptian service, and the intrigues set on foot against our 
ttflueDce by the notorious Baron Bing, who is one of the very ablest 
tanbeiB of the French Diplomatic Corps, are now matters of 
Uitofy. 

Further to the east, in Syria, French power, though less openly 
bplayed than in Tunis and Egyptj was not in reality one whit 
(m meiiaeing than in these latter states ; and we have lately seen 
hibf$ iiiooeBafal oppomtion to the re-appointment of Bustem Pacha, 
IM Ex-Oovemor of the Lebanon — a man of whom they could never 
iiflBtA toolr-4bAt their inflaenoe in that region is as potent aa it 
md that, nieh as it is. it is not exerted in the support of 
It. 

18 of saeh vital importanoe to this oonn try 




^ 



330 Frmeh Cohndal 

that is to say, so loDg as we retain our Indian empire, onr easier 
trade, and oor Australasian colonies — that we can ncTer dare t 
allow any Foreign Power to acquire a paramount influence betwee 
the Pillars of Hercules and the Isthmus of Suez. For tha 
reason we have acquired and retained the chain of fortified post 
which dot the Mediterranean and the Bed Seas. Gibraltar, Malti 
Cyprus, Aden, and Egypt itself are but links in the chain whicl 
binds the East to this western isle. These seas, though the 
have for obvious reasons been chosen as the high road of on 
Oriental trade, possess, nevertheless, many disadvantages as meac 
of communication which are likely to become painfully apparea 
in war-lime, and which, therefore, require every precaution to nea 
tndise in advance. The many narrowings of their waters afford ■ 
many opportunities to a hostile naval Power to throttle our con 
merce, and to cut off our convoys of troops and munitions of wa 
For this reason we bold Gibraltar and Aden, the entrances of tl 
two seas, in our hands; and for this reason also we have, 
immense expense, created at Malta a powerfully fortified nair" 
dockyard. But while all ibis has been done, there yet remains tl 
curious anomaly, that the most important point in the whole lira 
the canal which connects the Mediterranean with the Red Sea, as 
which at present exists almost exclusively for the purposes 
British trade and British dominion in the East, remains under tl 
control of a private company which owes allegiance to a forei^ 
Power, and that Power the greatest naval rival which this count. 3 
has to fear. 

The whole question of the Suez Canal has lately caused 
immense amount of interest and excitement in the country. T 
military importance to us came prominently into view last ye*, 
when it served as the basis of operations of our army invaditJ 
Egypt ; and also on a previous occasion when its existence allowe 
us to transport a considerable body of Indian troops with gretf 
rapidity into the Mediterranean fortresses. Its commercial impos 
tance is now the uppermost question, but it is widely felt am 
acknowledged that in this instance military and commercial int^resi 
go hand in hand and cannot be separated. 

For some time past there has been a very lively agitation o' 
the part of ship-owners and merchants interested in the Easter 
trade, to bring about the construction of a second canal whic 
should be exclusively an English concern, made with English 
capital, and managed by English officials. The existing ohanue 
has proved totally inadequate to accommodate the immense and evtf 
increasing quantity of shipping which seeks transit, and, in spite o 



French Colonial Aggression. 331 

tequaoy, its proprietors were known to be receiving enormous 
ds. Hence arose a further clamour for the reduction of the 
lerous tonnage dues and piloting charges, which are felt to 
only unfair and obnoxious in themselves, but which are 
ited by the heavy expenses of demurrage to owners caused 
intolerable delays in the transit. The friction between our 
rners, who contribute four-fifths of the traffic, and the 
tors of the canal was still further increased by the local 
tment, which, as alleged, is very defective, and by the un- 
) and dictatorial manners of the French officials. The result 
this agitation was the negociation between the English 
ment and the directorate of the canal, which has resulted in 
f notorious heads of agreement which have been recently 
nicated to the House of Commons, and which have provoked 
I of discontent throughout the country. It is not necessary 
uss this extraordinary agreement from the point of view of 
politics* The question, in its bearings on the country at 
3 almost too grave to be made the mere play-thing of factions, 
8 seems to be universally felt, for not a voice has been raised 
the ordinary supporters of the Government in favour of the 
lis. We may, however, very fairly consider the provisional 
ent on its merits, and suggest what alterations and amend- 
vould meet the case of the British traders and ship-owners, 
agreement as it stands provides for the construction of 
d canal by M. de Lesseps* Company, by means of money 
extent of eight millions sterling to be borrowed from 
iglish Government, at the rate of 3j per cent, interest, 
provides for the gradual reduction of the existing tonnage 
otage dues, for the employment of a fair proportion of 
pilots, and for the appointment of an English naval 
of high rank, whose functions are at present undefined, 
ose title is to be Inspecteur de Navigation, whence we may 
at his duties will be to control the traffic through the canal. 
>vemment, on the other hand, in addition to lending the 
arge sum of money at a rate of interest which enables the 
ay to save at least jE140,000 a year, compared with what they 
have to expend if forced to raise the money in the open 
,,also engaged to use their great influence with the Khedive 
\ obtaining the necessary concession for constructing the 
channel through the isthmus, as well as the needful land, 
ther, an extension of the original concession for an additional 
of twenty years over and above the time for which it was 
ily gn^nted. 



382 French Colonial Aggression. 

The weak points in the above arrangement are as follow : — 

The reductions on the dues are small, and are contingent npcrrDn 
immense dividends being earned by the Company, so that tflBte 
period at which any substantial redaction will take place appears -rio 
be exceedingly remote. 

The extension of the concession for a further period of twei^. tj 
years is a most unwise provision. The original monopoly is 
irksome enough, but to place British commerce at the mer^^j 
of a foreign Company for any further period is out of fc-Xie 
question. 

The better representation of British interests in the mana^^e- 
ment of the undertaking has been omitted. Although the n^w 
canal is to be built by the aid of the national money, azid 
although we have already four millions invested in the old 
concern, no provision is made for an increased British repre- 
sentation on the Board of the Company. This appears to be a 
fatal oversight, but is justified by the Government on the ground 
that unless we had an absolute majority of directors on the Board 
no mere additions would be of any avail in increasing our influenc^e. 
There could not be a greater mistake. What is wanted is, not any 
addition to the number of Government directors, but that tbe 
mercantile marine, and the great trading interests cf this countrj* 
should be adequately represented by delegates conversant with tbe 
needs of their clients, and chosen by such bodies as Lloyds and 
the various chambers of commerce and shipping thronghont tb^ 
country. These representatives of the mercantile community shool^ 
not merelv have seats at the Board, but some of them at le«^ 
should be members of the inner circle, tbe committee of manage 
ment. The Government representatives are no doubt exceedingly 
useiul, because of tbe influence which they have behind thetOf 
but they have no personal interests at stake, and no specif 
knowledge of the needs of British ctHnmerce. Sir John Stok^^ 
is a soldier of moderate abilities, and Sir Bivers Wilao^ 
was an able civil servant, and afterwards acquired a specif 
knowledge of Egyptian finance ; bnt be has never, so £ur as i^ 
known, had any connection with the mercantile community. Meiff 
bers selected bv the cbambers of ceinmerce would be in a very 
dilierent position. They would thofougUy understand their oW^ 
interests^ and would well know how to proceed in order to secu^^ 
them. Tfarir votes nxi^t not eoant for much, bat their inflaai0^ 
would weigh heavily ; and the mete fact tkaiovr oommeroewas tt€>^ 
aa M PCfore sen ted would go hr towards sccttiuig peaee;^ ami a 
£n»i the agitation whkh will otherwise WcomB ehinnir. 



French Colonial Aggression^ 383 

The GoTerDment oannot afford to negleot the legitimate wishes 
id needs of British commerce^ because our commercial interests 
ive, throughout our modem history, been the ruling factor in our 
reign relations. It was the wrongs of British commerce which 
ept Walpole from office and involved the country in the great 
ries of wars of the last century, which resulted in the foundation 

our Colonial Empire. It was the enterprise of British com- 
$rce which gained India for us. It is the wealth and extent of 
r commerce which now renders the empire great and powerful, 
le inOuence which has already accomplished so much, will, even 
left to itself, probably succeed in compelling M. de Lesseps to 
spect its just requirements. 

The errors of detail in the provisional agreement with the Canal 
)mpany, serious and even fatal though they be, sink into insig- 
ficance compared with the diplomatic error committed by the 
ovemment in the conduct of the negociations, in admitting the 
lim of the Company to possess an absolute monopoly to con- 
ruct canals across the Isthmus. Errors of detail can be altered 
ovided the negociator has something to go upon, but this error 

principle can never be made good by the present Government, 
icause they have, by an act of gratuitous and incalculable folly, 
It tbe ground from under their own feet, and deprived themselves 

the use of the one weapon which was likely to bring their 
Iversaries to reason. In the denial of this monopoly they would 
Lve been backed by much of the best legal opinion in the country, 
y yielding the point, they have rendered themselves of no further 
^ in the nvatter to those whose interests they are supposed to 
lArd; and, were the matter of sufficient immediate importance, 
^fe it, in fact, a burning question of the hour, they would have 
^ alternative but to resign their posts. As it is, we presume the 
^crests of the country will have to be shelved until some other 
^^emment, with hands free to act, can assume office. 
^he country is far from wishing to act in this matter in a manner 
^t would be harsh or unfair to M. de Lesseps. It would much 
^her settle the question with him than without him ; for it can 
^er be denied that the country benefited immensely by his 
^Qrs. Without him the canal would never have been made. 
'® difficulties he had to contend with were incredible, and 
^bably no other man of that time possessed the gifts and oppor- 
^ities for overcoming them. But if he has done much for us, 

k^Te also done everything for him. It is our shipping which 
^ enabled him to pay the enormous dividends which his share- 
'dera haye lately been receiving, and we have a right to enquire 




334 French Colonial Aggression. 

what limit, if any, he proposes to place on these dividends. W< 
have DO desire to solve the question of the canal without M. d 
Lesseps, still less in opposition to him ; hut if he persists in onli^- j 
considering the interests of his shareholders, which are alread]^ J 
amply provided for, we shall then be fully justified in endeavouring m 
to solve the difficulty in the manner which may best suit us. Ther^*^ 
appear to be no insuperable difficulties in the way of an equitabU J^ 
settlement. When shareholders are receiving twenty per eeut^^K: 
dividends, and traffic is constantly increasing, we may reasonabl; 
demand an immediate and substantial reduction in rates. Po 
sessing, as we do, two-fifths of the entire share capital, bei 
about to advance an enormous sum at a verv low rate of intere 
and contributing four-fifths of the entire revenue, we certainly 
entitled to a better representation than we now possess in t 
councils and administration of the Company. The concessicmz^!] 




k. 



which has been so much discussed lately, stipulates that tl^Hie 
direction of the undertaking shall consist of representatives of ^^mll 
the nations interested. It certainly never contemplated t^^na 
possibility of the Board being composed exclusively, or almo^ ^t 
exclusively, of the representatives of one nation. If these ve i^ry 
moderate demands are conceded, we may anticipate with tolerate le 
certainty that we shall hear no more complaints on the part ^)f 
British traders, and no more proposals to interfere with the righ^t:^ 
legal or moral, real or assumed, of M. de Lesseps ; and if, in tSne 
future, complaints should arise against a new composite Board, th^^7 
will be merely of the order of the common outcries against mc^ ^^ 
public companies, and will not possess the characteristics ^^ 
national antagonism which render the present agitation so pecaliair^3j 
dangerous. 

The military aspect of the canal question need not at prese^ci^t 
give rise to any serious apprehensions. So long as we remaS ^ 
masters in Egypt, and so long as we maintain a sufficient^/ 
powerful navy to keep the command of the seas, the can^*' 
will be at our mercy in time of war, as it was proved to be la^^ 
year. 

We are now able to review the whole situation as it at pieseO*'^ 
exists in the Mediterranean. France occupies an undoubtedly 
strong position on account of the possession of a large seaboard 
and important naval arsenal in these waters. She haa fiuth^^ 
acquired a considerable portion of the North African coast, ai^ 
can, if she feels so disposed, create in Tunis a very fomudabl-* 
naval station which will be a perpetual menace to oar commero^^* 
Her influence in Syria is unimpaired, and her doings in 



JFVench Colonial Aggression. 336 

require to be carefallv watched, and the further spread of 
3iice checked. There is strong reason to suspect that she 
ivouring to foment disturbances between the various 
sects in the Lebanon, in order that she may have » 
for landing an army there, ostensibly to protect the 
is^ but really in order to effect a permanent occupation.. 
} long been a favourite project in France. M. Thiers 
> carry out a similar expedition in 1839. The Emperor 
I actually dfd occupy the country in 1860. In each case 
ior designs of France were checked by the resolution of 
merston, but her influence in Syria has never been eradi- 
the contrary has been carefully nursed since the occupation. 
It of the French action in 1860 has been thus described by 
own Englishman at Constantinople — Mr. Frank Scudar 
. his recently published work, France in the East : — 

ueceeded in giving to the Lebanon an autonomy which has TirtnaUy 
ee predominant in that part of Syria, and has given her a starting-point 
ixtension of her powers. There can be no doubt that at any moment 
ess she be checked by England, can raise Syria, and probably Meso- 
ainst the Sultan. That she may choose to do so is one of the contingencies' 
9 have to look forward. 

e Other hand, in Egypt French political influence has 
suffered a severe check, if not total ruin, by the events of 
The services which England rendered to the Khedive at 
od, and the presence of an English army of occupation, 
urally resulted in making our influence for the time 
It. It is true that a French Company still holds the canal^ 
apable of being injurious to British trade ; but, as has 
Qted out, the actual ownership of the water-way can 
injurious military influence on a strong power holding 
s. 

Bt frankly be acknowledged that if France has recently 

her territory in the Mediterranean, the English positionr 

correspondingly strengthened during the last few years. 

18 we possess an excellent base for operations directed 

(yria, or any part of the Levant ; but the most important 

h England has taken in her own interests for many years^ 

the occupation of Egypt, the one piece of dry land which 

tween this island and its Indian possessions. The English 

in the Delta of the Nile is an unmixed benefit to the 

18, as well as to ourselves, securing, as it does, order to* 

[ safety to us. For the first time in our history we can be 

to the security of our communications with India, and for 

time in their records the people of Egypt possess a shield 



386 French Colonial AggressUm. 

agaioBt oppression, and a chance of prosperity. Let ns eunesJj 
hope, having now eetablished onrselvee safely in the countr}-, having 
got rid of dual controls, French intrigues, and all the other con- 
ditions of inslEibility which for so long threatened our security md 
the peace of the world, that our Government will not be induceiilo 
abandon a position of such comfort and ooDsequence, a position 
which they obtained by good Inck, and which they may hold foi era 
to the benefit of everyone concerned, by the most ordinary dispjij 
of firmness and tact. So long as we are settled in Egypt, and Eolong 
as we keep our neighbours from occupying Syria, we need fed no 
alarm at their recent acquisitions in the Mediterranean. But iS, 
JD a moment of weakDeue, we allow France to extend her powarii 
Syria and to effect a military occupation, the good of kli tbttn 
have accomplished in Egypt will be undone. 

(7*0 be contittued.) 




337 



litbian districts kring % ^lelrolt. 

By H. G. Eebnb, CLE. 



X. 

E Allahabad "Division" — of which the district of Cawnpore 
a constitnent — ^forms the eastern extremity of the famous- 
fib with which we have hitherto been concerned. In addition 
Cawnpore the other sections are the districts of Fatehpur, 
mirpur, Banda^ and Allahabad. Regarding the two former 
Te is no more to be said than what has incidentally come 
ore us in looking at Cawnpore. Banda and Allahabad, how- 
JT, will furnish illustrations of some characteristics of the out- 
ak, though (principally from want of literary ambition on the 
t of the narrators) the material is not all that could be 
ired. 

l?he district of Banda contains a little over three thousand 
sre miles, and the population, at the time of the outbreak, 
y have been something more than half a million, chiefly Bftj- 
8 of more or less pure blood. As in the rest of Bundelkhand 
"which, from a scientific point of view, it belongs) the physical 
I)erties of the soil have had a good deal to do with the state 
•lie people. Studded with isolated rocks, interspersed among 
i^ts of dry basaltic black soil, it is unfertile unless irrigated, 
I when irrigated peculiarly unwholesome. In the Banda 
brict there are few large estates or rich landholders ; but at 
chief town there resided, in 1857, a mediatised prince, the 
o?&b Ali Bah&dur, representative of a bastard family of 
liratta origin who had usurped power there in the anarchy 
the last century, and had embraced the creed of Isl&m. The 
^ stands on the right bank of the river Ken, an important 
cient of the Jumna, and is about ninety-five miles south- 
ti of Allahabad. 

^t the time of the outbreak the chief civil officer was Mr. 
O. MaynBi who— in spite of his friendly sobriquet of "Foggy'* 



338 Indian Districts dwrimg the BevoU. 

— waa a miui who exercised considerable personal influence oyer 
those with whom he came in contact. Any defect of insight or 
scholastic cnltnre was more than compensated by rectitude and 
-energy ; the power to see the duty nearest to his hand, the will 
to carry it out. He died some years ago ; a handsome building 
at Allahabad testifies to the respeci and r^ard of his comrades 
and subordinates. It is to this gentleman's Narrative that we 
are chiefly indebted for the sketch that follows. 

Shortly after receiving news of the disasters at Dehli and 
Meerut, Mr. Mayne found it necessary to strengthen his police 
force at out-lying stations, and to put an embargo on the ferries 
of the Junma by which persons of a dangerous character might 
otherwise pass into his territory and stir up a rebellious spirit 
among the people. The roads were patrolled by horsemen, aad 
strong posts stationed at all the approaches to the town. The 
English officers personally visited the town police-posts by night, 
and some of the native gentry and traders were allowed to 
entertain armed men for their own protection. Help was also 
obtained from the chief of Ajigarh and other places in the 
neighbourhood; and these measures were for some tiine 
efficacious in maintaining tranquillity. The regular troops con- 
sisted of three companies of the let Native Infantry, commanded 
by Lieutenant Bennett. 

But the elements of disaster were too strong. First, tb^^* 
was the depressed condition of the people of the distri^^ 
" ruined " — ^it is the Magistrate and Collector who says s^ — 
" by over-assessment and . . . half-starving." Then came p^^^ 
clamations issued by the British authorities at Agra, apparei^*'^^ 
without Mr. Mayne's consent. Released convicts from **^^ 
broken jails of the neighbouring districts soon poured in, o^^ 
firming and exaggerating the news of trouble elsewhere. 1^ 
first outbreak in the district was not a military mutiny bu* 
rural rising ; a Tahsili (Sub-Collector's office) was sacked, 
the records were destroyed by the villagers, "in order (as tb^- 
said) that no record of their liabilities might remain to the jx^^ 
government." The process was repeated in other quarter^ 
and Mayne saw the tide of rebellion rising rapidly all round hi^ 
as he sate at his solitary post at Banda; his deputy, Mr. Cocker^^ 
holding a still more lonely watch at the head-quarters of 
sub-division of Kirwi. The native officials, generally, showr 
much staunchness, remaining at their posts as long as tla^^ 
could do any good by remaining ; not a few being killed ^ 
wounded in the defence of Government property. Still, it ^ 



Indian Districts during the Revolt. 339 

plain that there was not in Banda that backbone of popular 
energy and good-will which existed in some districts and which 
enabled Dunlop, for oxample, to make such short work with 
revolt in Mcertit. A warning against the too frequent practice 
of treating unpleasant districtB as penal settlements for unsuc- 
cessful or disfavoured ofScers, a practice to which was probably 
attributable the deprouRed condition of the Banda peasantry. 
On rare occasions — as in Mayne's own case — a distinguished 
officer nonld be sent to a place like this, being promoted for the 
purpose before his time ; but usually the other course is believed 
tohavc been adopted. Men who were not esteemed by " Govern- 
ment " were deputed to these stations ; feeling themselves dis- 
credited and ill-used, they worked sulkily and without zeal; 
and the people, as of old, suffered for the folly of their rulers, 
and bore them no affection. 

Nor was the condition of the town itself much more assuring. 
HatinouB talk was heard among the sepoys, though as a body 
tliBy were still trusted ; Mayne even went the length of sending 
moch of his treasure to other districts under guards of these 
men, and confiding the balance to the care of the detachment, in 
vhoee lines he deposited the specie. An attempt was made to 
'^tify the jail as a place of refuge, but this bad to be subse- 
ifenUy abandoned on sanitary grounds. 

On the morning of the 8th June, as Mr. Mayne was sitting 
in hia office, vord was brought that a body of horse was 
m»oacbiog the bridge of boats at Gbilatira on the Jumna. 
An huate in the town took place at once and plundering com- 
'I'^need. The police were employed with effect, and the ladios 
vere removed into the Nawab's palace. In the meanwhile it 
m diaoovered that the supposed invaders were in truth the 
£nglia}i refugees from Fatehpur, conducted by Mr. Sherer ; and 
™* part? arrived in Banda the same evening. But unfortu- 
Utely the native officer stationed at the bridge had thought fit to 
*Moi^uiy them ; the road being thus left open, bands of rebels 
1, and general demoralisation was soon displayed. 

{jherefore remained in the palace, which was 
lie of the English gentlemen, while othera — 
tberer was conapicnous — took part in patrolling 
^ ioum. (>n the night of the 12th, in spite of these precau- 
" I, two bungalowa were burned, and the English began to 
1 the palace defenaible. Whatever they could do against 
I tb^ seem to have done; unhappily some, at 
kof their foes vere of their own honaehold. 





840 Indian Districts during the Eevolt. 

On the 14th the detachment of the let received news of 
mutiny of the regiment at Cawnpore. The 63rd broke out 
the same day at the neighbouring station of Hamirpur 
murdered the Christians at that station. Bennett reported his 

men as being utterly beyond control, and was accordingly ^^ put 
in command of a small body of the Naw&b's men, with wl 
aid Mayne proposed to disarm the men of the Ist and m. 
them give up the ammunition and treasure in their possess] 
Bennett showed the utmost coolness and resolution ; the Na^ 
wavered and vacillated for awhile, but was kept up to the n^K-arlr 
by Mayne. The attack, however, proved a failure; Benn^^tt's 
subalterns, Fraser and Clerk, were chased from the par^^Kde- 
ground with jeers, and esteemed fortunate in being able to ^oin 
the refugees in the palace. All was over, for the time. rXie 
detachment was in successful mutiny^ joined by the Naw &b's 
men ; and all that was left for Mayne and his associates wa.8 ta 
make the best retreat in their power, hampered as they were 
by the presence of seventeen women and a number of children, 
for whose safety they were responsible. Mr. H. B. Webster* 
with a few volunteers clearing the way, they left Banda a* 
8 o'clock that evening, reaching the friendly fort of Ealinjar a^^ 
the end of their first march. They had hardly left the to"^^ 
before the station (European) was in a blaze, which lighted 
them ten miles on their way. 

Meanwhile Cockerell had also left his untenable post ^ 
Kirwi. On the morning after Mayne's departure (15th Jctf»^) 
he rode into Banda, where he was shot down at the gateway ^ 
the palace. The refugees reached Mirz&pur after a long '^^ 
unmolested march ; and Sherer, proceeding to Allahabad, joi»^^^ 
Havelock's advance on Cawnpore, while Mayne remained for 
time watching his opportunity to recover his district. 

Meantime the Naw&b had endeavoured to take charge, 
times obeyed, sometimes opposed by the sepoys. All t*^® 
remaining Christians were gradually hunted down and mi 
dered. The contagion spread rapidly through the district ; ^' 
scores were paid, auction-purchasers and decree-holders w^ . 
ousted, caravans were stopped and plundered, the reign ^ 
anarchy prevailed as in the old days before the British conque^ ,; 
" Never was revolution more rapid, never more oomplei^'' 
[Mayne]. 

The sepoys marched oflF to Cawnpore on the 19th with *^. 
treasure and ammunition; and the Naw&b, relieved by 

* Sinoe the able Inspector-General of Polioe, N.W.P. 



Indian Districts during the Rei'OU. 341 

eparture, set to work to form a government, though with a 
eavy heart, and secret wishes for the return of the British. 
iTith them he attempted to open correspondence through Mayne, 
y whom, however, his letters were not answered. The fort of 
lalinjar continued to be held by Lieutenant Remington, of the 
2th Native Infantry. The rest of the district became more 
ad more a moral wilderness, though imperfect order was 
laintained in the precincts of the town of Banda, whose 
tizens were harried by pecuniary requisitions. 

About the beginning of April, 1858, the chief 's eyes began to 
d opened to his false position. While he had been doing his 
38t to guard against small bodies of British troops crossing the 
umna, he suddenly heard of the approach of the Madras 
>lumn from the south-west under General Whitlock. The first 
ction was fought at Ealrai, twenty-four biiles from Banda, on 
tie 17th April, when the Naw&b's troops retreated and saved 
beir guns. On the 19th they were again driven off from a 
tearer field, and pursued up to the banks of the Ken, on which 
he town of Banda stands : the town itself was occupied without 
esistance on the following day. 

" In a district," says Mr. Mayne, " in which our prestige had 
offered so severely, from which we had been nearly a year 
^nt, and where so many different bands of mutineers from 
He to time had congregated, and where the rebel government 
•d been so long supreme, it was necessary that our return 
otild be accompanied with a force sufficient to make a strong 
ixionstration, to overawe all opposition, and at once to disarm 
d disperse the disaffected." 

fiaving this requisite, the magistrate resumed his duties on 
d 29th April, and at once set to work to re-establish his 
thority. He adds, however, the humiliating confession that 
d conduct of the British troops was for several weeks far from 
Utt was suited to reassure '' the frightened and doubting 
>tiveB." And there were two chiefs still at Eirwi, retaining 
aaession of the eastern half of the district, with 15,000 men 
d forty pieces of artillery ; moreover, tact and judgment were 
luired in restoring order where the whole district had rebelled, 
d ** there was not a village marked in the map that had not, 
^eor less, committed itself." He therefore wisely determined 
single out a few of the most guilty in each Pargana, in which 
*i^ extreme severity should be exercised ; contenting himself 
th levying pecuniary compensation for the offences committed 
the others. A column of demonstration swept the country, 



■642 



Ivdian Districts during ilu R&joit. 



being everywhere well received, save in two places which h«- 
boured notorious offenders, and where due examples were made. 
Major Dallas, who commanded this column, was an of^ oT 
judgmeut and intelligence, whose firm yet conciliatory proceed- 
ings met with duo acknowledgment from the able magistrate. A. 
new police force was organised, the Tahsilis were reopened, uil 
on the 1st June the general proceeded in person to the reductiDii- 
of Kirwi. At the some time the rebels were driven from K&l^ 
by 8ir Hugh BoHe ; and the tranquil occupation of the entire 
district quickly ensued. About four-and-twenty villages that 
had obtained an ovil prominence in crime were burned, iA 
their bend men hanged or flogged, white a few more amxA 
demonstrations sufficed for the entire rostoration of order. 
Mr. Mayne modestly attributes this rapid progress to all eames 
except his own great determination and locaj knowledge; uS 
he concludes his report with the quaint suggestion that "no 
greater boon could be bestowed on the North-West Frovinoee tbia 
to dissolve the Regulations and Acts aitt^ether." Thi§ uif 
aspiration for the substitution of personal government for tliA 
reign of Law was fortunately disregEurded ; it is only mentiawd 
here as an illustration of the absence of statesman-like inu^i 
which is not inseparable from great administrative capaci^ in 
the ranks of the Indian Civil Service. The concluding itndM 
are alike characteristic of the humanity and of the loyal^ of tha 
class : — 

" Since closing the report the Queen's proclamation Maoi ning 

the government of the country baa been issued. . . . and dl 

prisoners under trial who came under the amnesty btve bam 

released, to the number of upwards of SOO men. 

" God save the Quean." 



XI. 
In Book XVII. of his HUtory of the Indian MuHnp fVoL QL* _ 
p. 399 of the first edition). Colonel Mallesoa gives eome ^amp^ i 
sketches of the work of civil officers during ^e revolt wbicb i^ ' 
has been out present buBiaess to study in detail. In epealdagoi , 
AilohabEtd, the author mentima, as folly as the proportion* 
of his work allowed, the oondition of the town 4iid stotiost i l0t i 
it will be here oeeessajry to etpojid ttioM Ikm and j 
gmphs, and to ratdeavon' te give some ideti «C tht ' 
only ibere, bat m the ontlj^ing traota of whiah <MUk 



Indian Districts during the Revolt. 348 

16 " DiviBion," or Gommissionership of Allahabad contains, 
Iready stated, a large tract of country divided into adminis- 
ye districts, in some of which authority was, for a time, 
rely swept away. The district especially named after the 
is of considerable extent — the area being 2,765 square 
fl — and the population is very various, being marked off 
1 some sharpness by geographical limits. The principal 
rs are the Jumna and the Ganges, the latter partly flowing 
in its borders, partly separating it from Mirzapur and Oude. 
total number of inhabitants in 1857 was about one million, 
)8t all Hindus ; in the Du£b, however, (the portion between 
two great rivers,) the estates were largely held by Muslims. 
by them, the people rose in actual rebellion ; the Brahmans 
lived by the pilgrimages to be presently described took the 
3 line : a man of obscure origin who assumed the title of 
lulW (MoUah, or Doctor of Divinity), raised the green 
and preached a crescentade ; the district police joined, and 
raJ anarchy was for a time established. Beyond the 
ges, so far as it intersects the district, there were other 
les and other interests. Here the estates were large and 
by B&jput clans, some of whom, ruined by their own mis- 
agement, had been dispossessed by mortgagees and 
inent-creditors ; but still maintained their prestige among 
cultivating classes, who are believed to have paid them 
ite out of which they maintained some degree of comfort and 
tion, supplemented by plunder, even in the quietest times. 
he parts south of the Jumna, where neither set of conditions 
lailed, three well-affected chiefs preserved some show of 
r, one of them especially — the M&nda Baja — taking charge 
le public treasure and managing the police. 
L the town itself great elements of confusion existed. 
0aghy as a Mughal settlement, it was not a place of any but 
legic importance, it had preserved traditions of sanctity from 
lajB of Asoka, the contemporary of the ancient Macedonian 
sirs, whose obelisk still stands in the fort, bearing the cele- 
ad edicts of the reforming monarch. In a grotto close by 
ds the Akshai Bat, representative of the sacred tree of 
iBiM, watered by subterranean droppings believed by the 
Iqs to be the reappearance of the Saras wati, ''the lost 
r" of the Sirhind plain, which, according to them, re- 
jpn heste to join the Jumna and Ganges in their united 
taM to the sea. 

mm honowted, the '' meeting of the waters *' has tot two ^ 

1% * 



344 Indian Dtsiricts during the BevoU. ] 

thousand years continued, in spite of political, even of reli^ons, 
revoIutioiiB, to be the holiest spot in Hindustan; the "field ol 
bliss," where it is more meritorions to bestow the Bnullnt 
copper coin in alms than it would be to lavish the largest bdihb 
elsewhere. Naturally, such a place would be the hmitiiie' 
ground of religious mendicants, the scene of some of tbne 
bathing- fairs that form, in so many sacred river-siteB, the 
combined resorts of pleasure and piety among the simple ftdk 
of Hindustan. As at Hardwur, Muttra, Benares, so htn* 
numerous gatherings take place on various festal days ; vhile 
in the pleasant season of Indian winter the plateau between 
the Jumna and the fort ie frequented by a special attenduee 
that collects on an average little less than a quarter of r nillian 
of human beings. To minister to the zeal of the pilgrinu, ttr 
slake their thirst for instruction, and to initiate them into tlv 
accurate observance of rite and mystery, a large con&atenit^ 
of idle friars has been formed whom ignorant Europeans are in 
the habit of designating by the name of Fakin (borrowed Gnw 
Mahamadaniam) , but whoso special description is Prfigwtii,i)r 
"Brothers of the Confluence." 

Mention has been mode of the fort. The obelisk and gftUt^ 
point to the conclusion that the place was considered impoitiiit 
as far back as the days of the Falibothran Empire. But tif 
present structure dates from a.d. 1676, when the put 
Mughal monarch, Akbar, was engaged in the iir>t^\ stmgglevitti 
the Sharki, or Eastern, dynasty of Afghan kings. It was thtf 
that be saw the advantage of establishing a place of anni lA 
the spot where his dominions in Hindustan were most opm to 
invasion, and whence they could most profitably direct Hi* 
channel of attack. The old castle has lost mnob of its me^vnS 
aspect in being adapted to the purposes of modem wiiftc* 
under its present masters, the British. In the words of BriMTv 
" the lofty towers have been pruned down, the hi^ aloW 
ramparts topped with turf parapets, and obscured by a gieei» 
sloping glacis." Massive barracka and magazines cono«il 0'' 
oven replace the council-halls and seraglios of the Mugh^^' 
whose great gateway — still a splendid relic in Heher's days — 
b now completely masked by the modern stucco-and-bnck>i?(vl^ 
of " the WeUesley-Ravelin." i 

In the spring of 1867 the garriflon comprehended a wioj: *>* 
tha Sikh " Begimant of Firozpor," and the Cth Native Infantir i 
two troops of Irregular Cavaky, under Captain HardinsrM^ 
Lieutenant A. Aiexuider, cune in bom Partabirai'h. -bv J^^^^l 



Indian Districts during the Revolt. 845 

Sir H. Lawrence; and — most valuable of all — sixty British 
•artillerymen were sent for from the invalid depot at Ghunar, 
under command of an old Haileybory man, Lieutenant the Hon. 
*G. J. D. Arbuthnott, who afterwards did excellent service with 
the levies in £ah&r. 

The morning of the 6th June dawned in apparent quiet. 
Some of the white folks had sought safety in the fort, which 
W&8 garrisoned by the invalided gunners and the Sikhs. These 
latter were not yet trusted. It was known that men of that 
*<^Ui88 had misconducted themselves at Benares, where indeed a 
sister regiment had just met with punishment, as will be shown 
hereafter. It was not known that the Sikh nation, and the people 
of the Punjab in general, were to make common cause with the 
British against their old enemies the Hindustanis. It is even 
stated by Mr. Fendall Thompson, the writer of the official 
Narrative, that the authorities of Allahabad had been warned 
-Against trusting their Sikh sepoys by Sir Henry Lawrence 
himself, the friend of that race. The treasure, therefore, was 
not entrusted to the Sikhs nor brought into the fort, although 
■one hundred and ten volunteers had been armed from the 
-Arsenal and added to the strength of the garrison. 

The chiefs of the British administration were Mr. Charles 

(fester, the Commissioner, and Mr. M. Court, the Magistrate. 

^^ the latter devolved, in virtue of his office, the responsibility 

of not moving the treasure and the whole details of preparation. 

^^e day passed on. In the afternoon a parade was held in 

"^^AJUtonments for the purpose of reading to the men of the 6th 

^© letter of thanks addressed to them by the Governor-General 

^^ Council on their volunteering to march against their insurgent 

'^^xxurades at Dehli. At 8 p.m. the different detachments of the 

-S^-txison marched to their respective batteries, and sentries 

-P^^Bted on the ramparts kept a brisk look-out. They had not 

*ong to wait. At 9 o'clock a rocket was seen to rise from the 

*^*idge of boats, answered by a similar signal from the lines of 

*^e 6th Native Infantry in cantonments. Shortly after firing 

^as heard ; and presently a note was brought from Lieutenant 

^toward, B.A., announcing that the sepoys had carried off two 

S^^tiiBy and that he had gone in pursuit with two troops of 

i ^^^galar Cavalry under Lieutenant Alexander. The rest is 

I ^eU known. Alexander was shot in charging the guns ; Harward 

i "^d others swam the river twice and got into the fort; five 

■ '^cers of the 6th and eight unposted cadets were murdered 

H ^ or near the mess-house; the jail was thrown open, thA 



346 Indian Districts during the RevoU. 

station was fired, plunder and slaughter raged ; by momwux 
thirty-nine persons of Christian blood had perished. 

At the inner main-gate of the fort — near the above-mentio 
Wellesley Ravelin — a company of the 6th remained, sym 
thising perhaps with their comrades outside but afraid to folL 
their example. These were at once disarmed by the volunte ^^j 
and expelled from the fort. This measure was ably carried ^oc 
by Lieutenant Brasyer, of the Sikh Regiment, one of tlM.^>8, 
veterans almost peculiar in those days to the East Ic^diii 
Company's service, who had risen from the ranks, and "^^a« 
destined to rise still higher. But it is not my part to dwell on 
military merit, however conspicuous. I return to my own 
subject. The disarming being happily accomplished without 
bloodshed or accident of any sort, the English in the fort hegem 
to breathe freely. On the 9th some confusion was caused by 
the misconduct of some of the volunteers who, being sent to 
remove stores from the Steam-Agency premises, took to 
plundering and drunkenness on their own account. But tixis 
was not followed by any serious consequences at the moment ; 
and on the 11th Colonel Neill, arriving from Calcutta with forfcj 
men, at once assumed command, and began to restore discipIiKX® 
among the volunteers and the Sikhs who had followed tt"-® 
example of disorganisation. In the meantime the mutinee-:^ 
of the 6th Native Infantry had crossed the river with th^^^ 
plunder ; but they had thrown away their arms for great^^ 
convenience in carrying bags of specie, and as soon as th^^^ 
crossed the river they were set upon by the villagers and spoil^^ 
of their ill-gotten gains. Disarmed and demoralised, tha?^ 
dispersed and became tramps, so that, as a body, they we^^ 
never heard of more. Of the Irregulars many remain^^ 
faithful ; and, being sent out into the district, rescued apartj^^* 
beleaguered Christians — Major and Mrs. Ryves and some rail* 
way employes — all of whom were safely conducted into the fo^ 
with the exception of the lady, who unhappily sank under h^^ 
fatigues. 

At this time the city and suburbs were in open rebellion und^*' 
the Maulvi already mentioned, whose preaching had commended 
him as a leader to the disaffected population. His head-quarteii^ 
were at the Khushru Garden, opposite the railway-statto^* 
whither he had conveyed the two guns taken from Lientenft^ 
Harward on the night of the outbreak. Having first secnrC" 
the bridge of boats, Neill organised an expedition against tbe^ 
ii^els. On the 18th the suburbs near the fort were cleared ; ^ V 



Indian Districts during the Revolt. 347 

the 14th the ateamer Jumna arrived with farther reinforcements ; 
on the 17th a party of volunteers, under Mr. H. D. Willock, the 
joint magistrate/ supported by some men of NeilPs famous regl- 
mezijty the Madras Fusiliers, and by two howitzers under 
Harward, proceeded up the river, and, in co-operation with 
another party headed by Neill, drove the rebels from the town. 
The Maulvi and his followers abandoned their guns and fled ; 
Mr. Court, proceeding to the chief police-station, restored his 
ftnthority over the town and reinstated his officers ; on the IBth 
*he " station " (White Town) was occupied, and the cantonments 
Were penetrated. 

Unfortimately, the exposure and licence of the past began to 
tell, in the shape of a violent outbreak of cholera, to which no 
«88 than forty of the priceless Fusiliers at once succumbed. 
Neill immediately thinned the population of the fort by ordering 
out all non-combatants, and (the re-occupation of the station 
and cantonment rendering this easier) the epidemic disappeared 
as suddenly as it had broken out. Drafts of men now arrived 
daily, and soon nothing remained to hinder the advance upon 
Cai^mpore but the difficulty of procuring transport in a locality 
that had been so scourged and ravaged. On the 30th, Major 
Benaud was able to start with a small column. Alas ! Wheeler 
had ahready capitulated — with consequences that we know. 

On the 1st July General Havelock reached Allahabad, and on 
the 11th joined Benaud at Khaga with a strong column of foot 
Wid three guns. Next morning they had their first brush with 
the enemy, headed by Hickmat-Ulla, revolted deputy-collector 
^ -Patehpur. Mr. Willock, being with the ** faithful " Irregulars, 
^^8 put to flight by a charge of the 2nd Bengal Cavalry, no 
doubt owing to the sympathising of his men, who were soon 
•fter disbanded by order of General Havelock. Let it be men- 
tioned, however, that the British officers displayed their usual 
S^Uantry, and that the Eisdldar (native captain) of the Irregulars 
^''^a killed bravely doing his duty. 

Mr. Willock may now be left, as he has proceeded beyond the 
™iit8 of his district, and we return to Mr. Court at Allahabad. 
Here the work of retribution and restoration was in stern pro- 
S^Ms. Numbers of those who had taken an active part in the 
disturbances that ensued upon the mutiny of the 6th were in 
«ding in and about the town, and it was upon them that ven- 
S^ftnce was in the first instance directed. On the 22nd July 
■ ^ apodal commissions " were issued to certain individuals, one 
^^ whom was a well-known railway contractor, and the work of 



348 Indian Districts during ike BevoU, 

reprisal began in fatal earnest. " The reanlt of these : 
vrites Mr. Thompson, " was soon visible in a wholesome fe« 
pervading all classes of natives — plundered property was cut 
into the fields and roads by those who felt that its posBeesini 
was unsafe." The sentence contains more than, perha^, ni 
meant. Fear, whether " wholesome " or not, was certainly 
felt by " all classes " — whether criminal or not. A terreuT ilandht 
was set up. " Zealously," writes an observer who was preBent,* 
"did the commissioners use their powers; and, in Uie shiit 
time which elapsed before their recall, one of these private indi- 
viduaU had sentenced sixty, the second sixty-four, and the dvil- 
Burgeon fifty-four, to the gallows. No record remains of crini 
or evidence, but we gather that one man was hanged for haiiiig 

a bag of new copper coin in bis possession Thirteen vot 

huug another day for a similar ofFence. Six were fanng In 
plying a ferry for the convenience of the rebels " (by whom flay 
must have been shot if they had refused). Mr. Cost, howefdt 
adds that the proceedings of the trained ofSciala, sensible of 
responsibility and aecuetomed to balance proof and disptKA 
were more deliberiite. Indeed, it is to be hoped so. 

At all events, Allahabad was now aofe. But the coontiyvii 
much disturbed. The usual agrarian outrages set in; landmiib 
were reuioved, new proprietors evicted, vendettas ealaiait 
Europeans hunted down. The Priigwul Brahmana spread Offf 
the village:^, abusing their uupposed sanctity and their penoial 
iiiduence to mislead the simple credulous villagers; and thi 
Maulvi Haunted his greeu banner. When authority recovnl 
the upper hand these tracts wore entirely deserted, and piHt 
di&iculty and delay were experienced before the opeiatiani * 
peace could be renewed there. 

It has already been mentioned that the tracts beyond. 
Jumna had escaped the general demoralisation. Hen 
chiefs, the liujas of Munda, Dehia, and Barra, had frowned] 
all attempts at misconduct, and were preitared to rec 
Goveriunent officers with open arms and a clear conscie 

Beyond the Ganges, on the other hand, the Rajput chuUT' 
aeized the opportunity to sweep away all that oppoeed W 
resumption of the power that they had forfeited by a longnn' 
of idleness and extravagance. Strong in the - sympatbiea eJ li* 
tenantry, they long continued to maintain a guerilla *ar&f< 
against the Government that had, in their opinion, caused dMtt' 
loues. They were assisted by escaped convicts and, dodHHI 

• Cnat^ " IMattiat dnring tha Rebellion."— Cat-'"* *— j;— ^^^B 



Indian Districts during the Revolt. 349 

mntinoiiB sepoys ; and it was not till the beginning of 1858 
at serious measures could be taken for their suppression. In 
nuary a force, under Brigadier Campbell, left Allahabad, 
ich, driving all opposition before it, occupied the Grand Trunk 
ui and surrounding country, as far as Fhulpur. Then came 
[itive troops from Oude, flying before the column commanded 
General Franks,^ and causing fresh disorganisation. *' Order 
mot," concludes Mr. Thompson's Narrative, ** be said to have 
n effectually restored until Brigadier Berkeley took the strong- 
d of Dehion (Dah&in) on the 14th of July. With that event the 
turbances consequent on the mutiny may be said to have been 
dued in the district of Allahabad." [Vide Malleson, iii. 280. J 
k)me pictures of civil administration in this troublous time 
re been extracted by Colonel Mallesonf from Mr. Cust's most 
oable paper. In addition to his other powers, Mr. Court was 
amsted with authority for the levying of fines upon offenders, 
lividual and corporate, and for the confiscation of estates. 
»rd Canning went to Allahabad in the beginning of 18«58, and 
)k over the local government from Mr. J. P. Grant, who, having 
ministered firmly during a most trying time, returned to 
Jcutta to take up the post of President of the Supreme Council, 
le Lieutenant-Gov^norship of the province was vacant, and 
lahabad became henceforth marked out as the future seat of 
i^ernment. 

Supported by the immediate presence of the Governor-General 
► longer fettered by any assessors), Mr. Court proceeded with 
arduous duties. In all things he displayed the moral and 
sUectual resources of a well-born and well-trained English 
cer. His work was varied and complicated to a degree 
dering on distraction. Unadjusted items, of the smallest 
I also of the largest amount, swelled his inefficient balance, 
^ing from payments that had often to be made on the spur of 

moment, and must sometimes have been unsupported by 
tchers. Thus, it is asserted by Mr. Cust that spies and 
issaiies had to be occasionally rewarded by being allowed to 

their hands into a bag of silver and appropriate as much as 
y could grasp ! Supplies of cash, and not of cash only, had 
be constantly made to advancing columns, and assistance 
't&ptly rendered to officers of the commissariat and ordnance 
>%rtments. The writer calls to mind a case in which one of 
*h, items remained imadjusted for nearly ten years. At the 
He time, though treasure was continually pouring in from 

* MallfiMn, u. 82(^9. t Vol iil pp. 442 ff. 



350 



Indian llistricls during tfie Revolt. 



Calcutta, revenne had in due course to be realieed from tlie 
villages, wasted by war and rapine, and from fields often deserttd 
by their cultivators; or, where not realised, formal procetdings 
of BuspenBion, equally of course, had to be recorded. For, a 
Mr. Gust (himself a high revenue authority) most justly remaiki, 
it often became " a grave moral question how far a governmfnt 
is justified in demanding the payment of taxes when it hu 
notoriously failed in its duty of protection." Other featurarf 
the district officer's care-ridden career will be found moat graphi- 
cally pictured in Mr. Gust's pleasant paper, among which naj 
be noted the keeping of an unpaid hotel. For bis honw it 
Allahabad became known as the rendezvous of viBikin; ud 
many survivors, officials and travellers, must still recollect tbt 
rough but ready hospitality of " The Red Lion." 

"No wonder," concludes Mr. Gust, " if some greyhaiiB bhonl 
in his beard, if his heart sometimes palpitated from over-eiolfr 

ment, and his liver sometimes troubled him He hii 

much to bear ; and the rebellion fell heavily on bis eattte, lii> 
family, and his health. He was mentioned in no deBpfttchtfi* 
the thanks of Government reached him not ; and, when he M> 
that the tide bad turned and that the country was saved, lii 
hurried to England, on the chance of rest bringing back tonatf 
his body and change of scene restoring equanimity to Ul 
mind." 

Mr. Court is, I believe, still enjoying the otium cum , 
of a country gentleman in his native land. If tbe labonB" 
other officers were more martial and, so far, more conapiciil* 
few of his contemporaries exceeded him in those eqmily 0*'' 
exertions by which the work of the sword is supported ■» 
rendered possible. 

• Tirfe E»ir»ot (roin Dnnlop in introdoetory 



A 



361 



By C. J. Stone, late 86th Beoiment. 



elve years ago an administrator appears to have been* 
^d for the army upon the principle that he was absolutely 
acquaintance with military matters. But he was to 
Ls great and lucid intellect to bear upon the require- 
»f the profession of arms. The dull, stagnant, or pre- 
ideas of starched martinets, or pipe-clayed officials, were 
light and life infused into them. The army was to par- 
bhe progress of the age, and, at the bidding of schemes 
lly formulated on paper, the young manhood of the 
was to volunteer for service with regular precision, 
s delightful, at the great manoeuvres of 1871, to see the 
brd £jrst-class man and ex-President of the Board of 
it Aldershot as head of the army. In civilian attire, 
pony, he rode amongst the plumed staff officers, the per- 
tion of Intellect amidst the gallant and brilliant but dull- 
scarlet and gold-laced galaxy of war. And forthwith 
I great and small were brought into operation. The 
js of the service were to be ** welded " together. The 
I of the civilian was to adorn the valour of the soldier, 
giments were to become quite domesticated in their 
3 as their pride and delight ; and desertion, drunkenness, 
lorder were to disappear with the abolition of the indig- 
the lash. Conservative Governments revised but did not 
the Liberal changes. At vast expense handsome build- 
3se for the reception of the new brigade depots. Yet, 
LI, it has to be confessed that, notwithstanding increased 
d supposed advantages, our small army is unable to 
in its standard ; while the militia is also deficient in 
•8. 

[listory of our army would seem clearly to demonstrate 

) pibssessed, before the late changes, a system admirably 

1 to the requirements of a nation which refuses to- 

conscription. A system of brigade depots, established 



352 Our Old and New Systems. 

in counties, would, of course, be exceedingly useful if a general 
levy of the district were demanded. But it was most unrea- 
sonable to suppose that recruits would respond to the require- 
ments in equal proportions throughout the country. It was 
also obvious that a man who had enlisted especially to serve in 
the regiment of his county would be more likely to be disgusted 
at being transferred to another corps, than a man who merely 
exchanged the 24th for the 25th. 

Our regiments had, for the most part, the attraction of comity 
titles, without being allowed that familiarity with the counfy 
which is capable of breeding contempt. As has been urged, a 
regiment, with the inspiriting accompaniments of music and 
mihtary glitter, must present attractions, if military ardour has 
not absolutely decayed. But a depot usually affords by no 
means an exhilarating spectacle of the pomp and circumstance 
of war. An old sergeant attending to the barrack garden, a 
small batch of recruits standing on one leg in the goose-stept 
and a party of officers and ladies playing at lawn tennis, present 
a picture of what may have been lately seen in our expensiyely 
constructed brigade depots. Formerly it was wisely held 
advisable not to let our ** marching regiments " become too 
strictly localised, for fear lest the barrack should become too 
home-like. We have been accustomed to associate the military 
spirit with the vagrant love of adventure. In the militifti 
intended only for home defence, we offered a purely local 
service ; and, from the middle of the last century to the Crimean 
war, the histories of our regiments show that the mihtia con- 
tinually operated as a feeder for the Line. | 

According to the valuable list of officers appended by Captain 
Trimen to his Memoir of the 35th Royal Sussex Regimenit 
eighteen ensigns and lieutenants of militia were gazetted to 
ensigncies, and one to a lieutenancy, in that regiment in the yea^ 
1799, when strenuous efforts were made to increase our army 5 
and a corresponding number of militia privates raised the reg^' 
ment to two full battalions. It is an old story that Waterloo 
•was largely fought by militiamen, who still wore their ol^ 
uniforms. Yet it has been considered by our doctrinaires oi 
the day that the connection could only be secured by m^ 
expenditure, and all sorts of alterations in names and unifona^ 
For instance, there was the 3rd Middlesex, or Boyal Wea*^ 

Light Infantry, which was called by the men tla»* 
Stingers, from its head-quarters at Tumham Gieec^- ' 

iment was very popular amongst the oostennonga^^ 



Oar Old and New Systems. 853- 

Lnd othera of the pnrliene of Westmineter. If in the old days 
bhey had wanted to associate it with the 57th or 77th, the 
Uiddlesex regiments of the Line, they would have adopted the 
umple expedient of quartering them together. Now the Royal 
Westminster has been converted into the 3rd Battalion of the 
Bojal Fusiliers (City of London). It would certainly seem 
probable that, in the event of extended war, a Londoner might 
be deterred from enlisting lest he should find himself actually 
IB the 3rd Battalion of the Royal Fusiliers, and ordered on 
foreign service. Our militia has formed an excellent army for 
home defence. Conscription might be ordered for it at any time 
by Parliament, without that injustice which conscription for our 
lengthy foreign service would neem to entail. Yet our militia 
hu been converted into sham battalions annexed to the Line. 
Iheir position seems sufficiently doubtful to deter any patriot 
from enlisting, who is dubious about going so far as to become 
u actual soldier liable to foreign service. 

In fact, the Line and Militia were formerly friends, hut the 
late endeavours have been directed towards making them man 
udwife. From the diverse nature of the duties expected of 
flmn, it would appear to have been better to have let their con- 
■fiction remain Uius pliant. Our noble marching regiments, 
pnndly bearing their county, royal, or other titles, retained 
tbmr local sympathies, hut found their actual homes throughout 
tin world. The esprit dc corps was promoted hy the sense of 
tm^deteness in tJie individual establishment, of which the 
nnndwr was often the proudest appellation. But certainly the 
eonnty connection was not forgotten. When the 35th returned 
from the Mediterranean, in 18X8, it was ordered to Sussex, and 
>D its own eonnty the Duchess of Richmond, wife of its Colonel, 
IMented it with colours. 

Of late years the idea of quartering a regiment in its county 
HTtr seems to have occurred to the authorities. It has been 
ptely held that the aasociation could only be maintained by 
bending a great amount of money in these local establishments., 
if (hey had only given the soldier the amount of pay under the 
nd system which he new obtains, and advertised the regiment 
p the county, recruits would donbtless have been procured in 
fe^3,tly increased numbers, withont expenditure in building, &e. 
r* I'Bgiird to our terms of servioe, it ia, of course, absolutely in 
l^cordance with justice that the inhabitants of a conntiy, when 
w^ ue compelled to serve, shonld only be retained with the 
^gg^ a short time. When all have to Hpend three yean 



B34 Our Old and New Systems, 

or BO in the army, as on the Continent, no nnffur Btaitii 
obtained by one yoang man in his vocation of life over another. 
But woald any one of oar advocates of short service recomauiid 
the son of bis own gardener or cottage tenant to pass from thne 
to six years Tolantarily in the army, instead of at once embaik- 
ing in the study or practice of bis intended vocation ? Msit 
he not necessarily lose in the race of life with other joiuf 
men by passing some years in military service ? And no ou 
practically acquainted with a barrack-room can say that it ii 
likely to be a valuable school for morals in our service for mu; 
years to come. Of course bis array experiences will ben^ 
him in many ways, but the disadvantages would seem to 
preponderate. The mere vagabonds will not be iqjured, bit 
why not endeavour to keep them ? Why sboold not a man entef 
upon the career of a soldier for life ? The pay of non-coB- 
missioned officers, also, ought to be augmented bo as to oSf 
prizes in the career. If a young man enters upon the basBH 
of a. blacksmith he usually has to make up his mind to remn 
in it ; and such was formerly the case in embracing a militu; 
career. If it can be shown that pensioning old aoldiera wnU 
be more oipensive than our present Bystem, it would at Iwt 
give us an army of veterans. And sorely fifty rsthar tin 
forty ought to be the limit of age considered efficient ; or, rate 
ought not each individual to be held efficient or otherwiw nptl 
his own merits, instead of a hard and fast line being druB 
to include the strong and weak constitutions in one gnMl 
average ? 

In regard to officers, that retirement should be pennitteda 
half-pay after twenty years' service, and on full pay after tlurtf 
years', would seem reasonable. That they should be oompaDl' 
to retire, however full of zeal and energy, and be penmontdrf 
by their country at the early age at which officers have litdj bri 
to leave the service, seems cnrionsly preposterous as a sy^e't' 
As for promotion, it is not likely to stagnate too long in oi!' 
essentially active army. Promotion purchased upon such Ut^ 
-only occasions more discontent than temporary st&gnAtint- 
AVhat, then, ought to be done in this latter case ? It wouM «M 
reasonable to idlow officers to serve so long as thoy are efficidit 
as in other professions ; and to permit promotion to fiod itt a*' 
level, as in other walks of life. Temporary measure's vat} ^ 
made to relieve each stagnation ae may threaten tlie giWi) 
efficiency of the service. 

In regard to the men, oak them to a 



Our Old and New Systems. 355 

mon also, so long as they are efficient, then discharge them 
lib pensions. Give them increased pay after certain periods 
f service. Find for them places as porters in Government 
ffices and the like. Let a superior class of non-commissioned 
fficers have increased pay. grant occasional commissions to 
lucated soldiers. While strictly enforcing discipline, remove as 
\i as possible, after carefal consideration, the constant petty 
»trictions and annoyances which have so harassed our soldiers ; 
ad give them increased leave of absence when on home service. 
1 fact, endeavour to render the military life as slightly irksome 
3 possible. And why should not a soldier under long service, 
Qly acquainted with his drill, be even encouraged to earn 
loney at such a trade as carpentering ? The efficiency of the 
ittalion in war need not be injured by its losing somewhat in 
ppearance upon parade in peace. The efficiency might be 
ially promoted by allowing drilled soldiers to do something 
Bsides continually going through the old movements and 
ispections. 

By restoring numbers to the double battalion regiments 
hich have been organised, and quartering one of the battalions 
B often as possible at its county depot, districts may learn to 
^e a pride in them. But if the county connection is to be 
oiiBerved, the greatest care ought to be taken to avoid drafting 
"om one regiment to another. Better allow the regiment to 
ink from a double to a single battalion regiment, if its county 
ffords little military ardour, than maintain its strength by 
ringing involuntary reinforcements from another regiment. 
M let the militia, again, be distinctly separated ; so that the 
oldier for foreign service, and the militiaman for home defence, 
Uiy be perfectly aware of their respective situations. An 
fficient militia will always form a reliable reserve, as has 
een demonstrated in our past ; and it was, in fact, our only 
utl reserve in the late war, for our so-called reserves were 
)nt to the front with the first troops employed. 

As it would seem that many would prefer not to enlist in their 
^ districts, let perfect freedom prevail in the choice of regiments 
t recruits. Let a man select his corps or county, just as a 
s&tleman purchases an estate and endeavours to become incor- 
porated with his new locality. It may be doubtful whether it 
OQld not have been better to have simply allowed regiments on 
^xne service to have been quartered as often as possible in their 
vn counties ; then to have linked depots of regiments on 
>^«ign service in battalions, selected so as to be stationed near 



356 Our Old and New Systems. 

their respective districts — returning in some measure to tl 
system of some years ago. But as we have constructed thai 
depot brigades, we ought, of course, to endeavour to make tl 
best of them ; and it would seem that a return to number 
and to long service rendered as attractive as possible, may aga. 
give our regiments the old sense of home which they appear 
have lost in the estimation of both officers and men. 

Why should a commanding officer be removed after five yeaa 
just when he has become thoroughly acquainted with his dutiec 
Surely a more stringent inspection to ensure that only efficie^ 
officers remain would be more reasonable. And essentially csl 
ought to be taken to procure the maintenance of disciplii 
without the perpetual worrying or even bullying which has to 
often been the curse of regiments, and the fruitful cause o 
desertion. 

If it is untrue that our comparatively small army of alxmi 
180,000, including English and Anglo-Indian armies, is several 
thousands deficient ; if it is also untrue that the standard of 
the Guards has been reduced to 5 feet 7 inches, and that 
of the Line to 5 feet 4 inches, with a chest measurement d 
under 33 inches ; and if it is the case that crime and deser- 
tion are not materially lessened ; finally, if what we baio 
called reserves were not employed to raise to a war footing the 
first line of regiments ordered on foreign service in the lata 
war : then ought apologies to be made to those styled doctrinariei- 
The aspersions cast upon them for inducing large ezpenditora 
for useless aims, contrary to the bulk of military opinion, ou^ 
to be humbly withdrawn. But apparently neither officers rat 
men are at present contented ; and the popularity of the bibJ 
in the country is not manifested by any accretion of recruits, b 
fact, common sense seems to recognise the absurdity of anf 
man's voluntarily entering upon a career which shall endure for 
only a few years of his life. Unless, indeed, he should cherish 
the ambition of becoming a commissionaire, it is difficult tat 
the less subtle military intelligence to see what ultimats 
advantage he can attain. And then the possible loss of life ot 
limb may deter even the adventurous spirit from risldiig sa* 
much for very doubtful benefits. On the other hand, if penakm 
are to be given they ought to be earned by the best years (f 
a life. 






357 



Cbc IHorale of l|c |lttrmting Question. 

By J. H. Lawrence- Abcheb. 



roveming Class, and not alone in England, has viewed 
ktisf action — ^tempered, however, with that ** cast of thought " 
wisely checks the otherwise over-sanguine— the activity 
ly displayed by the great and good, the rich and the 
ctual, the enterprising and the politic, in casting the 
apples of Hippomenes before the merciless and encroach- 
edanta, who, in these latter days, is known to us, as ''Mary 
' Every reasonable concession has been, from time to 
made to the impulsive and unwise masses in Europe ; 
even in Asia, we are already contemplating the early 
of a premature (if, indeed, ever possible with regard to our 
afety) experiment in the same direction. Magnificent 
entertainments invite, at small cost, the lovers of sensuous 
res to forget homely cares, and the periodic visit of the 
; collectors of revenue. Marvellous exhibitions of Art and 
6 charm those, in easier circumstances, who have had 
I to develop more intellectual tastes. Living chess-men, 
lilitary precision, have made their startling moves, at the 
of command, on the chequered floor of ''the Circus." 
[itries innumerable draw the residuum from their dens, to 
lie visible presentment of that greatness and opulence of 
they are invited to regard themselves as an integral part ; 
le latest, and, perhaps, the most really important idea, 
: the form of an Litemational Fisheries Exhibition^ 
18 a vital question, and, appropriately under the warm and 
lal auspices of the great " Sea Queen " of the age, reveals the 
ted harvest of the sea, as the natural source of food supply, 
insular people, at present painfully dependent on foreign 
ces. In short, there is nothing wanting in our modem 
iaiism, but the reality of mortal combats on the stage, or in 
:6na» to provoke the sentiment of pity amongst those who 



'Sbii The. Morah- of the IWruiiing Question. 

are. perhapH, too comfortalik- to i-eaiist the full import of hnnu-ti 
HiifTcring, without such a Btitnalus. 

But in the midet of oui prosperity, some political ^ViltieliX^. 
Meister may say, " This Raiety afflictti me, for thej are do^ 
happy;" and it is in vain that we dismiss to " Stygian car ^ 
forlorn " the rabble of croakers, alarmists, and pesfiimiets, wbeKi 
it is undeniable that, look in what direction we may. obscure ao«3 
portentous objects seem to be in motion. Here it is the conflie "• 
between Democracy, and Oligarchical principles, tker^ the raj^ - 
proc/tHienl between Imperialism, and Democracy against Constitv.- 
tional Government, or between either against the thu^ ; while ^ 
forced education of the masses beyond their actual requirements- 
unites a dangerous knowledge with poverty, and science vitli 
crime. Moreover, under Bucb circumstances, emigration, om. 
revolution, are the outlets for a population surcharged with a 
highly artificial civilisation, which interferes with their n^nml 
wants, and which the poor, regarding as a despotism, yeun to 
cast off by one or the other alternative ; while, at the suae 
time, the means taken by the benevolent, to increase the eomfbrb 
of the lower orders without a corresponding exertion on their 
part, tends to that state of enervation and dependency, or, oB 
the other hand, Communistic presumption, that, despite the mtfl 
strenuous efforts, on the stage and elsewhere, to keep ahve uJ 
enhance the martial spirit, certainly and injuriously affteU lb 
sKnirce.H whence armiei are drawn, and prepares for conscriptiiiL 
Indeed, it is a curious parados that, with the increase of kntn- 
lodge and civilisation, armies arc more than ever necessBiy, to 
prevent overwrought progress (as regards the multitods) en- 
pleting the cycle, in the gradual course of time, to what vaj 
be pardonably termed primordial imbecility, as may be infent' 
from the exhausting although noble efforts made to educate At 
rishig generation to a higher standard than its physical poMi 
perhaps justify, and the slightest relaxation of which, as teacben 
know, may drive even apparently the most promising bom ^ 
path of success, and upon that downward incline that snggeib 
degeneracy. 

Thus, while the political world is exercised with the qnarfW . 
of " bloated armaments," a writer in one of the doily pifS^ ' 
" Education or Death," disausses the other high _ 
blem, warning us, like the soothsayer, that the age of 
competition is " come," but " not gone." iBatmaio' 
of progress, few will deny that the world, after 
native talent, than to tiie seholastie attainmenta 




The Morale of the Recruiting Question. 869 

oian/' whom Bacon nicely diBtinguishes from the '' wise " man, 
indy also from the equally serviceable ** man of action.*^ 

Under these circmnstances, a variety of panaceas have been 
mggested by the public, and, in some cases, tentatively accepted 
)y the authorities — always laudably anxious to experiment on 
heories, from whatever source derived — and most of these have 
>een based upon the alternative principles, that, ''food," or 
' money," are the prime attractions to the service, and that 
iD additional ** quarter of a pound of meat" daily, '* free vege- 
ables," or an equivalent in pay, and particularly in '' deferred 
^ay," are amongst the chief incentives of patriotism, and the 
)est means of solving the recruiting difiSculty; which latter, 
Qoreover, has been even unhandsomely attributed to the 
^omen of England, who have been charged, in the lower 
orders, with lack of enthusiasm, where the call of honour and 
^ory to their sons to join the standards of their country has, it 
is said, been prudentially weighed against the home prospects 
}f the future, when, the exigencies of war having ceased, the 
soldier returns to his original calling, only to find himself 
" locked out." 

A Major-General, writing in the daily papers, says : — 

I hftTe been pained and grieved by appeals from old comrades in the ranks wbo, 
haying completed twelve years* serrice with the colours, are thrown adrift on the 
world, and, seeking employment in civil life, find the gravest difficulty in obtaining 
Breaa. the necessaries of daily existence. I fear hundreds of these young, able-bodied, 
war-trained soldiers are in this serious strait. 

Only yesterday, a fine young man, twenty-nine years of age, fitted in every way 
for a long renewal of his late calling found out his old Colonel, and gave me the 
details of a hard story, the truth of whieh I see no reason to doubt He told me, in 
BO whining spirit, but with manly confidence, that his twelve years had expired just 
prerions to the late Egyptian campaign, for which he was compulsorily retained, 
ind served with his distinguished corps in every engagement, winding up with the 
rath at Tel-el-Kebir. He is in possession of a certificate of education, two good- 
Bondact badges, and his certificate parchment of discharge notifies his conduct as 
'very good,** sustained in this special feature by a private testimonial from his 
CJonmuuiding Officer. 

Only twenty-nine, in the very prime of manhood^ he told me that nearly one 
hundred and fifty men like himself — ^nearly all holders of good-conduct badges — 
were east adrift at the same time, and though desirous of serving on, their appeal to 
lo so iras repudiated by the home military authorities. I ask, why were this 
khoroiighly efficient soldier and his comrades ousted from the Service, when their 
liseipliiie and valour had done its work for the honour and interests of England, 
■ad when their retainment would have been of such value ? 

The inference to be drawn from the above is, that there is 
either no real " line " or no real reserve, but that the two, on 
the slightest occasion, become interchangeable, and that practice 
BwampB theory, and in turn is swamped by it. 



860 The Morale of the Recruiting Question. 

Another writer, who claimB the experience of an old adjotut 
and recruiting officer, complains of woman's elfish influence, 
and proposes, virtiially, the principle of military apprenticeship, 
and the exclusion of civilians from civil employment vnitr 
Government, where such a monopoly may be practicable, Urns 
constituting a privileged labour market, scarcely compBtiblsr 
however, with the principle of " Free Trade," and likely to bo 
opposed by the great body of the taxpayers, although, withiD- 
bounds, not objectionable, as, to some extent, may be intemd 
from the experience of Germany, which, however, nalike- 
England, has but a few small imperial outposts to protect. 

" Raising the pay," says the same writer, " is not the seeret ; 
the private soldier is already well enough paid — ^paid for khI 
above his civilian brother, who belongs, perhaps, to the VoIud- 
teers, and who lives a life of drudgery from mom to ni^^ 
badly paid and badly fed." But his hope is still in the faton. 
By steady industry, he may look forward to his own " domu i 
telluB, et placens uxor," whereas he feels that, by joining the 
regular forces, the expectations one day built np by the neeen- 
ties of Government, and guaranteed by seductive circulars, iniji 
by the same means, when the occasion has passed, be eqnillT 
easily pulled down ; and, after all, this is but the natural «int 
of contidencc in systems which, in their inception, seem to be 
ephemeral, with the result of a suspicion of mala fidett whidi, 
however unreasonable, many recent circniustanceB have uemil 
to justify. 

The idea, again, that a remedy might be found in nuUlttf 
apprenticeship, at public schools established for the pnrpow,' 
but that of an expansion of the Duke of York's school. 1A it 
does not seem to he impracticable, under a retom to theiU 
system of long service and pension. But such exolomve tniB- 
ing in youth, as regards the sons of civilians, would be mn to 
be regarded by certain political parties, as an attempt to <^ 
blish in England, a dominant military caste, ready at tAJ 
moment to be employed by a despotic government agunst ^ 
liberties of their countrymen. This, however, it may he obsemd. 
would be no real objection, since, under the name of " libsrtf." 
Democracy has always aimed at the worse despotism of "dis- 
order," with the object, more or less remote, of placing ailtttni; , 
power in the hands of successfnl demagogues trained on tbf 
priscipla of Belf-aggrandisement, rather than on those h' ' 
pinaipleB which, as a role, infloenoe i,' ~ 
stake in their oooBtiy. 



The Morale of the Recruiting Question. 361 

Another writer on this subject remarks that the impression 
r thdse in authority seems to be that, by reducing the term of 
srvice, they would make the army more popular ; and he asks. 

Is it to be supposed that any sensible and provident youth '* — 
16 very class so desirable for the army — '' with an eye to any- 
ling beyond the enjoyment of the immediate present, would 
eliberately enter a profession which, at the end of a few years, 
ould turn him once more adrift on the world to make a fresh 
kart ? The man who once gets thrown out of his * groove/ 
-equently finds it impossible to re-enter .it, and remains a sort 
f outcast on the skirts of society to the end of his days.'* 

What, it is asked, would be thought of an employer who 
ursued such a system ; and the answer is at once given in the 
)llowing apochryphal, but nevertheless instructive dialogue : — 

Fancy a foreman of, we will say, thirty-fiTe or forty years, steady, reliable, tho- 
mghly at home in all the details of the situation, sent for one day to the '* master's * 
fioe. 

** Oh, Mr. Jones, you will please find another situation. I give you notice you 
iU be discharged at the end of this month.** 

The nnhappy foreman gasps out, ** Why, sir ? Have I done anything wrong ? 
jiTe I ceased to gi^e satisfaction ? ** 

** Oh no I I am thoroughly satisfied with you. Tou are a perfectly trustworthy 
laOy and thoroughly experienced in the business; but that is the yery reason 
9a are discharged. I want none but young and inexperienced hands on my 
orks I •* 

The Duke of Gambrige, a soldier of the greatest administra- 
ve experience, and a statesman without the name, but not the 
^8 remarkable, has recently touched upon one of the funda- 
lental defects of the present system, and points out in a few 
regnant words the fallacy of those theorists who would deal 
rith soldiers as mere insensate automatons, manufactured from 
be raw material to a uniform pattern. His Boyal Highness 
ays that if suitable inducements were held out, men would 
emain with their regiments and go all over the world, as they 
^ like to stay with those whom they have made friends of, and 
.o not like change." 

The moral instincts of the man are thus shrewdly recognised, 
kgainst the materialism of those who in the hour of need, as we 
lave seen in the case of our army in India, are obliged to resort 
o the uncertain expedient of what may be termed ** panic 
K>unties,*' to remedy by successive re-engagements the radical 
trror of original enlistment. 

But the Boyal Duke, although oppressed, has not been sub- 
iued by the incubus which for the last decade has tormented 
ihe country; and, at length, its agents are beginning to lose 



362 Tlie Morale of the Recntititif} Qfieslion. 

heart. In a recent debate in the Hou^e of Lords, this Ud 
came prominently forward, despite the attempt to make it 
appear, that the urgently demanded return to the long fema 
system, would be a " distinction," but no real difference from 
the short Bervice. 

Aa Lord Morley judiciously observed, in reply to the oppo- 
nents of the present reifimi-, " It is not very easy to give figura 
that require no qualitication " : but his lordship, nevertheleai, 
expounded the logic of the case with couRiderable in(;eiiDitf. 
Thus, he stated that "the dejieimci/ of the army amonntedto 
6,800," and that "at present . . . between 6,000 and S.OOOim 
were drjwicnt " ; but that, irrespcctivL' of the incrense of popnli- 
tion and other circumstances, " from 1803 to 187S, there was la 
each year a large deficiency in the rKtiihlMment of lomfthing liifr 
4,000 men," and that " from 1873 to 1S82 there was in cTeryyor 
a surplus oi strcnijth," showing a " greater success in the short 
system than in the long." Satisfactory as this statement mif 
appear, it nevertheless seems as though the speaker bad prored 
too much ; for, if there has really been a greater success, whj 
should he farther on have spoken of the " depletion of the army, 
when, by his own argument there were more men than evert 
And, again, that " the principal cause of the present deficieney" 
was an outHow of 4(5,000 men whose term of service [6nB 
1870 and 1876] had expired. Yet the general complaint of 
these men has been, that their offer of farther service has been 
rejected. Another cause is attributed to " raising the age froB 
18 to 19," and the greater " stringency of the medical eamnir 
tion," leading to the increased rejection of recruits. But tb» 
experiment of raising the " age" has been regarded, either w 
evidence that the authorities had not sufficiently taken into 
account the circumstance, that lads of 19 are more likely t> 
" look before they leap " than those a year Toonger, iA » 
critical a period of life ; or that, perhaps, something nif^ 
also have been due to the nomerical oscillationa vfaieh gO^ 
rally precede the presentation of the estimates. But we maA 
look elsewhere for an explanation, since it ia not to be foiuid it 
" age." 

The standard of height and chest measurement hw bKn 
lowered, and yet without the result anticipated. But this reduc- 
tion, at the some time, tells against the argumeot that tbf 
BQpply of recruits has increased under the present system ; whilS' 
as regards " medical examination/' it ia probable that there i(^| 
no greater stringency than in the antiquted ^ - - ~ - 



The Morale of the Recruiting Question. " 368 

s/' when a defect in his front teeth was sufficient to ensure 
icruit's rejection. 

•at, haying increased the ration, supplemented the pay, pro- 
k1 luxuries in barracks, with every reasonable means of 
eation, and accommodated even discipline, to a certain 
nt, to the changes of times and manners, the cry is still 
ley [do not] come ! " And on '' an average of 450 men able 
duty, 250 are sent to India, leaving 200 at home." 
^en, two years ago, the then Secretary for War laid before 
House his proposals, for improving the position of non-com- 
uoned officers, and men, he took it for granted, that the 
3ges proposed, would add largely to the popularity of the 
y. That expectation has not oeen realised, and, according 
ir W. Barttletot and others, neither the men nor the regi- 
ts are efficient, in proof of which is cited the case of two 
ments at Aldershot, which were *' unfit to take their share of 
duties " of that camp. 

nder the pressure of so many failures, a change has appeared 
3rative; and Lord Morley, while protesting that all was 
;ht," has admitted that provision has been made for some- 
g notoriously ** wrong." Accordingly Lord Hartington, 
ifiuenced by the obstructive obstinacy of mortified theorists, 
not insensible to the danger of allowing the best men to 
3 the army, at the very time when their services are of the 
test value, has announced his intention of practically revert- 
to the long-service — or, as Colonel Stanley has aptly said, a 
nnissive long-service system," under which men will be able 
Qgage for twenty-one years' service, and a pension, subject 
few modifications, sufficient to obviate the necessity for an 
Lssion, that the short-service system has collapsed, since 
missive long service " is said to be only the natural outcome 
short " service. 

le truth is, it matters little under what name the change 
38, since it is generally welcomed. But it is never easy 
\x any circumstances to restore confidence, once rudely 
jen, and even now it is to be feared that the community at 
3 may not feel sufficiently reassured to give full effect at 
to a salutary reform for which there is no absolute guarantee 
ermanency, in the midst of instability in which interests 
ted one day, may be abolished the next, on the plea of public 
lenience or financial necessity, as has already happened 
in the last thirteen years, in more cases than one. More- 
f as the education of the masses increases, and luxuries are 



864 The Morale of the Recruiting Qtustion. 

multiplied, it is not to be expected that men whorecave 
wagea, and can afford to take a pennyworth of polities 
emoking the pipe of peace, after the day's work is ovei 
accept without a cloae Bcrutiny offers, however tempting, U 
their homes. Bat were they absolutely convinced that so 
would be held personaily responsible for any breach of 
there can be no doubt tbat the majority would prefer dedi 
the best years of life to the service of their country, to rem 
at home under " contract " with an employer of labour. 

Yet it is undeniable that a feeling seems to prevail ai 
the lower orders more especially, that in joining the 
although the inducements to do so appear fair and above 
there is some element of deception in the background, 
nevertheless, they cannot attempt to define; and the 
attractive these inducements are made, the more are th^, 
rently, regarded with suspicion. 

Nor is this altogether surprising, when we consider tb 
vellous way in which ideas are disseminated, not alone 
press, but orally from class to class, by listeners behii 
scenes, at mess, in quarters, or in private honsefli who 
away, to be repeated with every possible colouring, the 
history of scandals that it might be indecorous to mentitm 
a whisper. 

Thus, the busy gossip surprises his obscure audienee 
to be retailed with appropriate comments) with the revelk 
some act of incomprehensible injustice, as it seems to hii 
tored mind. Old soldiers, too, retired from the service,! 
amongst thcmBclvcs, with their friends in private life, 
warrant, or order, which may virtually have seemed to b 
professed object, the general terms of which appeared to o 
some sinittter design, and which was abrogated when it hi 
filled the intended purpose. Thus, impressions are creati 
spread abroad, that neither merit nor services, ore snie ol 
rewai-d ; and that in order to reach a favoure d tew, the oba 
enactments are made, which include the x 
of the true cause of tlieir promotion or ) 
that the general public may not detect their"^ 
it is said that, in either case, bd carefully ard such r 
elastic, that, without any appearance of injustice, any p 
individual may eventually be isolated, for good or for tsvt 

Of course, there can be no Hubxtantial foundation ( 
gOBdp, and yet it carries conviction to the ijim|)le- 
believe tbat no one oon be safe, where tju 



The Morale of tke BecrttiUng Question, 366 

tieal representative of the GoTemment, while the real power of 
liig department, is Tirtnally wielded by an unseen oligarchy, 
where the "veto" of one binds the whole, and any independence, 
BB in secret Bocieties, is indirectly punished as an offeace against 
the compact body, which thus becomes, through what has been 
called the " Initial system," quite unassailable under ordinary 
circmiiBtances. The idea of so powerful a secret combination, 
tftkea the dramatic fancy of the vulgar, as it did in the time of 
the Venetian Bepnblic ; and, it is argued, that, where such inqui- 
aitors do not hesitate to destroy those of their own order, what 
must the chances of a poor man be, who comes by accident, 
nuEfortone, or even venial offence under their condemnation, 
since with Hiem really lies the power of legislation — for Parlia- 
ment, as a rule, only discusses pro/orma the dry figures of the 
annual estimate, which is passed as a foregone conclusion, 
without any real critical analysis.* 

These, as already observed, are the prevalent misconceptions 
of the profanum vulijva. How they originate is evident, but, 
although gross fallacies, it is difficult to suggest any means of 
•ndicating them, save by the almost impracticable course of 
^■ttblishing a hom(^eneous organisation, under which it would 
n clear to the meanest capacity that, for equal service there 
WIS an equal recompense, according to plainly defined grades 
<tf ntnk, BO that there should be no question about the equitable 
aj^priation of the army votes ; and under which the soldier 
''luiild feel that the army was a reliable profession, in which 
no man would be caet adrift, to find a precarious livelihood in 
the eivil community ; that in the event of death, there should be 
K> escheat of his estate or "balance" through imperfect, adver- 
tuement or other defect of the system ; and that, whether man 
V officer, no one should be liable to the infliction of a wrong 
tWigb any legalised fiction. 

On this question some intelligent remarks have already 
^Vetted in a military paper, &om the pen of a non-conmus- 
'unsd officer, who shrewdly observee, that, the last thing a 
^^uitir should ever name to the candidate for enlistment is, 
t'lH prospect that awaits him, on the expiration of his term of 

A tmeTO, ddbnlci [Jnl? Mh) in the Hoiue of Lords, on the motlan of the Earl of 
*^IM. tbit (he niflttU ba''rMtnited np to hi tnU otaMuimmt,'' ftc, elldtad 
^ Urd Truro the mnaik, thkt he -wmm " aot raffletentlr maqoftltdad with tha 
■"^AMB el the anii7, to Bxplmln the eniloae cdronmrtaiiee, that there wu a Iksot 
ittalarUit miUUa emr jmt, wtth a dimlnntlon In the itmvth of that foroa'; 
"^ Alt It WM "harttr wtUaotoiT" thrt 'ao large a mm mnalnad nna»- 



366 The Morale of the Recruiting Question. 

service, nnder a syBtem which, aa regards all ranks, is not m, 
bnt many loosely bound together, and under vhich there \» no 
guarantee of permanence, or any regard for the vested intereits 
of those who are not able to enforce a reapect for them, while 
negative injustice, may be relatively made aa crushing totbe 
individual, as positive and undisguised injury. 

"Where such impressions prevail, from the "Major-Genenl" 
already quoted, down to the intelligent non-commissioned offictr, 
can we be astonished at the fact, that no material advaotaga 
promised will induce a superior class of recruits to enlist, flw 
must, at best, have a misgiving of the bona jide* which ii n 
candidly offered as " security " for the value received of the bat 
years of a man's life ? 




% /cto f^mis ixm t\t f escrt Camp. 

By Hehbt Hathah, D.D. 



is a man like in a desert without meat or drink ?" was- 
ible connndnun to which moat of ub know the anawer. 
ire, however, many degrees of privation abort of that 

extremity, which weaken or incapacitate all but the 
trdened and seasoned troops ; but as in the Egyptian 
pi the period of such privation was not prolonged, and 
dt was a snccesB, few probably will care to inquire how 
e privations were avoidable. Stilt, this inert acceptance 
lat intervened, for the sake of the end wbicb it led up to, 
intly unfair to the sufferers. My object in writing is to- 
be inqniry by showing the existence of facts which call for 
lerely asanme that the exposure of troops to avoidable 
^ carries an economic blunder with an admini3trativ& 
tm its front, and partakes in some measure at once of a 

and a crime. But I wish this to be understood as 
kl remark only. Let ns look at the facts, 
listanoe frtun Ismailia on the Suez canal westward to our 
np at Kassasin is from nineteen to twenty miles, and 
» Tel-el-Eebir ia seven miles further. The whole of this 
■ an arid desert, save a narrow belt on the edge of the 
rater oanal. At Tel-el-Eebir the fertile area of Egypt 

there, on the desert edge, with the resources of cultiva- 
liis rear, tbe enemy made bis last stand. But our camp- 
^in was dependent on supplies from Ismailia, from 
face there watj a native railway rumiing parallel to the 
later canal right tbrougb our position, ^e native rail- 
tn in British hand^, worked, as I shall further show, so- 
bat — at any rate in the earlier dajt of onr ooeapation at 
I — it took six or seven hours to do the twenty milefl, and 
ra single train a day. As orgaaiiation improred, this 
Bteymatioa mended, and we hear of twi^ Hmti and. 



368 A Few Facts from the Desert Camp. 

finally four trains coming in daily, which enabled the grad 
coup at Tel-el-Kebir to be delivered. But on the whole, the 
picture is rather a forlorn one, and therefore the public prefer to 
exclude it from their view. That view is mainly filled with the 
showy-picturesque of the " own correspondents " of the daily 
papers, and the ** own artists " of the weekly ones, who naturally 
skip all details non-conducive to graphic effect. But history is 
not made for the benefit of " word-painters " in print, or for the 
weekly peep-show of the illustrated serial. I therefore invite fiie 
reader to study the dry monotony of genuine records from this 
desert camp. 

The evidence lies at first hand before me as I write, in the 
form of an officer's journal, written merely to inform and interest 
friends at home, and transmitted in successive letters as the 
exigencies of service and the postal arrangements admitted. 
It sketches the successive situations with frank outspokenneBB, 
as in the freedom of private intimacy, and without a thought ol 
s, larger audience, exactly as they arose. There is a cheery aod 
lively tone, which is unbroken in the earlier part, and makes iJ 
very pleasant reading; but as soon as Kassasin is reachei 
there mingles an under-current of hunger-bitten repining, vhidi 
would probably have been much louder in the case of civilifloi 
plunged by official duties into the desert on half rations for wu 
and beast, and not seldom going whole days without aq 
rations at all. Imagine the War Office and its staff of deib 
in such a position ! Suppose them even turned out upon thi 
South Downs with short commons and bog-water, but with fidl 
rations of red tape and foolscap, to spend a few weeks of boA 
sultriness as this climate sometimes, in one of its semi-tropteal 
fits has been known to afford. Or imagine the Metropolitii 
Board of Works with all its retinue of vestries on a similal 
sojourn in the Bog of Allen, with half a bad breakfast, half i 
worse supper, and often no dinner in particular ; and let thfltf 
dignified sufferings be further aggravated by the knowledge rf; 
abundant supplies just half a day's journey out of reach Iff 
rail, and crawling up to them by driblets only. The pictnre » 
civilians under such a penance is too absurd to dwell upon » 
further length ; but it is just what our brave fellows were tf* 
posed to, with all the stinging and sickening additions « 
Egyptian climate, Egyptian insect-plagues, scorpions, droo^ 
shallow graves, sun-swollen corpses, and that fluid Topbeti w 
" Sweet-water " canal. My business, however, is rather to 1* 
the joumahst speak for himself. After only touching Alexaodi* 



A Few Facts from the Desert Camp. 369 

on the way, he reaches Port Said on the 20th August. Here is 
his peep at one of the battered forts at the former place : — 

English soldiers on sentry OTerywhere I Egyptian officers were shewn round th» 
mina by a sergeant and man. It seemed odd to think of the different position these 
people occupied before our occupation of the city. Passing on through the palace 
sad the hareem, we came to the Lighthouse Fort, which was a scene of the wildest 
eoafnsioB. Guns of seyen to ten inches calibre were dismounted and smashed 
•faywhere ; the pieces of the huge carriages scattered like paper. The defensible 
bsrrtek-rooms and destroyed magazines were just as the troops had left them. It 
vu a dreadful sight. Fiye bodies lay under one big gun, the weather haying begun 
to dismember them; masonry and iron carriages were scattered eyery where; 
immonition and stores of eyery sort lying about broken and destroyed, just as they 
nwe on the day of the bombardment. I could not haye credited that such destruc- 
tion eould haye been worked by artillery. 

I propose next to string together a few passages, under different 
dates, from the journal, showing how privation gradually told 
upon our officer, until, after Tel-el-Kebir, foul air and worse water 
hocked him oyer with dysentery for a while. There was just 
enough of him left upon his legs to enable him to struggle into- 
Cairo with his corps. He seems to be a man gifted above the 
average with that toughness of the fibre which enables him ''to 
keep in any climate." It will be seen, however, that his staying 
power was well-nigh exhausted when the successful close of the 
campaign brought him a sudden respite from exhausting duties, 
and his constitution plumped out again. It seems as though 
this came just in time — or not much more — to prevent a collapse. 
I will take first those notices of actual hunger and thirst which 
form, the substratum of the situation, and may have to repeat 
under the same dates the context of other sufferings further on. 

bmailia, August 24th. — I am ofif to the front to-day, after two days of hunger and 
ttiwry and thirst. . . I shall be glad of some nice tea or cocoa. . . Anything for a 
dttage from this place. Oh I the filth there is to drink. I cannot go into a 
ineription of the horrors of the Sweet-water canaL An open sewer is a polite 
teription of it. My filter is inyaluable so long as it lasts, but it is too small, and 
|9ti loaded with a coat of slime i^hich preyents its acting except with great 
^Bfieolty. 

Xaisasin, August SOth. — [After describing how on the prerious day they had a 
loQg and wearisome, but desultory combat with the enemy, he adds] After a yery 
Wdday we got back to camping-ground at half-past eleyen. We had all been without 
^W or water the whole day, . . We are on half-rations, and there are no arrange- 
^Mnts for supply or hospitaL 

Kassasin, September Srd. — The same old song — waiting for supplies I Half- 
f9l&cm for man and beast, bad water, and canal falling. . . . Our ratioru have 
^>ea esl down by a half to-day. We had little enough before, and that little very bad, 
I^d is issued in lieu of biscuit. It is baked at Ismailia, kept there two or three 
^7S, seot upon the line another twelye hours, and issued to the troops here after 
9me whole days lying in the sand and filth by the railway. It is bitter, hard, and 
^ of taad. The biscuit is much better, as it is fairly crisp. We get fresh meat,. 
It ih«y want to keep the preserred for rations on our next moye. Our ration of 



870 



A Few Facts from the Desert Camp. 



nm has been knocked off, >■ also our lime-juice. VegeUblvn Iutc u td hn 
iasned twice u wook ; now none are to bo got. These are compnurd. m 
freiih. ... So Utllr foul is thr.rt thai food nni harrlg bt- rootid. mad htt lolff 
hoilfd; imdat the Kime lime nn oiifcr li iuitrd that, a* iht trnapr nrr hit i^flni 
tcith fatl, no mart foraging it to U ptrmitttd. ... It is rather heirt-timkiiii H 
■m a train once a da? onl;. with barely half-rntiaiu (or one daj, "hn *e km 
thete are heaps of trucks and three outlines at lamo-ilia. . . . Yon woidd nil( I 
yon flaw ne tuckinjj into Honp and biBcnit, neither very good by thanwlrn, W 
very naiily when mesged np together and eaten in ■ most pramiiCDDU ubBi 
A sort of fltew for breakfast, tea or cocoa fur Inni'h. with Nome biunit, ul tt> 
tea or coffee for dinner, with a fresh stew mads from meat or any food n n 
raise. September 4th. ^The intense tbirst that wan so orerpowarisg at Inl ha 
passed off, unil I rarely or erer linro anr wnter or coSes betwNB •■h. 
September 10th. — I got yonr letter yesterday eTening after coming tnlnBta 
doaert, lektre ire had hetnfor tiPentg-four hmn without our food, ropaUai laU^ 
second attack on the camp^ ... I went ant again aa soon >a I had ledthskaWi 
and we all got in at snnaot. after a very severe day's work, vithoDt ritbir M V 
water. We had no breakfast before starting. After seeing to the bonst sal iM 
we had our own dinner at seTon o'clock — twentj-fonr honn* withoat A ■ 
drink, except some canaUwator, which none of ns liked to drink u B o^ 
September lltb. — I am getting very thin, as are most of na. Daji off ^ *■ 
with nothing to oat are not coDdncire to putting on fleih. 

Cairo, October 24tb.— " SbaTcd and pipe- clay sd,''—ench ii th« atiar, 11 A* 
■ame time men and horses in this camp are oa halt-rBtions, beeaoH ibai b ■ 
break in the line somewhere. I mnst tell you of my jonniej bom TtMUh 
here. I was lying ill on tny bod, when I heard there wars loma Mlfty fei^ 

coming down the line, and that the Captain of had "beaid' ll^ 

I darted down, and 1 seemed to get stronger OTeij moment. I got da«a< U^ 
Tiewed the staff-oBcer, and asked to whom be had made OTor the faasksf ^ 

answered, " To the officer commanding ." I npUed, ' I am tlN mn'; ^ 

so I tamed oat mj reluctant junior, and gave him a f^ than, aal pocMU I* 
load np. . . . Off we vent, oh! ao glad to leare the ebamel-lioiiw of M^UM 
I know if I had remained I shoold have been very ilL 

The reader will perceive that, in order to prefiem Um ■» 
tinuit; of the officer's personal narrative, I have here i' 
from the strict rule of beeping by themBfilvee the i 
which deal with the "bread and butter question" tattf.id 
touched upon the general one of health ro closely uotinecttJ 
with it, and therefore difiScttlt in the journal to dieentaiiglufniO 
it. Here, then, after the fight at Tel-el-Kebir, in which hv W 
bis innings with the rest, duly giving the score of IdliHi 
wounded, and hon de combat from his own immedi&te coamitiii 
we find our friend laid on his back at last, and just able (o "gt 
a rise" out of himself in time to vindicate his right to ^ 
"trucks" which took his command on to Cairo. It ia intereftio| 
to note that, as soon as the' backs of the enemy hav« been Eiiijj 
-and finally seen, and vidette and outpost work a^uurt iM 



A Few Facts from the Desert Camp. 371 

is done with, it becomes necessary to keep a sharp look-out 
upon friends, comrades, and enterprising "juniors." As they 
go on to Cairo the men are still, it seems, himgry; for — 

At Zagasig we were enconntered by a seothlng crowd of natives — black, brown 
-»iid yellow, with hard-boiled eggs, figs, bread, &c., for sale. They drove a good 
trade with such of the men cu had any money left. 

Having brought him thus far, and touched the general sani 
tary question, I will now go back on such passages in the 
journal as relate more expressly to it. He writes, just before 
<Ii8embarking at Ismailia :— 

Angost 21 St. — ^I hope we shall not meet with much resistance, as I do not believe 
in oar fighting capabilities in this country. The climate is so hot, and these young 
soldiers are going sick in dozens. What we shall be after a month's work I don't 
know. 

Ismailia, Angnst 24th. — I am afraid the sickness and mortahty will be very great. 
Men will drink the beastly water without having it boiled. I bought a bottle of 
l>eer for 2s. yesterday I was quite played out, and, though it cost so much, it did 
me good. 

On August 80th, he records how, after a hard day's fighting, 

"vnthont food or water the whole day, the horses rushed madly at the water. We 
nearly lost two from falling into the mud, but got them out in time. ... I am 
AvfuUy well and fit and ready ; but as for boiling water, it is impossible to do it 
^^'•'•ys, as we cant get fuel. 

The lack of this last requisite is further illustrated, as 
follows : — 

•A-Q^ust dlst. — I went out into a village close at hand to cut wood. We got a lot 
'^'vt of the deserted houses from roofs, ploughs, doors, &c. September 8th. — ^In the 

•'^•inoon I went down to Mahsameh with W to get fire- wood. We got an 

^Id building near the railway station pulled to pieces, and then I found some beams 

^^ <ui Arab village, which seemed to be deserted. I began pulling them off, and 

"^^tit into the mud hovels and found a young Arab woman unveiled. She was 

'^^er good-looking, and seemed in an awful fright, but recovered herself as soon 

~" I explained by signs that I would not remove her father's house. 

We have seen already, in an extract dated September 8rd, 
"^"W an order issued that " as the troops were now supplied 
"''^th fuel " no more foraging was to be allowed. The above, five 
"^ys later, is an instructive commentary on the value of such 
Orders." The necessity of boiling all the water imbibed at 
f^y rate by the men, caused a consumption of fuel which was 
^'^^equately measured at head-quarters. Water for the steam 
•Oconaotive was also probably a serious demand. Thus to stop 
P^^^ttging was probably impossible, and, of course, the wretched 
"^ta of the natives would suffer. But far better that they 
J**ould suffer than our men be poisoned or parched with thirst. 
Ji**^ former loss might have been compensated, and the huts 
^^8 wrecked seem to have been at least temporarily deserted* 



872 A Few Facts from the Dfnert Camp. 

Again, after the battle recorded Auf[aBt 80th, I read :— 

S and I. vfilh nil men on horsobsck, went SontipaK- Wo had sMtdDf i» 

eat. nnd I ba<e not ohanKMi my clothes for threo dnya. not exun takaa o9 mTbuk 
We gat abont thirty fovU. 

Ah a happy illustration of the effect of "orders" on in 
officer's personal comforts, and the surprisen consequent thmon, 
I vill quote some remarks under date of September Ist :— 

I Iran told that it vae an nnler tliat orery ofSoer ■bonid liKhtin hi*kiltslti 
Uet deKTee. I did lu the order bid by packing away eut clolbei into a pMif 
sacking to aead to the base with the men'a kita. I hopo to t(el mj badipMN, 
as I don't like lyini; on the gronnd with no apmce boughii to eate ay toMa 

The bones of our gallant friend obtained ease some isjttia 
by the arrival of his impfdiiiu^nbi. It may be added thkt tki 
Egyiitian desert is not a choice camping-ground in which to & 
on native earth. To say nothing of the queer little liuiili 
with wondi-rfuUy square elbows, wbo scuttle about with noet 
pected spet-d, there are snakes and Bcorpions, which nub it 
unpleasant for the skin, besides the uneaainess of bonea abon 
referred to. 



Scptomlicr X — A hard daj'i work .... I was oi 
and K^t II bpnqtly beadnoho in my eyoH. I got in a bit ot a fttuk, m 
jnst Kono to hoKpitnL with ophthalmia. I am ratj kottj for him ; It laama t»h» 
depraiaing in its action. If I got it. 1 would do my bait to gat aant atnJ^tMik 
I don't think I cuuld xtand the lun){ dayi in hoapital all by UyMlL . . . n« 
in nuthiDK in the woyot fomtortn for the aick and wonndedat any of tbealnMll 
camps, not txen clean water. They get the filth from tha canal ]nat th« mm» 
Dtbera in health. . . . Our general and atalf ara in lamailia tajajing UmmmIM 
We are on half-raliun* nith nn appliances for aick or wonndad. 

8«ptpmber 4th.— The camp had to bo ahiftad from th« lint aita, nvtaf U tt 
tearful Kmslls from the nballow grarea. Hera it ia bad enongh. Bat lu ^a 
large party oat i>t the hattls-lield of the 38th ultimo burying tha Egjptian^ Ikl^l 
I Hhoulil not care tor the job. . . . We bib aa mnnh eonfinad to M^i lol Mi 
daya uri' bo sultry, the nights ao cold and dewy, that tha men am golif liak A 
dyBenlcry and fuvrr. I am wonderfnlly well, only I hata tha idlaiMai, kMl, ■< 
duet more than I run aa]-. ... I expect thia delay will make paopb MkNi* 
little alive to the atrocious lies which were promulgated about tha farwaf^W* 
onr trunaport and hospital preparationa. I aoa tha ^t. John's Anbulniiea 8MMf 
are going to help tho Egyptians. Ood knows onr poor aick and wonndad anksit( I 
n hod time of it here. 

Septomber lOtb.— [After a day's fluting.] Onr own loss was heaTr. Ikw**«' | 
fifty-flre wonnded warn bronght in, and of oonna aareral wore killed. I«M^^ ,, 
trains were going the whole night, taking tha wonndtd down to lanaiUa. Ws'' <'| 
losing at tha rate of thirty ■ day from liakiNM. | 

September llth.^ETeiyona who is aontohad hart Is sent away, aa «• !><*■ ' 
appliaooe* lor the wonndad, and np till qnita latolj there ara* no naadioba 

The arrival of a distinguiBhed penonage, long espectei-4t ' 
readermnBtgneBBwho — ia noted aifidlom, under the 8anieditl^''|' 

At Uat n has anlTad [at KaaaMfai] withaa 
vith aamnl taw af hagma aad haiipa oT wbm OMaK ■ 



A Few Facts from the Desert Camp. 878 

low resume the date of the arrival at Cairo narrated on 
ber 24th, as above. 

iMt we slowly steamed into Cairo railway station. After waiting a long 
I wfts told by a staff officer that we were to remain there all night, that o«r 
ronld not be moved till morning. I then fell my men in by sab-diyisions on 
itform, got them their blankets and made them lie down. In the middle of 
^ht I foond my tracks were being moved. So I got my men np and we were 
on to a siding. I will not enumerate the horrors of the next eighteen hoars, 
ire remained anchored first all night and then all day, with no space to lie 
no sort of cover, and with a rubbish heap of the whole popalation not ten 
away. Well, I was at last shunted out to Abassieh, and found that . . . the 
isd never told any of our people of our arrival I was very ill those two days 
old eat nothing. I fortunately had a pitcher of cold water (filtered) and 
)nndy, so I kept going on that and some biscuit. Next day I was at work 
) morning, and by the time I had finished I thought I should have had to 
hospital But I palled round again, though the pain in my eyes frightened 
tit I got the goggles that evening [spectacles sent to him]. ... I was 
awfully seedy, but determined to go into Cairo and get something to eat. 

1 ever victors arrive in the flash of triamph at a vanquished 
al in such plight before? They seem to have wholly 
ided on the arrangements made by somebody on the 
termaster-General's staff. He took no thought, gave no 
"s, and they got no quarters. Thus were a number of our 
nt soldiers, who had borne the burden and heat of the desert 
)aign, treated with what looks like calm neglect by those 
had been carefully exempted from those fatigues and perils 
selves, and were shunted as if they were so much '' rubbish " 
'' might be shot " anywhere, down among the unspeakable 
linations of the offal heaps of an Oriental suburb. Their 
r, who had stuck to his men through thick and thin (i.e. thick 
: and thin rations), and was now in an almost sickening 
ition, has to share the dismal penance with them. If their 
)line and self-restraint had not equalled their valour in 
eld, these men would have speedily made easy accommoda- 
md decent quarters for themselves at the expense of some 
3 astonished natives ; who probably lapsed speedily from 
ishment at their position into contempt at their tame 
rance of it. The officer whose sufferings we trace was 
id only too vigilant. Had he slept through the alarm of 
loving trucks, he and his would at any rate have been in 
)ation of the station-platform with room to lie and stand, 
ad of being subjected to rigors of an unutterably worse 
icter than would have been their lot at home if every one 
d rank and file had been guilty of drunkenness and disorder, 
handful of Arabi's beaten troops had so far held together 
r an officer as to reach Cairo with any remnant of organi- 
TOL. 71. 26 




374 A Few Facts from the Desert Camp. 

sation, would they have been content to wait in such quarters^ 
with such refreshment for eye and nostril, as was the lot of their 
conquerors ? It is the indignity of being so miscared for which 
stings more lastingly than the discomfort. The latter i^asseB 
off with the next turn of comfort, but the former renmim 
branded on the memory, and forms the nucleus of a cheriBhei 
grudge against the country and the service which can allow its 
best servants to be thus scurvily treated with perfect impunity, 
without a censure passed or a voice of question ever raised. It is, 
I believe, an authentic story that an officer commanding a detach- 
ment by train for Cairo, after Tel-el-Kebir, foolishly flung Bi 
tent out of the train while in motion, which fell on the line aa^ 
lay there, it being no one's business to pick it up. The trai^ 
next in succession was wrecked by the obstacle, and the engiiB^ 
and tender were visible lying just off the rails some days lata^ 
Possibly the " half-rations " in Cairo may have been dne fe^ 
some such cause as this, or simply to some mere blunders c:' 
officialism — a red-tape tangle somewhere — which bring the 5 
penalty on the long-enduring stomachs of the officers, the ran. - 
and file, and the horses who follow — all empty alike. Hence fe^ 
go to the Royal Hotel " and get something to eat ! " was ViM^ 
first happy thought of those who could afford it. These heroa' 
on half-rations, with a population of more or less full-fed civiliao^ 
swarming round them, who yet respected, so far as we knoWv 
the rights of meum and tuum as regards these latter, form ^ 
study of ethics only enhanced by the business-like brevity witb 
which the fact is stated. I am glad to extract the last 
notice which has any bearing on the knife-and-fork aspect oT 
the campaign. He had received orders to accompany hif 
General of Division to an old fort in the Nile. He had been 
instructed before starting — 

To do some paitienlar work, but the Geoerml changed his mind. ... I f^ * 
note from him saving that he hoped I would be ready at 2.30 to start haek: tol 
had to make haste and get on board in time to get a rerj good lunch— i*o^ * 
difference to anything I had eaten before in Egjpt I It did me good, and t^ 
making three or four hasty sketches, I am ashamed to saj, I fell asleep I 

We leave him, then, at last, well-fed and comfortably forgetfiu 
of desert fare, like another hero, of earlier fame, on the giU^^ 
deck, — 

Of the wisdom of trying such sustained and repeated stoiD^ 
experiments on young troops in such a climate, I invite ^ 
military authorities to consider and decide. The extracts ^ 



A Few Facts from the Desert Camp. 375 

vhirh I have drawn attention Heem, liowevei", t(t have a beariDg 
OD the opinion ascribt'd, as roliowB, to the medical oflicei-a, in 
aome of the public prints on November 18th, hy a tolcgram from 
AleiBodria : — 

Tlia 1it«it rstarni from ths hospital *t Oahari and the CnrtAag* nbow a dtmina- 
IJn in thg Dumber of death.^ imouKat the troupa. Out ol tiOO nick, the BTeroge rata 
c( BSTtility ia now ane per diem, whilRt lant weak it nax aliunt nix. The medical 
•flcin exproiis the apiniaa that the (femis of typhua lever, from which the aoldigra 
haialMaiiaiiifgTinK, wpre t;enaraled on the battte-lield, and that the dTaenlerj waa 
■ualjunsed by injudieiouti liTinj;. 

The "living" was no douht "injudicious," if our officer's 
JDunuil represents the average state of facts, as I believe it does, 
tDd not an exceptional caec. But whose judgment was in fault ? 
Not, I take it, that of British Private Smith, wlio would have 
bcffl only too glad to have kept out the " germs of typhus," if he 
tonld have fortified himself by a bellyful! against them, but that 
of vastly more elevated personages, known in mcHS-room gossip 
by the midress title of "hig-wiga," who order Private Smith's 
llll of tare. The indulgently mild censure passed above on the 
venial human weakness of "injudicious living," under the 
drcmnstances, is a masterpiece of diplomatic astuteness. The 
aedieal officers know evidently of whom they are speaking and 
to vhom ; quid de quoque viro et cui dicaa gaepe i'ideUi ! Perhaps 
tha &ctB thrown together above may lead to the " saddle " being 
IBM day or other " put on the right horse." It may some day 
pMi into an axiom, Feed your soldier well, especially if young 
Ud his constitutioQ nut yet set. Don't turn him into a desert 
on half-rations, with a filthy canal, fermenting with the com- 
ponnded dibrU of camels, horses, and human beings under a 
tnpioal BUQ, on one fiank, and the shelterless wilderness raining 
■nn-strokeB and scorching the bare flints into lime on all the 
oBur Bides of him. It may be estimated that a mile of that 
"Sveet-water " (suggestive name !) would contain "germs of 
^na" sufficient, if duly fostered, to overtax all the fever 
bo^talfl of the world. Whether these facts will ever come 
pore the commissioQ which has, I believe, been obtained to 
tqoire into the state of the hospitals and accommodation for 

; and wounded during the campaign, is not absolutely 
Those GommiBflioners may limit their labours to ascer- 
tning the state of hospitals, and their adequacy of provision 
^ tbe treatment of their inmateB when bron^t in. They may 

iBucludeany inquiry into prediapoBing causes, utd by lo 
g nevor reach to the root of tiio miachief. 

now ^ve K fflV puugsB vhioh bear on tha diffieol^ 
— 26 • 



376 A Few Facts from the Desert Camp. 

which formed that root, that, viz. of transport. Our officer 
writes, on the 3rd of September, at Eassasin : — 

Some speak of a disaster orertaking this expedition, if we do not more and HhmX 
•oon. The enemy gains confidence, and we lose it. We are being weakened, thfl^ 
are strengthened, both in men and proTisions ; and, what is more important, tiiD» ^ 
given them to throw np these hnge works which it will be Terr hard to turn hx0 
ent of. After each success we hare had to stop, as owr froiuporf f!t mL Tl^-* 
flonrishes in the English papers about the forwardness of the preparatioif f ^^ 
•applies, &c. are and were absolntelj untme. . . . How he expects to aocDsnl^^^ 
food for his advance, if he does not hurry up his transport, I cant say. Bit ^ 

should think each day^s delay will prove a serious matter. . . . S sayi 

are heaps of troops at Ismailia which are waiting to get to the front, but Hun 
no transport for supplies. ... I have just heard . . . that there are 60 gui 
the fortress of Tel-el-Kebir itself, and that our guns are to be moved np to takt ' 
place ; but that will not be for some days, owing to the want of transporl 

September 4th. — ^I expect this delay will make people at home a little alive to 
atroeious lies which were promulgated about the forwardness of our transport 
hoepital preparations. 

And, as a prime factor in the question of transport, the worki]^^ 
of the railway laid from Port Said to Ismailia, nearly parallel 
the Suez Canal, demands special notice. It may be well 
remind the reader that our morning papers announced, 
August 8th : — '' A hundred mileg (!) of railway has been proyidc 
as an accessory to the military operations in Egypt. . . . Tlafc ^ 
ships by which it is to be conveyed are not to stop at Alexandii^A 
but to proceed direct to the Canal and land the rails and aHaiBO 
plant at Ismailia. A railway corps has been specially tniii^^ 
for laying and working the railway, consisting of No. 8 Comptf^? 
B.E., who will embark with the plant this morning in tl3« 
Canadian. Three locomotive engines go in another steams-'' 
Compare with this the following from our officer, under dst^^ 
beginning sixteen days later : — 

Ismaiha, August 24th. — The railway is not yet In working order, so the iippB^* 
go up the CanaL 

Kassasin Lock, September Ist. — ^A siege-battery came up by train yesterdiji 
first which has been run through, and very glad we were to hear its whiillBt 
ourselves and horses were in want of grub. 

I have already cited, under date September Brd, a statemeK'^ 
that there was then but one train a day, and that it then \fiO^ 
six hours to do twenty miles. Our officer adds under the fts^^ 
date, " the railway is in the most ticklish condition.'* ^^^ 
September 4th he records " two trains a day " as " coming i<^ ' 
80 we hope there may soon be enough rations and tonffi ^^ 
warrant a forward movement." On the 6th this has ri860 k^ 
ikrte trains, with " crowds of provisions coming up and 1'^^ 
for an advance.'* On the 7th he announcee ''a 1 





A Few Bads from the Desert Camp. 877 

railway material came up, I believe for a siding to be made from 
oar camp to facilitate debarkation of stores, 4&c." On the 10th, 
"trains are arriving at the rate of four a day." Thus, supposing 
the trains into the Kassasin Gamp Station dependent on the 
stock and plant exported from this country, it seems to have 
taken nearly five weeks to get that supply of material throuf»h 
and into full working condition from the base to the front. I 
will add that the daily papers published on August 26th the 
receipt by telegram of " a requisition from Sir Garnet Wolscley 
for railway plant and rolling stock to be sent out as soon as 
possible," coupled with a statement that ** the Kent, laden with 
railway stock, will leave [England] to-day." The cargoes of the 
Kent and her probable consorts must have arrived too late for 
any purposes of the actual campaign ; indeed, I believe the fact 
to be— at any rate, as regards the last branch from the base to 
the front at Kassasin — that no English rolling stock, whether 
locomotives or trucks, was seen on the line, and that from first 
to last weak engines and an insecure rail hampered the efficiency 
of the railway on which all at the front depended for supplies; 
^t, at any rate, the railway being the main artery relied upon 
for transport, the troops were a week in the desert station before 
^ first train came through, and ten days more before the 
taiisits became at once rapid and frequent. In such a railway- 
podndng country as ours, one would have thought that this 
f^oisite, taught to be so in the Franco-German war of 1870-1, 
■nd the Turco-Bussian war of 1876-7, would have been the fore- 
™OBt article ready. In point of fact, it was the latest. There 
^^ the men, there were the stores : the former on half- rations 
'^oder severe duties ; the latter at Port Said, or creeping slowly 
''P the Suez canal to Ismailia ; but the railway which was to 
"'Uig the Btores within reach of the men was unavailable, and 
on this really all depended. I believe that of the ** hundred 
**Io8 of railway " not one was laid between Port Said and the 
'^Bip until the campaign was over. I also believe that in 
w two railway locomotives from England reached Ismailia, 
^ that when there it was found impossible to disembark 
^*BU BometimeB when transport is thus at a standstill, 
Nwil evenia are not. Had there been an enterprising enemy 

due advantage of this defect, it must have gone hard 
gdlant " young army." No wonder their ofiicers held 
ooDferaneei and looked longingly for the aignal of 

iltfflie opening up of Bapplies. " Very glad we were to 
tEVin's] whiflile, as otarselves and horses were in 





378 A Few Facts from the Desert Camp. 

want of grub." Tbese homely words will, I hope, speak to Uk 
hearts of Englishmen through their stomachs — perhaps the 
surest access to that higher organ in our countrymen. The 
general at Ismailia telegraphing earnestly for more "railnj 
J)laDt and rolling stock," perhaps about the time that the fint 
consignment of that material reached him — if, indeed, it era 
did — is a further significant commentary on the state of lacti it 
the time. The net result of the first fortnight of the actuj 
cn,mpn.ign is briefly told in the words of our officer: "Aftn 
each success we have had to stop, as our traneport it nil." Tha 
first requisites of life and activity did not reach the troopt a 
sufficient measure to make a decisive advance possible for faD 
three weeks. Meanwhile, the enemy was near and nnmomi 
enough to keep them constantly on the alarm, and, if Ihit 
enemy's vigour had borne any proportion to their oumben, to 
have swept up their remains to augment the " sweetneea " o' 
that Elysian duct, the very name of which our men, I Bhoold 
think, wouH never recall without a loathing shudder. The pIiiB 
lesKon which this journal tells is that of short rations, and tberelif 
lowered vitality, preparing the way for dysentery and typkni; 
and of occasional fits of shai-ply-pining hanger and inton 
exhaustion tempting men to take any method of filling, and, if 
they could snatch on occasion, of overfilling, that vacuum iriikk 
of all others nature most abhors. I have shown how htmgv 
haunted them throughout, even to the last hour of triumph, iti . 
how our ofhcer with candid frankness confesBes that, on partiillf 
picking himself up from the overstrain of forced marches, pn^ 
longed viy;ils and " shuntings," and that "last straw" whid 
broke his much -enduring hack — or rather stomach — themonri- 
ing a guard of honour over a "rubbish heap" (enpfaemiitiii 
and suggestive term ! ) in Boulac, his first convalesHBi 
impulse led him to the Boyal Hotel. No doubt his espsB* 
ence and temperament both favoured self.control : ' 
many of the young troops under bis command wai 
prudence to be expected ? They would hardly wait, . 
had waited, would not have the cash requisite to < 
to encounter the " fleah-pots of £gypt " in the less i 
form of the " Boyal Hotel " in Cairo. They would [_ 
tempted to rush in and regale their crude orguisBi 
snatches of whatever coarse luxuries c&me within rosch of 
pockets. Here is the source of the "injudicious living" 
vbieh they appear io be patroninngly ta^ed. Thabloft^ 
of BoietiM irill donbtlsBS biuB over the ^ 



A Few Facts from the Desert Camp. 379 

lie Tolnme as '' blue " as themselves^ throwing the light of 
latest medical research on the relations between cause and 
:t; but, when all the dust they shall have raised is settled 
n, there wiU remain above its level the salient points of a 
ig army scantily fed in a climate exceptionally trying, with 
.dequate water-supply within reach, save of such water as no 
) farmer would use to wash out his stables withal, unless he 
a copious supply of carbolic acid to follow. As regards this 

defect, I may add that the following notice appeared in 
e of the London papers on September 8th: ''A telegram was 
ived by the War Department yesterday from Egypt, asking 

more pumps and artesian wells, with additional driving 
uratus for their use, might be forwarded with as little 
7 as possible. As in the Abyssinian campaign, this mode 
)rocuring water is found of great service in the present 
*' One would like a little light thrown on the questions 
ih this statement suggests. There were pumps and wells in 
Egyptian Expedition camps. The Head-Quarters enjoyed 

the Boyal Engineers another. Were there any more ? is a 
ition which I hope some one will ask and press in the right 
rter. There may have been some at Alexandria or in its 
;hbourhood ; but in the camp of the advanced force and 
ng the troops on whom fell the brunt of watching, checking, 

eventually crushing the enemy, I believe it will be found 
i there was none. The public may take it as a fact that those 
ps did not, imless on quite exceptional occasions, obtain any , 
3fit from the two Artesian wells above named. The Eoyal 
;ineers certainly kept theirs to themselves, I believe, exclu- 
ly. I know an officer who declares he applied more than 
i to obtain water for his command from the Royal Engineers' 
, but was refused each time, and could not even obtain the 
I of a water-cart. This may have been a stem necessity ; but if 
as, it illustrates the terrible pressure laid on the price of the 

necessary of life by the exigency of the situation. It ought 
ave been no more difficult to send out to the advanced camp 
ozen wells and pumps than a couple. The circumstances 
B such that British officers found it their duty to refuse their 
rades water in the desert, under a climate the terrors of which 
Here thermometrical register can adequately measure, and 
ie comrades men exposed night and day to the harassing alarmSy 
iOt actual attacks, of a far-outnumbering enemy. Such a 
aal is almost like pushing a surviving straggler from one's 
ting plank in the ocean, when it is not strong enough to^^ 



880 A Few Facts from the Desert Camp. 

bear the weight of two. But the question which needs to be urged 
is, who was responsible for the circumstances ? We have been 
told with jubilant self-complacency that the very square league of 
desert, and the very day of the month within which check-mate 
was to be given to the enemy, were all noted by the Commander 
and known to the home authorities. Thus it seems inconsistent 
to plead unforeseen contingencies, and circumstances beyoad 
control. Whilst, as regards experience, the oldest desert campaign 
recorded in history, that of Cambyses against the same Egyptiaja 
frontier, but coming from the Syro- Arabian side, finds its most 
interesting passage in the arrangement which that monarcli 
made with the Sheikhs of the wilderness to ensure the watftX"- 
supply of his troops in their advance. It looks as if the adminLsi- 
trators of the British Empire, in this old age of the world's expe- 
rience, were put to shame by the foresight of a barbarian despot 
five hundred years before Christ. The only alternatives for ovM^r 
forces to fall back upon were boiling or filtering the atrociot*-^ 
water of the canal. The former was, we have seen, impo8sil>Xe 
through defect of fuel, to say nothing of the tax upon the officer^ 
watchfulness in seeing that the boiling, had it been possible, w^»-8 
duly performed. As regards filtering, the supervision necessac"^ 
to insure it would have been even more minute and harassii^' i 
than that of the boiling. Indeed, I venture to submit tl^*-® 
question whether on actual field service the use of filters for ^ 
large body of men would not become impossible. But, again, th^- ® 
supply of filters was certainly not general, even if it was not 
rare, capricious, and arbitrary as that of wells and pumps. I hav^ 
heard of one corps, and there probably were others, which hi 
them in the proportion of a single filter to eight men. These wer* 
"suction" filters, and soon got lamentably foul. The filth of th^ 
canal stuck about the india-rubber tubing with noisome pert»- ' 
nacity. The weak point of the filter arrangement is, that ti»^ 
fouler the water is, and therefore the greater necessity for tbei-^ 
constant use, the less serviceable the filters are apt to become - 
Even supposing the eight men to keep up with their filter-beare-J^ 
amid the scattering tendencies of outpost duty in the desert — 
which is, perhaps, too much to assume — would it be possible t^>* 
wait till the filter, fouled by its last use, is cleansed, and all ha^^ 
had their suck at it ? I am no military critic of such matters ; 
but it seems to require a very low rate of pressure of exigencfr 
to make the pursuit of such hydraulic studies an impossibili^' 
Filtering is generally a slow process, and modem war is a qui^ 
one. However valuable the resource in itself, we know it tab* l| 



A Few Facts from the Desert Camp. 881 

.6, and time is often the one thing which those most lavish in 
expenditure of men and beasts, stores and cartridges, cannot 
>rd to spend. Imagine the weary, jaded, smi-sickened men, 
iggling back to camp from the thirst-fever of a day in the 
ert, and waiting till water was boiled or filtered ! I doubt the 
tish soldier is yet machine enough for that. Next in the 
er of suffering to the men came, of course, the horses. We- 
e seen how, under the pitiless exhaustion of a twenty- four 
rs' outing, these poor creatures '' rushed madly at the water " ; 
^ previously how welcome was the engine's whistle to man 
horse "in want of grub." Shortly before that, viz. on 
tember 1st, our officer records that he had been out, 
itting a large quantity of jowary grass for the horses," which 
z him '' all the morning, and most desperately hot it was.' 
e he " got a bit touched by the sun, but soon got all right.'^ 
3n the first train unloaded, he adds, '' we got oats for our 
8 for the first time for days, and also a little hay. They 
e been living on chopped straw and a few beans and green 
., and were getting rather weak." I will again compare this 
rd with the following statement from a London paper of 
list 10th :— 

ere being little or no fodder to be had in Egypt for the large number of horses 

moles sent out, thousands of tons of new hay have to be sent in a compressed 

The vast pyramids of hay which had accumulated at the dockyards a 

ago have all disappeared, and ships are now waiting for further supplies tO' 

in. 

hese wholesome supplies were probably ready at the base in 
i time, but for want of transport power they were slow in 
ihing the scene of demand ; and the consequence was, as we 
1 further see, serious loss of power in the horses. 

ssasin Gamp, September 4th. — Many of the cavalry regiments have lost a good 
' horses. The " Tunbellies,** or Life Guards, lost eighty, and several batteries 

tiUery six to twelve each. . . . General has just been in camp, and 

d of reducing the ration of hay ; but unless he gets leave for us to go further 
I foraging green food, we shall not be able to do without the full twelve pounds 
orse. 

ut next day supplies have reached, and the prospects mend, 
ti the grand transformation scene of a pantomime : — 

ptember 5th. — Our horses look ever so much better than they did a few days- 
and, perhaps, if they have two or three more days* rest, they will all get round 
hurts and galls. September 10th. — [After stating that in foraging he " got 
large bags of beans."] Our horses are picking up wonderfully ; and now the 
backs are healing we shall do welL 

bus it seems plain that if the railway had only been fit for 
r, neither man nor horse could have suffered more than the 



382 A feu; Facts from the Desert Camp, 

inevitable fatigues of active duty in such a climate, and that, u 
soon as it got fairly to work, man and liorse resumed a Bervice- 
able condition. 

Now, in that bad fortnight, with a variable margin ntnningco 
to three weeks, duriug which man and beast were ready inl 
Diipplies were not, I ask, would not the least formidable of posai- 
ble European enemies have probably gained a deciaive advantage? 
"But in the face of on European enemy," it will be perhipi 
rejoined, " such liberties would never be ventured upon." StiU, 
military events won't wait while you are bringing up soppUo, 
any more than the operatious of nature while you are BtoekiBg 
your farm. It muy be a strategic necessity to fight or oeeq]' 
certain posts and pei-form certain operations in the eoiuse of I 
fortnight, for fear at the end of that time there should be nothing 
left to fight for. Whenever such a military crisia comes upoo ■ 
general and forces disposed as ours were from August 24tli to 
September 7th, I forbear from stating any opinion of my ownli 
to the probable conseiiuences. 1 only invite military critici to 
consider them. But behind all such questions lies Uie olimitli 
with its ever-whii-liiig vortex of insect plagues, ita blinding w* 
of sandy landscape, its sky of brain-scorching sunBtrokei. Onr 
and over again our officer dwells upon such detaib, but I hnt 
not extracted the passages ; they may be taken for granted. Ik* 
Alpine tourist of pleasure pits his own strength and endnniM 
against the tremendous forces of nature, at his sole risk and n 
his own free will. Uut in the name of humanity, the proteetiiB 
of which is spread so amply round our worst gaol-mfiisni it 
borne, one may point out that our soldiers abroad have Mt 
forfeited its rights, that they go on their country's perilous enu' 
of duty, and not uj choice, and are therefore entitled to all tbi 
ampli^r measure of that protection. As in the days when GaptU 
farquhar wrote The lietruitiiui Officer — 



Therefore, to stake their health and lives against »ucli fcarftu 
odds of climate, unless it be in the last dread struggle fur natiopal 
existence, is simply inhuman : and, if iuhumiuuty at hmuc it & 
national sin, it cannot cease to be one abroad. The aigunwnl 
passes out of the range of strategic criticism, and staniU a" 
broad ultimate grounds of right and wrong. Of cour««i tfi> 
tesponsibility of any official person ooncerutid depends ud bo* 
fif tha Bufferings could, in the poiticnlar case, have be^i J^^ 
lean, and therefore prevented by xea^ supplies. Hut. iliflHH 



A Few Facts from the Desert Camp. 383 

3^8 can ordinarily be foreseen and prevented admits of no 
enable doubt. Nay, as above suggested, the prescience 
m is self-convicting. They are responsible who, forecasting 
^ry day of final victory, leave their soldiers staked as mere 
an units in the struggle against the desert and its putrid- 
r miasma, its hunger, thirst, pestilence, and vermin. These 
ghts are the property of no political party, and in the 
-ests of none. They belong and extend to humanity at large, 
take, of course, upon myself the whole responsibility for 
3 remarks, and for producing the testimony of my friend in 
>rm. That is necessary. No true soldier will, if he can help 
e his own mouthpiece in such a case. There are other 
Eiges in which he weighs the amount of fight to be expected 
e Egyptians, and candidly hopes that it is not much. But 
3 are speculations of no weight after the event. His record 
cts under his own eyes is what I rely upon. There may be 
)r inaccuracies, as will happen to a man snatching half 
's in the wilderness, amidst harassing duties, for letters 
e, or killing dull days there by unbosoming freely to un- 
2al friends. But if the whole were known, these would 
ably be balanced, or more, by the deeper accentuation of 
r facts on which he has dwelt too lightly for their real 
bt. The lights and shades must both be taken into account, 
speaks of matters which it was his business to know, in 
h he could not easily be mistaken, in which he had no 
'est to mislead. He wrote utterly without any arnere pensee 
iblication. I do not believe that any cross-examination fiom 
L-quarters would invalidate or materially shake his testi- 
y, and its tenour is exactly as I have given it. No doubt 
e are some hundreds of others who could confirm it, if they 
d. 

lit I must not leave the reader under the one-sided impres- 
that the journal is a mere tissue of grumbling after creature 
forts out of reach. On the contrary, the writer seems half- 
imed at being driven — as one ** gravelled for lack of matter" 
dwell upon them. He says, from Kasassin — 

>tember Ist. — I feel ashamed of the poorness of my letters, but there is a deadly 
ness about oar life. Our petty quarrels about our food would not be instruc- 
kor in^resting, except as memorials of human folly I will try and give you an 
)f our everyday life. 

hen follows a sketch, commencing with revdUee at 4.80, 
mental duties till 6.80, return to tents, hot tea, and tubs, 
id do our washing, which is not a success as a rule, for mina ^ 



384 A Few Facts from th^ Desert Camp, 

seem really as dirty afterwards as before." The enemy's cavalrj 
come out to look at them, and can count every horse, man, and 
gun in the camp, as he mentions elsewhere, at the respectfxil 
distance of 8,000 yards. ** Then breakfast, compressed m^at 
and tea, with a little jam, which will not last long at the rsk^ 
these young fellows eat it." He sketches, sleeps, talks, or writer, 
as inclined, till lunch, interrupted only by watering the horses or 
" some fellow happening to call in." Then a ride over the deseari, 
'* or anything we can muster energy for," or, if nothing, a 
siesta. " But," he adds, ** we get rebuked for going beyond tine 
outposts, who, at most, are a mile from camp, instead of thi^^e 
or four, as they should be." Then duties again, wash for dinner, 
a ditto of breakfast, " only we have a drop of rum issued to c«J, 
or perhaps a spoonful of lime-juice." This, of course, represerm Is 
a day of full rations and half duties, or, rather, duties whi^^li 
only half occupy. But there follows the tale of days in whi<5h 
these proportions are inverted. The following is a Uttle fc>it 
from Alexandria, earlier than all but the earliest of my premie 
extracts : — 



On our left is the palace of the Ras et Tin and the hareem of the Khedire, 
ladies of which are very skittish, by the way in which they behave on meetiqg 
I am ^oing to call on the Khedive to-morrow or next day. He likes to see yoiLX*^ 
Eof^lish officers. He was brought np in England, so perhaps that is the reaf*^ 
We were berthed alongside a jetty jnst before nightfall It was a fine sight, tha^' 
hage docks, all fall of large transports crammed with troops I They cheered '■^^ 

like mad. Immediately behind was the Iberia, with on board. The xn^*** 

cheered me, and were so glad to see me. ... I then came down to onr horse-lin^^* 
and found an Arab with whom I had made friends. He showed me a splendid ^m** 
of water, unknown to the Commissariat, where I hare watered my horses, and g**'^ 
me to understand that he had two wives, fire children, and that they were m^** 
starring. Poor chap, he looked it. I gave him a shilling, and got him a big fvV 
of grub from the ship, and I am told by people who know these men that he is s*^ 
•errant for life. Anyhow, no man could show his gratitude more. I am going t^^^ 
take him some more to-morrow, and feed an English pointer which I found stsriiiiiT 
in a yard. 

Port Said, August Slst, — There were a good many vessels about the mouth of tb-^ 
Canal, several of them being foreign men-of-war. A Russian vessel, I am tok»^ 
behaved in a very extraordinary manner, yawing about just in front of us, nearly 
forcing us into the bank. It was the same vessel that tried to get in betwe»<* 
Admiral Seymour and the forts at Alexandria ; but on being told that, if i^^ 
continued that game, a shot would be put into her, quitted suddenly. 

Kassasin, August SOth. — We marched all night, and found, on arriving at Tel-el ^ 
Mahouta, that our people were encamped on the site of the Egyptian camp. Tai^ 
dead were buried there very thick. . . . One place, where we wished to niik« ^ 
tmnoh for our kitchen, the legs and arms were visible on very small digging.* *^ 

* ** The sand, I believe, does not deodorise or disinfeet what is buried in it; 
oos exhalations, so long as they arise, are spread abroad on the wind. ' 
l-Qeneral Sir £. Hamley . K.C3w. in the NweUemtk CaUury, Deesmber l^ 




A Few Facts from the Desert Camp. 385 

l»j (here for two dayn, and wo wore Uioimnlered to mirch np to Kaiaaiin, ntclsFen 
4'clKk, lo drive hack tho onem;. Wo nuruliod off nt ones, and halted at Mulisamah, 
wlicn tbs onemT had had a bi;.; camji. VTu lootod a few thingn. . . . Wiilt, on 
«rri(ini[ »t SCahisineh. wc fnund that tho iiclii>n «-a» BuppoNcd to bo over ; but tho 
UHiu rocommrneud, ... In half an hour wu camo andor Itrc. and the fun hoi'iime 
Lot lod fut. . . . Thu muflkvtry wuh lerrilily fant lor a Hhurt time. Thu nhell fire 
■i> loo high to do much hiirm, and thny barit principally to oar left und aror our 
htadi. . . . Some of oar dead, wlio were li.'fl on tho ({round when the Caralry 
Bri^e retirod, were iln^adfully mutilated liy tho enemy. Oh I the njjonT of oar 
Itlts't wbsD they auw the fearful «t)cl]t 1 Via .ire hero tar o few duya till the 
redlof the uaralry come up, and then we move on to Tol-ol-Kobir, anl then on 
Za{i»i\][m Biilfeiii, wliero wc expect n aorcro action. We uro on half-ratianH, and 
therg are no .irrangomffntu for nupply or hospital. 

This was the battle in whicli the since well-trumpeted charge 
of onr cavalry took plaeii on the night following the *28th 
Auf^st. It had its merits, especially as a picturesque source of 
illustration for the penny-a-liuera and their "own artists." 
But I believe that the opinion among strategiHts ie that, alike in 
its effect on the enemy at the moment, and on tlie further 
treats of the campaign, its importance has been over-rated. It 
nay be remembered that the cavalry on that occasion claimed 
to have captured guns vai'ying in number from seven to twenty, 
liiieh on the dawn of light were found to have been " withdrawn 
noder cover of the darkness." I must luave this statement to 
nilituy critics who can see in the dark. 1 wonder what our 
trtilleiymen thought of the occun-cnce. As regards the earlier 
battle of the 24th August, a rather remarkable circumstance has 
fame to my knowledge ; but I am not referring now to this ofiicer's 
jonnial as my athority for it. It may be remembered that a tele- 
pam reached home on that day from Sir Garnet Wolseley, giving 
U account of an action at the canal-dam between el-Magfar and 
d-Hahuta, in which "two guns borae-artillery, about thirty 
Koonted Infantry, and about 1,000 Infantry, and [as added in a 
Kioaaqoent telegram] two Gatlings worked by seamen," formed 
Ilia fiirce against " 10,000 Egyptian troops with ten guns." I 
Tnitare the statement that that General could have had four 
An gnus at the front by mid-day had he wished it, and further 
'•w the said f(una were all disembarked by the previuua after- 
P^'ori at Ismailia, bat were left doing nothing there. I may add 
B^at the fact wa», an announcement by the usual authority that 
j^e ^t guns lauded from the oanal would be first despatched to 
F^ ^at, induced a brisk competition amongst the artillery 
R^'-t^ : but that all efforts were made to insure the Horte 
pi^iUtiry the roremoat place, by refusing the Boyal Artillery the 
B^^jtii&nfipurt for their reqnirementa ; and that the competition 



386 A Fete Facts from the Desert Camp. 

thns stimulated was afterwards banlked by those who were fin 
ready being kept waiting — ^roasting, I might almost say— on tl 
arid beach of the eansJ for twenty-four hours, in a landsca] 
which one might compare with that of Mr. Holman Honl 
" Scape-goat," in order to enable a single division of the Royj 
Horse Artillery to put in an appearance of being first. This 
the reason, I believe, why the scanty British force number€ 
only two guns (with Gatlings) against the vastly out-numberir 
forces and ten guns of the enemy on that hard-fought day. 

As regards appliances for the sick and wounded, our office 
we have seen, speaks with military bluntness of " the atrocioi 
lies promulgated about the forwardness of our transport ac 
hospital preparations.*' I believe the fact to have been that 
mere temporary reception-room or rooms was first formed s 
Eassasin on the 28th August, immediately after the engag 
ment there. It was formed out of the group of rooms surround 
ing the main living-room of the lock-keeper's house there, whic 
main room was the head-quarters of General Graham. He: 
at Eassasin were tended the slight hurts which were not serioi 
enough to be forwarded to Ismailia, and those so badly hart th^ 
thev could not safelv be removed thither. Here, of course, the: 
were no beds, or at any rate none which a hospital would ha*^ 
recognized as worthy the name. I believe there was indeed r 
hospital '' plant " of any sort, save a few drinking- vessels, ac 
that the worst cases lay on the simple military sbretchers use 
to remove them from the field. The whole lay about tweni 
paces from the lock-gate, and here, I suppose, it was that ot 
officer records that he visited a wounded comrade. Of the moi 
permanent hospital at Ismailia I am unable to speak in equi 
detail : but I believe that up to a late stage of the campaign il 
appliances were such as would be deemed defective. These at 
matters on which it is likely that more light will ultimately b 
thrown ; but probably only at a period when public interest wl 
have waied faint on the subject, and will be hurrying off in qnea 
of some more novel excitement than the investigation of oa 
si^Kliors* sufferings — such is the breathless pace at which th 
miHlorn world lives. It may be presumed that at the termina 
lion of the campaign all the patients at Ismailia who wer 
rtniun-ablo werv despatched to Gabari, or on board the CarAagi 
or else to Cyprus, or sent home. I have already cited a telegrac 
of NovombeV ISth, at which date out of 600 sick the aveng 
ortality was one a day, instead of six a day of the previous weei 
I had been for sixty digrs at the Imtt^ rate and no hig^er- 






A Few Facts from the Desert Camp. 387 

and rather more than that time had elapsed eince the close 

of the campaign by the march upon Cairo — that makes 860 

deaths at Oabari and on board the Carthage. But it probably 

stood higher in the few weeks immediately succeeding Tel-el- 

Kebir, when the hospitals were probably at their fullest, and the 

weather more sultry. There was, however, a previous annoimce- 

ment under date of '' Cairo, September 21st," stating that '' all 

the sick and wounded had been removed to Cyprus, to Malta, 

or to England." This does not seem reconcilable with the 600 

patients at Gabari and on board the Carthage on November 

IStli. The dispersion of the patients into various hospitals may 

have been a proper safeguard ; but it makes it more diflScuIt to 

obtain accurate information regarding the results. The subject 

belongs to a class on which all Governments are apt to practise 

8 p>olicy of reserve, until compelled to disclosure by public 

opixiion or parliamentary pressure. An exhaustive inquiry 

dexxiands time, and time blunts the edge of general interest. 

Tbris is why it is expedient that such facts as are available at 

th^ moment, even if incomplete and one-sided, should not be 

kex>'t back. The merest tiro in campaigning studies knows the 

delusiveness of reckoning losses on an expedition by the mere 

enixmeration of killed and wounded on the field. The old proverb 

of ** reckoning without one's host" does not sufficiently express 

the absurdity of a calculation which would leave the heaviest 

items out of sight. If we want to know to the uttermost what 

stainina our "young army" and "short service men" have 

developed, we must be content to await the sifting of full official 

returns from all sources capable of furnishing them, and faithfully 

and severely study the results. I only wish at present to fix in 

the public consciousness the impression that there is a strong 

T^nuifade case in favour of making those studies thoroughly 

^^J^eserved and exhaustive, leaving those to judge and sum up 

^^ question who are professionally capable of doing so. 

* will only add that, speaking generally, there can hardly be 
*^y thing more unreal and delusive than the would-be-picturesque 
*^^ can't-be-natural style of the " own artist " of our " lUus- 
P'^ted " contemporaries. I come to this conclusion after examin- 
es carefully a large assortment of sketches taken on the actual 
^^^, and equally authentic with the written record which I 
^^^ punctually quoted. I would particularize, as examples, the 
'^^t^er strongly sensational engravings of the fights at el-Magfar 
^ Kassasin, to which we were treated by those accomplished 
^^^ributors to the interest of the campaign for the home market* 



■888 A Few Facts from the Desert Camp. 

I venture to say they represent a different country with wM; 
a]ien featoree &om those of the Egyptian desert. There ns, I 
believe, not a single tree, bush, or sbruh near the localiues 
where these fights took place. The dreary, unmarked deseil 
with its rolling ridgoB of Band-hills, offerB little pl&y for tlu 
picturesque imagination ; and truth — the naked tmth— is w 
abominably naked in these regions that art will not coadeBcenii 
to it, but must needs do a little draping ; in short, moat voik in 
the " fig-leaf" style. 



TO CORRESPONDENTS. 



All H8H. iatonded for insertioii must be diieeted to Um THJWfcll 
Knvy Magume, IS, Waterloo Plus, London, 8.W., uid mutt nonhii 
ftddrau M the writer. Name and iddreM on Wert u inavfBctanL 

It a nqtutttd that ruial wiper bt uted. tht paga numbtnd, fi 
mud a moU margin Uft. 

Evray can will lie iskea ; bnt neither the Editon nor tba PmU 
iMfonMble for tha lou of U88. throng the poet or otbvwka. ^ 
detirad to 1m MtnriMd, Htuops mast be auoloMd. 

Boriowa of Booki and Notes on salient matters oonnsatad wiU) fl 
Vayj will be iwntinniwl each month. 



ri It W. H. Altoa k Oa., 1 



THE ARMY AND NAVY 
MAGAZINE. 



SEPTEMBEK 1888. 



^\t §aitIt-iiElIts of §tmmi 

By Colonel G. B. Mallesom, G.S.I. 



n. — The Lech ksd Nubeubero. 
■ Twtfflry of Breitenfeld had given Catholic Germany into 
3 hands of Gostavas. With the renumnta of his beaten army 
Ify had retreated into Westphalia, and between Leipzig and 
amis there -naa no other army to oppose the progress of the 
Ojaeror. Had GaBtaToa marched directly Cram the battle- 
Id to the capital of the hereditary statcB of the house of 
istria, he uiif^ht tbtTf have ilictatud terms of peace alike to 
iidinand and Musimiliaii. 

From Bucb a march Gustavus was deterred by the considera- 
•a that he would leave behind him, ready and able to recon- 
erand to harass the states of North Germany, bo experienced 
jeneral as Tilly. There could he no question but that, left to 
tuaelf. Tilly, rallying hia beaten soldiers 'and joining to them 
B garrisons of some of the places still held for the League, 
Ud soon again be formidable. Had Gustavus been able to 
pMe of the Saxon army, to place it under the command of a 
htal such as Banner, or Horn, or Bernard of Saxe-Weimai'. 
l^ght h&\& ventured on the daring step, a step the sound 
■ciple of nbicb was, in a later age, vindicated by the genius 
* warrior greater even than the hero King. But he was 
I able to dispose of that army. The jealousy of John 
Rge had hut little abated, and although in his first momenta 



'■y.-*^ Tut hatin-'fi'll.r 'IT Germanu, 

•:zi::u;.^e:l u- nai r.fi-rtrl :: ~5c- all his induenoe to have 
•-:■-:■": ■.^-. ~:-.. II:i.: '•: ^i:t Limans, he soon relapsed into 
L_ -J-',.. J 11. . i:i;*:urL :: Lim. Another consideration 
-.. r:-i --.-I.: :i ^-.^Lii^r G^istavus aj:^ain=i ihe bolder 
"1.- — m'-:-^ J--- Ti.r l: th-r moment sitting at Frank- 
zr: : ^-i..£ '_.- Li.": : Z^-^stiiution, and Ferdinand ^^as 
1^1- _ _ zir.:.-j.. - : -.irLj-f:! the members of that diet 
r — ~ :i_ z^z^j^.j:r:}^:T:'is agreement with him. The 
.— .-_:~ : -J JT-:^ j.-l •: j::=:avus alone would prevent 

-. -~— 7-- iultll ::•:. :: a Swedish army throu(;h 

~.-^- 11- i_- -- Z-:.r4 Tr:^:r.Cr5 — a part of Germany which 

— - i_ :l^:l r:i-~rrri .i-t bv the armies of the Lea^iue — 

_ . . 1— . '^ -i^t i -iJiv effect upon the minds ot 

- . ^.— r..— . ..:.: : ::t=. Gustavus then charged th« 

] - -.^ -' . i^T- -lit war into Silesia, Boht-mia. and 

• . IT- '--.T : ^Li-ria. his other German allies to 

conquer in Xorth Germaay. 



., « . 



".- ■^' iLz.is ruled by the princes of the 

.. -•.-Lzi.r with this plan Gustavus ?ot 

— ~ 1-:- n.j:ingen and lower Frauconi3, 



..-. - . _'r :--j-.-.: -li leen fought on the 7th Septeix^' 

: _r -•."- - LrT.;— If rrfseutcd himself before Erfur^t 

_. . _: ..:- : riz-I ::"r:i on the Gera. Though tUi^ 

IT .. •*::i..T-: :;.- ~1- »Ja:hulic bishop of Worms, an*^ 

^.. . . i.r-1- -^:_: J.: jc relation, the magistrates suX"* 

. .. ->.--•": -. LTiitavus gi-anted the inhabitantii 

. • -.. .- "---T rili-rlrn : then, nominating AVilliaii^ 

:...::■ ". '-': ^.Tfrnor of the district and oftU^ 

..-::_•.::. Lz-i :lie Count of Loweusteiu to L>«? 

:. ^■•i-.-r-.s.i:. -.vjioh consisted of Colonel Fowle"^ 

-. - , •. : . --*:'7:: » .mired strong, he, for conveuienct* 

. . :.> u-iiv inro two Indies, and pushed forwar^l 

5- ; . ; ..' :^'.'ii ..r..^:. Tvliich loasted of no great town an*-^ 

. . \ ■..:l^^:^. -i::.: louver Franconia. The left columX* 

- . .- : .-.V :•: ,":ci:::;::ed to General Bandissiu, unde^ 

^ • . . . i..Mt t rIii?o.irn : the King himself led the rigbt- 

..::;> .1 i-i'j injLivIi were considerable, for there Wfr*^' 

>,.>. a.vi :.:w rar?rort of artillery over the rocks aii«^ 

.VM^ti \nx' icd..:s «*iu?eJ the exercise of much labour aji<-^- 

>v'* i^rclitlv: :?s on the evening of the third da}' Gustara =* 

4b«f >cii:i:'W-ts5 lH)undaries of the forest. The ne^c^* 

^ % ^ :i;:;ick;:d jjid carried the town of Konigshofen, oi^ 






The llattlc-fieUs of Gemantj, 391 

the Saal. bclonf^ing to the Bishop of Wiirzbiirg. This town 
tontsined the maj^azitie and arsenal of the diocese of that 
prelate, waa victualled for twelve months, and was held by a 
stroQ*; j^arriHon. ItH easy capture, then, was a matter of great 
importance to the Swedes. Marching twenty-sis miles the day. 
following, tiuHtavuB invested and foi-ced to capitulate the free 
imperial town of Scliweiiifurt. Here he came again into com- 
manioation with BandisKin who, in his niarcli, had mastered 
the towus of ^malkaldoD, Meiuingeo, Neustadt, Hammclburg, 
Oeniiiuden, and KarUtadt, the latter being the fortified frontier 
town of the see of Wiii-zburg. 

GustavuB now had his army once more united on the right 
buikofthe Maiii, the famous river which constitutes the natural 
line of demarcation between northern and Bouthem Germany, 
within striking distance — for it is only twenty-three miles— of the 
important city of Wurzbiirg. The bishop of that diocese was 
absent, acting an ambassador in France on behalf of the 
^tholic League, but his brother of Bamberg was on the spot 
■to represent him. This prelate was quite equal to the occasion. 
TPhilst on the one hand ho offered to treat with Gustavus, on 
tlie other he despatched messengers to Tilly, who was hurrying 
■to the relief of Wiirzburg, urging him to hasten his march. 
His overtures to Gustavus — overtures in which he offered, in 
'ttuuideration of being left in peaceful enjoyment of his lands 
■Ud dignities, to pay down a sum equal to £il,0O0, to furnish 
ninitlily to GustaMis the same sum which up to that time he 
Wpoid to the League, to recall his forces from tlic League army, 
"•ud to Borrender in pledge tlie strong fortresses of Forcheim 
=>nd Eronoch-^id indeed impose upon and cause delay to the 
■Bvedish king ; for when, after having agreed to the conditions, 
1* pressed for their execntion, the bishop, who had received 
■tottin intelligence of the near approach of Tilly, threw off 
tha muk and declined to complete the bargain. 

^RUj, vho by meauB of reinforcementa ^headed by Aldringer, 
*Bager, and other generals had increased bis army to the 
nimber of tliirty tliouaand, -was indeed approaching Wtirz- 
"iTg, hut ho was still three days' march firom it, not so near bnt 
W a dtitonnined general commanding determined Boldien 
ti^t not venture an attack npon that town before he coold 
trivG. Comprehending this on the moment, Gustavus, as socm 
< Uie negotiations with the Bishop of Bamberg tukd been 

f^iea off, marched dirfietly on to Wiiribnrg and invested it. 

Bji'yili ijlff b» oi^^H^ <^ &™ footing on the Boath bank of 
^ " 96 • 



392 The Battk-Jields of Germany. 

the Main, poured in an incessant fire on the fortificatioi 
during that night and the two following days, carried the ga 
of the castle of Marienberg and the stone bridge over its dik 
on the second day, and the castle itself the same night. Tl 
capture of Marienberg caused the instantaneous surrender 
Wiirzburg, for the castle dominated the town. In Wiirzbu: 
Gustavus obtained large supplies of corn, of wine» and 
money. 

Tilly, after his defeat at Breitenfeld, had fallen bac! 
with an army reduced to eight thousand men, into Wefl 
phalia. Beceiying there a strong reinforcement of cavalry ar 
infantry from the Elector of Cologne, he had marched in 
southerly direction to Warburg (on the Diemel), and, pnsl 
ing into Hesse, had joined there the reinforcements brougl 
from Italy by Aldringer and Fugger. He had reached Fnlc 
when he heard of the investment of Wiirzburg by Gustavus. H 
army now amounted to somewhat over thirty thousand me: 
exceeding that of Gustavus by five or six thousand. A brai 
man, anxious to wipe out the defeat of Breitenfeld, Tilly wi 
about to push on by forced marches to succour Wiirzburg, whc 
he received an imperative order from Maximilian of Bavari 
to avoid a combat if possible, and by no means to attack. Tl 
army commanded by Tilly was, in fact, with the exceptic 
inmiediately to be referred to, the only army left to the Leaga 
and Maximilian felt, and felt justly, that its destruction won] 
expose the whole of southern Germany to be over-run by tfa 
victorious Swede. 

The one exception spoken of was the army of Duke Charles T 
of Lorraine, a prince who, with the view to win for himself tl 
electoral rank, had warmly espoused the Catholic cause, an 
who was, at the moment, marching at the head of seventee 
thousand men to join Tilly. The boastful character of the Duk 
and the indiscipline of his army, brought, however, no real assi 
tance to the Catholic commander. Both the Duke and the am 
disappeared, too, almost as suddenly as they had appeared ; f) 
a little later the Swedish cavalry fell, during the night, upc 
the Duke's camp, and so terrified his soldiers that they hastens 
back, with all possible speed, to their own countr}\ As, sti 
panic-stricken, they approached the Bhine at Strasburg, 
waggoner, passed on the road, struck the Duke's horse wit 
his whip, calling out : *' You must go faster than that if Jo 
would escape the great King of Sweden." 
Tilly had been forced to allow Wiirzburg to succumb withoc 



The Battle-fields of Germany. 893 

making an effort to save it; but the arrival of Duke Charles 

had increased his army to nearly fifty thousand men, and he 

hastened then to the north bank of the Main, nearly opposite 

Ochsenfurt, at the angle of the very sharp bend made by the 

dyer, a bend so strongly marked that both flanks of an army 

marching on Ochsenfurt from the north would be covered, 

G^ustavus, who was very anxious to save that town, placed in it a 

Scotch brigade under Hepburn and Monro. Meanwhile, he sent 

•a detachment of cavalry to beat up the Lorrainers in the manner 

already referred to. Tilly, finding Gustavus prepared at all points 

and vigilant, made only a demonstration against Ochsenfurt, and 

then withdrew his army. It was only when the Swedes had, in 

the manner now to be described, placed a considerable distance 

^tween themselves and the Main, that Tilly ventured, in virtue 

<^f a secret agreement with the Bishop of Bamberg, to cross the 

^▼er and occupy the strong places which that prelate had pre- 

nonsly offered to Gustavus. There, and in the neighbouring 

''^vqaisate of Ansbach, he remained for some time, living on the 

^tintry and watching events. 

^0 sooner had Tilly fallen back from Ochsenfurt than Gustavus^ 

^^^^ays bearing in mind the real object of the campaign, began 

'^^ march towards the Bhine. Following the course of the 

'^c^in, he occupied, without serious opposition, Seligenstadt, 

'^ohaffenburg, and Steinheim. The capture of these places 

■^oiight with them the possession or the submission of the 

^^"tricts which they represented on both sides of the river. 

^li^ilst he was thus advancing, one of his lieutenants had cap- 

t'^^^cd, by collusion with its ruling count, Philip Ludovic, the 

^^^n and citadel of Hanau. Gustavus himself was marching 

^^t;li eight thousand men in a north-westerly direction towards 

■tt^ valley of the Neckar, whilst Tott and Banner were engaged 

^ securing the more northerly districts. The Saxons likewise 

still marching towards Prague. 

effect of the influence gained by Gustavus at this period 

the adhesion, just as he was quitting Wiirzburg, of the 

^'^iK>rtant city of Nuremberg. Nuremberg, the English rendering 

of liJie true name Niimberg, was a free city of the empire, famous 

®^^ai in those days for the wealth, the order, the industry of its 

People* Rising from a sandy plain, rendered fertile by the 

^P'E^lication to it of the waters of the Pegnitz, it was surrounded 

*^T ^ wall having more than a hundred towers, culminating in a 

^*^tle whichy built on rising ground, dominated the city and 

^xxuianded an excellent view of the country around it. The 



S94 The Battle-felds of Germany. 

beauty of its churclies, the splendour of its private houses, iW 
reputation as the home of art, added lustre to a city which then, 
in the commercial world, occupied a place inferior only to that of 
Venice and Genoa. It had been famous almost from its birth. In 
the year 1050-1 it was heard of as obtaining from the Emperor 
-Henry III. the rights of coining money, of holding markets or 
fairs, of imposing duties. The ^establishment of these fairs, tl^e 
worship of wonder-working Sebaldus, the repeated visits, alwar>s 
for a lengthened period, of the emperors, drew the industri^ 
classes to the rising town. With the other possessions of tt*^ 
Pranconian imperial house of Germany Nuremberg came, by tt*^ 
death of Henry V. (1125) into the possession of the House ^^^ 
Hohenstaufen ; and the representatives of this family, Conr^*^ 
and Frederic, had, two years later, to defend the castle against 
Emperor Lothair. Lothair was repulsed, but the odds again 
the Hohenstaufens were too great, and, in 1188, Nuremberg 
taken by Henry, " the proud," of Bavaria. But the election 
Conrad of Hohenstaufen to the imperial throne (1188), restorer- '^ 
Nuremberg to its position as an independent fief of the empi 
. Greatly favoured by theiHohenstaufens, the city soon extend 
beyond the Pegnitz, and its new boundaries speedily came 
be surrounded by a wall with towers and ditches. In 121 — 
. Frederic II., grandson of the famous Barbarossa, granted 
city a patent of freedom. In 1324, 1856, and 1390, imperi 
diets were held within its walls. At the last of these the princip* 
of having one coinage for all Germany was established. Diet' 
assembled there likewise in 1522 and in 1523. On the 2drd 
July 1532, the first religious peace was concluded, and six 
later the Emperor Charles V. and the Catholic princes form^^ 
there a league to suppress Protestantism throughout Germaay- 
The political history of the city had meanwhile undergone * 
material change. The] Hohenstaufens had passed away, to be 
succeeded by the HohenzoUerns. The latter, after an adminis- 
trative rule of nearly two centuries, had removed to Branden- 
burg. Their departure left the city a prey, for a long time, to 
constant wars, but the independent spirit of the citizens at 
length asserted itself. They had, at an early period of the B^ 
fonnation, adopted, in their truest form, the principles of Luther, 
and, whilst denying a residence in the city to all who were not 
of the reformed persuasion, had carefully preserved from icono- 
clastic fury the beautiful churches and symbols which weie 
amongst the precious * ornaments of the city. When the tbirtj 
years.' war broke out, the disturbance of its commercial prosperiiy 



Th^ BaitU'fidds of Germany. 395 

by the discovery of the Cape route to the East had been but 
BliKhtly felt, and the city still maintained nearly all its old 
influence and pre-eminence. 

This city, on the retreat of Tilly, had declared oi>enly for 
Gustavus. Its example had been followed by Ulm, Strasburg, 
and Frankfurt (on the Main). The Swedish monarch consi- 
dered it, then, advisable to push on to the last-named city, im- 
portant even then, as the recognised seat of the diet for the 
imperial election. Ho had taken Steinhcim on the 13th, and 
joined his lieutenant at Hanau on the 14th November. He 
pushed on, thence, to Offenbach, some four miles from Frank- 
furt. Here he concluded an agreement in virtue of which his 
army was allowed free entrance into the city, the magistrates 
took an oath of fidelity, and the suburb of Sachsenhausen was 
placed absolutely in hia hands. The following day, the 17th, he 
made a triumphal entry into Frankfurt with great pomp and 
ceremony, amid the plaudits of the people. 

Three days were occupied by the i)assnj]je of the Swedish 
wmy, its material, its baggage, its sick and wounded, through 
Frankfurt. Fully aware, as he was, of tlie impression which 
^uld be produced by tlie surrender of so important a city, 
GnstavuB was determined to utilise that feeling by following up 
™ success. The very evening of the day, tht-n, on which he 
>Mde his triumphal entry, he sent troops against Hoclist, six 
miles beyond Frankfurt, and belonging to the Klector of 
Mwnz, a strong adherent of the League*. Hiichst surrendered 
wat night. The day following, Landgrave William of Hesse- 
^ftsael, who had done good seniee in Westphalia and Lower 
°*^^yi joined the Swedish king with six thousand foot and 
™ee thousand horse. Amongst other men of note who found 
lefnge in his camp at this period, was the unfortunate Count 
Falatine Frederic V-, titular King of Bohemia. 

The King stayed at Frankfurt only a sufficient time to prepare, 
■tHochBt, materials for crossing the lUiine at Mainz, and for 
'^'tetering the strong places on both banks of the Alain. On 
.»e Igt December he quitted Frankfurt, and in three days 
f^-nsx the district known as the Bergstrasse* — a district 
Videh, in the more comprehensive application of the term, 

'^Qdes the country between Darmstadt and Heidelberg. He 

• 

J^iUiuuTOW and strictly literal application, the Bei^giitraBse iiignifica only the 
mad, about thirty-ieven miles in length, at the foot of the Odenwald, 
near Dannstadt, and HeidelbeiK ; but, as stated in the text, it 
.to MBKpnhend the fmitfnl Unds on both sides of ir. 



306 The Battlc-jields of Germany. 

then made as thongh he would besiege the last-named city, with 
the view of restoring it to the Elector Palatine ; but, knowing 
all tho inconvenience of attacking a place whilst an enemy lay 
on his communications, he turned short off to his right, and 
at;aK*ktxl Opr^nheim, an important town on the left bank of th 
Rhine, ard ihe sirong connecting fortress of Landskron. Whilsts^^ 
hr^ ir>:os w-ri>? engaged against that place, he secured boats foi^^ 
ibf fr.^sifczii: c^f the river at Gernsheim, some few miles highev-^ 
XT lib^ s:rream. The passage of the Rhine was successful!, 
«(B^'^>i. in spite of the opposition of a strong detachment 
S^tfbsiif.^ in&ntry, forming portion of a corps which, under Do: 
rtiia' ^iF Sylvan, was serving in the Lower Palatinate. He the 
jAtfr di very short siege, stormed Oppenheim and its fnrfrrf — r^ 
Sii IVvomber). The opportune fall of this place allowc^^a^ 
lVa$asivu> to march with his main body on Mainz, whilst | 
^ca^^niont secured Worms. Mainz, though defended by t^^9 
i^*c5sMid men under Don Philip de Sylva in person, surrender^^ 
«Q tht> second day. Gustavus made his triumphal entry in. ^o 
iIk' city the day following, the 13th December. 

The surrender of Mainz marks the close of the first portion 
^ the campaign which followed the battle of Breitenfel^J. 
IVditically it was an event of the highest importance. It Becur^?J 
Kvrliustanis not only the command of the Rhine, but enormo'OB 
impplios of every desrciption, the possession of the electorate ^ 
which Mainz was the capital, and the submission of two-thiitf^ 
uif the Lower Palatinate. It enabled him to gather up all tb* 
thrt'ftds of the forces of which he disposed, and to strike od^ 
ittch a line as would tend to finish the war. 

A glance at the positions of the various forces at his dispos^ 
will give the reader a clear view of the position of the Swedial* 
monarch at this moment. Banner and Tott and the Marquis o' 
Hamilton had been acting with the Duke of Mecklenburg an^ 
Iho Landgrave of Hesse-Kassel in endeavouring to cleet^ 
nturthern and north-eastern Germany of the Imperialists ^^ 
i)l>)H>sod by Pappenheim, Gronsfeldt, Boninghausen, and others 
^ less note, they had nevertheless been fairly successfnl '-- 
IVippenheim, indeed, had maintained his hold on Westphalia*^ 
but in the other provinces the Swedish arms had made progres^'-- 
S«>uth of the Main, Tilly, watched by Gustavus Horn with nin^ 
tlioiisand men, was asserting the cause of the League in Uppe^* 
iaid^^j^||ral Franconia, and now that the Swedish kinghacS 

tided movement in the direction of Mainz, 
ing Nuremberg. The Chancellor, 




The Battle-fields of Germany. 897 

apccompanied by the Queen Eleonora, had marched through 
North Germany with considerable reinforcements to Mainz, 
jknd had there joined the King. On the other side, the 
Saxons, after much delay, had over-run the Lausitz, and, beat* 
ixig down the resistance of the imperial generals, Tiefenbach 
and Gotz, had entered Bohemia and occupied Prague without 
resistance. Here the Elector, John George, quitted his army, 
and left the further conduct of the war to his minister. Field 
ICarshal von Amheim. 

Between Prague and Vienna the road, if not quite open, was 
at the moment barely defensible ; for Wallenstein had not yet re- 
appeared on the scene, and Tilly's army was in Franconia. Had 
the Elector of Saxony been a strong man, he might, at this 
period, have finished the war. But John George, fickle, irre- 
solute, timid, and fond of pleasure, far from looking at the 
opportunities before him, was at the moment debating within 
himgelf whether it would not be more for his ease and advantage 
to come to terms with the Emperor. The success of Gustavus 
*Ioiie prevented him from taking this course. It may be 
'^a«onably asked now, as it was asked at the time by generals 
^ Si^t ability, how it was that, in planning the campaign after 
^^eitenfeld, Gustavus should have allotted to his Saxon allies, 
^«c»e feebleness and capacity he had thoroughly gauged, the 
^*^«ct and comparatively undefended route to Vienna, whilst he 
*G06pted for himself the less decisive road through Franconia 
^ the Rhine. The question was put in so many words to 
J^'^stavus by Oxenstierna when he joined him at Mainz. 
Sire," he said, at their first private interview, " I should have 
y^^n better pleased to pay my duty to you at Vienna than at 
*^^dnz." The answer of Gustavus, whilst it reveals as much as 
act of his life the profound statesman-like capacity of the 
I, is a thorough justification of his conduct. ** I gave," he 
J]^l>3ied, " the fullest consideration to the question. I recognised 
*^^t in the Elector of Saxony and in his minister, Amheim, I 
^j^^ to deal with two men, one of whom was irresolute and 
*^^^« me no love, the other was insincere and hated me. Such 
^^^ would serve to keep the Protestant feeling alive in Bohemia 
f'^^ the Lausitz, and hold their own there against the few 
^^^X^erial troops opposed to them, until Providence should afford 
JJ^ the opportunity of striking a second and decisive blow at 
^^ enemy. But, suppose for a moment that I had taken the 
^^^le through Bohemia, and assigned to them that which led to 
"^^ Bhine. The whole bearings of the question would theD 



r-r£i ■• L--^!- la BoLerzlA there is not a 

izz -nil-: -- )ii Tuoiii tiitr E l-f -.'Vr of Saxony can e 

ir. Z-jr- -le Tt)iiid ijr- in :hr verv centre of 

r -11. TZ'jLZL:i TUD enceFeJ Liiio ihf confederacy of L 

.-.. isiiLiyiZTL. Tuo leads him llizi-folded, and is a 

• -t:- J. ^ i-Litrr. are both timid eiii-uxrh to submit d 

:-.il:-i. lh i 7..-ii inccrtsted en«yj^L i? >rli me and mj 

' • '■' --» .'. I" •i'/mt? aonoi^iition «jf tcrriiory. In eitlier c 

:i. v:.-: •t--iii.L i)e my p.^sition if I wtre at Prague 

:.c L roz-'c*" LS the drsfi Fro:e>:iii:; j»ower in 6e 

TT-c-:* ;£ zhr I'mou. if h«:- wcFf cfre amongst them 

•ir--i^" Tjar?f» th^rir coudaot after hi?. Upon the E 

.•.;._:. Tiit-u. ^iT could I conduct a r-^iresLi from Bo 

.-^.i-^. u:«i Ai-^tria to the Baltic — :'::e onlv course 

. *.i utu Jt Iri: to mt-, with tht* Imj.h;rial:?ts on my re 

:Tri:-Liu .a ir:iLZ'? N'o : in the jr^mo which Gustavus 

i^-. . L ^ =.-\Lf:av:is who must be amon^?: the Protestant 

, T---u:i:i'.' — and the tirst man amonj?: iheni too." 

■":.'>* :!:«--:3. was the p«.»sitii.ni. The Saxon>. at Praf;:n 
.»: > ad :o Vit una but L Anv occuuied a: :he monii-nt. bu 
■•: ■i::::.'tr':r was makinu' -trt-nuous tr-.-r:-. in the i 
^*.jii :o S.C related, t'.' oevunv -tr«>nL:iv. *i tfore thev cou 
.•:»>;av::s. larLTiIv strt iimht lud at Mainz, and fron 
• cMiM/it-r::'.: tho Palatinati- : (hi-tavu^ Horn waiehin.c 
-:-4icvi::a : the utht-r subordinate ;:l lit- i-als a:;d adies i 
-^ i.ii.: :-^provi.T:.L: tht- pt.sitiini in norilitrn :\vA nor: 
v:'ua:rv. On the side of the lUiinv. Till v. afte 
,:j.jtiy: :o surprise Nurtiiibti-.i:, Iiad left .-lu- half i. f 
::vul \ldr::i::cr to watch Gu-tavus Hor!i, whilst, wi:) 
:iir. lie had taktu post at N«'rdlin;;:t*n. an iu-.j'eri 
^r. aiLLi. cl;se to tile frontier- of Wurte:::: ii-j. 
',vr':d the principal road by whieh the >wed.. - m- 
l:o tho former country, i'appenheim. tht iiunil 
*AS*s was bein:: jiradually raisid to ii;^lit<.vn :h 
L»ld::u his own in Westphalia and on the lower 
ic b':i:pcror Ferdinand \\a.'?, as ahvady stattd. « 
iv»c^L strenuous efforts t«» levy an army whieli 
Lui to rc-assert all his former power. 

Ic was in the month ««t" Noveuilier. li»:U. wh- 
CIV already at IVaLjue, when (iustavu:?, atitr 
vlU- at Wiirzbm'g. was making: lii> triumphal ] 
■^ that Ferdinand 11.. driwn to desperar 
vertures to the pt»weri'ul .--ubject whoi 



The BaUle-Jields of Germany. 399 

months before, he had subjected to the mdignity of a curt 
dismissal. The story of the previous overtures made by Wal- 
lensteiu to the Swedish king, their faihire, of the soHcitations 
addressed to him by the Emperor, of the first refusal of 
Walleusteiu (November 1631), of the conference held between 
them at Znaim in the following January, and of Wallenstein^s 
guarded consent to raise an army in three months but not to 
command it, of the new negotiations conducted on the part of 
the Emperor by Father Quiroga, by the Bishop of Vienna, and 
by Count Eggenberg, which resulted in an agreement whereby, 
on the acceptance without reserve of his conditions, one of 
which assured him a roval title and a sovereim state* on the 
conclusion of peace, Wallenstcin finally agreed to command the 
army he had meanwhile been engaged in raising, — belongs 
rather to the life of that great commander than to these pages. 
It must sufiice here to state that on the loth April the final 
compact was signed, and on the last week of that mouth the 
new imperial army, led by the greatest captain of the age, 
entered into the campaign. 

Before these negotiations could be brought to their perfect 
conclusion, Gustavus had quitted Mainz for Frankfurt, the 
fortifications of which he greatly strengthened. Having 
arranged for the levying of fresh troops in Sweden and in the 
German provinces on the left bank of the Khine, he opened 
thence the campaign of 1()5]2 by marching to undertake the 
fifige of Kreuznach. Kreuznach, defended by a garrison of six 
hundred veterans, was one of the strongest places in the 
Matinate, one of the few which had not been attempted by the 
Swedes dm-ing the earlier winter months. It was regularly 
'wtified, in the most approved manner of the timc^ On one 
MCt defence rose above defence in such a way that it was 
™cult for a besieger to gain a position commanding it. The 
other side was, though very strong, still open to attack. To- 
™a ride Gustavus directed his efforts. For a whole fortnight 
"^ place resisted him, and it was only when the springing of a 
'^ offered to his troops a small but very steep breach, full 
^ loose rocks, and difficult of ascent, that he ordered a storm. 
JohmteerB from the ranks of the Anglo- Scottish brigade sprang 
vnmd to elaim the honour of leading the attack. Led by 
i*^^ ChaTen, then very yoong, Colonel Talbot, and Mr. Masham, 

^ttfv iiaDAitioiit actiudly ran as foUowa : The Emperor pledgad himself to ■ 
ig^ IMlBoatohi ■'aa ordinary reward an imiMrial flef, on an oxtra- 
r:B|9ppidaoTati|gn Jarisdiotion in all the lands to be conquered.*' 




400 The BaUlc'fields of Germany. 

they performed this service, supported by the Swedes, wEl th 
signal gallantry. After a very sharp and obstinate conte «t, 
which lasted two hours, the garrison surrendered. The lo ass, 
however, of the stormers was considerable. Not only was t "lie 
number of killed excessive, but Gustavus had to lament t:. Jibe 
death of one of his best officers, Colonel Halle. Not one of b lie 
British officers escaped uninjured. Lord Craven, whose con- 
duct pai'ticularly attracted the favourable notice of Gustarczis, 
was wounded by a pike in his thigh ; Sir Francis Vane, brotki «f 
of Lord Westmoreland, was shot in the hip-bone ; Mashs^jn 
receiveil a severe hurt from a large stone and a fire-brand; 
TallH)t was killed close beside Lord Craven. Partly to testiA 
his opinion of the gallantry of his English allies, partly in 
appreciation of the merits of the officers concerned, Gu^tavns 
apix)int(Hl ^Ir. Alexander Kamsay to be governor of the conquered 
town: about this time, too, he nominated Sir Patrick Ruthven to 
bo ginornor of the free imperial city of Ulm, which had just tben 
proiunineod in his favour, and had consented to receive » 
jSirrlson of twelve hundred men. 

;. With almost the sole exception of Heidelberg, the strong plaoes 
of the Lower Palatinate were now in the hands of the Swedes a-»i 
ihoir allies, (lustavus was anxious, before marching into Bavairiai 
to complete the expulsion of the Spaniards from that Electonft-e; 
ihon lo deal luially with Cologne, as well to punish the Bisho? 
Klivtor of that eity as to confiscate the enormous amount <^' 
prv^perly deposited therein by the princes and nobility of nortl' 
woslcrn Cierniany. To attack Cologne, however, would h^.'^* 
luvessiiated a deviation from his true course : and he wft^ 
|vrhaps fonunately. di-ierred from attempting it by the receipt 
of inforuiaiivMi that Tillv had struck his lieutenant in Franconi* 
iuistavus Horn, a vitv st vere blow. 

We left Tillv at Nv^Jlinizen. on the Kuders of Bavaria an^ 
Wurtemberi:, prepartd :o protect the former country against 
iiustavus and his army, l^ut, whilst lying at Nordlingen. Till? 
nvoivtd sevr^: iu:«.i;ici::oe that Horn, who had recentlv lak^^ 
Ivuulvr::. >\a> vvor.rviiii: thai citv and its nei^rhbourhood i^ 
such ir.ar.r.iT as wv^::ld, wi:h the connivance of the inhabitant^* 
f,io:;i:a:; ,in :\::*r.ir: :o surprise liim- The Bambergers. ^^ 
iHsn^'i* v^: l^av.:Krc, wirt as iiiicnselv and devouilv Caihohc ^ 
iho tu*i::V.lvv.ri::c iwv'.i of Nar>?nibtK: w-ere intensely aO«* 
Jexov.tlv lVo:< >:ii:::. Fbtir rultr and bishv^p. doihed in annotxt 
liko a co:v.::^^r. oav^l:; r. was s: :!:* lime Strrinic in the ranks ^* 
iTUO ar:::v. l>v vV^rsunicanous initialed bv him it 




The Battle-fields of Germany. 401 

uranged that the people of the city, aided by armed bands from 
Forcheim and Eronach, should plan an insurrection, in which 
ihey should be supported by the sudden appearance of Tilly 
and his army. There was some miscarriage in the plan, for 
the insurrection had already broken out] and been repressed 
when Tilly, at the head of sixteen thousand men, arrived before 
the place. Horn had nine thousand, a sufficient number, had 
his orders to concentrate been obeyed, to repel the invader. 
Bat his orders were not obeyed. Baudissin, instead of falling 
back on the city, moved against Tilly. Attacked and over- 
whelmed, his men drew with them in their flight the newly- 
taised corps of Count Solmes ; and Tilly's veterans, led by Cratz 
•od Farenbach, followed them so closely as to gallop on to the 
bridge leading into the city pell-mell with them. But here Horn 
showed himself worthy of his great sovereign. By strenuous 
aertions he maintained during the rest of the day the barricade 
at the other end of the bridge, in spite of all the efforts, re- 
peatedly renewed, of his adversary's horsemen. When, however, 
towards nightfall, Tilly brought up his artillery, and began to 
place it in position, Horn thought it expedient to retire. He 
fli&barked his guns, his ammunition and baggage, on boats, 
dospatcbed them down the Main, and then, himself commanding 
the rear-guard, conducted an orderly retreat in a westerly direc- 
tion^ crossed the Main at Eltmann, and, breaking down the bridge 
there, halted only when he reached Schweinfurt. Thence he de- 
■patched a courier to the King, bearing a report of the mishap. 

This report effectually dispelled from the mind of Gustavus 
my lingering desire he might have had to move against Cologne. 
LeaTing Oxenstierna with a division to finish with the Palatinate 
>od to protect the middle Bhine, he marched without delay 
(4fh March) on Aschaffenburg, and, pushing on thence, effected a 
puiction with Horn between that place and Schweinfurt, and 
^ advanced, his army increased now to forty thousand men, 
to Kitzingen. Tilly, who had been harassing and pressing 
Bom, on the first information of the King's approach fell back 
kttriedly on Neuburg (on the Danube), and crossing that river, 
jMnbed to the town of Bain (on the Lech), breaking down the 
NifftBB bebind him, two alone, to be hereafter referred to, ex- 
MM* At Bain he was within striking distance of Donanworth. 
^^NlttfQB had marched very closely on the track of Tilly,. 
often in the bed which his opponent had occupied the 
At Weissenburg he had halted to storm the 
Wohborg, on the west slope of the Jura, about 




402 The Battle-fields of Germany. 

a mile from tho tonn, wLicli was held for tlie League. Batasihc 
siege of this stronghold seemed likely to involve a longer delsy 
than he had anticipated, and as he judged it especially EulnBtblf 
to secure Donanworth, not only Ijccause that town was the k« 
into that part of Swabia which leads into Bavaria, hut became it 
would afford him a secure place upon which to fall back in cut 
of a reverse, Guatavus decided to leave Wiilzburg to its fite, 
and to hasten on tu the Danube. He arrivt'd, then, before 
Donauworth on the '26th March. 

Donaiiworth, a small town on the left bank of the Danube, it 
the junctiou of that river with the winding Wornitz, was held ly 
a garrison of about two thousand men, commanded by Bndcdph, 
Duke of Saxe-Lauenhurg. This prince declared that he mHi 
hold the place to the last ; but after sustaitung an attad 
of twenty-four hours duration, seeing no signs of TiD|f^ 
approach, and receiving no communication from that geneti^ 
he cut his way through the Swedish army and escaped. 

During this time Tilly was on the Lech, having his heal- 
quarters at Bain. Ho might undoubtedly have reached Doniii- 
worth, only seven miles distant, in time to enter the plv* 
before it could be stormed. But many considerations iodiHel 
bim to prefer to meet Gustavas on the Lech. At Donamriicft 
he would liave fought with the river in his rear. Defeat irodi 
have meant absolute destruction, whilst the position on ft* 
Lech was very defenniblc, had been carefully studied, and b 
had occupied its strong points. He was aware that hy tti 
marching to the relief of Donauworth he left to GnstaTOl * 
position assunng him an entry into Bavaria. But it «u ttt 
lesser of tho two evils, and be still fondly hoped that he ni^ 
prevent him from taking the second step, without which A> 
first would he comparatively fruitless, by erecting a bante ft 
his further progress on the Lech. j^, 

The Lech, a tributary of the Danube, rises in the B<^B4p|^ 
-where that precipitous mountain towers over the Formaiui*3c 
in the Voralbcrg. Swiftly flowing thence in a uorth-tostdtj 
direction, its turbid waters reach, by a multitude of curros nw 
windings — at a distance of fifty miles — the little town of RiDte- 
Leaving Bente, the valley takes a northerly du-ection, ai 
widening, affords scope for a broader development of the riTA 
.as it flows, still mshing and winding, past the msgni^ 
-Bceneiy which mtevenea between that place and Fussen.' 

* Nmt FOiMii tm tli» flnett npldi in Oennuiy, maH a good waMfoU 
IlkawiM Uw boad-qnutan of a laka eosBtry ol its cm. 



■^ 



The Bank-fields of Germany. 403 

rt distance beyond Fiissen the Lech enters Bavaria, flowing 
I, and until it joins the Danube beyond Eain, almost due 
th. At Bchongau, some twenty miles beyond Fiissen, it 
lins a breadth of over thirty yards, and becomes navigable 

boats. Between that place and Landsberg, the valley 
dually expands, and thence to Augsburg and from Augsburg 
Rain the river courses over an open plain with flat but often 
h banks, its surface covered with many islands. In this 
in, however, the Lech still maintains the character of an 
»ine stream. So irresistible is the rush of its waters that no 
ns can stop them ; they continually overflow the banks, and 
tn, in their midst, large and constantly changing islands of 
ble. The same cause produces astounding differences in the 
adth of the bed of the river, which, whilst it averages about 
;y-four yards, amounts at the confluence with it of the Wer- 
h near Augsburg, to more than nine hundred.* The height 
the water changes too, continually and quickly, whilst the 
iam itself offers sometimes the appearance of a considerable 
ontain torrent, sometimes that of a rapid river. A careful 
dy of all these particulars would give to the defender a con- 
srable advantage over an attacking enemy. Tilly was 
uenced by this consideration when he decided to leave 
oauworth to its fate, and to meet Gustavus on the Lech, 
lo sooner, then, had the general of the League heard of the 

of Donauworth than, anticipating the action which he felt 
lid at once commend itself to the great commander to whom 
was opposed, he broke down the bridge across the Danube 
which his position could have been turned between Bain and 
iburg, and destroyed that over the Lech, close to the former 
n. Occupying then Bain with a portion of his right wing 
I Augsburg with a strong detachment, he distributed the 
mnder of his army at the assailable points between the two 
ees. Small bodies of cavalry were placed at intervals to give 
rning as to the movements of the enemy. The distance 
8 covered was sixteen miles. His army, strengthened by all 

troops which Maximilian of Bavaria, who joined him at 
Ji, had been able to raise, was forty thousand strong. 
3(astavus, immediately after taking Donauworth, had de- 
tched the flower of his dragoons and musketeers to seize th6 
Ige over the Danube between Bain and Neuburg. But, as 
liave seen, they were too late. He then resolved, if possible, 
i^epair the bridge near Bain, over the Lech. But this opera- 

♦ Yide Brockhaus's Conversations-Lexikon, 




KM The Battle-JUlds of Germany. 

tioQ was likewise found to be impracticable. BafBed here, ht 
made, then, a loug and careful reconnaissance, examining ever; 
bend and every peculiarity of the river. But here, too, he ni 
forced to acknowledge the genius of his adversary, for he fonsd 
the enemy's troops posted so as to command every likely poiDl 
A demonstration, which he made as a test, proved that liUf 
was on the alert. Throwing np, then, intrenchments aloig ft 
portion of the left bank, where the river made a sharp brad 
almost in the form of a half-moon, the outer rim of which he 
occupied, ho posted behind those intrenchments a HtroDg de- 
tachment, whilst with the bulk of his army he encamped in lh> 
rear close to the little village of Nordheim. He then erected ia 
the intrencbment three batteries — one on the centre of the hiU- 
moon, the others on the two faces, and armed them with aem^ 
two pieces of caimou. The fact that the left bank of the Le^ 
was hero higher than the right bank, ^ave GnBtavna a nuzfeal 
advantage, and when, on the morning of the let Aiiil, hi 
opened tire, he inflicted great damage on the enemy, who *« 
posted in a wood behind a little ri\-ulet called the Aeh, ul 
effectually prevented thorn from approaching the banke of ttt 
Lech. This cannonade, in which, though it was replied K 
the Swedes had all tlur advantage, contiuned fonr dqi 
Whilst it was progressing, Gustavus was engaged in ^ 
paring, at the little village of Oberndorf, near the place he M 
selected to cross the river, and which was concealfld bvftl 
enemy's view by a decli\ity, on a plan of his own iiira)tkii|i> 
means wherewith to effect that purpose. These 
of strong wooden trestles, of various heights 
feet, which could ix'^t on the bottom of the river 
piles. To facilitate the driving in of these 
several hres to be lighted between the villag* 
and had themo continuously fed with smoky 
fovourable wind blew the smoke thus caused towards 
and completely hid his workmen from their view. 

Having mode everything ready, GoHtavus, vety early OD tk 
morning of Uie fifth day Ithe 5th April), whilst it was s^ ilut 
despatched across the river in two hoats which he bad dudi^ 
to secure, covered by a heavy fire, a thousand picked on 
amongst whom were the most skilled workmen ol luH %B13- 
These speedily made a lodgment, and proceeded furtfawttli tt 
throw up a bridge-head. This work had been corajiktiNl *!■ 
the rising light of the son diseloBed it to Tilly. That gtuoit 
vithoat an instant's delay, bron^t two batteries to 




The BaUle-Jidds of Germany. 405 

at the nature of the ground, which just at that point was 
and swampy, interfered greatly with the efficacy of their 

But this low and swampy land told equally in his favour, 
it lay directly between his own intrenchments and the 
des, and to attack him they must traverse it. To render 
I an attack more hazardous Tilly proceeded to strengthen his 
tion by hewing down large trees to form breast-works, 
ing their branches to be sharpened and pointed near the 
k into a form of chevava defrize. 

eanwhile, under a heavy fire from both sides, the bridge was 
pleted, and about noon was crossed by the advanced guard 
\xe Swedes, led by Colonels Wrangel and Gassion. As other 
ftdes continued to follow the advanced parties, Tilly directed 
ringer to move round the swampy ground, charge with the 
er of his cavalry those who had already crossed, and seize the 
ge-head. Aldringer obeyed the order with great alacrity. 
tamed the marsh, and led hie men with splendid daring 
nst the enemy. But the Swedes, divining his intention, had 
t to form up, and Aldringer, notwithstanding the prowess 
is men, failed to make any impression upon them. Falling 
[, then, for a moment, he rallied his troops, and then charged 
n at their head with splendid courage. In vain, however ; a 
ion-ball grazed the temple of Aldringer, and he was carried 
eless from the field. His men, shaken, and exposed to a 
lendous fire, broke in confusion. Tilly, noticing the catas- 
he, and having no one at hand efficiently to replace 
inger, descended from the wood with a fresh body of 
rans, renewed the attack with indescribable fury, he himself 
dng with all the ardour of a boy. The combat had lasted 
it twenty minutes, and its result was still uncertain, when a 

from a falconet struck him on the knee and shattered the 
). The old general, who had fallen swooning to the ground^ 
at once carried off the field, and his troops, now without a 
Br, gave way. Their retrogade action was hastened by the 
luct of two considerable parties of Finland horse, who, eager 
ftction, swam their horses across the river, and threatened 
kke them in flank. 
f this time the shades of evening were falling. The Swedes 

indeed, secured the passage of the river; but the army 
36 League still held its intrenched position in the wood 
nd the Ach. Gustavus, then, decided to content himselC 

bringing across the remainder of his army, and with 
xtaimng his position on the Bavarian side of the river. 

VOL. Ti. 27 




406 The Baiile-Jields of Germany. 

TiUy, meanwhile, had been carried, with the agony of % 
painful death upon him, to the wood behind the Ach. There, 
during the fight, had remained his old master, the nomiiud 
eommander-in-chief, Marimilian, Elector of Bavaria. To a greit 
general there was still a chance, for the position was strong, lu 
unassailable on the right, and covered in its front by the manhy 
ground.* Under other circumstances Tilly would imdoubtedlj 
have made an effort to defend it. But under the influence of 
excrudaiing pain his spirit had given way, and he ad?i8ed 
Maximilian to save himself as best he could. That same night, 
then, the army of the League evacuated its position, and fell 
back in good order on Neuburg and Ingolstadt. 

Firm now on Bavarian soil, Gustavus took Bain and Neuburg; 
then, sending Horn to follow the remains of the League army to 
Ingolstadt, marched himself with the remainder of his army 
up the Lech to Augsburg. He arrived at Lechhausen, • 
village two miles from the imperial free city, and sepantod 
from it by the Lech, on the 8th April. Its Governor, Colond 
Breda, who held it with four thousand five hundred men, had 
broken down the bridge ; but Gustavus immediately built two 
others, the one above, the other below, the city, and summooed 
it to surrender. Breda, hearing that Tilly was dying, thai 
Aldringer was severely wounded, and that no help was to b^ 
expected from the League army, complied after a decent intenily 
and Gustavus on the following day, April 14th, made » 
triumphal entry into the city, considered then the birthpla^of 
the Beformation,t attended by the titular King of Bohemii^ 
and many other princes of note. 

Leaving a garrison in Augsburg, and enlisting in his own raak^ 
five hxmdred men belonging to the force which he had tbsDX^ 
expelled, Gustavus hastened to retrace his steps along the baokf 
of the Lech to Neuburg, and marched thence to IngoktaJt- 
This town, one of the strongest places in Germany, poeseaaedih* 
virgin reputation. Never had an enemy been able to faroe U^ 
way behind its walls. Not only did it possess a formidaU^ 
garrison, but Tilly himself was there, and the League uttjr 
led now by Maximilian of Bavaria, covered it on tiie norih- 

* *< If I had been the BaTarian " exclaimed Gnstanu when he TiaSted aait V 
the strongly fortified abandoned intrenehment, ** nerer— eren if a eannoB-baD k*^ 
earried away my beard and my ohin — Derer would I ha^e abandoned a f^ 
•mob as this ; never would I have thus opened a way into my own eoaitaT ^ 




Tlia Confeaaion, called the Augabuig Confeaslon, had been 
y. in that atj just above a eentnry before— in the year 158QL 



The BatUe-fidds of Germany. 407 

) than this, Tilly had implored Maximilian to maintain 
to^ni and Batisbon at all hazards. The presence of the 
;oe army forced Gustavus, who appeared before it on the 
April, to confine his efforts to an attack upon its southern 
The following morning, whilst inspecting the outworks, 
King of Sweden met with an adventure which is thus 
ded by one of the chroniclers of the seventeenth cen- 
* ''But all these advantages did not compensate for 
^ht in which the Swedes were thrown the 20th April, 
I they just missed receiving a fatal and irreparable blow ; 
he King, having advanced that day to reconnoitre more 
ly the approaches to the place, mounted, as was his wont, 
I grey hackney, the gunners of Ingolstadt, conceiving that 
^ing extraordinary was taking place, took so good an aim 
a ball carried away the hackney's quarters, and covered the 
; with blood and dust. All his suite were in indescribable 
r at the occurrence, but their fears were immediately 
ged into joy when they saw that the King was unhurt." 
le day following this incident was memorable for two inci- 
3. A cannon-ball carried off the head of Christopher, 
prave of Baden Durlach ; and the veteran Tilly expired. 
I his last breath the old soldier urged upon the Elector two 
p : the first, never to break his alliance with the Emperor ; 
second, to bestow the command of the army upon Crata. 
at officer," he said, '' has courage to serve you, fidelity to 
mt you, and parts to assist you. He will conduct your 
m with reputation, and, as he knows Wallenstein, will 
trse his designs." 

istavus remained eight days'before Ingolstadt; then, finding 
eduction of the place would require time which might be 
I usefully employed, he raised the siege, and hastened 
the bulk of his army, by way of Geisenfeld, to Moosburg. 
ice he detached Horn to take possession of Landshut on 
[sar, forced that place to pay a hundred thousand thalers 
to receive a garrison; then, drawing from it eighteen 
, hastened along by way of Freising to Munich. The 
irian capital surrendered without a blow on the 17th May. 
it Gustavus made a triumphal entry, and availed himself 
le large amount of treasture and stores found there. From 
central point he employed himself, either in person or by 
enerals, in reducing the remaining strong places in Bavaria^ 

• SoUat SvedoU, or HiMtmrt de ce qui s'est pau^ en AUemagtk€ dqnds PmtrSe 
f (fe Sueth m faunae leSO^jiuguM aprkt sa nwrt, Pablishad in 168a 

27 ♦ 



40b The BattU-julds of Germany. 



in sending succours to his generals in the north. He ^vtt it 
length called thence by the movements of Wallenstein. 

Wallenstein, I have said, had concluded his final treaty iRth 
th8 Emperor the 15th April of that year. I have also staled 
that whilst the treaty was negotiating, indeed during DecemlMr 
and the three following months, the agents of the Duke of 
Friedland, who had thoroughly forecast the future, had beea 
engaged in levying troops in his name. It soon appeared that 
that name possessed a power greater than that of the Emperar. 
Fflwm all parts of the Austrian dominions there flocked thoa- 
■ands to his standard, some possibly enticed by the advantagBS 
held out to them, but the greater number drawn thither by a 
desire to renew the ties which had bound them by revereooe 
and affection to so great a commander. When, then, on the 
16th April, the compact was signed, Wallenstein found an amy 
ready to his hand. At the head of this army he entered 
Bohemia, expelled thence with scarcely an effort Amheim and 
the Saxons, and formed a jxmction near Eger with iia^ 
remnants of the army which had been beaten on the Lectin 
and which, after leaving a strong garrison in Batisbon, bad 
marched northwards, through the upper Palatinate, towirf^ 
that frontier town. This junction increased the strength ofbi^ 
army to nearly sixty thousand men. Viewing the situation 
with the eye of a great general, he noted that although OuBta;^^ 
had conquered the whole of Bavaria, and had occupied ^^ 
principal towns and fortresses, yet that his position north ^' 
the river Main was by no means secure ; that whilst the Saxoi^ 
had been removed by his own action from the scene of comb^ 
Pappenheim more than held his own in lower Saxony and ^ 
Westphalia. He perceived, then, that the surest way to for^ 
Gustavus to abandon his hold upon Bavaria was to march o^ 
some important point between him and northern Germany-^ 
point which his enemy would not relinquish, but would 8tr»^ 
every effort to maintain. Gould he draw Gustavus to sucb^^ 
point, he would endeavour to hold him there whilst Bavar^ 
should recover from its alarm, and Pappenheim, reinforo^^ 
should re-establish the Imperial hold on northern Germaia^ 
For this purpose he selected as a point of attack the importa^^ 
city of Nuremburg. 

Wallenstein had recovered Prague the 4th May, had tott^^ 
the Saxons to make a hazardous retreat to Pima on the 80kl^ 

1 effected a junction with the Bavarian army on the U-^ 
e, and he appeared before Nuremberg the SOth of 



The BatUe-Jidds of Germany. 409 

naatit. There he found GnstavuB, with what foree be could 
command, intrenched, and ready to receive him. 

GoatavaB fally recognised the skill of his great opponent. He 
hid, we have seen, occupied Munich on the 17th May, just when 
Wallenstein -was engaged in driving his allies from place to place 
ID Bohemia. His own forces had, from the despatch of Horn to 
(lie Lower Palatinate and other causes, been greatly diminished, 
ud when the jonction of Wallenstein with the Bavarian troops 
DesrEger proved to him that that general had given npthe idea 
which, it was supposed, he had first entertained, of following up 
the Saxone, he had felt certain that he would have to bear the 
tvont of the next movement. Indications not to be doubtetl 
■oon convinced him that Nuremberg would be the point of 
ittack. He coald not but see how very advantageous to the 
hnpetialists would be the possession of that city. For not onfy 
vould the moral effect be enormous, but it would ensure the 
deBtmetion of the allied troops is Swabia, which, under Banna, 
VilUam of Weimar, and Buthven, were then on the march to 
join him. Although, then, he could at the moment dispose 
oty of about seventeen thousand men, he hesitated not for an 
autant, but hurried with all speed to the threatened city. 

GmtaTufl arrived at Nuremberg the Idth June. His appre- 
knnonfi that Wallenstein had immediate designs on the place 
wtrc confirmed by the infomation which there reached him. 
Ihree considerations then forced themselves npon him. The 
Int) how, being as it were in a hostile country, to support bis 
waaji the second, how, his troops numbering fewer by more 
ttu two-thirds than those of Wallenstein, successfully to resist 
*&>ttaek; the third, by what line to direct the generals, who 
wn marching to join him, to advance so as not to be inter- 
Mpted. Ha met all these difficulties in the manner which might 
Imw been expected from one of a generous and manly nature, 
4k> had confidence in the justice of his cause, confidence in the 
Btei which the same belief would induce in others, confidence 
b his Boldiers and in himself. To meet the first difficulty he 
(pealed with open heart to the citizens of Hnremberg ; showed 
D them the neceaaities of the case, and asked them to supply 
■u army with food and money until he should have strengtii 
n meet the enemy in the open plain. In this dread crisis the 
■titena of Nuremberg were true to the eaose they had eapooBed. 
^^y «ntered heart and booI into the plans of Gnstarns, and 
S^Md to all his propoulB. The third diffioolfy was to the 
gdiah ying the most formidablfl, beeauM the eolation of it 



410 The BatUe-Jalda of Germany. 

depended very much upon the action of others. All he conU 
himself do under the circnmHtances was to send messeugen to 
Horn, to Banner, and the other detachments, indicating luB on 
position and the route which he heard from time to tiiu 
Wallenstein was taking, to warn them to avoid, as mnch u 
lay in their power, a decisive conflict with the enemy: hi 
refrained, in a word, from trammelling their action by too pn- 
cise orders. The second he met in a manner which has stamped 
his reputation as a great military commander. 

GustavuBwas at Nuremberg with, at the most, seventeen tbofr 
sand men. Wallenstein was marching on that place from Epr 
with nearly sixty thousand. Were Gustavus to quit NnrenlMit 
and fall back on his several detachments beyond the Mud, ha 
would save his army, be in a position very shortly to affiant 
Wallenstein, but be would sacrifice the free city which hadbea 
the first, south of the Main, to declare in his favour, he maU 
give up conquered Bavaria, and he would deal heavy disooorm^ 
ment, possibly a fatal blow, to the cause of freedom of ooiucifloga 
On the other hand, by remaining to protect Norembeiig, b 
would occupy a position materially and politically strong, woril 
give time to his detachments and partisans to rally, and ntf 
keep Wallenstein at bay until, either he were strong enon^to 
assume the offensive ; or, should he in the end be fbroed to ^ 
his position, he would have given confidence to ProtoW 
Germany by his long retention of it in the face of nrftr . 
superior numbers, and have afforded his lieutenants % raaJW 
vous at a point where a junction was always feasible. 

He set to work, then, without delay, to select and Ibrti^t 
camp which, occupied by his soldiers, would defy Walknileii. 
Bound the city, at a distance of about thirteen hundred jiril 
from it, he dug a ditch, for the most part twelve feet 
and eight deep, in some particular parts eighteen 
and twelve deep. Behind this ditch, at intervals, not 
but varying according to the conformation of the _ 
the points to be guarded, he erected eight diBtinot 
armed them with his heaviest gons. He comifiotoS. 
each other by long and thick earthen parapets, efavngthoirfit 
intervals and wherever required with bastions and htdf mMH^ 
and mounted these also with cannon, of which there were. wbB 
the camp was completed, three hundred pieces in positinDi 
mostly supplied by the city of Nuremberg. The IVguits tntra>- 
uig the oamp, divided it into two not une gaol parti, aad Jay ] 
nnite these, nnmerons bridges were " 



The BaUle-fields of Germany. 411 

whole camp, not including the spaceB allowed for irregular 
anglea, outlines of defence, intrenchmentB, and redoubts, was 
computed to cover two hundred and nineteen square acres. In 
Buch a space, it was comparatively easy to concentrate, Tvithout 
delay, in case of attack, a very large number on the decisive 
point. The whole of these works were designed and completed 
in exactly fourteen days. 

GustavuB had, I have stated, reached Nuremberg on 19th June. 
The works of hia intrenched camp were very far advanced to- 
wards completion when Wallenstein and Maximilian of Bavaria 
appeared before it, the 30tli June, with the full intention of 
attacking it. But the works, though not quite complete, were 
still so formidable, that Wallenstein recognised at once that the 
issue of such an assault would be, at the best, doubtful, and 
made up his mind on tlie spot, in spite of the earnest entreaties 
of Maximilian, to endeavour, in preference, to starve out his 
enemy. When Maximilian pushed his arguments beyond a 
eertaiu limit, Wallenstein offered, in a cold and haughty manner, 
that if the Elector would begin the attack with his Bavarians, he 
would support him with his army. Tliis remark ended the dis- 
cussion, and the plan of starving out was agreed to. 

With this view, Wallenstein took up a position near 2inidorf, 
ftboat two miles south of Fiirth,* upon a low, wooded hill, sur- 
mounted by a fortress, now in ruins, and which gives to the hill 
the name of Alte Yeste. Bound this, and enclosing a tract of 
eoQutiy sufficient to make a circumference of seven miles, ho 
threw up only light defences, surrounding tlie camp with a ditch 
of comparatively small dimensions, and covering it with an 
interlacement of forest trees, baggage waggons, and gabions. 
Behind these he ranged his army, formed into eight divisions, 
each about seven thousand strong. Besides these, the camp 
contained fifteen thousand women, nearly as many carters, 
Botlerfi, and servasts, and thirty thousand horses. 

To support this army and this following Wallenstein had little 
difficulty. He had with him large supplies of grain; the country 
ihebind and on both sides, belonging to the Bishop of Bamberg, 
vae devoted to him; he possessed all the towns and passes in the 
circle of territories which surrounded him, except that little seg- 
ment occupied by Gustavus. He received, likewise, provisions and 
ammunition from Vienna. To make assurance doubly sure, he 
stationed two oonaiderable bodies of troops in the dtoceae of 
Bamberg and the upper Palatinate, and caused hia Croats to 

* I'Urtb I* HTptoilMfromKiiTBmliaK: Walkiwtrin'ii ciimp mi 011I7 thnat 



412 r/« Baltle-Jields of Germany. 

ucoui the country day and night in a cross line from Bainbeig 
to Munich. Id this manner, and by sending daily putiti 
from his own camp to prevent foraging on the p&rt ol the 
enemy, Wallenstein at once increased his own store, and com- 
pelled the Swedes to confine themselves to the resonreet of 
Nuremberg. 

Between the two camps, three miles apart, flowed tfaePep^ 
which, after traversing Uie Swedish camp, formed a sort (rf bow 
in front of it. The waters of this river supplied both umid, 
though the Imperialists were not absolutely dependent upon it, 
for, flowing to the north-west of, and partly through their poo- 
tion, and parallel with the Fegnitz, was the Bedniti, an' 
narrow, unnavigable stream, but still constitutiiig a p 
their camp. 

From these positions, for nearly tliree months, the two irmili 
looked one another in the face : Wallenstein resisting enr 
incitement to attack ; calmly asserting his own suprame poi- 
tion ; not hesitating to lay waste for the support of his srmj tt> 
dominions of Maximilian of Bavaria, always vainly clunom 
for action ; occasionally parading his troops in battle array, pfr 
Yoking his enemy, but not going one step beyond. GiutH4 
on the other hand, eating up the resources of Nuremberg, ean- 
fully watching his enemy, iu the faoiw of a false m or e— < 
which was never made, or of the consequences of a disagnesait 
between Wallenstein and Maximilian which were never mui- 
feated ; now despatc;hing cooriei-a to his detached genezaU, nft 
routes for their guidance carefully marked out by himself J^ 
always leaving them freedom of action • ; reviewing his tittip* 
daily ; endeavouring too, by means of carefu ly planned raid^ li 
intercept, and somistimes succeeding in intercepting, theeosniT^ 
supplies ; devising, for the flrst time, I believe, in mililvj 
history, a scheme for mounted infantry, hy mounting on hoiSB- 
back the men who carried a shorter musket, and who «« 
called " dragoons," and intermingling them with his ^ 
cavalry, so that on an expedition the former could, if nodmuji 
dismount and serve as footmen t ; and doing everytliing tn^ 

* " yoarkiHK,'' it wm hia habit to kdd at ths oloss of tboHe d^ajxtoliM. "aoWf 
dinct bin nbient dinciplsa in general tanns. InddnU will axine wiuekaltn^ 
toreaigbt can prsdctennine. Sdisthe momsnti, match the proffcmd ^palWdl* 
*hioh take birtb and Sight In otw Inrtant I raa^ into vuur faandi (bQ dMi*- 
tianarj pomr; ow it in a manner worthy of m» aad nf jannelrM* Uh^ 
hidaad worth IlTii^f to wrre under meb a oommander I 

t TUa lyetem wai foond Tai; effieaeima In deaUag «ith the CfOnt*, <ita l*^ 
tks looM )if{bl infantiy of the Tmperial aiwitn. 



The Battle-fields of Germany. 413 

power, by a display of his natural gaiety and example, to 
encourage his men. 

It must be admitted that on the Imperial side the courtesies 
of "war were more conspicuously displayed than on the other. 
On one occasion a foraging party led by Colonel Dubatel had 
a